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Note on Citations
THIS BOOK does not contain footnotes. Instead, abbreviated references are
inserted in the text (between square brackets) when a proposition contained in,
or a citation taken from, the work of other authors is used. The full source is
stated in the list of references at the end of this book.
All references are to the number(s) of the page(s) containing the relevant
proposition or citation, except for the references to Dutch case law in
Chapters 6 and 9; such references refer to the number in the relevant case law
reporter (the "Afo/e/7<3«öfce Jamprarfenrte") under which the cited case has
been published.
To illustrate the system of citations: [Manne (1975), 516] refers to:
Manne, H.G., 1975, Our 7Vo Cor/wrafro« Systems. Law one/ £COAIO/W/CS, in:
Idem (ed.). The Economics of Legal Relationships - Readings in the Theory
of Property Rights, page 516.

INTRODUCTION
THE PAST DECADE witnessed a number of collapses and scandals in the world
of big business that hit the global headlines. These included several
spectacular bankruptcies, cases of appalling mismanagement, sometimes
accompanied by fraud, as well as several environmental disasters. Such cases
were not limited to one particular country but occurred at several unconnected
places on the world map. Moreover, they almost invariably involved
companies with a more or less respectable record of previous performance.
As regards widely publicized business collapses and instances of
mismanagement, one may think of, for instance, the failure of the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (nicknamed by some the "Bank of Crooks
and Cocaine International") in 1991, whose principal holding company was
registered in Luxembourg, after more than 5 billion U.S. dollars had
disappeared from the bank's accounts, the fall of Canadian mining company
Bre-X Minerals in 1997, which purported to have discovered an exceptionally
rich gold deposit in the jungle of Kalimantan, Indonesia, at a site which
proved to be primarily composed of mud, the failure of British business bank
Barings in 1995, after top management had allowed a single employee to put
the fate of the entire bank at stake by engaging in high risk futures
transactions in the Singapore stock market, and the collapse of major German
retail group Co-op in 1989, which was accompanied by fraud accusations
against the group's top management amounting to some DEM 100 million.
Widely reported also were instances of fraud in the Japanese Sumitomo
company in 1996, which lost over 2.5 billion U.S. dollars in a copper trading
gamble by a member of its senior staff, and in the Spanish bank Banco
Banesto, which was put under the guardianship of the country's central bank
in 1993 after it had failed to account for an amount approximating several
billions of U.S. dollars and the president of which was subsequently tried in
criminal proceedings following allegations of fraud. Less outrageous, but also
upsetting local public opinion were the failures of the Ogem (real estate
development), RSV (ship building) and Fokker (aircraft construction)
concerns in the Netherlands, the first two of which (in the 1980s) were
reportedly caused in significant part by mismanagement of top managers,
whilst the bankruptcy of aircraft manufacturer Fokker in 1996 has been
attributed to the over-ambition of the company's top management and failure
to adjust to market developments.
Other cases involving big business which caused general public
indignation included the massive mineral oil pollution which resulted when the
Exxon Valdez, a tanker of the Exxon group, ran aground off the coast of
Alaska in March 1989 and the poisoning disaster which had occurred a few
years earlier when toxic gas escaped from a Union Carbide factory nearby
Bhopal, India, which reportedly caused thousands of casualties. To a related
category belong the allegations that tobacco companies such as Philip Morris
and R.J. Reynolds damaged the health of numerous people by putting
cigarettes on the market knowing that they could cause lung disease, without
properly warning the public, and claims directed against Dow Chemical and
Dow Corning for having manufactured and marketed silicone implants, which
allegedly caused injury to hundreds of thousands of women who had such
implants inserted into their bodies. The tobacco and silicone cases have
meanwhile given rise to settlement proposals involving multi-6;7//on U.S.
dollar payments by the industries concerned.
Although the events described above vary in nature and in dimension, they
are united, not only through the public indignation each of them prompted but
also through the fact that in one way or another they produced a substantial
number of victims. Such victims have included in their number investors and
creditors, who sustained losses as a consequence of the collapse or failing
management of the company in question, and third parties (including the
public at large in the Exxon Valdez case), who were harmed as a result of the
company's activities.
Yet the above-mentioned cases are united in one more respect: all cases
involved businesses legally organized as corporations, or as a group of
affiliated corporations. Although in common parlance the word "corporation"
is frequently used as a synonym for company, business enterprise or firm,
strictly it denotes only one of the legal forms in which a business may be
organized. Throughout this book, we will use the term "corporation" in its
legal sense, that is, as a legally endorsed concept for the organization of a
business firm.
In brief, when a business enterprise is legally organized as a corporation it
means (i) that the enterprise is able to have rights and obligations in basically
the same way as an individual (thus, the enterprise has "legal personality"),
(ii) that it can raise funds to finance its operations by the sale of transferable
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shares in its capital, (iii) that the holders of such shares, who are entitled to
the enterprise's profits and to the excess of its assets over liabilities when the
business is dissolved, are not liable for its debts, and (iv) that the management
function is legally separate from the providers of the share capital. (We will
further discuss these features in Chapter 2.) Thus, the corporation embodies
the basic "rules of the game" for the organization of a business enterprise
operating in corporate form.
Is the fact that the companies referred to above were organized according
to the aforesaid corporate principles merely a consequence, or an illustration,
of the corporate form's frequency? Or could there be a relation between the
unfavorable performances of these companies and the fact that they were
dressed up as corporations? These questions, which touch the very heart of
the corporation as a method of organizing a business, refer to the relationship
between the firm, as an economic entity, and the corporate form of
organization. This relationship is examined in this study.
More precisely, we intend to examine whether, and how, the corporate
form of organization relates to the functioning of the firm it organizes. For
this purpose, we will discuss both the economic rationales underlying the
basic legal principles of the corporate concept (as summarized above) and the
behavioral incentives these principles create for the individuals controlling the
organization (/.e. managers and shareholders). Through this exercise, we
endeavor to contribute to a fuller understanding of how the corporate form of
organization may affect the behavior of the firm and its controlling individuals
and in effect, the use that firms operated in this form make of society's
valuable resources.
The Victims
As indicated, apart from the fact that they all concerned firms operated in
corporate form, the cases quoted above have in common that each of them
created victims who sustained injury as a result of the activities of the firm or
the management in question. These victims can be divided into two categories.
The first category consists of shareholders who sustained accounting or
opportunity losses as a consequence of improper or inadequate performance
by the company's management, which resulted in or contributed to the
company's eventual collapse, or which caused large losses to the company.
Shareholders incur "accounting losses" when they lose all or part of their
invested wealth in a particular firm, whilst "opportunity losses" refer to the
forgone returns the shareholders would have earned if management had taken
appropriate action. <
Shareholders are a party internal to the company's organization. They
have agreed to participate in the firm by supplying equity capital to it in
exchange for shares. Moreover, they have agreed to bear the risk of the
company's success or failure: they have accepted that they may lose their
entire invested wealth in the event of bankruptcy and that the value of their
shares as well as the reward they receive for their investment is contingent
upon the success of the business. The shareholders have also agreed that their
invested wealth and their risk be primarily controlled by a specialized
management. However, they have «of agreed that management waste their
capital investment, or that management use their invested money so
ineffectively that the shareholders would have been better off if they had
managed their capital themselves.
The second category of victims consists of parties external to the firm and
includes creditors, tort victims and other members of society not belonging to
one of these classes, who suffered injury as a result of the firm's activities,
including its failure to satisfy contractual obligations or to repair damage
outside the firm resulting from its operations. Such external victims had either
agreed to furnish the firm with certain inputs (money, raw materials,
intermediate goods) on credit, usually in exchange for a fixed return (interest),
or had not agreed to provide inputs to the firm (tort victims, victims of
pollution, casualty or illness attributable to the activities of the firm). Tort
victims, for example, involuntarily supplied "inputs" to the firm by exposing
their health, safety or welfare to its operations. Unlike the shareholders, the
cited external parties have not agreed to bear the risk of the company's
fortune or misfortune. Still, they face losses from the company's failure to
properly pay its debts or to pay compensation for external injury ensuing
from its operations.
When it comes to the causes of the injury sustained by the victims in either
one of the above-mentioned categories, frequently the blame is put on one or
more factors belonging to the same limited range of potential triggers:
mismanagement by the firm's top management, failure by management to
install effective systems for monitoring employee behavior, fraud, failure to
properly respond to developments in product or factor markets, an ineffective,
non-competitive, unsafe or unhealthy organization of productive activity,
business adversities, or disappointing macroeconomic developments.
However, most of the time the corporate form as such appears to be above
suspicion, and would only occasionally seem subject to critical analysis. The
corporation's status of apparent immunity is amazing, not merely because it
furnishes firms with their essential principles of organization but also because
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the corporate form is broadly acknowledged to be the dominant form of
organization among large business firms. The present study may be regarded
as an attempt to focus more closely on the corporate form, its merits and
demerits.
In analyzing the corporate form and its effects, we will distinguish between
its potential relevance to losses sustained by shareholders as a result of
management's behavior on the one hand (which will be discussed in Part II of
this book), and injury sustained by parties external to the corporation
(creditors, tort victims) as a consequence of the activities of the corporate
firm on the other (to be addressed in Part III). Our exercise is limited to the
class of for-profit corporations, as the vast majority of incorporated firms are
operated to earn profits for the shareholders.
Furthermore, with few exceptions, we concentrate on publicly held
corporations given that they organize or control, directly or through
subsidiary corporations, the larger businesses and that they, therefore, tend to
affect large numbers of people (shareholders, employees, creditors and other
parties outside the firm). A publicly held corporation is defined by the fact
that its equity shares ordinarily are owned by numerous dispersed
shareholders and that there is a possibility for active trading in its shares,
either in an organized securities exchange or in an over-the-counter or other
private market. This type of corporation has traditionally been at the focus of
attention in United States state corporation statutes; in the Netherlands, the
other country to whose corporate law we will refer, this type of corporation is
incorporated as a "Mra/w/oze Fi?A7rtootec/7fl/?" under the special chapter on
publicly held corporations in the country's Civil Code. Its counterpart is the
closely held or close corporation, the stock ownership of which is
concentrated among a relatively small number of shareholders and for whose
shares no active trading market exists. When hereinafter referring to
"corporation", we mean publicly held corporation as defined above, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
The Methodology
In this book, we examine the relationship between the corporate form and the
behavior of the firm and the individuals controlling it from the perspective of
microeconomic theory. The use of economic theory and tools of analysis to
understand a legal concept places our study in the line of scholarship known
as "law and economies'". Since both the concept of the corporation and the
firm organized by it are parts of the institutional framework of the modem
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market economy, the object of our study also belongs to the area known as
neoinstitutionalist economics.
Economic analysis distinguishes between empirical and conceptual
analysis. Empirical analysis centers on the use of factual data to explain and
understand a given subject. Conceptual analysis endeavors to examine a given
theme or problem by theoretical analysis based on assumptions, paradigms
and methodological tools generally accepted in economic theory. We apply the
second form of analysis and refer to empirical findings by others only when
such findings clarify economic theory concerning the rationales and effects of
the corporate concept.
Nobel laureate Ronald H. Coase [1993, 360] maintained that "it is
impossible to undertake good empirical work without a theory and difficult to
formulate theories without good empirical work". The same author also
emphasized the importance of theory when he criticized the institutionalist
school in American economic scholarship during the first decades of the
twentieth century, for being "anti-theoretical" and for having produced
"nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory,
or a fire" [Coase (1984), 230]. Taking Coase's exhortation seriously, we will
endeavor to bring together elements relevant to the formulation of an
economic theory of the corporate form of business organization.
When lawyers study a particular case for the purpose of establishing its
legal consequences and implications, they require a full and detailed
understanding of all relevant facts pertaining to that case. Economists, by
contrast, tend to narrowly define the subject or problem they examine and to
confine themselves to analyzing those aspects of the subject or problem which
fall within that definition. They apply the same method when analyzing
matters traditionally belonging to the realm of law. This approach may be less
complete than that of lawyers, but it is indispensable for the purpose of
ascertaining the effects of a given legal rule or concept on behavior patterns
and consequent allocations of resources. Following the economists' approach,
we define a corporation by the four characteristics mentioned earlier (legal
personality, transferable equity shares, limited liability of shareholders and
separation between management and share ownership), which distinguish the
corporation from other legal forms of organization. We acknowledge that this
definition ignores much of the corporate law governing the corporation and
the relationships between the individuals involved in it, but it is not the
corporate /OH- as a branch of law which we are expounding: our focus is on
the corporate form as a method of o/-ga«/za//o/7 of economic activity, and this
form of organization is characterized by the cited features.
Lawyers usually analyze cases on the basis of the facts as they are
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perceived to have occurred. Thus, their starting point is the /ocf, and they
apply rules to facts once occurred. Economists trespassing onto the field of
law, on the other hand, examine the effects of a legal rw/e or concept on
human and organizational behavior. The question then is what facts may
result from or be attributable to a given rule. Thus, their starting point is the
legal rule rather than facts. In other words, whilst lawyers' perspective is ex
/wwf, /.e. after-the-fact, economists tend to proceed from an ex a/?te
perspective [Hoi (1990), 632]. The ex cr/?te perspective enables them to make
predictions and explanations in the abstract concerning a rule's probable
effects. We will examine the effects of the rules that make up the concept of
the corporation (as defined above) in the same manner.
The use of express or implied assumptions is another element common to
economic analysis that is alien to lawyers' traditional methods of analysis
(except for attorneys in criminal trials and for attorneys in civil proceedings
invoking the mythical notion of "the reasonable man"). Economic theories
often involve express or implied assumptions concerning the institutional
structure of the economy and the behavior of individuals and firms. For
instance, much neoclassical economic analysis is based on the assumption
that markets are perfectly competitive. The perfect competition model
assumes that there are numerous buyers and sellers in the market, all of whom
have perfect information on prices and products available, that the products
offered for sale are homogeneous, so that the product of one firm cannot be
distinguished from the competing product offered by another firm, that there
is complete freedom to enter and to exit the market, and that the prevailing
market price is given to all parties in the market. Economists realize that real
markets to a greater or lesser degree differ from this model, but the model still
enables them to analyze the operation of markets and the behavior of
consumers and producers. We will use the economists' technique of making
assumptions as an analytical tool throughout this book.
A common assumption in mainstream neoclassical economics is the
assumption that people are rational utility maximizers. This assumption is
frequently criticized by non-economists, partly, we presume, because its
meaning is not always clearly understood. It does «o/ mean that all human
beings always act perfectly rationally in a psychological sense, or that they
have no regard for other people. Nor does it mean that people are consciously
and systematically exploring markets for goods and services all the time in
search of maximum personal utility. Opponents of the assumption of rational
utility maximization tend to depict the notion's meaning in this incorrect and
rather caricatural way in order to make it appear controversial.
Rational utility maximization assumes solely that, in a world in which total
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resources available are insufficient to meet everybody's wants, people can and
do rank their wants on the basis of evaluations independent of budget
constraints (z'.e. preferences) and make decisions (choices) on the basis of
such preferences and relative prices in the markets facing them, so as to
maximize their total satisfaction (/.<?. utility) from a given budget and a given
range of possible decisions. Maximum utility requires equation of marginal
utilities per dollar spent on disparate goods and services. "Rational utility
maximization" does «o/, however, require that in reality people consciously
act in the manner described; it is only maintained that human behavior can be
understood and explained in that way. The assumption is concerned with the
explanation of the ow/comes of human behavior, not a purportedly accurate
description of mental processes [Ekelund and Tollison (1991), 159]. As a
hypothesis, therefore, rational utility maximization, in our view, is neither far-
fetched nor controversial.
In addition, the test of any economic theory is not in the realism of its
assumptions but in its ability to explain or to predict real world phenomena,
as Friedman [1953] has set forth, and in the theory's internal coherence
including, in particular, logical consistency between the assumptions used and
the conclusions reached. In Friedman's own words [1953, 15], ''the relevant
question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory is not whether they are
descriptively ''realistic", for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently
good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be
answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it
yields sufficiently accurate predictions".
Throughout this book, we assume that the human actors involved in or
affected by the corporate form of organization are rational utility maximizers
in the sense described above. A person's utility function, representing his
preferences based on the utility that he derives or expects to derive from
different goods and services, may include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
components. Wealth is only one source of utility. For instance, a manager of a
firm may prefer both a high salary and a fair amount of leisure. (We will
further discuss managers' utility functions in Chapter 4.) It is difficult to see,
however, how a shareholder, who is not at the same time a manager of the
corporation in which he owns shares, could maximize his utility as a
shareholder other than through maximization of his pecuniary benefit from
owning the shares. Therefore, as for shareholders, but not for managers, we
will equate maximum utility with maximum wealth.
Finally, economic analysis distinguishes between positive - "what is" -
and normative - "what ought to be" - analysis. In /ww/7/ve analysis the
emphasis is on the explanation and prediction of behavior patterns in a given
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institutional environment, and on how such behavior patterns and the given
institutional environment affect the allocation of scarce resources among
alternative ends. Positive analysis also extends to predicting the effects of
potential changes in circumstances relevant to economic agents' choices
between alternative uses of scarce resources, including potential modifications
of the economy's institutional structure. Positive economics is independent of
any particular normative judgment or preconception [Friedman (1953), 4].
./Vormafrve analysis concentrates on changes in the allocation of resources in
order to increase the satisfaction of human wants, given that total resources
are limited, and on developing changes in the institutional framework of the
economy intended for this purpose.
The major part of the economic analysis in this book is positive analysis.
Normative analysis is largely confined to Chapters 5 and 8 (discussing
possible remedies to certain deficiencies that we will associate with the
concept of the corporation).
The Plan
The first part of this book (Chapters 1 through 3) is dedicated to a general
discussion of the economics underlying the corporate form of organization.
An examination of the relationship between the corporate framework and the
business firm it organizes involves two parameters, viz. the corporate form
and the firm. Understanding the relationship between these parameters
requires us to first examine each parameter individually. In Chapter 1,
therefore, we survey economic theories on the nature and rationales of the
business firm. Chapter 2 does the same for the corporation as a method of
organization. We shall see that the corporate form is a product of market
forces as much as the firm it organizes.
Subsequently we examine in some detail what is, as we shall see, the most
peculiar characteristic of the corporate concept: the statutory principle of
limited shareholder liability. Generally the law induces persons entitled to the
fruits of an activity to take into account the effects of that activity on other
people by making them liable for injury imposed on others. Limited liability
for shareholders, however, has the opposite effect: it removes liability from
those entitled to the corporation's profits. Why are shareholders treated
differently, and how does their limited liability fit in with the economic
functions of the corporation as described in Chapter 2? We will seek to
answer these questions in Chapter 3.
Part II of this book (Chapters 4 through 6) deals with the possible impact
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of the corporate form on managerial behavior. Chapter 4 examines the effects
of the separation of the functions of management of the firm and supply of
investment capital, which is inherent in the corporate concept. In particular,
we will review whether this separation provides top managers with the
discretion to sacrifice shareholders" wealth-maximizing interests in favor of
the maximization of managers' personal utility. Having concluded that
managers are likely to have such discretion indeed given imperfections in the
mechanisms that operate to discipline them, Chapter 5 addresses several
potential cures from a theoretical point of view.
Chapter 6 then describes legal remedies, and their consistency with our
economic analysis, which are currently applied under United States corporate
law, having originated from a common law background, and under Dutch
corporate law, as a rather rigid exponent of the civil law tradition on the
European continent. This approach will enable comparison between United
States common law and Dutch civil law solutions and, so, between the
approaches developed from contrasting legal traditions.
Finally, Part III (Chapters 7 through 9) examines whether, and how, the
corporate form of organization and in particular, the limited liability principle,
affects the behavior of the firm itself in relation to parties external to it
(including creditors and tort victims). In Chapter 7, we discuss the effects of
the limited liability rule on other members of society. As we shall see, limited
liability of shareholders may promote activities and behavior patterns on the
part of the firm that are desirable from the shareholders' point of view but
that adversely affect parties outside the firm. Chapter 8 discusses several
potential remedies to this phenomenon from the perspective of economic
theory, whilst Chapter 9 surveys where and when the limited liability pnnciple
is set aside under United States law and under Dutch law to remedy adverse
effects on third parties.
Throughout this book, when referring to United States statute law on
corporations, we refer to the provisions of the Model Business Corporation
Act, which was first promulgated by the Section of Business Law, Committee
on Corporate Laws, of the American Bar Association in 1950 and which had
its most recent complete revision in 1984 (with some later modifications of a
relatively minor nature). The Model Business Corporation Act has served as a
model for many state corporation statutes or parts thereof and has been
influential on corporation statutes enacted by other states. It has now been
adopted more or less in its entirety as a general corporation statute in twenty-
four state jurisdictions, including Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee
and Virginia, whilst other states have adopted selected parts or provisions
from it. Therefore, the Model Act can be safely assumed to reflect the general
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tenor of state corporation statutes in the United States. In addition, according
to the introduction by the Committee on Corporate Laws to the 1984 revised
edition, the Model Act has deliberately been designed so as to reflect "current
views as to the appropriate accommodation of the various commercial and
social interests involved in modern business corporations".
1 . ; , 1 « ^
PARTI
THE CORPORATE FORM OF ORGANIZATION

1. ON BUTTERMILK AND ISLANDS
OF CONSCIOUS POWER
THE LEGAL CONCEPT of the corporation embodies the basic institutional
framework of many business enterprises. It is widely employed to structure an
enterprise according to certain legally endorsed principles of organization,
enshrined in the corporate concept. In essence, the corporation is nothing but
a cocoon enveloping a business enterprise.
A biologist desirous to understand how a cocoon relates to the species it
encloses must know first the characteristics of the species contained in the
cocoon. Likewise, if we desire to find out if and how the corporate framework
relates to the enterprise it enwraps, we need to understand, as a preliminary
matter, what exactly the corporation organizes. Therefore, our inquiry into the
relationship between the concept of the corporation and the business
enterprise organized by it starts with a description of the object of the
corporation, the business enterprise or. as it is commonly called by economic
scholars, the "firm". What defines an "enterprise" or "firm", and what are its
particular advantages causing economic activity to be organized in firms'.'
Economic theory has developed various answers to these questions In this
chapter we survey the most influential contributions.
The Firm - A Production Function
The way in which a '"firm" is defined largely depends on the academic field
from which the definition has emerged.
From a sociological angle, a firm frequently is described as a social
organization. In this approach, emphasis is put on the inter-human
relationships inside the firm and on various aspects of the cooperation
between the human actors whose productive efforts the firm combines
Attention is paid also to the firm's interaction with other social institutions
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and to its place and functions in society as a whole [Vanberg (1982);
Nutzinger(1978)].
In mainstream neoclassical economics, on the other hand, a firm is defined
by its constituent economic activity. Neoclassical economics generally views
the firm as a production function, that means, as a series of inputs from which
output (goods or services) is produced.
A production function summarizes the relationship between a number of
inputs (the factors of production: raw materials, labor and capital) on the one
hand and the maximum amount of output on the other, which can be obtained
from given quantities of these inputs. It indicates how much output can be
produced from different combinations of inputs, given the state of technology
and knowledge. The firm captures this input-output relationship and is, thus,
properly defined as "a set of feasible production plans" [Hart (1989), 1758].
The activities of the neoclassical firm consist of three components, which
together make up the firm: it obtains resources (inputs) from the owners of
production factors, it transforms such inputs into one or more products
(output) by combining different inputs, and it disposes of the resulting output
to parties external to the firm (the product market) [Grossack and Martin
(1973), 13]. Accordingly, a firm has been described as "a vehicle of
organizing an input-output process" [Kwang and Wu (1971), 6] and as "an
input-output system" [Albach (1981), 718]. Based on the same conception,
Stigler [1951, 187] has referred to the firm as "purchasing a series of inputs,
from which it obtains one or more salable products, the quantities of which
are related to the quantities of the inputs by a production function".
The Firm - A Coalition
Neoclassical economists are increasingly inclined to broaden the approach
outlined above and to view a firm not merely as a set of inputs put together
for the purpose of producing goods or services.
It has been suggested, in particular, that the essence of a firm is
cooperative activity, or teamwork, by different resource owners. From this
perspective the firm has been defined as a coo/;7/'on, or a team, consisting of
owners of inputs whose joint efforts produce output, such output being the
product of the inputs collectively rather than the sum of individually created
products by different resource owners [Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Alchian
(1991), 233; Alchian (1993), 367].
The key premise underlying this approach is that there is a gain from
cooperation, which motivates individual input owners to unite their efforts in
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a coalition or team; the latter is termed a "firm". It is maintained that by
cooperating in a firm, inputs are able to enhance their individual
productivities: through teamwork the joint inputs will yield a larger output
than separately used inputs could otherwise achieve [Alchian and Demsetz
(1972); Alchian (1991), 233; Alchian (1993), 367]. Similarly, Arrow [1974,
53] has phrased the principal function of the firm in terms of its ability "to
take advantage of the superior productivity of joint actions". We return to this
point later in this chapter.
If the firm is described as a coalition of jointly producing inputs, generally
it is also assumed that the owner of a resource (a production factor) suited to
serve as an input into a team productive process has certain rights entitling
him to determine how his resource is used, to reap the fruits it yields and to
encash the value others may attach thereto, and to exchange these rights. In
other words, a resource owner has the right to take decisions affecting the
value of his resource, the right to bear the value consequences of the resource
concerned, and the right to alienate these rights. In microeconomic theory, this
bundle of rights is collectively referred to as a "property right" [Alchian
(1977), 129-132; Alchian (1984), 34; Demsetz (1966), 62].
In the theory which approaches a firm as a coalition of cooperative input
owners, it is usually implied that the latter contract among each other about
how their respective inputs are to be combined with other inputs, ;.e. about
the use of their resources in the coalition (the firm). More accurately, the
owners of /?ro/?e/-fy /-/g/zte (as defined above) in resources to be used in the
coalition are deemed to contract among themselves about the exercise of these
rights so as to effect joint production [Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Jensen
and Mecklmg (1976); Alchian (1984)]. Jensen and Meckling [1979, 470]
have argued, therefore, that the very notion that inputs are supplied into a
firm implies "the existence of a system of "rights" in resources".
The view of the firm as a coalition between contracting input owners has
culminated into the thesis that what is called a "firm", is what comes into
being as a result of the contracting process between owners of property rights
in resources.
The Firm - A Nexus of Contracts
Thus, a firm has come to be regarded as a set of contracts among individual
input owners devised to organize joint production [Alchian (1984), 34].
Accordingly, Jensen and Meckling [1976, 310] have concluded: "Contractual
relations are the essence of the firm". Such contractual relations emerge
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because each contracting input owner expects to be better off by cooperating
with others in a firm than by working on an individual basis. A firm, then,
connects various contracts between input owners and by doing so, it serves as
"a nexMsyör con/racftHg A-e/a//OA7.s/j//w" [Jensen and Meckling (1976), 311;
emphasis by the authors].
Within the firm, all contracting individuals are deemed to be motivated by
their personal self-interests and the behavior of the firm, including the output
it produces, will therefore reflect the equilibrium emerging from such
individual self-interests [Jensen (1983), 327].
In brief, by the above-mentioned theory, a "firm" is the place where
contracts between input owners come together. The contracts which make up
the firm cover "the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way
receipts from outputs are shared among inputs", as Fama [1980, 290] has
explained. It is not always understood, especially by lawyers, however, that
the "nexus of contracts" concept of the firm does not exclusively refer to
contracts in a strictly legal context.
The term "contract" has different connotations in law and economics,
respectively [Gordon (1989), 1549; Hart (1989), 1764 fir 30). A lawyer tends
to define a contract according to the rules of contract formation specified in
the relevant contract law. As a rule, therefore, he is inclined to think more
formally of what constitutes a contract than an economist would tend to do.
Traditionally, to a lawyer a contract is essentially made up of one or more
promises, enforceable by law and ordinarily based on an offer made by one
party followed by its acceptance by another party. Williston's definition
stated long ago is still the core of many lawyers" thinking about what
constitutes a contract. "A contract is a promise, or set of promises, to which
the law attaches legal obligation" [Williston (1927), 1]. Similarly, Section 1
of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a
contract as "a promise or the set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty".
From a legal angle, the distinguishing mark of a contract is the creation of
one or more legally enforceable rights, founded on such promises, to another
party's conduct in the future [Pollock (1946), 1]. One party's r/g/tf to a
particular performance is mirrored in another party's o6//gafto/7 to act
accordingly. The legal notion of contract requires that the rights and
obligations between the contracting parties be "specified and fixed by their
own voluntary and actual agreement", as Clark [1985, 60] has stated.
To an economist, on the other hand, a contract is rather a manner to denote
an arrangement characterized by reciprocal expectations and behavior,
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directed toward and induced by a common interest in the realization of a
mutual benefit [Gordon (1989), 1549; Hart (1989), 1764 fh. 30]. Unlike the
lawyer, the economist does not focus on the legal requirements with regard to
contract formation. In his view a contract is simply where supply and demand
meet.
From an economist's point of view, spirit rather than letter (legal rules)
determines whether there is a contract [Williamson (1993), 45], His emphasis
is not so much on legally enforceable /?ro/w/.se.s but on a mutually understood
joint /«/eres/ and on reciprocal ex/?ecfcmo/tt that each contracting party will
behave according to a particular course of action beneficial to the other party.
Economists tend to assume that in a "contract" such a common interest and
such expectations are reflected in one or more commitments about future
action, in this rather informal way [Alchian (1993), 368].
In the definition of the firm as a "nexus of contracts", a contract should be
conceived of in accordance with the above-mentioned economic concept rather
than in strictly legal terms. Therefore, when a firm is said to be "a nexus for a
complex set of contracts among individuals" [Jensen and Meckling (1979),
470], this description primarily points to the premise that the individuals
involved have a mutually understood common interest in and reciprocal
expectations about bringing together inputs for the purpose of jointly
producing output, which are deemed to be reflected in a set of (more or less
informal) commitments about collective action made for this purpose. Such
commitments may be formalized through binding contracts in a legal sense,
but they do not need to. Thus, the firm as a "nexus of contracts" may include
both "implicit" (/.e. legally unenforceable) and "explicit" (/.e. legally
enforceable) contracts.
Furthermore, it should be noted that economists, as well as lawyers, often
distinguish between two types of contracts. A spo/ co/tfrac/ (or c/zscrete
coH/racr) refers to a single exchange, that is, a transaction by which a
resource is traded outright or by which a service is provided on one occasion,
usually in exchange for money, or in exchange for some other resource or
service (in barter transactions). A spot contract, by definition, is a short-term
contract.
A re/a/vo/ra/ cort/rac/, on the other hand, refers to a relationship by which
parties engage in cooperative action for an agreed purpose. It does not refer to
cooperation to bring about a single exchange, or a series of such exchanges,
but to some longer lasting cooperative action [Macneil (1981); Macneil
(1985); Williamson (1986), 104-105]. The emphasis here is on continuity of
the parties' cooperation. A relational contract, therefore, refers to an intended
long-term relationship. In the "nexus of contracts" definition of the firm, the
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term "contracts" is to be understood as primarily including relational
contracts. The "nexus of contracts" concept assumes a set of /•e/fl//o«s/7//w
between resource owners cooperating for the purpose of jointly producing
output, rather than a series of separate spot contracts.
The "nexus of contracts" approach is complementary to the definition of a
firm as a series of inputs from which output is obtained, /.e. the firm as a
production function. It extends the production function concept by indicating
w/tttf brings such inputs together so as to produce output: a set of implicit and
explicit contracts between owners of property rights in resources.
The extent and nature of the output a firm can produce depend on the
nature and substance of these rights and contracts. Hence, the composition of
the firm's production function and, so, the production opportunities available
to it depend on the rights input owners have and on the terms of the contracts
among them [Jensen and Meckling (1979), 470]. Otherwise said, the
production function the firm embodies is itself a function of the rights of input
owners and the contracts between them, and this insight is what the "nexus of
contracts" theory adds to the description of the firm as a production function.
The "nexus of contracts" concept emphasizes the essentially contractual
nature of the firm, the term "contractual" being used in the sense discussed
above. The firm's contractual nature is relevant to our question of how the
corporate structure may relate to the operation of the firm, given that the set
of contracts from which a firm emanates may also determine its
organizational structure and provide incentives to the individuals in the firm
to engage in particular courses of conduct. In Chapter 2 we will examine the
particular contractual arrangements represented in the organizational concept
of the corporation.
The Firm - An Alternative to the Market
The "nexus of contracts" concept of the firm has emerged largely in reaction
to another theory in which the firm is approached as an alternative to a series
of market exchange transactions (spot contracts) [Jensen and Meckling
(1976), 310]. The starting point in the latter theory is the observation that
there is a paradox between the existence of firms and standard (neo)classical
theory of how the economic system of a market economy works.
(Neo)classical economics teaches that the market mechanism, meaning
exchange transactions directed by relative prices, coordinates economic
activity by directing scarce resources to their highest valued uses. It does so
by permitting owners of property rights in resources to trade freely at
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whatever prices they agree. The operation of the market mechanism is
illustrated by the following example.
If B, desiring to use a resource x for a particular purpose, attaches a
higher value to x than the value of x to its current owner A and to other
market participants, resource owner A would increase his wealth by selling x
to B. Such a transaction would make each of A and B better off, since A
would only sell at a price exceeding the value of x to A and since it would
only make sense for B to purchase x if B's expected benefit from x outweighs
its price.
In sum, for both A and B there is a potential gain from trade, being the
difference between the transaction price and the utility each of them attaches
to x. To obtain this gain A and B, conceived of as utility maximizing
individuals, will enter into a transaction as described. As a result, resource x
will flow from a place where it is valued comparatively low to a higher valued
use.
Relative prices emerging in the market indicate a resource's market value
in relation to the value of other resources. A resource's relative price is
determined by the availability of and demand for that resource relative to the
availability of and demand for other resources. Relative prices prevailing in
the market together with personal preferences - a person's evaluations
independent of price and budget considerations - reveal to individual
participants in the market potential gains from trade. Utility, or wealth,
maximizing participants buy and sell to obtain such gains, like A and B in our
example. In this manner the "invisible hand" of the market mechanism [Smith
(1981; orig. 1776), 456] directs resources to their highest value in use.
The market mechanism can, and to a large extent does, in the same way
serve to allocate factors of production to their highest valued uses. If in the
above example x is substituted by, for example, labor, the example
demonstrates that it would be beneficial to both A and B if A would sell his
labor to B.
Acquiring A's labor could be beneficial to B, for instance, if B would be
able to use A's labor to operate a machine in order to manufacture a product
y. Suppose that C would be willing to purchase y from B at a price which
exceeds the costs to B of obtaining A's labor as well as the operating costs of
B's machine. In these circumstances, B will increase his wealth if he hires A's
labor to manufacture y and if he subsequently sells y to C. If more people like
C show up, B may further increase his wealth if he hires more labor (and
perhaps more machines) to raise the production of y (until B's marginal cost
and marginal revenue from manufacturing an additional unit of y become
equal). In this way the market mechanism serves to direct inputs into
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products.
a firm, however, the use of inputs is typically «or governed by
market exchange transactions directed by relative prices. In our example, B
acquires A's labor with a view to having A operate a machine, but how
exactly A is to perform once hired will depend onB's directives. Within the
firm it is not exchange transactions between A and B of the kind described
above which determine how A's labor is used, but B's instructions. In
Arrow's words [1970, 140], within the firm "the price system, which the
economist tends to regard as essential to the rational allocation of resources,
is not used (...) at all".
The different manner in which w/Y/i/n a firm the use of resources is
determined, is what distinguishes a firm from the allocative system of the
market. In a firm normally the "visible hand of management" [Chandler
(1977), 1] coordinates the allocation of production factors among alternative
ends. It is the firm's management which decides to which production
opportunity set available to the firm resources (for example, workers) shall be
dedicated, that means, where on its production function the firm shall
produce.
As described, (neo)classical economic theory tells us that the market
mechanism directs the use of resources by means of bilateral transactions
between resource owners, the buying and selling decisions of market
participants being made on the basis of relative prices. However, within firms
there are "intra-firm coordinators" (commonly referred to as entrepreneurs or
managers) who allocate production factors between different uses, in place of
exchange transactions among resource owners acting across the market. In
effect, the firm constitutes an alternative mode of coordinating economic
activity.
This fundamental insight has been set forth by Coase in his seminal paper
on "The Nature of the Firm" [1937], pointing out that organizing economic
activity in a firm is an alternative to using the market mechanism. In his own
words, firm and market are "alternative methods of coordinating production"
[Coase (1937), 388].
The Firm - An Allocative System
makes up the alternative coordinating mechanism within a firm has not,
however, been defined without ambiguity.
Coase [1937. 388] has stated that within a firm market transactions are
substituted by an "entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production". In his
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view, within a firm the orders of such an "entrepreneur-coordinator"
determine the use of resources, including the tasks that workers are to
perform. In a firm the market mechanism is superseded and it is
entrepreneurial authority that takes its place, so Coase maintains. Judging
from the popularity which the association of the firm with such
entrepreneurial "supervision" over productive activity meanwhile has
achieved, Cohen [1979, 589] has concluded that "the presence of supervision
[is] perhaps the most commonly ascribed characteristic of firms".
On the basis of Coase's insight, others have proceeded to describe the
intra-firm allocation of resources as a "hierarchy", suggesting that the mark
of a firm is a system of superiors and subordinates, the former instructing the
latter on how to employ productive resources. In this approach, the use of
resources within a firm is determined by the hierarchy in the firm, which
selects its appropriate production plan. The opposite of the hierarchy in the
firm, then, is everybody's freedom to engage or not to engage in a transaction,
which is characteristic of the market [Williamson (1973); (1975)]. Coase has
meanwhile explained that his term "entrepreneur-co-ordinator" is to be
understood as a catch-all term referring to all hierarchy in a firm replacing the
market mechanism, viz. "the hierarchy in a business which directs resources
and includes not only management but also foremen and many workmen"
[1988b, 31]
The "hierarchy" or "entrepreneur" concept suggests that within a firm
there is an authority (or a hierarchical system of authority) which has some
rather autocratic power to instruct and to discipline others, so as to direct the
use of resources. This perception has been challenged by Alchian and
Demsetz [1972]. They have explained the firm's internal allocative system
from the perspective of the contractual nature of the firm previously
discussed.
In their view, an intra-firm coordinator has no superior authoritarian
power at all to instruct and to discipline inputs. Approaching a firm as a set
of contracts among diverse cooperating input owners, they argue that his
position is that of a "ce/7/ra/ co«/rac/Mtf/ oge/?/ ;n o /ea/w /?rodwc7/ve /?roce.s.s"
[Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 778; emphasis by the authors]: he is conceived
of as a party common to the various contracts between input owners from
which the firm has emerged.
To direct resources within the firm and to discipline cooperating inputs,
Alchian and Demsetz assume that this "central contractual agent" continually
renegotiates with individual input owners about the use of the resources they
supply, that means, about the contractual terms governing their cooperation in
the firm. Thus, when a manager allocates a production factor (for example, a
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worker) to a different use (task), according to Alchian and Demsetz this
means that the terms of the contractual relationship between the resource
owner (the worker) concerned and other participating input owners are
adjusted through the manager as their common agent. No managerial
commanc/ is involved.
The process of renegotiating the various contracts among input owners
that constitute the firm does not require every individual input owner's
consent to every contractual change. In order to enable him to enhance joint
productivity, Alchian and Demsetz assume that input owners bestow on the
firm's central agent the right to revise contract terms of individual input
owners independently of contracts with other inputs, that is, without having to
terminate or alter every other input's contract.
In principle, so Alchian and Demsetz maintain, this process of
renegotiating contractual relationships among input owners does not differ
from contracting across the market, except that within a firm renegotiations
and contract adjustments take place through a specialized central agent and
not through bilateral negotiations like in the ordinary market. They have,
therefore, called a firm a "specialized surrogate" of the market, and "a
privately owned market" of input owners for team use of inputs [1972, 793,
795].
The Firm - A Market?
The Alchian-Demsetz analysis summarized above does not, however, refute
Coase's basic proposition that the allocative system of the firm is different
from the allocation of resources by means of bilateral exchange transactions
across the market.
They may have termed it a "surrogate market", but the continuous
renegotiation through a common agent of contracting relationships among
input owners, which in the Alchian-Demsetz hypothesis marks a firm, is not
equal to carrying out transactions via the market. Within a firm, the ordinary
market mechanism consisting in exchange transactions directed by relative
prices, does not operate. Coase [1937, 389] therefore concluded, "the
distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism".
Alchian and Demsetz assume that the contractual relationships between
cooperating input owners in a firm do not materially differ from contracting in
the market place. While agreeing to the firm's contractual nature, Cheung
[1983], by contrast, has argued that within a firm market exchange
transactions have been replaced by another type of contract. A firm, he states,
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should be conceived of as "a way to organize activities under contractual
arrangements that differ from those of ordinary product markets" [1983, 3].
In a market exchange contract a resource is usually traded outright, in its
entirety, or, more accurately, the entire property right in a resource is
transferred. In a firm, Cheung [1983, 10] argues, this type of contract is
substituted by a contract by which an input owner transfers only a delimited
bundle of rights to use his input (referred to as a "limited set of use rights"
[1983, 3]). By such a contract, the input owner entitles the acquirer of these
rights to allocate his input, largely at the latter's discretion, in exchange for
future income. Therefore, within the firm no further transactions are needed to
direct resources between alternative uses. Although in Cheung's opinion
[1983, 10] the point is not that a firm supersedes the market mechanism but
that in a firm bilateral exchange contracts are superseded by another type of
contract, his conclusion is similar to the observation made by Coase [1937,
391].
Jensen and Meckling [1976, 310-311; 1979, 470] suggest that the set of
contracting relationships which constitutes a firm, does not merely include
contracts among cooperative input owners but also contracts with consumers.
The insight that the firm differs from the market in that within a firm the
allocation of resources is not governed by the ordinary market mechanism,
implies that this thesis is conceptually incorrect.
As far as contracts with consumers are concerned, these are transactions
between parties that trade in the market. The firm, or the joint input owners,
enters into such contracts as a participant in the output market and so do
consumers. On the premise that the activities inside the firm are not directed
by the market mechanism, in our view contracts between the firm, or the joint
input owners, and consumers, which «re directed by the market mechanism,
fall outside the allocative system established by the firm.
Such contracts belong to the domain of the market as they are no different
from other bilateral exchange transactions between parties transacting across
markets. They deal with the distribution of the firm's output and not with the
allocation of resources into products. The allocative system of the firm, by
contrast, deals with the allocation of production factors into output, the latter
being disposed of through the market, and thus comprises contracts among
resource owners only.
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The Specialization Argument M
Since the market mechanism serves to allocate resources between different
uses and since in that way it is technically able to direct factors of production
into output, one may be tempted to ask: why have firms emerged at all? Why
do we, apart from exchange transactions coordinated by relative prices
directing scarce resources into their highest value in use, observe firms within
which the ordinary market mechanism does not function? Why have firms
come into existence, as "islands of conscious power in this ocean of
unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk", as Robertson [1923, 85], quoted by Coase [1937, 388], has
posed the question?
It has been asserted that neoclassical theory has "failed to provide a full
rationale for the firm's role in the economic system" [McNulty (1984), 245].
Similarly, Boulding [1960, 1] has stated that in neoclassical economics the
firm remains "a shadowy entity (...) and most of the problems which are
connected with it simply do not arise". The relative lack of interest in
neoclassical economic theory in the role of firms ensues from the fact that in
the theory's dominant perfect competition model, which was briefly described
in the Introduction to this book, the existence and operation of firms is simply
taken for granted. In that model, all production is assumed to occur in firms
as opposed to consumption, which occurs in households. Firms produce goods
and services for exchange in the market, with market prices dictating the use
firms make of productive resources, assuming a given level of technology and
knowledge.
Demsetz [1997, 426-428] has made it clear that in conventional
neoclassical theory the relevant distinction is not between the firm and the
market, but between production for the market, /.e. for sale to others, which is
done by firms, on the one hand and production for oneself, /.e. self-
sufficiency, which is «of regarded as production by a firm and which is
excluded from the perfect competition model, on the other hand. Market and
firm then are complementary concepts, not potential substitutes, given that
firms need markets to sell output and to acquire inputs. The Coasian
distinction between managerial (entrepreneurial, hierarchical) coordination
within firms and coordination of productive activity by the price mechanism,
is not made. Yet it is this seco/W distinction which brings into question the
matter of the firm's origins and determinants.
However, as we elaborate below, various explanations of the emergence of
firms have been advanced. Each of them endeavors to demonstrate that
organizing productive activity in a firm has certain advantages peculiar to this
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form of economic organization which are responsible for the firm's
emergence. What, therefore, are the merits of organizing production in a firm
which may account for its existence?
Although the classical economists, too, have been accused of having failed
to develop a plausible explanation of the emergence of firms [Blaug (1958),
226], Adam Smith [1981] did take a first step towards the formulation of an
explanatory theory of the firm. He associated the existence of firms with
cooperation between owners of production factors to accomplish production
on a large scale, which in turn enabled specialization of production factors in
different activities.
Illustrated by his famous pin manufacturing example [1981, 14-15], Smith
noted that if production takes place on a sufficiently large scale, factors of
production can become specialized in different tasks, thereby improving their
dexterity and productivity through increased experience in a particular
activity. Specialization also enables workers to save time in passing between
different tasks and it fosters invention by concentrating workers' minds on a
single activity, so Smith observed. Consequently, specialization increases the
amount of output which can be obtained from a given level of input of
production factors, and concurrently enables production to take place at a
lower cost per unit of output than if production were in small volumes and
unspecialized.
Briefly, through specialization of labor and equipment, large-scale
production results in productivity advances and consequent reductions in unit
production costs. In Smith's description of how the economy works, firms
emerge to take advantage of such <?co/?o/w/e.y o/sca/e. In his theory, they are
vehicles facilitating the production of large quantities of output by specialized
equipment and specialized workers. It is Smith's reasoning that has caused
specialization to become regarded as "a fundamental principle of economic
organization" [Stigler (1951), 193].
The Division of Risks Argument
A second explanation of the origin of firms has been developed by Frank
Knight [1921]. His theory of the firm also hinges on specialization, but in a
different way to the way in which Smith construed it. Smith thought of
specialization in technical terms, ;.e. specialization in different parts of the
production process and in different technical skills. Knight, however, centers
on specialization in the assessment of the r/.s&s to which economic activity is
inherently subject.
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He argues that such risks inevitably result from the existence of
uncertainty, particularly with regard to the future development of technology
and knowledge, future demand for outputs, availability of production factors,
price fluctuations in output and factor markets and so on. According to
Knight, business ventures are affected by a large degree of uncertainty, as
various contingencies influence their success or failure. Consequently, there is
ordinarily substantial risk involved in putting resources together in order to
produce and market goods or services.
Knight submits that some people are better able to assess such business
risks than others. They have "greater ability to forecast the future and greater
power to control the course of events" [1921, 265]. Because of their superior
ability to appraise risks, these individuals have an advantage over others in
organizing productive activity. Therefore, they will both specialize in ''risk-
taking or uncertainty bearing" [1942, 129] and organize production. To
organize production, they acquire labor and other inputs from third parties
and as risk-takers they earn the profits (the excess of earnings over costs) and
suffer the losses arising from productive activities. Knight refers to these
people as "entrepreneurs".
Others who are less able and, hence, less willing to take risks, will furnish
productive services to the former in exchange for a fixed remuneration. They
agree to carry out the entrepreneur's instructions, while in return he provides
them with security of income. Those who dislike risk will become employees.
By submitting to the directives of an entrepreneur in exchange for a fixed
remuneration, they shift business risks to the latter and are relieved of
uncertainty. In Knight's view, firms come into being as a result of this
shifting of risks to entrepreneurs who direct economic activity.
If there were no uncertainty, according to Knight, firms simply would not
arise. If uncertainty were absent, every individual would have "perfect
knowledge of the situation", so that there would be no need for specialists in
risk assessment to assume control of productive activity. In effect, Knight
asserts, in the absence of uncertainty the "flow of raw materials and
productive services to the consumer would be entirely automatic" [1921,
267].
Knight's entrepreneurial concept comprises two functions [1921, 271].
First, the entrepreneur bears the res/?orts/A/7/(}' for the success or failure of
business operations. If a venture becomes a success, he will reap its profits; if
it becomes a failure, he will suffer the losses. Second, he has co«/ro/ of the
use of resources in the firm. He decides in which way resources shall be
allocated and which activities workers are to perform. In summary, the
entrepreneur is a specialist in both risk-taking and "leadership or economic
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pioneering" [1942, 128]. In the latter capacity his primary task is "to initiate
useful changes or innovations" [1942, 128]. The firm emerges as a
consequence of this dual specialization.
Thus, along with the separation between risk-taking and risk-avoidance
Knight noticed the separation between c//>ec?/on and execM//on. Risk-taking
individuals direct economic activity and bear the wealth effects of the various
contingencies that affect business operations. Risk-avoiding people execute
the directives of the former. Knight regards such separation between direction
(leadership) and execution as the "most important differentiation in function,
or division of labor, between individuals" [1951, 17].
From his observation that firms place specialists in leadership in the
position to direct economic activity, he concludes that "undoubtedly the
largest single source of the increased efficiency through organization results
from having work planned and directed by the exceptionally capable
individuals, while the mass of people follow instructions" [1951, 17].
The Transaction Costs Argument
Ronald Coase [1937] has given a third reason for the emergence of firms.
Coase does not deny the productivity advances that Smith associated with
specialization. Nor does he object to Knight's assertion that some people have
superior abilities to assess business risks. He does claim, however, that
neither argument provides a sufficient and convincing explanation for the
existence of firms.
Coase's explanatory theory of the firm starts with a reference to the ability
of the market mechanism to coordinate the use of productive resources. To
comprehend his reasoning, we must revert briefly to the working of the market
mechanism. As we saw earlier, in a market economy people enter into
transactions on the basis of relative prices in order to obtain gains from trade.
Gains from trade arise mainly where people specialize in different activities;
trade is to a large degree the counterpart of specialization. If a person
specializes in producing a particular good or service that he sells on the
market, he can use the revenues to purchase other goods and services. In this
way he will be able to satisfy his wants to a greater extent than if he were to
attempt to produce everything he desires by himself.
Market prices induce individuals to specialize in a particular activity,
according to comparative advantage. Suppose that A could earn USD 6 per
hour as an unskilled laborer. Suppose also that the market price for
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interpreting services is USD 12 per hour and that A has a gift for languages.
In .these circumstances, A would maximize his revenues if he would specialize
as an interpreter. People, and production factors in general, have different
qualities. A utility maximizing individual may seek to maximize revenue by-
specializing in an activity in which he has an advantage over other people. By
specializing in an activity in which he has such a comparative advantage
(more accurately, an activity in which his comparative advantage over other
people is greatest), he will maximize his revenues, which he can subsequently
exchange for other goods and services to satisfy his desires. All of this is
elementary economic theory.
As people can and do trade and as market prices induce individuals to
specialize in activities in which they have a comparative advantage,
technically an institution such as the firm is not required to bring about the
advantages connected with specialization. People specializing in different
activities could simply trade the results of their specialized productive efforts
through the market, which would make resources flow to their highest value
in use. This is the starting point in Coase's argument
For instance, a specialist in a particular part of a production process could
sell his output, as an intermediate good, to a specialist in the next stage and so
on. Hence, Smith's pin manufacturing could, in principle, be organized by
means of market transactions between specialists in different parts of the pin
making process.
Coase [1937, 398] argues that there is no need for a special "integrating
force" to organize and control specialized production (as had been suggested
by Dobb [1928, 10]), given that such a force already exists in the form of the
market mechanism which directs the use of resources, including people's
productive efforts. Because of the coordinating function of the market
mechanism, Coase contends that "'there is no reason to suppose that
specialization must lead to chaos" [1937, 398].
Also, Knight's specialists in the assessment of business risks could sell
their superior judgment on the market as advice, for instance, to those
interested to know how demand for a particular good or service is likely to
develop. There is no need for them to engage actively in organizing productive
processes [Coase (1937), 400]. From these observations Coase concludes that
specialization /?er se is not a satisfactory explanation for the existence of
firms.
As described, in Coase's view a firm is an alternative to organizing
economic activity by means of exchange transactions across the market; firm
and market are regarded as alternative means of economic organization
[1937, 388]. A firm, he maintains, consists of "the system of relationships
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which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur"' instead of market transactions [1937, 393]. Coase proceeds to
explain why one coordinating mechanism (the entrepreneur) is substituted for
another one (the market mechanism). His answer is that firms arise because
there is a cost of using the market mechanism, viz. the costs of carrying out
transactions in the market. Organizing production in a firm serves to avoid
these costs [1937, 392; 1988c, 40; 1992, 715]. If the costs of carrying out
market transactions were zero, in Coase's view firms would have no purpose
[1988c, 34] and would therefore simply not exist.
In his 1937 paper, Coase was not very explicit about what he meant by the
costs of using the market, although he did give some indications. First,
transacting in the market involves the cost of "discovering what the relevant
prices are" [1937, 390]. Second, there are costs of negotiating and specifying
exchange contracts [1937, 391]. Coase later clarified that "to carry out a
market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal
with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being
observed, and so on" [1960, 15; 1988d, 6].
The costs of carrying out market transactions have come to be known as
/ramacf/ort ccwte. "Transaction costs" is a catch-all term referring to a«y
costs that people considering to engage in and to implement a transaction
across a market have to incur, apart from the contract price of the good or
service which is the subject of the transaction concerned and apart from the
production costs of the particular good or service. Accordingly, transaction
costs have been interpreted as the costs of "a^y activity undertaken to use the
price system" [Demsetz (1997), 426; emphasis by the author]. They are the
costs of bringing buyers and sellers together and of organizing and enforcing
exchange transactions.
Stephen [1988, 31] has defined transaction costs as "the cost of finding
transactors, negotiating the transaction and policing and enforcing its terms".
Similar definitions have been given, /«ter o//o, by Dahlman [1979, 152] and
Polinsky [1983, 12]. Other commentators have referred to such costs as the
"costs of running the economic system" [Arrow (1969), 48] and as the
"economic equivalent of friction in physical systems" [Williamson (1985),
19].
By organizing economic activity in a firm, transactions are taken out of the
market place and shifted into a firm. Coase argues that within a firm,
transaction costs are saved by allowing some authority to direct the use of
resources through instructions [1937, 392]. The direction of resources by
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such an authority, the "entrepreneur-co-ordinator" previously referred to, is
held to avoid transaction costs as it avoids transactions between individual
resource owners.
Within the firm cooperating factors of production do not have to incur the
cost of identifying parties with whom they could transact, or the cost of
negotiating and enforcing contracts for separate contributions to the
production process. This is because within the firm, such a series of separate
transactions is substituted by one contract, viz. an employment contract under
which a production factor agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur
within the limits of the employment contract in exchange for a certain
remuneration [1937, 391]. As Coase [1960, 16] stated in a later paper,
"within the firm individual bargains between the various cooperating factors
of production are eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an
administrative decision".
In Coase's theory, the firm emerges to economize on transaction costs. It
arises when it is possible to organize an activity within a firm at less cost than
would be incurred if the same activity were organized through market
transactions [1988b, 19; 1988d, 7]. In other words, a firm exists if it is able
to allocate resources at a lower cost than the cost of allocation by means of
the market mechanism. How an activity is organized, through the market or in
a firm, depends on a comparison of the costs of organizing the activity within
a firm with the costs of carrying out market transactions [1988a, 17; 1988b,
32].
If, for instance, Smith's pin manufacturing process were to be organized
by the market mechanism, a large number of separate transactions would
have to be negotiated between specialists in various parts of the pin
production process. Or imagine the number of transactions that would need to
be concluded in order to manufacture an automobile if market transactions
were used to organize production. In such instances, the amount of
transaction costs incurred by using the market mechanism would
unquestionably be enormous. Substituting a series of market transactions by
entrepreneurial direction, in other words, organizing production in a firm,
serves to save such transaction costs.
In conclusion, Coase argues that production will be organized in a firm
"until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become
equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an
exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm"
[1937, 395]. Thus, the boundaries of firms are not regarded as technologically
determined [Williamson (1985), 4], but a firm will tend to extend its activities
as long as its organizational costs are less than "the costs of achieving the
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same result by market transactions or by means of operations within some
other firm" [1988c, 47; 1988c, 38],
The Team Production Argument
A fourth explanation of the firm has been advanced by Alchian and Demsetz
[1972]. They do not reject Coase's proposition that economic activity is
organized in a firm when this method of organization serves to economize on
the costs of carrying out exchange transactions across markets. However,
they do criticize Coase for failure to identify the factors which determine
wAen the cost of organizing economic activity in a firm is low relative to the
cost of carrying out market transactions [1972, 783-784].
The market mechanism operates at a cost but there is also a cost
accompanying the allocation of resources within a firm. Alchian and Demsetz
submit that Coase did not explain when the cost of directing resources within
a firm would be less than the cost of using market transactions. In a similar
criticism, Williamson [1975, 3; 1985, 4; 1986, 175] has maintained that
Coase failed to "operationalize" the notion of transaction costs: he has not
developed a comprehensive theory concerning the factors which account for
differences in the respective costs of organizing economic activity through the
market or within a firm and which, thus, determine the outcome of the choice
between organization of an activity in a firm or by means of market
transactions. Meanwhile, Coase has conceded this criticism [1992, 718].
The theory of the firm developed by Alchian and Demsetz [1972] can be
regarded as an attempt to make up this deficiency. They have identified one
source of cost differences between the firm and the market as methods of
organization, viz. team use of inputs and shirking problems connected with
team production.
The starting point in the Alchian-Demsetz analysis is that much productive
activity involves teamwork of production factors. "Teamwork" refers to a
production process involving multiple inputs which are owned by more than
one supplier, and yielding an output which is not simply the sum of
identifiable products of the individual inputs [1972, 779], Team productive
activity is moreover defined by the fact that "a union, or joint use, of inputs
yields a larger output than the sum of the products of the separately used
inputs" [1972, 794]. Thus, with team production, the productivity of the joint
inputs is larger than if each of them were to perform independently of the
others. This surplus is the gain resulting from cooperation as a team.
The output of a team productive process is the result of the yo/wf efforts of
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the cooperating factors of production; it is team output, not an aggregate of
separately produced components [Alchian (1993), 367]. In order to induce
each ;>»//v;</Ka/ input to a team productive process (a "team member") to
make maximum use of its comparative advantage over others, each team
member is to be rewarded in accordance with his contribution to the team's
total output [Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 778]. If an input's reward were not
reflecting its actual contribution to the team, /.e. its marginal product,
individual team members would not have proper incentives to productive
action. If a team member were to earn less than his marginal product, he
would have insufficient incentive to improve his effort. And if a team member
were to earn more than his marginal product, he would receive a reward for
bad performance and would therefore have an incentive to shirk.
To reward each cooperating production factor in accordance with his
contribution to the team's total output, it is necessary to determine the actual
contributions of the individual team members to the team's output. However,
it is difficult and costly to measure individual contributions, as they are not
separately reflected in the team's output. By definition, a team's output is not
the sum of the separable outputs of each of its members or. in the words of
Alchian and Demsetz, the "individual cooperating inputs do not yield
identifiable, separate products which can be summed to measure the total
output" [1972, 779; emphasis by the authors].
As individual contributions of team members to the team's output are not
directly and cheaply observable, it is both difficult and costly to determine
each individual team member's reward in accordance with his marginal
product. This difficulty gives rise to .y/Hrfong problems: a team member may
be able to shirk without the resulting decrease in his productivity being
detected and without his reward being reduced proportionately to his neglect
of duty. Individual team members have incentives to shirk in so far as shirking
is likely to result in a net increase in their utility (for example, by affording
extra leisure).
Shirking by individual team members leads to a decrease in team
productivity, which will be reflected in a decrease of the team's total output
and in a decline in net team earnings (profits). Note that the survival of any
team (and any firm) requires that team earnings be at least sufficiently high to
offset the opportunity costs of the inputs, /.e. the amount they could earn
elsewhere which is given up by joining or staying on the team.
To detect shirking and to prevent shirking losses, team members would
have to incur costs to monitor fellow team members; such costs discourage
monitoring by individual members. Because of the difficulty of measuring a
team member's marginal product and the cost of detecting shirking, the
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reward to a shirking team member may well be reduced by less than the
reduction in team output and income for which he is responsible. In this
manner a team member may be able to shift at least a part of the costs of his
shirking to the team as a whole, the costs of his neglect of duty being shared
by the team members collectively in the form of a reduction of total team
output and profit [1972, 780].
In the theory of Alchian and Demsetz, a firm arises to cope with the
above-mentioned shirking problem. As noted earlier in this chapter, in their
approach within a firm there is some central common party to the contractual
arrangements between the various cooperating inputs. This central agent
monitors the performance of cooperating team members and apportions
rewards to team members in accordance with each member's marginal
product. He measures individual productivities, detects shirking, disciplines
team members, assigns tasks, and may change the team's composition to
improve team productivity. For these purposes he has been given the authority
to revise the contract terms of individual team members independently of
contracts with other members [1972, 782].
By monitoring the members of the team so as to detect undesirable actions
and by adjusting the contract terms on which the team members cooperate so
as to enforce desired actions, the team's central agent (the "monitor")
manages the use of resources. He does not merely keep track of individual
team members' performance but he also directs their efforts, explores
productive opportunities and takes business decisions, thereby coordinating
the activities of the team. In order to motivate the monitor to act in a manner
which reduces shirking and which maximizes the team's productivity and,
consequently, team profit, he is given the "residual claim" on team assets and
cash flows: he is entitled to the residue amount remaining after all other
cooperating inputs have been remunerated. The monitor will earn his residual
reward by diminishing the amount of shirking by the team members.
"Shirking" is a special cost connected with team effort and arising from
the difficulty to measure individual productivities in a team production
process [Demsetz (1987), 5]. Alchian and Demsetz submit that this cost is
reduced more effectively and more cheaply within a firm than if production
were organized by means of market transactions, because in a system of
bilateral exchange transactions there is no central agent to measure marginal
productivities, to detect shirking, to discipline shirking team members and to
revise the team. Although input owners could in principle perform the same
tasks by bargaining across markets, for team productive processes, in which
the marginal products of the individual team members are not readily and
separably observable, matching rewards to marginal productivities and
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reducing shirking can be achieved "more economically" in a firm, /.<?. by an
intra-firm monitor [1972, 794, 782].
True, market competition by outsiders would (and to a certain extent does)
deter incumbent team members from shirking, but not entirely. Outside input
owners might offer to replace shirking team members by promising better
performance, or in exchange for a lower share of the team's total income than
the reward given to the shirking member. By refraining from shirking, new
team members could raise team productivity, which would be reflected in
their rewards (on the assumption that rewards are paid in conformity with
individual team members' contributions to the team).
For competition to be effective, however, competitors must be willing to
incur the cost of detecting the amount of shirking by incumbent team
members in order to ascertain whether, and to what extent, opportunities exist
for productivity increases. In addition, once a shirking team member is
replaced by a new one, the latter will also have an incentive to shirk since he,
too, will probably face less than the total reduction in team output and profit
for which he is responsible, because of the same difficulty and cost of
measuring shirking [1972, 781].
Alchian and Demsetz suggest that team productive activity will be
organized in a firm if a net increase in productivity can be achieved, net of the
costs associated with the shirking problem (including monitoring expenses), in
comparison with a multitude of bilateral bargains between individual inputs
[1972, 780; Demsetz (1987), 5]. They argue that team production can be
organized in a firm at less cost than by means of bilateral transactions across
markets, because of the firm's superior ability to tackle the shirking problem.
The firm's device to cope with shirking costs, an intra-firm monitor motivated
by the possession of the residual claim, is presumed to be superior to bilateral
bargaining between input owners across the market and competition by non-
team members. Thus, the firm is essentially viewed as "a means of achieving
the benefits of collective action in situations in which the price system fails",
as Arrow has put it [1974, 33].
The Asset Specificity Argument
A second reason for differences in the magnitude of the costs associated with
organizing productive activity in a firm or by means of market transactions
has been identified by Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1978]. In short, they
argue that specificity of assets used in production processes gives rise to
postcontractual opportunistic behavior, the costs of which can be reduced to a
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larger extent by the creation of a firm than by contracts between resource
owners across markets. Their argument runs as follows.
A resource owner may possess an asset (for example, a piece of
equipment) which is specialized to the productive activities of another
individual, or to the operations of a team of cooperating production factors.
The value of such an asset is likely to be higher to the individual, or the team,
to whose activities the asset is specialized than to other parties. In other
words, the value of a specialized asset elsewhere (the "salvage value") will be
less than its value to the individual, or the team, to whose activities it is
specialized.
Non-specialized assets typically have values that are not dependent on a
particular user. If their current user would disappear, such assets would be
able to earn an equal remuneration elsewhere. The return on the investment
made to create a s/>ecza//zec/ asset, however, is dependent on its use by a
particular individual or team. Therefore, the value of such a '"specific" asset
depends on the behavior of the individual or team to whose activities it is
specialized [Alchian (1984), 36].
Suppose that the specialized asset is rented to the individual (or the team)
on whose activities its value is dependent. If the individual (or team) to whom
the asset is specialized were to stop renting it, the asset would lose a part of
its value. It would lose the value in excess of its salvage value, ;.e. the excess
of its value over the value in its next best use to another renter, which has
been labeled the "quasi-rent value of the asset" [Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978), 298].
If an asset is specific to the activities of its renter in the manner described
above, the renter may attempt to have his rent reduced after the rental contract
is agreed. He may try to negotiate a lower remuneration to be paid to the
asset's owner, opportunistically manipulating the situation on the basis of his
knowledge that the owner is unlikely to have a comparable demand for the
asset concerned from third parties willing to pay the same rent. Therefore, if
the present renter would stop renting the asset, the owner would be left with
the asset's salvage value and would forfeit the excess of the investment cost
incurred to create the asset over the asset's salvage value.
By threatening to renege on the rental contract unless the specific asset's
owner agrees to lower the rent, the renter of a specific asset may be able to
reduce his cost of using the asset. In this manner he might effectively
appropriate a part of the return on the asset owner's investment which is non-
salvageable if the renter would disappear (/.e. the rent from the asset's
specific value to the activities of that renter). In other words, he might
appropriate a part of the quasi-rent to the asset owner.
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Similarly, if an asset is specifically tailored to the activities of a particular
user, the asset ow«er could attempt to renegotiate a higher rent by threatening
to withdraw the asset. If comparable assets specialized to the user's activities
are not readily available, by withdrawing his asset the asset owner could
impose a cost on the asset's user, for example, by causing a production delay.
Thus, by exercising credible threats of withdrawal and by carrying out such
threats, the asset owner could renege on the rental contract in order to have
his remuneration increased.
For instance, once a firm has become dependent upon supplies from one
particular factory, the factory's owner may attempt to raise prices by
threatening to cut off supplies to that firm. On the other hand, once a supplier
has made an investment in a machine producing a product for which there is
only one possible customer, the buyer could seek to obtain a price cut by
threatening to reduce his purchases.
In summary, when an investment is made in an asset specialized to a
particular user, a "hold-up" potential is created [Klein (1988), 199]. Asset
specificity so creates prospects for opportunistic behavior, that is, self-interest
seeking with little regard for principles or consequences [Macneil (1981), 87
fh. 17] and not restrained by consideration for rights and duties previously
agreed. This type of behavior may result in the unanticipated non-fulfillment
of contracts.
Williamson has related opportunism to "self-interest seeking with guile"
[Williamson (1975), 26; (1981), 45-46; (1985), 47]. Somewhat more
precisely, Macneil has defined opportunism as "self-interest seeking contrary
to the principles of the relation in which it occurs" [1981, 87 fh. 17]. The
relationship between owner and renter of a specific asset is susceptible to self-
interest seeking contrary to the principles embodied in their rental contract. In
particular, as set forth above, it is susceptible to postcontractual reneging in
order to obtain individual advantage in the form of a rent reduction or
increase. Incentives for opportunistic reneging exist where the owner of a
specific asset and its user have conflicting wealth or utility maximizing
objectives.
The prospect of postcontractual opportunistic behavior by the other party
exposes both the owner and the renter of a specific asset to the risk of
unanticipated losses resulting from unanticipated breaches of contract.
Therefore, if there were no cost-effective means of avoiding postcontractual
reneging, the possibility of postcontractual opportunistic behavior would
discourage investments to create specific assets of the kind described above
(relationship-specific investments), as a part of the value of the investment
would be subject to the risk of appropriation.
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Opportunistic behavior is likely to result in high transaction costs, if the
relationship between the owner of the specific asset and its user (the renter) is
organized by transactions made in the market place. High transaction costs
would result not only from postcontractual reneging />e/- se, but they would
also be incurred by designing and enforcing contractual devices to reduce the
prospects for such opportunistic behavior. Detailed contractual arrangements,
together with a payment arrangement directed to align incentives, would be
necessary to assure non-opportunistic behavior. However, in the event that
such contracts do not completely eliminate prospects for opportunistic
behavior, the potential for unanticipated costs from postcontractual hold-ups
will continue to exist. In this event, ex pasf contracting hazards will
discourage investments to create specific assets.
Even though a contract may be evidently legally enforceable, it may still
be subject to postcontractual opportunistic behavior. For instance, by
reneging a party may be able to impose substantial enforcement costs
(entailing a postcontractual loss) on the other party, the threat of which may
induce the latter to accept the demands of the reneging party. Also, "the threat
of production delay during litigation may be an effective bargaining device"
[Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), 301], Hence, threats to breach a
contract may be credible and effective even when they lack legal basis.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian argue that organizing the relationship
between the specific asset and its user within a firm will serve to economize
on transaction costs associated with postcontractual opportunistic behavior.
Intra-firm coordination of asset use eliminates the prospect for gains from
reneging on market contracts involving asset specificity, and so removes
either party's incentive to behave opportunistically. Thus, the firm serves to
align interests and behavior. To avoid market transaction costs, both the
owner of a specific asset and its user have incentives to organize their
relationship in a firm instead of across the market.
Thus, the problem of postcontractual opportunistic actions can be resolved
by substituting a firm (in other words, imposing vertical integration) for
market transactions. The more specific one party's investment would be to
another party, the higher will be the market transaction costs associated with
opportunistic behavior relative to the costs of organizing resources in a firm,
and the more likely their relationship will be organized within a firm.
In the reasoning of Klein, Crawford and Alchian summarized above, asset
specificity is a constraint on transacting in the market place which leads to an
intra-firm relationship in place of market transactions. Coase [1988c, 42-46],
however, has objected to asset specificity as a force causing market
transaction costs to exceed the costs of organizing resources in a firm. First,
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he submits that the market discourages opportunistic actions by inducing
individuals to take account of the adverse effects of such behavior on their
chances of doing business in the future. Even if immediate gains are available,
opportunities for future business may be lost.
Second, Coase points to the availability of contractual arrangements
"which reduce the profitability of opportunistic behavior and therefore make
it even more unlikely" [1988c, 44]. He suggests that the costs connected with
opportunistic behavior in situations where there is asset specificity could
effectively be reduced by means of properly tailored long-term contracts.
Therefore, in his view there is no reason to assume that the hold-up potential
created by asset specificity is more likely to lead to a firm than to a detailed
long-term contract.
Likewise, Demsetz [1988, 150] has suggested that organizing resources
within a firm does not have a significant advantage over bilateral contracts
between resource owners to resolve the problems of opportunism to which
asset specificity gives rise. He is skeptical about asset specificity as a factor
affecting the relative amount of transaction costs. Demsetz questions whether
it would cost more "to detail the terms of a contract when asset specificity is
involved than when it is not" [1988, 150].
Instead, he argues, the relevant presumption of the asset specificity theory
is that the presence of asset specificity increases each party's loss if the other
party were to fail to comply with the terms of the rental agreement, relative to
failure of an agreement involving non-specialized assets [1988, 150]. This
observation suggests that it is not high transaction costs but the incentive to
avoid the risk of such greater losses in situations involving asset specificity
which induce a specific asset and the resource to which it is specialized to be
organized within the same firm. This would then be the "true" rationale of the
firm from an asset specificity perspective.
2. THE CORPORATE VEHICLE - A
VIEW FROM ORGANIZATION
THEORY
MANY BUSINESS FIRMS are legally organized as corporations. The
corporation, including both its publicly held and its close manifestation, has
over the past century come to be "the dominant organizational form for
conducting business", as Scherer has noted [1988a, 61]. Its dominance does
not so much appear from the absolute number of corporations that can be
counted but, rather, from the percentage of total sales and business revenue
for which corporations account and from the numbers of people they employ.
In the United States, for instance, corporations are responsible for over 80
percent of annual business revenue. Accordingly, in market economies firms
organized as corporations are usually responsible for the greater part of gross
national product. In their famous 1932 treatise on "The Modern Corporation
and Private Property", Berle and Means [1991, 313] already concluded that
the business corporation may be regarded "not simply as one form of social
organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of
the modern world". In a similar observation, Chayes [1959, 27] described the
corporation as "the dominant nongovernmental institution of modern
American life".
For quite a long time economists have studied the firm without particular
reference to the corporation as its predominant form of organization in many
parts of the economy. Similarly, legal scholars tend to study corporate legal
problems without paying much attention to the economic entity that the
corporation organizes. Thus, the corporation, as a form of organization, and
the firm as its object of organization, are treated largely as separate subjects.
Notable exceptions are Wolfson [1984], Easterbrook and Fischel [1991] and
Romano [1993].
Economists studying the firm tend to regard the availability of instruments
to set up a firm as given. They assume that organizational devices such as the
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corporation exist and usually do not discuss the particular features of the
corporate concept. Likewise, lawyers refrain from entering the area of the
economics of the business firm structured as a corporation. In general, they
simply take for granted that the corporate form helps to finance the firm's
operations by enabling the sale of equity shares and by insulating investors
from liability. This observation is unquestionably true but it provides by no
means a full and comprehensive insight into the relation between the firm and
the corporation as an organizational concept embedded in the law.
As long ago as 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler, at that time president of
Columbia University, said: "I weigh my words when I say that in my
judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of
modern times. (...) Even steam and electricity are far less important than the
limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative
impotence without it" [Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison (1979), 351]. However,
it seems less clear w/iy the corporate form should deserve so much praise.
In this chapter we examine in what ways the concept of the corporation is
related to the firm as an economic institution. For this purpose, we examine
the various functions of the corporation in organizing a business enterprise.
What does the corporate concept contribute to the firm or, in other words,
why docs the corporation organize a firm as it does? As indicated in the
introductory chapter, our focus is on publicly held corporations as generally
they organize the larger businesses and as, therefore, they frequently affect
large numbers of people.
Transaction Costs Revisited
In the preceding chapter we investigated first, what economists mean by a
firm. We saw that the starting point in neoclassical microeconomics is that a
firm comprises a series of inputs from which outputs are obtained, /.e. a
production function. In the "nexus of contracts" theory the inputs represented
in this production function are assumed to be linked together by a series of
implicit and explicit contractual relations among owners of property rights in
resources. These resource owners cooperate for the purpose of jointly
producing output.
The relationships between input owners within a firm differ from bilateral
exchange transactions across markets. Within the firm, the ordinary market
mechanism does not function and the use of resources is directed by some
alternative coordinating mechanism called either entrepreneur [Coase (1937)].
hierarchy [Williamson (1975)] or monitor [Alchian and Demsetz (1972)J. The
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institutional setting of the firm has come to be viewed as an alternative to a
multitude of exchange transactions directed by the market [Coase (1937)].
We explored various reasons that have been given in order to explain why
economic activity is organized in a firm. Smith [1981] associated the firm
with productivity advances from specialization enabled by large-scale
production. Knight [1921] argued that firms emerge as a result of the
organization of production by specialists in the assessment of business risks.
Coase [1937] explained that the firm serves to economize on the costs of
carrying out exchange transactions through the market. Alchian and Demsetz
[1972] approached the firm as a means to ensure effective monitoring of input
behavior in a team productive process. Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1978]
argued that the firm eliminates prospects for postcontractual opportunistic
behavior in situations in which the value of an asset (resource) depends on the
behavior of some other agent.
As discussed in the previous chapter, both team effort and shirking
problems arising from it and the hold-up potential to which asset specificity
gives rise, have been identified as forces which occasion differences in the
respective costs of organizing economic activity by means of market
transactions or within a firm. Whether or not transactions will be shifted out
of the market into a firm depends on market transaction costs in relation to the
costs which would have to be incurred to operate a firm. In Coase's words,
the firm has "a role to play in the economic system" when it is possible for
transactions "to be organized within the firm at less cost than would be
incurred if the same transactions were carried out through the market"
[1988b, 19].
If market transaction costs were zero, potential gains from trade could be
attained at no cost. Resources would flow to their highest value in use
automatically, provided that rights in resources are well defined and freely
transferable (and regardless of the choice of legal entitlements). This is what,
again, Coase has pointed out in his now classic article on "The Problem of
Social Cost" [I960]. There would be no reason for the existence of firms
[1988d, 14] in view of the fact that exchange transactions across markets
would serve to direct resources into products and services without cost. The
market mechanism invariably would organize production by means of
exchange transactions between resource owners.
However, transaction costs do exist and their existence entails that
resources are absorbed in the making of transactions needed to bring about
gains from trade. If the expected gain from a transaction is less than the
transaction costs which would have to be incurred to carry out the
transaction, the transaction will not take place [Coase (1960), 15-16; Coase
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(1992), 716]. Thus, the existence of transaction costs implies that certain
transactions are not carried out although they would make parties better off in
the absence of those costs. In this event the wealth, or utility, maximizing
allocation of resources will not be reached.
In other words, transaction costs are a barrier to the realization of gains
from trade; they prevent potential gains from trade from being fully exploited.
In this way the magnitude of transaction costs influences the economic
outcomes obtained [Furubotn and Pejovich (1974), 46].
Demand for Organization
Suppose the market were the only method of economic organization available.
If every productive activity involving different input owners were to be
organized by means of market exchange transactions, a large amount of
resources would inevitably be absorbed by the transaction costs which would
have to be incurred in order to bring about the exchanges needed to organize
production. Every contribution to the production process would require a
separate transaction and would necessitate the cost of identifying a co-
transactor, the cost of the bargaining process itself and the cost of specifying
and enforcing contract terms. Owing to such costs certain productive
arrangements would not be organized at all: a utility maximizing input owner
will not exchange the resource he owns if the magnitude of the transaction
costs involved in an exchange exceeds the size of the utility improvement
which he would expect from an exchange transaction ignoring transaction
costs. In such a case, on balance a transaction would not make him better off,
and as a result his resource would «o? come to serve as an input to productive
activity, whereas he would have supplied it in order to exploit gains from
trade if transaction costs were zero or less.
Assuming that all resource owners participating in the market face
transaction costs in one way or another, certain transactions needed to
generate productive activity would not be carried out, although they would
bring about wealth improvements if transaction costs were left out of the
account. Transaction costs, then, would inhibit the organization of productive
arrangements that would be organized in the absence of such costs. It follows
that the existence and the magnitude of transaction costs has a negative effect
on the amount of output which would become available for the satisfaction of
consumer needs. In addition, in respect of those productive arrangements that
would still be organized, transaction costs would be reflected in the costs of
generating output and, consequently, in the prices consumers would have to
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pay.
In brief, if market exchange transactions were the only possible way to
organize production, the existence of transaction costs would imply that
certain production processes (output) would not come about at all, or at high
costs (and correspondingly high prices) only. Thus, transaction costs would
not merely affect the transactions that would take place but also the goods and
services that would be produced and their prices [Coase (1992), 716],
When transaction costs absorb potential gains from trade, it does not pay
resource owners to specialize. The amount of transaction costs they would
have to incur in order to sell their specialized output to other parties might be
larger than the extra income they could earn by specialized performance. In
this way market transaction costs would inhibit the attainment of productivity
advances from specialization. Hence, if all production were to be organized
by transacting in the marketplace, the larger output quantities and the
reductions in unit production costs that could technically be effected by
specialization would simply not be realized. For instance, given the multitude
of transactions that would need to be carried out to set up Smith's specialized
pin manufacturing process, the magnitude of transaction costs would almost
certainly inhibit the attainment of the same degree of specialization if it had to
be achieved by means of bilateral bargains across the market.
If market transactions were the only way to organize production,
transaction costs would similarly impair the organization of production by
Knight's specialists in the assessment of business risks. Also, the transaction
costs of ascertaining input performance might offset productivity increases
from team production and in effect, they would preclude the exploitation of
the superior productivity connected with team productive processes.
Furthermore, the costs of potential postcontractual opportunistic behavior in
situations of asset specificity would seriously discourage the making of
investments to create specialized assets. If the anticipated cost of
postcontractual reneging, including the cost of designing and enforcing
contractual arrangements to prevent postcontractual hold-ups, were to exceed
the expected return on the investment required to create a specific asset, the
investment would not be made [Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), 301J.
Organizing productive activity in a firm serves as a means to avoid the
above-mentioned effects of market transaction costs, but it only does so if the
cost of organizing a firm is lower than the cost of a series of bilateral
exchanges through the market. The firm surmounts the impediments raised by
market transaction costs - provided that it is possible to establish a firm at
less cost. In as far as a firm avoids the costs of market transactions,
organizing productive activity by establishing a firm serves to secure
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productivity gains from specialization of equipment and labor, from having
production organized by specialist risk-takers, from team production and from
investments in specific assets. Thus the reduction in transaction costs effected
by the firm is the source of all other gains associated with the emergence of
firms.
A firm does not, however, come into being as a creature of its own. It
needs to be organized. Robertson's "islands of conscious power" [1923, 85]
are not true islands raised by the forces of nature but polders which are
intentionally created by men amidst the "ocean of unconscious co-operation"
constituted by the market. In addition, the cost of shifting a market
transaction into a firm is not /fl/»emtf/y less than the market transaction costs
that would so be avoided. The existence of firms, therefore, requires
organizational devices that enable them to replace market exchange
transactions and to economize on the costs of such transactions. This point is
often overlooked in mainstream neoclassical economics, which tends to deal
with "firms without organization" [Coase (1988d), 3]. The prevalence of
market transaction costs can be conceptualized as having triggered a demand
for organizational instruments suited to organize a firm at less cost than
would be incurred if production were organized by means of market
transactions.
The higher the costs of organizing production in a firm relative to market
transaction costs, the less attractive it will become to shift market transactions
into firms. When the cost of operating a firm would exceed the cost of
carrying out exchange transactions through the market, the firm would lose its
comparative advantage over the market as a means of economic organization.
The alternative of organizing productive arrangements by means of market
transactions, however, would inevitably face the transaction costs and the
consequences of such costs on productive activity discussed above. Thus, the
higher the cost of organizing production in a firm, the lower the number of
productive arrangements which will be organized and, hence, the lower the
amount of output which will become available to satisfy consumer needs, and
the higher will be the prices consumers will have to pay for what is offered in
the market.
Supply of Corporate Features
The legal concept of the corporation is essentially that of an organizational
instrument which enables economic activity to be organized in a firm at costs
lower than those incurred by carrying out transactions in the market place.
77ie Corporate Paradox 47
Yet it is not the ort/y legal concept available to employ in the setting up of a
firm. Other organizational devices embodied in the law include, for instance,
the sole proprietorship, the partnership, the limited partnership and, in a
steadily increasing number of United States state jurisdictions, the limited
liability company. As noted earlier, however, the corporaf/'o/i has become the
dominant form of business organization in many parts of the economy.
The explanations advanced for the existence of firms cannot
simultaneously be used to explain the emergence of the corporation as a
means to organize a firm. In the preceding section we argued that the
existence of market transaction costs has occasioned a demand for
organization in order to avoid the costs associated with using the market
mechanism. The mere observation that the corporate form is such an
organizational instrument does not explain why the corporation in particular
has emerged to meet this demand. Nor does it explain the success of the
corporation as a form of organization.
Before examining in some detail the economic functions of the corporate
form, let us briefly describe the principal organizational features that
characterize it.
Lega/ Persona/tfy
First, the corporation enjoys "legal personality". This means that the
corporation is entitled to have rights and obligations on its own behalf and in
its own name, independent of the rights and obligations of its constituent
human beings. For example, it may acquire and alienate property as an entity
and it may contract debts in its own name. "Legal personality" means that in
the eyes of the law the corporation is treated as if it were an individual, with
similar ability to have rights and obligations of its own.
For instance. Section 3.02 of the Model Business Corporation Act confers
on corporations "the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary
or convenient to carry out its business and affairs". Similarly, Section 2:5 of
the Dutch Civil Code provides that for the purposes of the law of obligations
and property law, a corporation is equated with a human being, except where
statute law provides otherwise.
The corporation's "legal personality" is predominantly displayed in two
ways: the corporation is able to act in the market as an entity distinct from its
shareholders and it has access to the judiciary in its own right. It can buy and
sell in product and factor markets, own property and incur debts as if it were
an individual, and it can sue and be sued in the courts in its own name. The
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corporate form of organization, hence, does not merely serve to establish an
economic entity (a firm) but it also constitutes an entity for the purposes of
the law (/.e. a legal entity).
Pursuant to the concept of "legal personality" (or "legal entity") as
embedded in corporate law, the corporation has a life of its own, separate
from that of its constituent human beings (including shareholders), and so the
life span of the corporation may exceed that of the constituent human beings
at a given time. Therefore, corporations are sometimes said to enjoy
"perpetual existence and succession": a corporation may continue to exist
long after the initial shareholders and managers have passed away or have left
the organization. Yet this statement is misleading as it does not take into
account the possibility that corporations can be terminated. Shareholders ca«
dissolve a corporation if the requisite majority vote accordingly. Moreover,
the law may provide that a corporation can be involuntarily dissolved by a
court order under certain conditions.
Transferafc/e Scares
A second characteristic of the corporation is the division of its equity capital
into transferable shares. The owners of these shares, the shareholders, are
entitled to the profits, net of taxes, earned by the business firm organized in
corporate form. Shareholders receive profits in the form of dividends paid by
the corporation. In addition, in the event of dissolution of the corporation they
are entitled to any excess yielded by the corporation's assets once its liabilities
to creditors have been satisfied. Furthermore, the shareholders are entitled to
the money value of increases in the market value of the firm as measured by
the market price of their shares.
A share represents a part of the equity capital put up by investors to
finance the ventures of the corporate firm. The return on the shares, that is,
dividends as well as potential value increases (capital gains), are not fixed but
contingent on the success and profitability of the firm's operations. The same
applies to the eventual repayment of the shareholders' capital contribution at
the corporation's dissolution: whether their investment will be repaid is
contingent on the amount remaining, if any, once all liabilities have been
settled. Thus, unlike lenders, shareholders do not have a yfaed claim on the
corporation's earnings and assets.
Shareholders' claim, by definition, is subordinate to the claims of the
corporation's creditors, including tax claims. Since shareholders' return on
investment depends on the fortune of the firm and since they may lose their
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entire investment if the business fails, share capital is referred to as m/t
«i/wta/. The shares reflect the risks to which a firm operated in corporate
form is subject. The profitability of a business and, thus, shareholders'
reward is inevitably subject to a certain degree of risk. A share is a stake in
the business risk of the corporate firm and the shareholders, by definition,
have agreed to bear that risk.
Shareholders can primarily influence the risk to which they are exposed in
two ways: they can vote in shareholders' meetings and they can relieve
themselves of continued risk exposure by transferring their shares to a third
party. A share, thus, carries a right to vote and a right to transfer the share.
Both rights enable shareholders to protect their investment. In the analysis to
follow we will assume that both of these rights are inherent in the shares. (We
acknowledge that United States jurisdictions following Section 6.01 (c) (1) of
the Model Business Corporation Act permit the articles of incorporation to
provide for the issue of non-voting shares. For the purpose of our analysis,
however, we assume that shares do carry voting rights, as is the general rule
in both the United States and the Netherlands.) Also, we will not distinguish
between different classes of shares but assume that all shares in a particular
corporation have equal attributes, including equal voting rights.
The scope of shareholders' voting rights (the issues on which shareholders
may vote) is defined by the applicable corporate statute, whilst the
corporation's articles of incorporation may confer additional voting rights on
the shareholders to the extent permitted by the law. According to United
States state corporation statutes, shareholders' voting rights ordinarily include
the right to vote on the appointment and removal of directors. Similarly, in the
Netherlands, statute law bestows on the shareholders the right to vote on the
appointment and removal of the members of the corporation's management
board and supervisory board. However, in the Netherlands a special type of
corporation exists in which shareholders' voting rights do «o/ extend to such
appointments and removals; we will describe this type of corporation in
Chapter 5 and until then we assume that the shareholders do possess the
above-mentioned voting rights. In both countries, shareholders' voting rights
moreover include, /«/er o/;a, the right to vote on amendments of the
corporations articles of incorporation (Section 10.03 of the Model Business
Corporation Act; Section 2:121 of the Dutch Civil Code) and on dissolution
of the corporation (Section 14.02 Model Business Corporation Act; Section
2:19 Dutch Civil Code), for instance, in the event of merger with another
company.
Although we acknowledge that shareholders' right to transfer their shares
may be subject to restrictions ensuing from statute law or from the articles of
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incorporation (especially in the event of statutory close corporations), our
analysis will assume that shares are freely transferable throughout. This
assumption is justified as for publicly held corporations, free transferability of
shares is the rule, not the exception, in both United States jurisdictions and the
Netherlands. In addition, if transfer restrictions do apply, generally the laws
do not, and the articles may not, render transfer of shares completely
impossible. We will briefly discuss restrictions on share transferability and
their rationales in Chapter 5.
/./m/ted L/ab/Wy
The statutory principle of limited liability of shareholders is the third feature
of the corporate form. Apart from their voting rights and the right to alienate
their shares, limited liability, too, protects the interests of the suppliers of
equity capital. The principle of limited liability means that the shareholders
are neither liable for the fulfillment of the corporation's contractual
obligations, nor for torts attributable to the corporation or any of its
employees.
Section 6.22 (b) of the Model Business Corporation Act phrases this
principle as follows: 'Unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable
by reason of his own acts or conduct". Section 2:64 (1) of the Dutch Civil
Code expresses the same principle, stating that a shareholder is not liable for
acts performed in the name of the corporation and is not subject to any
liability for corporate losses beyond the subscription price for his shares.
Shareholders have an obligation towards the corporation to pay the
amount for which they subscribed when committing themselves to purchase
shares but they have no further financial obligations towards the corporation
or towards its creditors. If the corporation were to fail to repay a loan
extended to it, they are not liable for the deficit. Also, if the corporation were
unable to pay damages to tort victims, shareholders do not have to pay the
unsettled amounts. The principle of limited liability means, therefore, that if
the corporation fails, a shareholder will never lose more than his invested
wealth. Thus, "limited liability'' limits the risk to which shareholders are
exposed to the purchase price of their shares.
Although the statutory principle of limited liability may be set aside, either
by the law (as we will see in Chapter 9) or by private contracts between the
shareholders and the creditors of a corporation, limited liability for
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shareholders is the prevalent legal rule and in our analysis of the corporate
form we will treat it as such.
Cenfra/Vzed
Finally, the legal concept of the corporation separates the management of the
corporate firm from the provision of equity capital; management of the firm
and supply of equity capital are treated as distinct functions, with specialized
roles for the actors in each category. The suppliers of equity capital, the
shareholders, have a claim on the profits earned by the corporation and on the
excess of its assets over liabilities in the event of dissolution, but they are not
entitled to run the corporate firm. Instead, the direction of the firm is assigned
to a specialized management body which is legally separate from the
shareholders. Managerial power is centralized in this body, which is clothed
with specific managerial rights and duties for this purpose. The centralization
of managerial power is the fourth distinguishing mark of the corporate form
[Manne (1975), 512].
State corporation statutes in the United States traditionally provide for a
single governance body, the "board of directors", in which the management
function is formally vested. Section 8.01 (b) of the Model Business
Corporation Act provides that all corporate powers be exercised '"by or under
the authority o f the board of directors and that the business and affairs of the
corporation be managed "under the direction o f the board. However, this
provision does not require active involvement by the individual directors in the
day-to-day management of the corporate firm [Clark (1986), 108]: the
directors may, and frequently do, appoint officers to whom managerial
authority is delegated, if the corporation's bylaws allow them to make such
appointments (Section 8.40 (a) of the Model Business Corporation Act).
The officers then actually run the corporate firm as its full-time top
managers, under the supervision ("direction") of the board of directors. A
corporation's officers usually include, in any event, its president, vice
presidents, secretary and treasurer, whilst other senior executives may be
designated officers as well [Clark (1986), 113]. The board of directors may
include both executive directors (who are at the same time officers) and non-
executive directors (z'.e. "outside directors"), who have a supervisory role only
and who usually dedicate only a small part of their time to the firm. Outside
directors, unlike officers and executive directors, typically are not employed
by the corporation. Technically, the board may also be entirely composed of
non-executive directors or of directors who do actively manage the corporate
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firm. <
Dutch corporate law, by contrast, has institutionalized a two-tier structure
of corporate governance, consisting of a "management board" (known as the
"fostowr") and a "supervisory board" (the "raad va« comm/^^amse«"). In
this governance structure, the firm's day-to-day management is entrusted to
the management board in which executive power is concentrated and which is
responsible for the monitoring of the other inputs in the firm (Section 2:129 of
the Dutch Civil Code). The supervisory board in turn monitors the
performance of the management board and the firm in general and gives
advice to the management board when appropriate (Section 2:140 (2) of the
Civil Code).
Each Dutch corporation /m<s/ have a management board and it may have a
supervisory board if the articles of incorporation so provide. However, a
supervisory board is mandatory for large corporations (as identified by Dutch
legal standards) that satisfy certain statutorily defined quantitative criteria
(Sections 2:153 (2) and 2:158 (1) of the Civil Code). The role of the
supervisory board is comparable to that of the non-executive directors in the
United States governance model, whilst the management board performs the
functions of the executive directors and the (traditional) officer positions in
the governance structure of United States corporations.
Thus, although the /orw of both corporate governance models is different,
practically they each distinguish between functionaries in charge of the firm's
day-to-day management (executive directors and officers in the United Stated
model versus members of the management board in the Dutch model) and
functionaries supervising the former (non-executive directors in the United
States versus members of the supervisory board in the Netherlands). Given
the similarity of the functions performed, throughout this book we refer to
"managers" to denote directors exercising executive power and officers in the
United States governance model as well as members of the management board
in the Dutch model, and to "supervisory directors" to denote both non-
executive directors in the first model and members of the supervisory board in
the second.
In both United States and Dutch corporate statutes, the distinction between
share ownership (/.e. the supply of risk capital) and management of the
corporate firm is the key principle of corporate governance. Shareholders may
be appointed as managers or as supervisory directors and managers and
supervisory directors may also own shares in the corporation they manage or
supervise, but such combinations of roles do not alter the legal premise that
share ownership is legally distinct from managerial powers. Managers, and
not shareholders /?er se, are to make business decisions.
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The Monitorial Model
In summary, the corporation is characterized by legal personality, transferable
shares in its equity capital to which voting rights are attached, limited liability
of shareholders, and separation of share ownership and managerial
responsibilities. What are the economic functions of the corporation as a
vehicle to organize a business enterprise?
Below we elaborate on the premise that the merits of the corporate form of
organization should be considered in two ways. On the one hand, it facilitates
effective monitoring of input activity and on the other, it is beneficial to the
raising of funds to finance business ventures.
We will first examine the corporation from a monitoring perspective. The
monitorial approach to the corporate form of organization originates with
Alchian and Demsetz [1972], Their thoughts on the corporate firm will
therefore be the starting points for our analysis. The concept of monitoring,
which was introduced in Chapter 1, refers to the collection of information
about individual productivities and about productive opportunities in team
production processes, the detection of undesirable input behavior (shirking),
and the enforcement of desired actions so as to enhance team productivity and
team profits. It encompasses the right to direct the actions of the individual
team members and the right to apportion rewards [Alchian and Demsetz
(1972), 782].
Tfre Corporate Team
Alchian and Demsetz [1972] have emphasized the necessity of monitoring
input behavior in team production processes in order to oppose shirking and,
thereby, to improve team productivity. They have argued that within a firm,
the monitoring function is assigned to a specialized monitor. This monitor
manages the use of cooperative inputs and has the right to revise the team's
composition. To motivate the monitor to enhance team performance, he is
given the residual claim on the team's assets and cash flows: the monitor is
entitled to team earnings, net of payments to other inputs, and to the team's
remaining assets, net of outstanding debts, when the team is wound up. The
monitor earns his residual award by optimizing input performance. The
Alchian-Demsetz theory of the firm was discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
As described in that chapter, in a team productive process, individual team
members do not yield identifiable, separable products that can be disposed of
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through the market. The output sold is that of the team members collectively
and by definition no individual products are observable in the team's output.
The team operates in the market as an entity: it sells team output and it
acquires resources for team use by the joint cooperative inputs. "Legal
personality" permits the team (the firm) to act as such an entity.
It recognizes the fact that a firm does not consist of a series of individuals
carrying out individual businesses, and that the individuals in a firm work as a
union to effect joint productive activity. "Legal personality" recognizes the
team nature of the firm by enabling the firm to buy and sell and to sue and be
sued as a union. In addition, as teamwork yields a larger output than the
team's separately used inputs could otherwise achieve, "legal personality" can
be understood as the law's recognition of the superior productivity of team
production.
"Legal personality" furthermore enables the team to select as an entity a
central agent to monitor the performance of the cooperative inputs in the
team. In the absence of "legal personality", it would be for individual input
owners to select a monitor. By implication, the monitor may look at the
performance and the interests of the particular team members »ibo cfesrgnatexf
him rather than at those of the team as a whole. With legal personality,
however, the monitor is assigned to the team as such for the enhancement of
the productivity of the joint team members so that ideally the whole of the
team will benefit.
/Vfon/foring Sen/Zees
Who will be the most effective monitor of a team, z'.e. the monitor best able to
direct team members so as to take full advantage of the superior productivity
of joint productive efforts? Alchian and Demsetz [1972] assume that the most
effective monitor will be that team member who has the greatest pecuniary
incentive to optimize team performance, that is, the team member who has the
residual claim. But this leaves us with the question: which member shall be
given the residual claim?
In the framework of the corporation the residual claim resides in the
shareholders. They are entitled to what is left over after the corporation's
obligations to other parties have been fulfilled. Firms organized as
corporations grant the residual claim by issuing shares in their equity capital.
A share is a portion of the residual claim combined with a right to vote and a
right to transfer that particular portion and the voting right attached to it.
As noted, shareholders provide risk capital to the corporate firm. In their
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capacity as providers of risk capital they would have a clear incentive to
monitor input behavior even if there were no residual claim. This incentive
stems from the fact that, by definition, suppliers of risk capital are not
protected by security for the repayment of their capital contribution (whereas
lenders frequently are) and may lose their entire invested wealth if the firm in
which they have invested fails. They, therefore, have well-defined, loss-
minimizing incentives to monitor other team members in order to protect their
investment. Designating the suppliers of risk capital (the shareholders) as the
team's monitor, serves to take advantage of such initial monitoring incentives.
Alchian and Demsetz identify the monitor of a team with the residual
claimant. Accordingly, by allocating the residual claim to the shareholders,
the corporate form designates them as the team's monitors. The allocation of
the residual claim means that the shareholders have a dual incentive to
monitor the actions of the other team members: to protect their invested
wealth and to enhance their earnings from the possession of the residual
claim. The residual claim on the team's assets and cash flows, net of pay-outs
to other inputs, is shareholders' reward for the supply of risk capital />/«$
monitoring services to the team.
Shareholders can monitor team performance directly or by appointing one
or more intermediaries. Direct monitoring by shareholders occurs when they
also run the corporate firm, that is, when the shareholders concurrently have
managerial positions that entitle them to conduct the firm's day-to-day
management. Alternatively, shareholders may appoint specialized managers to
manage the team. In that event they may confine themselves to monitoring the
performance of such specialized managers (monitors). The factors
determining w/?e« shareholders will delegate the monitoring function to a
separate management are discussed on pages 59-61 /«/ra.
The possession of the residual claim entails that shareholders' reward is
dependent on the profitability of the team. More accurately, shareholders do
not merely receive a reward positively correlated to team profitability, but
collectively they are entitled to «// team profits (net of taxes). As their
remuneration depends on the profits earned by the team, shareholders have
wealth-maximizing incentives to optimize team performance, either through
direct monitoring or by appointing capable managers to the team.
In principle, however, shareholders would not need to be given title to a//
of the team's profits to make their reward depend on team profitability They
could also be motivated by a promise of a certain perce/7toge of future team
profits. Such a promise would not entitle them to all team profits, as does the
residual claim, but only to a part thereof. The remainder could, for instance,
be distributed among other inputs. In that event, shareholders' reward would
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still depend on team profits, which would induce them to monitor other team
members so as to enhance team performance.
If the residual claim is not in its entirety given to the shareholders but if
instead they have to share team profits with other members under some profit-
sharing scheme, a shirking problem would arise among the various team
members who would be entitled to the team's profits [Alchian and Demsetz
(1972), 786]. A member entitled to only a percentage of team profits would
have utility-maximizing incentives to rely on the efforts of other claimants to
monitor input behavior. By shirking as a monitor, he may be able to benefit
from monitoring by other team members without having to incur monitoring
expenses himself, and without a proportionate reduction in the size of his
earnings as a residual claimant.
The prospects to individual claimants for gains from shirking as a monitor
would endanger the adequate provision of monitoring services to the team. By
allocating the residual claim to one input category (the suppliers of risk
capital), the corporate form serves to mitigate this problem.
To find the most effective monitor, a corporate firm may (and corporate
firms frequently do) exploit competition among potential monitors.
(Neo)classical economics tells us that competition among suppliers of a
particular product compels suppliers to sell high quality products: competition
will drive suppliers of bad products out of business, and induces suppliers to
offer products which meet demand in a manner maximizing consumer
satisfaction. The same principle applies to the supply of monitoring services.
A firm can take advantage of competition among potential monitors by
selling all or part of the residual claim to the highest bidder(s). Firms operated
in corporate form do so by selling equity shares. The residual claim (the
shares) is likely to be purchased by the most effective monitor or by an
investor able to assign the most effective monitor (management) to the firm.
The monitor best suited to enhance team performance, or the investor able to
assign the best monitor to the firm, will expect the highest return from the
residual claim and he will therefore be prepared to pay the highest amount to
obtain the residual claim.
Selling the residual claim (the shares) as a method for acquiring
monitoring services will be beneficial to the team, given that the highest
bidder is likely to be the monitor, or the investor, who will make the best use
of each team member's comparative advantage in order to maximize his
earnings as residual claimant. This bidder will maximize team productivity
and profits, to the benefit of the joint team members.
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D/V/s/6/e Res/cfua/C/a/Vns
The corporate form assigns the residual claim jointly with the function of
monitor to the suppliers of risk capital. A team in which one particular
member has the residual claim and monitors all other cooperative inputs, is
representative of a corporation with a single shareholder who also manages
the corporate firm.
However, the amount of risk capital put up to finance a firm's operations
may be furnished by more than one supplier. If the size of his investment in a
particular firm increases, the risk to which an investor is exposed (that is, his
potential loss) also goes up. The larger the amount of capital a firm demands,
the larger the risk to which a single supplier is exposed and the less likely it
will be that one particular investor will be prepared to provide the entire
amount.
The possibility that sewra/ suppliers will provide risk capital to the firm is
what establishes the need for the division of the residual claim on the firm's
earnings and assets into portions (shares). The division of the residual claim
into shares enables each supplier of risk capital to obtain a portion of the
residual claim in proportion to the relative size of his investment. As
indicated, in the Alchian-Demsetz model, the function of residual claimant
and monitor is joined. Consequently, the division of the residual claim results
in the dispersal of the monitorial function among the various owners of
portions of the residual claim.
To protect their investment and to enhance their reward, each owner of a
portion of the residual claim (i.e. each shareholder) may demand rights
enabling him to monitor the team's activities. Thus the possibility of multiple
suppliers of risk capital does not merely result in divisible residual claims, but
also in proportionate monitoring (i.e. voting) rights attached to each portion
of the residual claim.
The existence of multiple residual claimants with monitoring powers
necessitates flexible transferability of shares. Different residual claimants
may have different views on the exercise of monitoring powers, for example,
with regard to the activities the firm should undertake. Suppose decisions are
taken by vote, with each residual claimant's voting rights being proportional
to his portion of the residual claim. In this event, any investor's invested
wealth becomes subject to the firm's course of action as determined by the
majority vote.
To protect his interests, a residual claimant who disagrees with the
majority decision may wish to remove his investment from control by the
other residual claimants [Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 788]. The ability to
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transfer his shares, without the permission of fellow residual claimants, makes
such a removal possible. If they were exposed to the risk of becoming locked
in, /.e. if shares were not transferable, potential suppliers of risk capital may
not be willing to invest in the firm's operations at all, given that they might
then lose all or part of their invested wealth as a result of decisions adopted
by their fellow residual claimants in spite of their opposition.
In addition, if a team has several residual claimants with equal voting
rights and irreconcilable views on how to use them, votes may be evenly
divided. The ability to transfer shares and the voting rights they carry is a
method for resolving such deadlocks in intra-firm decision-making processes.
Alchian and Woodward [1987, 121] capture the same point, stating that
"without transferable shares the potential for shareholder conflicts over
investment and dividend policy could kill the corporation".
There is a second reason for flexible transferability of shares. The
activities of a firm are not static and neither is the economic and technical
environment in which it operates. A firm's activities may expand and the
nature of the firm's business may change. Technology may develop in a way
affecting the firm's operations or opportunities. Relevant product markets as
well as factor markets may change over time; prices may go up or down,
competition by other firms may increase, and demand for the goods or
services manufactured by the firm may change. In such a dynamic
environment the most effective monitor(s) to a firm at one point in time may
no longer be the best monitor(s) when circumstances change.
Transferability of residual claims and monitoring powers attached thereto
allows them to flow to superior monitors [Manne (1964); (1965)]. If a third
party were able to monitor the corporate firm more effectively than its current
residual claimant(s), he will anticipate a higher future income stream from the
residual claim than its current owner(s) do and be prepared to pay a higher
price for it than its value to the latter. In this event existing residual claimants
can improve their wealth by selling their residual claim. As the most effective
monitor will expect the highest reward from the residual claim, he will
normally offer the highest price and so obtain the claim (and thereby the
monitorial function). In this way flexible transferability of residual claims
(shares) is a mechanism ensuring that firms will always be able to attract
effective monitors, that is, monitors having a comparative advantage in
monitoring the firm concerned.
A third reason calling for flexible transferability of shares originates in the
fact that residual claimants do not live in perpetuity. To a residual claimant,
his residual claim is an asset which may be inherited by his descendants
(provided the law of succession applies). Heirs may not always have the same
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gifts as the deceased and, hence, they may not have similar abilities to monitor
input activity.
Heirs unable to optimize team productivity and profits have wealth-
maximizing incentives to transfer their inherited residual claim to more
effective monitors [Ekelund and Tollison (1980), 717]. Because of their
superior abilities as monitors, the latter are likely to offer a higher price for
the residual claim than the net present value to the heir of his anticipated
future earnings from the residual claim. By enabling the transfer of the
residual claim to superior monitors, flexible transferability of shares serves as
a means to ensure effective monitoring over the long run.
Spec/a//zed Mon/fors
The principle of easy transferability of shares makes use of across-market
competition from potential monitors outside the firm to attain effective
monitoring within the firm. Centralization of management, meaning
management of the firm by (a limited number of) specialized managers, is an
instrument internal to the firm designed to secure effective monitoring of input
behavior. Several forces are responsible for the emergence of centralized
management as a monitoring device.
First, as noted above, if the amount of capital required to finance a team's
operations increases, the number of suppliers is also likely to rise. Hence,
teams demanding large amounts of risk capital tend to have several team
members who furnish such capital in exchange for a portion of the residual
claim. If all, or most, of the suppliers of risk capital to a firm would actively
participate in the firm's management in order to protect their investment and
to enhance their earnings as residual claimants, decision-making to direct the
firm's activities would become more complicated as the number of suppliers
rises. Also, the costs of decision-making would rise concurrently with the rise
in the number of residual claimants [Buchanan and Tullock (1965), 68]. In
other words, if a firm with many shareholders were to be managed by the
shareholders, high costs of decision-making would be incurred. Centralized
management serves to economize on these costs [Demsetz (1975), 33].
Easy transferability of shares is a requirement for centralized management
[Woodward (1985), 602]. Without it, shareholders would need to participate
actively in the management of the firm in order to protect their investment
from managerial decisions that they consider undesirable. The transferability
of shares enables shareholders to evade the effects of such decisions by selling
their shares and so avoids the costs of shareholder interference in the firm's
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management. Accordingly, transferability of shares does not only promote
effective monitoring by facilitating competition from would-be monitors
outside the firm, but it also promotes centralized management.
Second, if the number of residual claimants increases, individual claimants
will have an incentive to shirk as monitors, that is, to rely on the efforts of
others to monitor input behavior. By shirking as monitors they would avoid
monitoring expenses, while still being able to benefit from monitoring by
fellow shareholders. The appointment of specialized managers to conduct the
firm's day-to-day management is a way to cope with this shirking problem
among larger numbers of shareholders [Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 788].
Instead of monitoring the behavior of every cooperative input, shareholders
may now limit themselves to the monitoring of these specialized managers
only.
But then a potential new shirking problem would arise, viz. shirking by the
members of the management, as individual shareholders may rely upon others
to monitor the performance of the firm's centralized management. The actual
possibilities for specialist manage« in multi-shareholder firms to shirk are
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The introduction of supervisory directors is
an attempt to secure effective monitoring of the firm's day-to-day
management where shareholders may fail to properly monitor managerial
performance. Moreover, if the residual claim is diffused among many
different shareholders, high costs will be incurred if all or most of them were
to concern themselves with the monitoring of the firm's management.
Therefore, to the extent that individual shareholders were to expend resources
to monitor the firm's day-to-day management, the monitoring of the firm's
management by a limited number of supervisory directors may well bring
about a net reduction in the costs of monitoring managerial performance
which would be incurred if many dispersed shareholders actively monitored
the management.
Third, in the Alchian-Demsetz theory of the firm it is largely assumed that
those having the greatest pecuniary /'«ce/if/Ve to monitor input activity (the
residual claimants) will also be the most e^ecf/ve monitors. But this need not
necessarily be so. Residual claimants might be better off by hiring outside
managers to run the corporate firm. Specialized managers may have a
comparative advantage in monitoring (for example, as a result of education
and training appropriate to the job) and, so, may be able to enhance team
income and rewards to the residual claimants in greater measure than the
latter themselves may be able to accomplish. If the extra earnings professional
managers effect exceed their costs to the shareholders, it pays the
shareholders to appoint such managers to run the corporate firm. In these
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circumstances, possession of the residual claim can be thought of as a means
for inducing shareholders to select capable managers, to be watchful of the
performance of those managers, and to revise the composition of the
management team if incumbent managers fail to maximize team income.
Centralized management by specialized managers may yield a higher
return to shareholders than management by the shareholders themselves,
because centralized management yields the advantages commonly connected
with specialization of labor, viz. greater dexterity and productivity and, hence,
more output at less cost per unit of production. Therefore, specialized
managers are likely to produce more effective management at a lower cost per
unit of management than unspecialized shareholders may be able to
accomplish. Specialized management will particularly pay when a large
amount of managerial input is required, /'.e. in large firms or conglomerates,
in firms operating in various product or geographical markets and in firms
with complex businesses. This explains why management tends to be
entrusted to specialized managers more and more as the size and complexity
of a firm's operations increase.
There may not only be gains from specialization with regard to the firm's
day-to-day management, but also with respect to the monitoring of the
performance of hired managers. Supervisory directors are specialized
monitor-monitors, who may be able to monitor managerial performance more
efficaciously' than shareholders could do. Thus, as well as being both a device
to resolve the shirking problem among large numbers of shareholders and a
cost-saving device, the introduction of supervisory directors may also be a
method to take advantage of specialization in monitor-monitoring.
Above we have attempted to identify factors accounting for the
centralization of management into the hands of a limited number of
specialized individuals. Frank Knight [1921], by contrast, has regarded the
management (control) of a business and the bearing of the business risks as
inseparable. As described in Chapter 1, according to Knight, those having
control of the use of resources in a firm will also bear the financial risk of its
success or failure. In Knight's words: "Any degree of effective exercise of
judgment, or making decisions, is in a free society coupled with a
corresponding degree of uncertainty-bearing, of taking the responsibility for
those decisions" [1921, 271]. The functions of control and risk-bearing are
joined in his concept of "res/«vw/6/e d/rec/zo/?" [1921, 271; emphasis by
Knight], which he has called the "essence of enterprise". Knight's approach
seems to ignore the benefits attainable by specialized management we have
discussed above.
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Pnnc/pa/s
Some particularities of the relationship between residual claimants
(shareholders) and managers are addressed by the economic theory of agency.
This theory views managers and supervisory directors as "agents" of the
shareholders who in turn are considered to be their "principals". Lawyers, on
the other hand, may object to that perception on the basis that although
shareholders have the right to elect and to remove managers (in the
Netherlands) or supervisory directors who appoint the day-to-day
management (in the United States), the managers and the supervisory
directors are A?of shareholders' agents in a legal sense [Clark (1985), 56].
For the legal concept of agency to be met, it is essential first that the
principal has the authority to direct (control) the activities of the agent. For
example, under Section 1 (1) of the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Second) of Agency the existence of an agency relationship requires "the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his cwtfro/, and consent by the other so to act"
(emphasis added). Likewise, Section 7:402 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code
obliges the agent to obey the directions given by the principal.
A second component of the legal concept of agency is that, as a rule, the
principal assumes liability for the acts of the agent which are performed on
behalf of the principal and are within the agent's scope of authority as
conferred upon him by the principal (see, for example, Sections 140 and 219
(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and Sections 6:171 and 6:172 of
the Dutch Civil Code).
According to the legal concept of agency, managers are the agents of the
corporate e/if//y, and not of the shareholders. They act on behalf of the
corporate entity and it is, at least in theory, the corporate entity that controls
their activities. Shareholders do not have a right to determine or to command
specific managerial actions. As Clark [1985, 56] has observed, the "power of
the principal to direct the activities of the agent does not apply to the
stockholders as against the directors or officers of their corporation".
Moreover, the cor/?orafro/7 is liable for the acts performed by the management
on behalf of the corporation and not the shareholders. Shareholders
experience wealth effects of managerial actions through their residual claim
on the corporation's assets and cash flows but shareholders are not liable for
the acts of the corporation's management. Thus, the relationship between
shareholders and managers is not an agency relationship as understood by
agency law.
The economist's conception of agency, however, is different from its legal
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definition. In economic theory, an agency relationship is assumed to exist
whenever one person (the agent) performs an action which affects the wealth
or utility of some other person (the principal), and which z/H/?//es (or, better,
/vestt/jpases) the delegation of some decision-making authority by the
principal to the agent whose actions affect the former's wealth or utility. The
principal does not need to define the powers of the agent expressly, nor is the
principal required to direct the activities of the agent. What is decisive, is
whether the agent has the power to take decisions and to perform actions that
influence the interests of the principal. Pratt and Zeckhauser [1985, 2;
emphasis by the authors] have given a simple but characteristic definition of
agency as an economic concept: "Whenever one individual depends on the
action of another, an agency re/afro«.^//? arises. The individual taking the
action is called the age«r The affected party is the /vwz/ra/".
According to the economic concept of agency, managers (and supervisory
directors) ore agents of the shareholders [Arrow (1985), 39; Jensen and
Warner (1988), 15] as the market value of shareholders' residual claim, the
returns from the possession of that claim and the ultimate repayment of their
invested wealth depend on whether management (as monitored by the
supervisory directors) is taking appropriate decisions to enhance
shareholders' wealth. Such an agency relationship is created by the separation
of the functions of management and residual risk-bearing present in the
corporate form.
However, the interests of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers)
may diverge. As Jensen [1986, 323] has put it, the agency relationship
between managers and shareholders is "fraught with conflicting interests".
Shareholders may desire, for instance, that managers maximize dividends in
the short term and maximize the value of the residual claim in the long run.
But managers may shirk the pursuit of shareholders' objectives and seek to
maximize their personal utility instead [Alchian (1975a)]. To this end
managers may attempt to manage the corporation in their own self-interest,
with the sacrifice of shareholders' interests, for example, by appropriating
corporate resources in the form of perquisites, by exploiting corporate
opportunities for their personal benefit, or by pursuing leisure instead of
maximizing returns to shareholders. In Chapter 4 we will discuss managerial
deviations from shareholders' interests in greater detail.
The divergence of interests between managers and shareholders is
responsible for the existence of age«cy cos/s [Jensen and Meckling (1976),
308]. Agency costs are the costs arising from the possibility that agents
(managers) may not always act in the best interests of their principals
(shareholders). They are the costs of separating management from residual
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risk-bearing. Agency costs tend to exist in any agency relationship since
principal-agent contracts are not written and enforced without cost [Fama and
Jensen (1983a), 304; (1983b), 327]. Jensen and Meckling [1976, 308] have
identified three components which together make up agency costs.
First, shareholders are likely to incur costs to monitor managers in order to
ensure that the latter will faithfully and efficaciously act to advance the
interests of the shareholders and will refrain from pursuing competing
interests. Second, managers may expend resources to commit themselves to
shareholders' interests (bonding costs), since if they fail to convince
shareholders that they will serve them faithfully, shareholders may not hire
them or may only be prepared to hire them at a lower remuneration. Third,
given the existence of positive monitoring and bonding costs, some divergence
is likely to remain between oc/wo/ managerial decisions and those decisions
which would be optimal from shareholders' viewpoint (as the costs of
ensuring full compliance with shareholders' interests would exceed the
benefits). Consequently, shareholders may experience wealth reductions
relative to a situation in which managers would always act in the pursuit of
shareholders' objectives (/.e. shareholders' "residual loss"). It will only pay
shareholders to appoint specialized managers if the anticipated benefits to
shareholders from specialized management outweigh the costs of managerial
rewards (salaries) plus agency costs.
The legal concept of the corporation comprises several devices protecting
shareholders from self-interested managers who seek to pursue managerial
objectives at the expense of shareholders' interests: shareholders' voting
rights, transferability of shares, monitoring of management by supervisory-
directors and limited liability of shareholders. These devices serve to mitigate
agency costs, although they do not eliminate such costs altogether. In other
words, they serve to diminish the costs of the separation between management
and residual risk-bearing [Fama and Jensen (1983a), 312-315; Jensen (1983),
328]. By mitigating the agency costs arising from the divergence of interests
between shareholders and managers, the corporate form encourages
shareholders to make use of the benefits of centralized management by
specialist managers - as we discussed in the preceding section - and
encourages investors to invest in the equity of corporations with centralized
management.
Shareholders' voting rights enable them to displace ineffective managers
or supervisory directors, for example, if they fail to manage the firm (or to
supervise the management) in a manner maximizing shareholders' earnings
from the residual claim. Moreover, shareholders' voting rights ordinarily
entitle them to approve or to reject managerial proposals relating to issues of
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paramount importance to the firm (in other words, which potentially have
large impact on the value of their residual claim).
The monitoring of the management by supervisory directors imposes a
further constraint on managers' discretion. Fama and Jensen [1983a] have
argued that the monitoring of managerial decisions by supervisory directors
serves to separate decision management (the initiation and implementation of
decisions) from decision control (the ratification and monitoring of decisions)
at the firm's top level. They have interpreted this separation as a mechanism
for controlling agency problems and regard it as a major device for limiting
the costs arising from divergences between shareholders' interests and those
of managers.
Furthermore, the principle of limited liability creates a ceiling for
shareholders' potential loss from managerial failure to serve their interests
(and other causes). Limited liability ensures that shareholders are not exposed
to potentially unlimited costs should managers neglect shareholders' interests.
As Franke [1987, 143] has stated, limited liability gives shareholders
"protection against large losses of private wealth arising from imprudent
behavior by managers".
Finally, the easy transferability of shares does not merely enable
shareholders to withdraw their invested wealth from control by managers with
whom they have become dissatisfied but it also imposes a market constraint
on managerial discretion to ignore shareholders' interests: if managers fail to
act in shareholders' best interests, third parties may observe potential gains
from acquiring the corporation's shares and subsequently replacing incumbent
managers by more effective ones. This threat of displacement deters
managerial shirking.
The Financial Model
In the preceding pages we explained the corporate form as a means to ensure
effective monitoring of input activity. As our discussion reveals, the
emergence of corporate features can be explained solely on the basis of the
monitoring needs inherent in team production processes. The non-separability
of marginal productivities in team production processes creates information
(measurement), shirking (supervision) and decision-making (coordination)
problems, which in turn have created a demand for sophisticated monitoring
to secure the superior productivity of team production and to ensure that team
earnings be sufficiently high to offset the opportunity costs of the inputs. The
corporate form facilitates the supply of such monitoring within the firm.
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An alternative, more traditional, approach explains the corporation as an
instrument to raise large sums of capital through the sale of equity shares in
order to finance large-scale, capital-intensive production processes. For
instance, Scott [1951, 442] has described the corporation as "no more than
the ready means for improving production by arranging for the ready inflow
of capital". Similarly, Posner [1992, 409] has defined the corporate form of
organization as "a method (...) for attracting capital into the firm". And
Cutler [1979, 346] has judged the corporation to be "a remarkable method of
assembling and deploying capital and of turning it into an engine of economic
efficiency and growth". The financial approach and the monitorial model
described above comprise complementary, not competing, theories of the
corporation.
Firms demand both monitoring of input behavior and capital to finance the
operations of the business. The concept of the corporation serves to provide
both. Yet as the monitorial model in itself is capable of explaining all four
distinguishing characteristics of the corporate form, even without a theory
based on corporate finance considerations we would still have a
comprehensive genetic theory of the corporate form. This is illustrated, for
instance, by the adoption of the corporate form by large professional service
providers such as auditing firms and management consultancy firms, which
initially began and developed to considerable size as partnerships. The
incorporation of such firms is not motivated by the desire to attract outside
equity capital. It can be explained, however, by the monitorial theory
described in this chapter.
The work in such service firms has gradually changed from the provision
of services on an individual basis to teamwork, requiring more intensive
monitoring of input behavior (supervision). Legal personality facilitates the
firm's operation in the market as a team provider. As the number of partners
(z'.e. the residual claimants) rises, decision-making costs may be reduced by
centralizing managerial decision-making, and as the organization grows larger
and becomes more complex, a centralized management specializing in the job
may more effectively run the organization than the joint partners. Limited
liability, then, is instrumental in encouraging individual partners to delegate
decision-making power to such a management and a flexible exit mechanism,
as supplied by the transferability of residual claims, protects individual
partners from becoming subject to the effects of decisions which they are
unwilling to accept. The same mechanism allows for the smooth entry of new
residual claimants who may enhance total team earnings. Attempts to refine
the partnership contracts underlying large professional partnerships in order
to provide substantially similar rules of organization would be on a scale of
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undertaking tantamount to the reinvention of the corporate form.
The monitorial model, as indicated, views the corporation as a vehicle
facilitating the supply of appropriate monitoring services to team productive
processes. The financial model adds that the corporate form also serves as a
mechanism for the supply of capital inputs into a firm. The corporation as a
capital raising mechanism, too, may be understood (in the economic sense) as
a principal-agent relationship, capital suppliers (including both shareholders
and creditors) being the principals and capital managers (hired managers as
well as shareholder-managers in control of debt) being their agents, as the
returns capital suppliers will receive depend on the performance of the capital
managers.
The significance of the corporate form to the raising of capital for
investment is discussed below.
Equrty Cap/fa/
The amount of capital a firm desires to invest may exceed the resources of its
founder(s). In particular, substantial funds may be required to organize large-
scale production enabling specialization of labor and equipment. And some
firms will be unable to produce at all unless huge investments are made to
create the assets required to manufacture output. To organize production so
as to take full advantage of economies of scale, the organizers of a firm may
seek to acquire capital from third parties.
Suppose the organizers of a firm would attempt to raise funds by
borrowing in credit markets. Suppose further that the security they could offer
for the repayment of loans would be limited, as will normally be the case. The
larger the amount of credit sought relative to the security the firm's organizers
can give, the higher the risk to which lenders are exposed and the higher the
compensation (interest) the latter are likely to demand. In addition, the less
security a firm's organizers can offer, the lower will be the total amount of
credit lenders will generally be prepared to provide [Hicks (1982), 11],
Moreover, since debt charges are fixed costs to a firm which it cannot
unilaterally reduce, the amount of the firm's debt will affect the risk of
failure, as firms with heavy fixed costs are more likely to go bankrupt in the
event of business adversities than firms with low fixed costs. High costs of
debt, that is, interest charges and amortization, imposing high fixed costs on a
firm, tend to increase the firm's default risk [Posner (1992), 393].
Consequently, the higher a firm's indebtedness, the less eager lenders will be
to increase credit and the higher will be the interest rates they will charge.
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The corporate form enables firms to surmount the above-mentioned
impediments to borrowing in capital markets. It does so by permitting a firm
to raise funds by the sale of equity shares to those willing to provide risk
capital to finance its activities. By definition, no interest is payable on funds
obtained in this way and no security for repayment is given. Purchasers of
shares put up capital in exchange for promises of future rewards, the size of
which depends on the firm's profitability, whereas lenders provide capital in
exchange for a fixed interest or a fluctuating interest depending on market
interest percentages.
The sale of equity shares enables firms operated in corporate form to
acquire large amounts of capital through the accumulation of small
investments from a relatively large number of investors. The funds so raised
permit the acquisition of the many resources that are needed to organize large-
scale production processes. From this observation, John Stuart Mill [1965
(orig. 1848), 137] has concluded: "Production on a large scale is greatly
promoted by the practice of forming a large capital by the combination of
many small contributions; or, in other words, by the formation of joint stock
companies" (/.e. corporations).
We do not discuss why businesses raise funds by borrowing in some
instances and by raising equity capital in other cases, for we do not intend to
enter the domain of (the determinants of) the capital structure of a firm. For
the present purpose, it is sufficient to note that these different forms of
obtaining capital exist and that the corporate form makes it possible for firms
to finance all or part of their ventures by means of the sale of equity shares.
The investors providing the equity capital accept that their remuneration as
well as the eventual repayment of their contribution will depend on the
success or failure of the operations of the corporate firm. However, if they
were entirely unprotected from business failure and from wrong expectations
with regard to the firm's profitability, investors might not be prepared to
invest in the firm. Thus, the absence of protective devices might endanger the
firm's capital raising opportunities. As previously discussed, voting rights,
monitoring of the firm's management by supervisory directors, limited
liability and transferability of shares all serve to protect investors.
The operation of a firm requires investment in the equipment of the
business for the full lifetime of the business or the assets in which the
investment is made. Rather than making long-term financial commitments for
the purpose of such permanent or semi-permanent investments, investors,
however, want to be able to liquefy their investment at short notice in order to
be able to shift their invested wealth to more profitable investment
opportunities or to avoid losses [Scherer (1988a), 55]. Flexible transferability
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of shares allows investors to do so: it allows them, at their own discretion, to
exchange their investment for cash by selling their shares in the stock market.
Thus, it gives them the opportunity to recover their investment, not from the
firm's assets, but from potential purchasers of their shares. The possibility to
liquefy their investment by selling their shares enables investors to reallocate
their invested wealth to different uses from which they expect greater
pecuniary returns or utility [Manne (1975), 514].
Assef Ownersft/p
Firms, to a greater or lesser extent, invest in assets to carry on a business.
Legal personality enables a firm to own such assets and to conduct the
business in its own name.
If a firm were unable to own property as an entity, its assets would have to
be owned by individual investors and transactions and other legal acts in
respect of the assets would, in principle, require the involvement of the
individual asset owners. For instance, the cooperation of the individual
owners would be required for the transfer of ownership or the lease,
mortgage, or pledge of assets. In addition, if a firm could not own property in
its own name, every single purchase of an asset would require an investor to
own the asset concerned.
When the number of investors and assets increases, the costs of organizing
and administering the ownership of assets and the costs of carrying out legal
acts in respect of the assets would rise accordingly. These transaction costs
would absorb a part of the earnings of the firm and in this way they would
effectively set a limit to the number of investors in the firm as well as to the
number of assets. Legal personality economizes on such transaction costs. In
place of a number of individual owners is substituted one owner, namely the
corporate entity, which is entitled to purchase, own, transfer and encumber
the assets in the firm in its own right and in its own name, and without the
involvement of individual investors being required.
Moreover, if individual investors owned the assets in a firm, its business
may be disrupted if an investor chooses to withdraw his assets from the firm.
He may do so, for instance, if he desires to sell his assets in order to obtain
liquid funds for investment elsewhere. Alternatively, an investor desirous of
withdrawing could demand payment of the net value of his assets, after
deduction of his proportionate share in the firm's aggregate liabilities. To
ensure liquidity of their investment, prior to making an investment, investors
may even demand a ng/tf to be bought out of the firm whenever it suits them.
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If an investor invokes such a right, a proportion of the assets in the firm may
have to be sold in order to obtain cash to buy out the investor concerned. By
withdrawing their investment, either through the withdrawal of assets or by
forcing a buyout, individual investors might unilaterally provoke the
termination or curtailment of the operations of the firm.
Disruption of a firm as the result of one or more investors' exit would
deprive other investors of the expected return on their investment. To avoid
such an effect, the remaining investors would have to make up the
withdrawing investor's contribution, either by putting up additional resources
themselves, by finding one or more other investors to replace the former or by
additional borrowing, which in turn would raise the interest and debt
repayment obligations incumbent on the firm. Both the risk that their expected
return may not materialize due to the firm's potential disruption through
another investor's withdrawal and the expenses they may have to incur to
preclude such an effect, may discourage potential investors and, thus, harm
the firm's prospects for raising funds for investment.
Legal personality is a mechanism to avoid disruption and the above-
mentioned effects thereof, and it also eliminates the costs which would
otherwise need to be incurred to ensure continuity of the firm, should an
investor withdraw his investment. Since legal personality provides a firm with
an existence of its own, distinct from the investors, individual investors can no
longer cause the disruption of the firm (except if they own the requisite
majority of shares). In this way, legal personality serves to preserve the
continuity of the firm and minimizes the costs to investors of other investors'
withdrawal.
Legal personality serves investors' interests in yet another way. The assets
in the firm frequently have greater value collectively, /.e. as an integrated
business, than the sum of their separate values if each asset were appraised
independently of the others. In other words, the "going concern" value of a
firm may well exceed the marketable values of the various assets separately.
If an individual investor (or several investors acting jointly) were able to
cause the disruption of a firm, such added going concern value might easily be
sacrificed. In that event a// investors would be deprived of their share in the
firm's going concern value in excess of the independent market values of the
assets.
The risk of losing value because of another investor's decision to withdraw
would, again, discourage potential investors and harm the firm's ability to
raise capital. By eliminating the possibility that individual investors could
force the firm's disruption, legal personality serves to preserve the going
concern value of a firm [Clark (1986), 19], which enhances its appeal to
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investors.
Instead of the withdrawal of their contribution, the corporate form
provides investors with an alternative mechanism to recover their investment:
the division of a firm's equity capital into transferable shares. As indicated in
the preceding section, share transferability is a means to attain investment
liquidity other than through the withdrawal of the investment from the firm.
The alienation of shares maintains the firm's going concern value, given that
share transfers, unlike the withdrawal of investments (separately owned assets
or their money value), will not affect the firm's existence in itself. The
transferability of shares permits investors, through the stock market, to
encash a stake in the firm's going concern value proportionate to their
investment, whilst maintaining that value for the remaining investors (and for
successive shareholders).
In addition, the transferability of shares simply provides investors with a
method for attaining investment liquidity that is less cumbersome and less
expensive than the withdrawal and sale of the assets of a business or the
withdrawal of the money value of their investment from the business. Thus,
apart from being a protective device for investors, the existence of
transferable shares in a corporation's equity capital economizes on the
transaction costs of investment withdrawals.
' L/ab/7/Yy
Suppose the owners of the shares in the firm's equity capital were personally
liable to the full extent of their personal wealth for the debts of the corporate
entity.
Under a rule of joint and several liability, personal liability means that the
risk to which any one shareholder would be exposed is negatively correlated
to the wealth of other shareholders relative to his own personal wealth. The
poorer are the other shareholders, the larger will be the amount a wealthy
investor may eventually have to put up to settle corporate debts and vice
versa. In other words, unlimited shareholder liability would imply that
relatively wealthy investors may bear a larger part of the burden than
relatively poor shareholders, should the corporation fail to fulfill its financial
obligations.
Consequently, under a rule of unlimited joint and several shareholder
liability, shareholders would be induced to expend resources in order to
monitor the wealth of other shareholders. Since their costs in the event of
corporate default would not merely depend on the liabilities of the corporate
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firm but also on the wealth of other shareholders relative to their own,
shareholders would have loss-minimizing incentives to monitor (developments
in) other shareholders' wealth [Jensen and Meckling (1976), 331]. The costs
of monitoring other shareholders' wealth will reduce a shareholder's net
return on his investment and will thereby render investment in corporate
equity less attractive than if there were no such costs. .-::
Moreover, shareholders would have loss-minimizing incentives to demand
organizational devices preventing the entrance of poorer and the exit of richer
investors. However, devices restricting the entrance of investors of relatively
modest means would reduce the amount of risk capital a firm may be able to
attract. Devices restricting relatively wealthy shareholders from alienating
their shares would have similar effect, as such devices would discourage
investment in corporate stock by wealthy investors.
The principle of limited liability, which insulates shareholders from
liability for debts of the corporate entity, renders the relative wealth of other
shareholders irrelevant with regard to the amount of a shareholder's potential
loss. Therefore, it removes the need for shareholders to incur costs to monitor
other shareholders' wealth [Demsetz (1975), 34] and it takes away their
incentive to demand devices restricting the entry of poorer and the exit of
relatively wealthy shareholders. Apart from encouraging investment merely
by reducing investors' risk, in both ways limited liability promotes the supply
of risk capital to the corporate firm.
Limited shareholder liability does not merely economize on the resources
shareholders would otherwise expend in monitoring each other's wealth, but
also on the transaction costs facing potential providers of credit (for example,
loans).
If shareholders were personally liable for the debts of the corporation,
creditors would be entitled to collect corporate debts not only from the assets
of the corporation but also from the individual property of its shareholders.
Therefore, to assess their risk, potential creditors would have to evaluate the
personal wealth of a corporation's shareholders. The larger the number of
shareholders, the larger the costs potential creditors would have to incur to
assess shareholders' capacity to repay credit (loans) granted to and to pay
interest due by, the corporation. Similarly, the larger the number of
shareholders, the larger the costs to creditors of enforcing liability for
corporate debts against individual shareholders [Clark (1986), 8-9].
Limited shareholder liability avoids the aforesaid costs to creditors:
potential creditors have to evaluate only the corporation's payment capacity
and enforcement costs are, as a rule, limited to the costs of collecting from the
corporation. By reducing the costs of credit evaluation and the costs of
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contract enforcement, limited shareholder liability may enhance the supply of
credit and lower the cost of credit to firms operated in corporate form (to the
extent that those costs would be reflected in interest rates).
(Please note that above, we have only partially reviewed the functions of
limited liability. We have reserved Chapter 3 for an in-depth examination of
the limited liability principle.)
D/Vers/7/ed /nvesfmerrts
Centralized management is another device that promotes the supply of capital
to the corporate firm. In the discussion of the monitorial model of the
corporation we argued, mfer a//tf, that centralized management by specialist
managers economizes on the cost to investors of making decisions with regard
to the running of the corporate firm. Also, we argued that specialist managers
may be able to effect higher returns on investment than unspecialized
shareholders. However, the operation of a firm by specialized managers
enhances the firm's ability to obtain funds for investment in yet another way.
An investor who purchases shares in only one firm will lose his entire
invested wealth if that firm goes bankrupt. Modem portfolio theory teaches
that investors in corporate equity are able to reduce their risk by spreading
investments over a number of firms, provided that the prospects of success for
each of these firms do not depend on the same set of contingencies. Based on
this premise, the larger the number of holdings, the less an investor is likely to
lose as the result of any one company's failure and the less will be the
variability in returns on his aggregate investment. Accordingly, investors may
seek to reduce their risk of suffering losses through diversification of
investments [Brealey and Myers (1988), 132; Ross and Westerfield (1988),
148]. As, for example, Kripke [1976, 39] has observed, "much of the risk of
individual securities can be eliminated by appropriate diversification".
When holding shares in various unrelated firms in order to avoid
dependence on one firm's fortune, individual shareholders will have no
particular interest in becoming personally involved in the day-to-day
management of the activities of any one firm in their portfolio [Fama (1980),
291], Suppose an investor would participate in the management of each
company in the stock of which he has invested. In this event his ability to
reduce risk through diversification would be limited in two ways. First, there
is a practical limit to the number of companies someone can manage
simultaneously; this limit would constrain an investor's ability to eliminate
risk by increasing the number of his holdings. Second, an investor's costs of
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participating in the management of the firms in his portfolio would increase
concurrently with the number of investments. Ultimately these costs will
offset an investor's anticipated gain from bearing less risk, /.e. the reduction
in his potential loss from investment misfortune effected by means of
diversification.
Management by hired specialist managers enables investors to hold
diversified portfolios without having to become involved in the management
of the companies in which they invest [Morgan (1978), 93]. In this way
centralized management permits investors to reduce risk by diversification
without having to incur the costs of participating in the management of the
firms in their portfolio, and without a limit determined by the number of
companies an investor is technically able to manage. The costs of hiring
specialized managers (and agency costs) are shared by the investors in a
company's stock collectively, and wealth maximizing investors will incur
such costs until they outweigh the anticipated reduction of potential losses
further diversification (/.e. increasing the number of holdings) would
accomplish.
In summary, centralized management is an instrument that resolves the
management problems attending diversified investment portfolios. By
enabling investors to reduce their risk through diversification without having
to participate in the management of each company in their portfolio,
centralized management renders the provision of equity capital less risky,
therefore more attractive to investors. In this way it supports the supply of
risk capital to firms operated in corporate form.
(As we shall discuss in Chapter 3, limited liability of shareholders is also a
requisite for risk reduction through diversification.)
The Corporate Firm
Monitoring and capital are inputs to production processes, in the same way
that raw materials and workers' labor are. The corporate form is a vehicle for
the ready input of large amounts of capital and specialized monitoring
services to production processes.
Jensen [1983, 323] has argued that organizational forms tend to be related
to the type of activities the organization undertakes. The corporate form and
in particular the publicly held corporation, is specifically suited to organize
activities requiring large amounts of capital and specialized monitoring of
input behavior. Activities requiring such inputs include capital-intensive and
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complex production processes. They may also include other economic
activities such as trade and the provision of services, especially when these
activities are carried out on a large scale, that is, by large and complex
enterprises.
The more resources (assets) a firm seeks to own, the larger will be the
funds it needs to attract for investment in the assets of the business. In
particular, (the organizers of) a firm will seek to own those assets that are
specific to the firm's activities, /".e. that will lose value if employed elsewhere.
If such specific assets are rented, this may give rise to problems of
postcontractual opportunistic reneging (hold-up situations), as discussed in
Chapter 1. The firm's ownership of assets that are specialized with respect to
its activities serves to avoid the transaction costs connected with the
possibility of such opportunistic behavior [Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978)]. Therefore, the larger the number of firm-specific assets required to
carry on the business (and the more expensive is their creation), the larger the
amount of capital a firm will need in order to obtain the ownership of those
assets and the more likely it is that the firm's organizers will choose to take
advantage of the corporate form as a capital raising mechanism.
Moreover, the more inputs (workers) a firm employs, the larger the
potential losses from shirking by individual inputs if they are not monitored
properly to counter shirking. In any team production process, individual team
members have an incentive to shirk since the benefits of less effort or lower
quality effort by an individual member are enjoyed exclusively by that
particular member, whereas the costs of his shirking will be shared by the
team as a whole in the form of productivity losses and forgone profits [Manne
(1981), 689].
Not only does the nw/wAcr of potential shirkers rise with the number of
workers employed, but /nJ/v/t/ua/ team members will also have more
incentive to shirk as a firm grows larger. This increased incentive to shirk
ensues from the fact that as the number of team members rises, a shirking
member would have to shoulder a smaller part of the costs of his shirking
himself, since a greater part of its effects would be borne by others in the
team. In addition, when the total number of a team's members rises, the return
to each individual member from spending resources in order to detect shirking
by fellow team members will be diluted proportionately, which in turn
diminishes individual members' incentives to incur such expenditure as well
as a shirking member's chance of being caught. Accordingly, as firms grow in
size, overall shirking problems tend to grow larger [Jensen (1983), 327] and
the total costs of shirking to the firm tend to rise. Because of these increased
shirking problems, the larger a firm grows, the larger is the need for effective
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monitoring of input behavior to reduce losses from shirking, and the more
likely it is that the firm's organizers will seek the benefits of the corporate
form as a means facilitating the ready input of specialized monitoring
services.
The corporation's capital raising ability and its ability to arrange for the
inflow of effective monitoring services are key elements of an organizational
theory explaining why it has become the dominant form of organization in
those sectors of the economy requiring such inputs. In particular, these factors
yield an organizational explanation of why, for example, manufacturing
companies, transportation companies demanding substantial funds to invest in
aircraft, trucks or ships, companies engaged in trading activities on a large
scale, and commercial banks and other financial institutions which require
large amounts of capital, are predominantly organized as corporations.
The Concession Theory
The corporate form has come to flourish as a result of both the technological
developments of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath which made
possible the production (/.e. the .?«/?/?/)/) of goods on a large scale, and the
demographical developments (the population explosion) of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries which created a dewa«c/ for large quantities of products
for consumption. Both developments called for the organization of production
on a large scale, requiring the input of substantial amounts of capital and
resulting in sizeable and complex firms demanding elaborate monitoring of
input behavior. In this chapter we have endeavored to demonstrate that the
corporate form of business organization facilitates the raising of large
amounts of capital as well as the intensive monitoring of input activity in team
productive processes. Similarly, Chayes [1959, 28] observed that "[t]he
corporate form fostered not only the aggregation of capital but the altered
social organization for work implicit in large-scale enterprise".
Among lawyers, the corporate form of organization is often viewed as a
creation of the state that has grown popular in response to the above-
mentioned developments. In its most rudimentary form, this view originates in
the fact that a state permit is required to incorporate a firm. A business can be
legally operated as a corporation only after a certificate of incorporation has
been obtained, confirming the state's permission to incorporate. Thus a
corporation is deemed to come into existence upon the successful completion
of the formal procedure resulting in the issuance of a certificate of
incorporation [Clark (1986), 5]. It is frequently maintained, therefore, that the
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corporate form is essentially a cortcess/o« granted by the state.
The much cited statement of the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, John Marshall, in 1819 in Trustees o/Dar/mow//? Co//ege v.
»Wnwirf [17 U.S. (4 Wheat). 518, 636 (1819)], is illustrative of the view
of the corporation as a creation of the state. In the opinion of the court,
Marshall stated. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence". And as recently as
in 1987, in C7SCorp. v. Dymwito Cor/?. o/Vimer/ca [107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649
(1987)], the United States Supreme Court described corporations as "entities
whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law".
The theory of the corporation as a concession of the state has its roots in
medieval England [Chayes (1959), 32-35; Hessen (1979), 3-11]. In
particular, from around the eleventh century, the English Crown developed
the practice of granting special privileges to institutions such as boroughs,
guilds, churches, hospitals and charities. Such privileges were generally
granted notwithstanding potential future changes in the membership of the
organization concerned. That is to say, they were vested in the institution
rather than in its constituent human beings at a given time. In this way the
institution receiving the privilege obtained quasi-perpetual existence
comparable with that of the modern corporation.
The privileges granted by the Crown varied between different
beneficiaries. For instance, a borough might obtain the right to collect taxes,
while guilds were usually granted certain rights to fix and enforce prices and
quality standards of products, and related rights to regulate trade (;'.e.
monopoly or quasi-monopoly privileges). Churches, hospitals and charitable
institutions might be permitted to acquire and to alienate property as an entity.
The organizations which obtained such privileges independent of their
membership at a given time were known as corporations, although they
cannot be compared with the private business corporations of today [Hessen
(1979), 4-5].
In order to obtain privileges of the kinds referred to above, a special
legislative act was required. In exchange for the grant of privileges the Crown
often demanded something in return, generally a sum of money. In this way
the granting of privileges served to meet the financial needs of the Crown.
In the Mercantilist era, the Crown and later also Parliament started to
grant special privileges to trading companies on a similar basis. Originally the
organizers of such companies petitioned for a royal charter to obtain
monopoly privileges in respect of trade to specific territories and
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governmental power over those territories [Butler (1986), 170; Anderson and
Tollison (1983), 112-113]. As of the seventeenth century, promoters of
trading companies would also request that the charter included provisions
entitling their company to act as a legal entity distinct from the merchant-
venturers involved and to raise capital by the sale of transferable equity
shares, and granting limited liability to the investors putting up the equity
capital intended to finance business ventures. Such charters were primarily
sold as a means to raise money for the state [Butler (1986), 171], just as the
earlier medieval grants of privileges did. Like the medieval grants, every
separate incorporation of this type required a special legislative act.
The method of establishing corporations by a special act of Crown or
Parliament was abandoned by the adoption of general incorporation statutes
in the nineteenth century, which provided "a revolutionary new method of
creating corporations" [Hessen (1979), 3]. General incorporation statutes
were enacted prior to 1860 in England, the United States and the Netherlands.
As a result of this legislation the incorporation of a business no longer
required a legislative act by the state. To create a corporation, it became
sufficient to comply with the formalities prescribed by the general statute, and
this situation has prevailed until today.
As contemporary incorporation statutes set forth rather formal procedures
which may technically be complied with by anyone desirous to do business as
a corporation, the theory of the corporation as a privilege from the state has
lost much of its ground: the historical foundations on which this theory is
based no longer accord with the realities of today's general incorporation
legislation which makes the privilege of doing business as a corporation
available to anyone who fulfills the formalities prescribed by the law [Berle
(1950), 198]. Under the current legislation, the choice for the corporate form
is a decision by private parties and not contingent on some discretionary act
of the state. As Berle [1950, 217] has put it, under today's general
incorporation statutes "[t]he Government, for all practical purposes, no longer
creates a corporate entity".
In the Netherlands, the theory of the corporation as a creature of the state
is often associated with the birth in 1602 of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie (the "VOC"), a joint-stock trading company [Van der Grinten
(1992), 2; Van Schilfgaarde (1995), 29]. The VOC was established pursuant
to a concession granted by the state, which, /«ter o//'o, bestowed corporate
features upon it. However, in our view, the essence ofthat concession was not
the bestowal of corporate features but the granting of a trade monopoly
relating to trading with what is now known as Indonesia and other parts of
Eastern Asia and the conferral of governmental powers over corresponding
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East Asian territories, backed by the right to use military force for these
purposes [Gaastra (1991), 20-23]. Likewise, Gaastra [1991, 21] has regarded
the assignment of sovereign powers to the VOC as the company's
distinguishing characteristic. Both before and after the establishment of the
VOC, trading companies were established in the Netherlands which had
corporate characteristics based upon private contracts between the parties
involved, and which did not ensue from any concession or privilege granted
by the state [Gaastra (1991), 16-19; Van der Grinten (1992), 2-6; Maeijer
(1994), 2-3],
Sections 2:64 (2) and 2:175 (2) of the current Dutch Civil Code require
that a "statement of no objections" be given by the Minister of Justice before
a business can be incorporated. However, this requirement should «or be
conceived of as evidence for, or as a reminiscence of, the corporation as a
creature (concession) of the state. Ignoring for the moment differences in the
legal history of the corporation in the Netherlands, on the one hand, and
England and the United States on the other, the requisite ministerial
"statement of no objections" is a merely formal requirement: the grounds on
which it may be obtained are generally available to the public (Sections 2:68
(2) and 2:179 (2) of the Civil Code and the Guidelines on incorporation
published by the Ministry of Justice, most recently in 1985) and the Minister
of Justice is legally obliged to issue the statement upon request if these
grounds are duly complied with. Thus, the ministerial statement of no
objections is part of the formal procedure of incorporation, and does not
provide the Minister with substantive discretion to permit or to refuse
incorporation as would have been typical of the granting of a "privilege'Mike
concession.
The Contractual Theory
The view of the corporation as a creation of the state has encountered
fundamental criticism because it largely ignores the role of voluntary
agreements among private individuals in the emergence and the prevalence of
the corporate form [Anderson and Tollison (1983); Butler (1986); Butler and
Ribstein (1988)]. Based on that criticism, an alternative theory has arisen
which explains the corporation as a result of private contracting and not as a
product of governmental activity. According to this theory, the corporation is
a creature of market forces, particularly of the demand for capital and
monitoring services by some and the supply thereof by others. Where such
demand and supply meet, contracts arise which are considered to be reflected
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in the characteristics of the corporation. Accordingly, the corporate form, just
as the firm it organizes, has been construed as a set of contractual
relationships among various cooperating individuals [Jensen and Meckling
(1976), 310-311; Jensen (1983), 326]. The contractual theory of the
corporation has come to be the dominant view among neoinstitutionalist
economists.
In the previous chapter we discussed the "nexus of contracts" concept of
the firm, which views they?rm as a result of the contracting process between
cooperative input owners aimed at enabling joint production. Likewise, the
corporate ^ orm of organization has been conceptualized as a set of contracts
among cooperative individuals, including providers of risk capital, specialized
managers and creditors. The leading definition comes from Jensen and
Meckling, who described the corporation as a '7ega/_/?cf/"on w/7/cA serves as a
nexus ybr cort/racfr>7g re/afto«s/7//>s a«d w/j/c/7 /s a/so cAaractenzea' Z?y ffo
ex/stewce 0/ aVv/s/6/e res/a'wa/ c/a//ws o« fAe asse/s OHO* cas/7 y7ows 0/ //;e
/7/cÄ COA? ge«era//y 6e so/a* W/YÄOM/ /7erm/«/o« 0 / //?e of/?e/-
/MO"; V/OMO/S" [ 1976, 311; emphasis by the authors]. The
contractual relationships which make up the corporate concept specify "the
rules of the game within the organization" [Jensen (1983), 326], ;.e. the basic
organizational framework within which a firm structured as a corporation is
to operate.
In Chapter 1 we described the different meanings of the term "contract" in
law and economics, respectively. This difference is crucial to understanding
the contractual concept of the corporation as embraced by economists. As
described, while lawyers tend to define a contract as one or more legally
binding promises, to an economist a contract is properly, and more broadly,
defined as "an arrangement between two or more actors supported by
reciprocal expectations and behavior", as Gordon [1989, 1549] has stated.
The "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation is predominantly based on
the economists' conception of a contract. The corporation is viewed as a
gathering point for a series of commitments, express and implied, among
individuals desirous to cooperate according to certain principles structuring
their relationship, which are comprised in the corporate form. According to
this approach, the corporation is a compilation of voluntary arrangements
among private parties accompanied by the parties' reciprocal expectations
that each of them will behave accordingly. No explicit, legally enforceable
contracts are required.
The "nexus of contracts" view has its legal counterpart in the inherence
theory, which views the concept of the corporation as the inherent result of
purely private contracts requiring legal recognition [Henn and Alexander
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(1983), 146; Butler and Ribstein (1988), 622]. The inherence theory assumes
that the voluntary associative activities of individuals demanded recognition
by the law, which is provided by the legal concept of the corporation. This
approach does suggest that a corporation could technically be organized by
means of oc/wo/, legally binding agreements among private individuals.
For instance, to enable a firm to enter into contracts in the market as an
entity, the firm's constituent human beings could appoint a central agent (for
example, a trustee) to represent them and authorize him to conclude contracts
on their behalf. Legal title to the assets of the business could also be placed in
the name of this agent. Similarly, the organizers of the firm could contract
among themselves to channel legal actions by the firm through this central
agent. In order that third parties wishing to take legal action against the firm
would sue the firm and not individual input owners, they could include
provisions to this effect in contracts with third parties. And if the judiciary
would not uphold such provisions, contractual arrangements providing for
arbitration by private arbitrators could perhaps provide an alternative means
of dispute resolution. The corporation's 'legal personality" formalizes such
arrangements, and replaces a multitude of separate contracts among
individuals that would be necessary to produce a similar result.
Also, investors could agree with other input owners to put up capital in
exchange for (a portion of) the residual claim on the firm's assets and cash
flows. They could further agree that separate portions of the residual claim
should be transferable by their respective owners without the permission of
the other contracting individuals. The concept of transferable shares in the
corporation's equity capital reflects such arrangements.
Limited liability for investors in corporate equity is another device which,
to a large extent, could be accomplished by means of contractual instruments.
Limited liability is a risk-sharing arrangement between the suppliers of risk
capital and the corporation's creditors. The former agree that both their
remuneration and the ultimate repayment of their capital contribution be
contingent on the firm's success and that their claims for repayment be
subordinated to creditors' claims, provided that their total risk is limited to the
value of their investment, that is to say, provided that they will not have to
make up for the corporation's debts to its creditors. Creditors, on the other
hand, consent to seeking repayment from the corporation's assets and cash
flows only on condition that they themselves are given a fixed claim on the
corporation's resources with priority over equity claims.
Shareholders and creditors could contract for limited shareholder liability
as a part of the credit agreement. To provide shareholders with limited
liability, standard clauses to this effect may be included on a regular basis in
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contracts entered into on behalf of the firm. However, there may also be
creditors who involuntarily provide credit, that is, who have not entered into a
prior contract. This category includes, in particular, the victims of torts
generated by the operations of the firm. Such tort victims are creditors of the
firm to the extent that the latter is liable to pay damages to them after the tort
is committed, but unlike voluntary creditors they have not agreed to provide
credit.
One could hypothesize, however, that involuntary creditors and
shareholders may enter into contracts by which the creditors agree not to seek
payment of damages from the personal (;.e. non-invested) assets of the
shareholders, on condition that their claim for damages is given priority over
shareholders' residual claim on the corporation's resources. Such contracts
might be concluded before a liability in tort arises in as far as shareholders
could identify potential tort victims in anticipation. The corporate principle of
limited shareholder liability reflects such an arrangement to protect
shareholders' non-invested wealth from tortious liabilities generated by the
firm. (Whether contracts limiting shareholders' liability to tort creditors
would be //£e/y to arise is a different question, but technically such
contractual limitations are possible.)
Centralized management, too, could be achieved by means of contracts. To
achieve the advantages of centralized management the residual claimants
could contract among themselves so as to hire one or more specialized agents
to manage the business. Through the appointment of one or more of such
agents they could seek to maximize their earnings from the possession of the
residual claim. The contractual arrangements needed to separate the function
of residual claimant from the management of the firm are represented in the
concept of the corporation where it provides for centralized management by a
governing body.
Note that the use of contractual instruments to achieve corporate
characteristics is not merely a theoretical construct. Anderson and Tollison
[1983] and Butler [1986] have produced historical evidence demonstrating
that in England and in the United States, prior to the coming of general
incorporation legislation in the nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for
firms to be given corporate characteristics by means of contractual
arrangements of the kinds described above. In this way companies were
created which, although not legally incorporated, enjoyed the essential
organizational features of a corporation. Contractual arrangements were used
to establish corporate characteristics in order to avoid the costs of formal
incorporation through a special legislative act by Crown or Parliament (or, in
the early United States, state legislature). Anderson and Tollison [1983, 116]
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therefore conclude that the "emergence and spread of the corporation did not
depend on legislation. (...) The corporation emerged because it was an
efficiency instrument".
The Corporation as a Standard Contract
If the main organizational features characterizing a corporation can be
achieved, at least in theory, by means of private contracts among the
individuals concerned, then what is the function of the /ego/ concept of the
corporation? In other words, if individuals can contract to establish an
organization with corporate attributes, why does the law expressly provide for
the corporate form in a public corporation statute? And why do corporation
statutes provide for a formal procedure to establish a corporation through a
certificate of incorporation issued by the state?
The answer, again, rests on transaction costs. If transaction costs were
zero, an organizational structure with corporate attributes could be created at
no cost by means of contractual arrangements among the individuals involved
in the manner described above. However, given the existence of positive
transaction costs, considerable resources would inevitably be absorbed by the
costs of making the various arrangements that would be needed to bring about
corporate characteristics. The amount of such transaction costs may be
prohibitive.
If transaction costs would prevent the necessary contractual arrangements,
the advantages of the corporate form in the raising of capital and the
attainment of effective monitoring of input behavior would not be realized. In
as far as this would inhibit firms from obtaining the capital inputs and
monitoring services required to maximize output and to minimize unit
production costs, consumer interests would be harmed. And where
notwithstanding the existence of positive transaction costs, parties would
contract to create corporate features, high transaction costs would be reflected
in the prices consumers will have to pay for the firm's output. In the second
case, to the extent that high transaction costs would reduce net returns to
investors, they would also adversely affect levels of investment, with similar
effect on output levels and prices. In short, if corporate characteristics were to
be created by a multitude of separate contracts, the existence of positive
transaction costs would imply that the requisite arrangements might not come
about at all, or at high costs (prices) only.
In general, the higher the cost of operating a firm in corporate form, the
more likely the firm will be organized in an alternative way (/.e. without the
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benefits of the corporate form). And, as noted earlier, the higher the cost of
organizing production in a firm in whatever way relative to the cost of using
market transactions, the less likely production will be organized in a firm.
Either way, transaction costs have a negative effect on the amount of output
that will become available for the satisfaction of consumer needs and on the
prices consumers have to pay. "" i \o , i
The legal concept of the corporation and the procedure of incorporation
under a public statute serve to economize on the transaction costs associated
with the creation of corporate features by means of a variety of private
contracts. Instead of the transaction costs of numerous contractual
arrangements, individuals desiring to organize a firm in corporate form
merely have to incur the cost of the formal procedure with which they have to
comply in order to receive a certificate of incorporation from the state
(pursuant to the applicable corporate statute). As the cost of compliance with
this legal procedure is most likely less than the costs of separate contracts
among private individuals, a net reduction in the costs of organizing a
corporation is achieved.
The corporation as recognized by corporate law is a standard-form
contract that unites the various contractual arrangements that would be
required to bring about corporate features if no corporate statute and no
incorporation procedure existed. Accordingly, the primary utility of corporate
law has been said to lie in the provision of "a set of standard, implied contract
terms" [Posner (1976), 506]. These standard contract terms specify the rights
and duties of the parties to the contract comprising the corporation, which are
summarized in the four cornerstones of the corporate form, viz. legal
personality, transferable shares, limited shareholder liability and centralized
management. As Posner [1992, 396] has observed, the corporation as a
standard contract serves "to economize on transaction costs by supplying
standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt by
express agreement". By compliance with the procedure for incorporating a
business prescribed by the law, the parties can opt into the standard contract
terms embodied in the corporate law.
The above reasoning suggests that if the costs of incorporation under a
public statute were to exceed the costs of obtaining corporate characteristics
through the use of contractual instruments, parties seeking the benefits of
corporate characteristics would apply the latter instead. Indeed, Anderson and
Tollison [1983, 110-112] have found evidence indicating that in the eighteenth
century in England, the high costs of the legal procedure required for
incorporation motivated the use of contractual arrangements to organize
unincorporated firms with corporate features as a substitute for the specially
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chartered corporation. High costs of formal incorporation have also been
reported by Amsler, Bartlett and Bolton [1981, 776] who found that the costs
of obtaining a corporate charter from the Crown or Parliament at the time
were prohibitive for "all but the largest enterprises" because of "the elaborate
and uncertain political procedures" which the chartering process required.
Private contracting then afforded an alternative means for obtaining corporate
characteristics.
As the concept of the corporation is essentially the reflection of a
voluntary contracting process among private individuals, it is not a creation of
the state. By embodying the corporate concept in a statute establishing a
formal procedure for obtaining corporate features through a state certificate
of incorporation, the state recognizes the result attainable by private
contracting. Given that the state does not create the corporate form but merely
recognizes it, Butler and Ribstein [1988, 620] conclude that "a state corporate
filing no more creates a corporation than a birth certificate creates a baby".
Incorporation under a corporate statute a//?r/w5 the arrangements private
parties consent to but it does not cmrte them.
The contractual approach set out above and the more traditional view of
the corporation as a concession granted by the state both have different
normative connotations.
The concession theory suggests first that the terms on which individuals
may do business as a corporation are determined by the state rather than by
the will of the private parties concerned. When the corporation is defined as a
concession by the state, the state granting the corporate privilege (/.e. the state
in which the firm is incorporated) is deemed free to decide the content of the
privilege as it pleases, and it may unilaterally modify the terms of the
privilege as embodied in the corporate law. Second, the conception of the
corporation as a grant from the state suggests that the beneficiaries of the
corporate privilege should adhere to the terms which govern it, and are not
free to agree on deviations from the otherwise governing rules without the
permission of the state [Henn and Alexander (1983), 145-146]. In other
words, the concession theory supports the view that the legal rules governing
the corporate form are /wa«dotory rather than enaW/rtg.
On the other hand, the contractual theory of the corporation suggests that
since the corporation is the result of private contracting, corporate law should
seek to standardize the contractual arrangements which private parties would
normally arrive at if they could bargain without obstacles, in other words, if
transaction costs were zero. Such standardized contract terms implied by the
law reduce the cost of attaining corporate attributes and so economize on the
cost of economic organization, to the extent that the standard terms properly
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accommodate the desires of the private parties concerned [Posner (1976),
506]. From this perspective the role of the state is limited to the creation of
standard-form contract terms which minimize the effects of transaction costs
[Butler and Ribstein (1988), 617, 619].
Moreover, since from the contractual viewpoint corporation law is deemed
to be a reflection of purely private agreements, parties should be free to "opt
out", that is to say, they should be free to agree on terms different from those
provided by corporation law. As Gordon [1989, 1551] has put it, according to
this theory corporation law should function as "an "off the rack" set of terms
that parties may use for their convenience but may also freely alter". Thus
corporation law is primarily thought of as being of an e/ra6//>?g nature.
The Dutch corporation statute, by contrast, provides that departures from
statute law are allowed only if and to the extent permitted by the statute
(Section 2:25 of the Civil Code). The mandatory nature of Dutch corporate
law is based on the premise that the corporate form is a concession from the
state, a premise that defies the essentially voluntary associative nature of the
relationships between the various parties involved in the corporation.
In relation to corporations incorporated in United States state jurisdictions,
finally, Butler and Ribstein [1988] have construed the contractual nature of
the corporate form to imply that the private arrangements embodied in
corporate charters deserve the protection of the "Contract Clause" of Article
I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution, providing: "No State shall
(...) pass any (...) Law impairing the obligation of Contracts (...)".
Application of the Contract Clause to the associative arrangements which
make up the corporation would considerably restrain the power of state
legislatures to enact corporate legislation unilaterally dictating changes into
the terms governing previously established corporate charters. According to
this interpretation, state legislation impairing the rights that private parties
have under corporate charters in existence when the particular legislation is
introduced, might face challenges on the basis of unconstitutionality, and from
the corporation's contractual nature would ensue a constitutionally protected
right to structure corporate relations basically free from post-incorporation
regulatory interference by the states.
3. A PARADOX NAMED LIMITED
LIABILITY
THE CORPORATION IS a legal method for organizing a firm that comprises
contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between the firm's various
constituents. The corporate form does not merely serve to organize economic
activity in a manner avoiding the costs of carrying out exchange transactions
in the market, but it also makes available to the firm the advantages of legal
entity status, transferable equity shares, limited shareholder liability and
centralized management. Incorporation under a corporate statute serves to
avoid the transaction costs that would be incurred if the same characteristics
had to be accomplished by means of private bargaining.
Limited liability for equity investors is often regarded as the "hallmark of
the corporation" [Sowards (1974), 2]. At the same time, it is presumably the
least understood and most puzzling feature of the corporate concept. The
owners of equity shares assume the risk of the firm's success or failure as
both the return on their investment and the repayment of their capital
contribution at the corporation's dissolution are contingent upon the
prosperity of the business. However, whereas share owners, in principle, are
entitled to all of the firm's profits, they assume the risk of the firm's failure to
a limited extent only: the statutory principle of limited liability limits a
shareholder's risk to the value of his investment. The risk that the corporation
performs so poorly that it ultimately proves unable to fulfil its obligations to
creditors is shifted to the latter.
Limited liability means that shareholders bear all of the positive wealth
effects of the activities of a firm operated in corporate form, but only part of
the negative wealth effects that the operations of the firm may generate. They
have unlimited title to the profits which the firm may accumulate but their
stake in the firm's losses is limited to the amount of their investment. Why do
we observe this distinction, and what is its function in the context of the
organizational concept the corporation embodies?
In the preceding chapter we examined the ways in which the distinctive
organizational characteristics of the corporate form relate to the operation of
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a firm. In the present chapter we examine in greater detail the role of one of
these characteristics, the principle of limited liability for shareholders. Our
analysis centers, as before, on the particular functions of this principle in
relation to publicly held corporations. . . . . . .
The Principle of Limited Liability
As a legal entity, the corporation itself is liable for any debts attributable to it
which are incurred in the course of its business. The corporation is liable for
obligations arising from contracts which employees or agents have entered
into on behalf of the corporation, for torts generated by the corporate firm's
operations, for taxes imposed on it by fiscal authorities and for social security
premiums payable under social statutes. Thus a corporation is subject to civil
liability in the same way as a private individual.
"Corporate liability" refers to the corporation's ability to be liable as one
entity, and this ability is inherent in the corporate form. Corporate liability
ensures that those dealing with the corporation and those injured by its
activities need to make one stop only in order to claim damages or to demand
the performance of a contract, and have access to one "deep pocket" from
which damages may be obtained.
In general, the corporation's constituent human beings are not liable for
obligations incumbent on the corporate entity. This principle applies to
shareholders, directors, officers and workers alike. It does not, however,
relieve these persons of the possibility that they become subject to liability as
an individual. For instance, a worker who commits a tort while acting in the
course of his employment may well be personally liable for the harm done to
the victim, albeit that in many cases he has recourse to the corporate entity for
reimbursement. Similarly, officers defrauding the corporation's creditors may
become subject to personal liability.
The corporation's legal personality, enabling it to have obligations in its
own name and on its own behalf, does not by nature absolve its constituent
human beings from liability for the obligations of the corporation. One could
conceive of an arrangement imposing liability on the corporation with
vicarious liability of some or all of its constituent persons for corporate debts.
The non-liability of shareholders, managers and workers for the obligations of
the corporation, therefore, is complementary to the concept of corporate
liability.
Non-liability of managers is consistent with, and ensues from, the
principles of agency law. Managers acting on behalf of the corporation are
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legal agents of the corporation (;.e. the legal entity), the latter being their
principal. Generally, a principal assumes liability for the actions of his agent
that are within the scope of the authority conferred upon him, but not vice
versa. Accordingly, managers may contract debts, the payment of which the
corporation is liable for, but they are not personally liable for the latter's
obligations. Similarly, an employer is usually obliged to compensate workers
for liabilities they incur when acting in the course of their employment, but
not the other way round. Therefore, the non-liability of managers and workers
for corporate debts is not peculiar to corporations but it is the prevailing rule
with any agency or employment relationship.
Suppose that the corporation would not enjoy legal personality, and that
managers would act directly on behalf of the shareholders. Managers would
then be the legal agents of the shareholders. In this event the latter, as their
principals, would be liable for obligations entered into by managers (provided
they acted within the scope of their authority) and managers would be relieved
of personal liability. Non-liability of managers, thus, is in fact independent of
the corporation's legal personality.
Shareholders are neither agents nor employees of the corporation.
Therefore, shareholders' non-liability for corporate debts once they have paid
full consideration for their shares cannot be explained by the existence of an
agency or employment relationship. Non-liability of shareholders is a distinct
legal rule that has emerged by its own merits.
The term "limited shareholder liability", as the above suggests, is, strictly
speaking, inaccurate. Upon payment of the subscription price of their shares,
shareholders are under no obligation whatsoever to pay any more to the
corporation or its creditors. In other words, shareholders who have paid full
consideration for their shares are relieved of any liability whatsoever. We will
continue to speak of "limited liability" instead of "non-liability" (which would
be more accurate) only because the former term is the more current one.
As noted in Chapter 2, limited shareholder liability is a risk-sharing
arrangement between shareholders and creditors [Easterbrook and Fischel
(1985), 101]. It effects that the risk (including the cost) of the corporation's
failure is borne by the shareholders to the extent of their investment and that
the remainder is borne by the corporation's creditors. Because of
shareholders' limited liability, creditors cannot collect debts of the corporation
from shareholders' personal assets (except if they contract around the rule of
limited liability), and will be unpaid if corporate debts cannot be satisfied out
of the corporation's assets. Limited liability of shareholders has been
described, therefore, as "an arrangement under which the loss largely lies
where it falls" [Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 98].
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If a prize were awarded to the most celebrated corporate feature, limited
liability would win it with distinction. For instance, Eliot has depicted limited
liability of shareholders as "the corporation's most precious characteristic"
[Cook (1921), 583], Henn [1970, 96] has called it "the most attractive feature
of the corporation", while Posner [1976, 502] has denoted limited liability as
the "basic principle of corporation law". Warner Fuller [1938, 1376] has
asserted that in "the historical development of the corporation probably no
single attribute has been more significant than that of limited liability". Even
more emphatically, the commentator of The Economist of December 18,
1926, wrote: "The economic historian of the future may assign to the
nameless inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading
corporations, a place of honour with Watt and Stephenson, and other pioneers
of the Industrial Revolution" [Halpern, Trebilcock and Tumbull (1980), 118;
Hunt (1936), 116]. Similarly, Hicks [1982, 12] has said that "it must be
regarded as a major achievement of limited liability that it has made much of
our economic progress possible".
The Limited Liability Paradox
The favorable appraisals cited above should not conceal the fact that, in a
way, the statutory principle of limited liability for shareholders is a stepchild
of the law.
Both tort and property law contain rules to the effect that the person who
is entitled to the benefits from an activity or a piece of property is also subject
to full personal liability for the costs the activity or property imposes on
others, once the legal requirements for establishing liability have been
fulfilled. The principle of limited shareholder liability, however, has the
opposite effect. As indicated, it results in the fact that those who are entitled
to the benefits ensuing from a firm's operations (the profits earned), are not
liable for the costs these operations would impose on creditors if the
corporation's assets fall short of its debts.
As a rule, the owner of an asset (a piece of equipment, a building, an
animal) is entitled to the fruits the asset produces but, at the same time, he is
liable to the full extent of his personal wealth for harm the asset concerned
may cause to others. Likewise, a person who chooses to engage in a particular
course of action also has to make up in full for harm done to third parties
attributable to the action concerned (in particular, in the event a tort is
committed). A car driver enjoys the benefit of driving but if he injures a
pedestrian through his fault, he will be fully liable for damages payable.
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Similarly, an employer who earns the benefits from his employees' labor is in
most cases obliged to assume the liabilities incurred by the employees in the
course of their work.
In each of these instances, the law establishes that the person who has the
benefits from an activity or an asset also has to bear its costs to third parties
(provided the conditions for imposing liability as determined by the law are
fulfilled). The economic rationale underlying such rules is that a person will
behave efficiently only if he bears the full social costs (/.e. the costs to himself
one/the costs to other members of society) of the asset or the activity of which
he enjoys the fruits.
Suppose a person does not, or not entirely, have to pay for the adverse
effects of his behavior on others. In this event he will be induced to leave
potential costs to third parties out of account, in whole or in part, when
choosing between alternative ways of behaving. Consequently, his decisions
will most likely be inconsistent with the social costs they may generate. He
will be inclined to undertake too much of a particular activity or to employ
too much of a particular asset in proportion to its total costs to society as a
whole. For instance, if a car driver were not liable for harm caused by
careless driving, he would have little or no incentive to exercise care for
others. Therefore, the level of careless driving he would be likely to undertake
would be too high in relation to the potential costs thereof to others, especially
the costs to the victims of traffic accidents.
In general terms, microeconomic theory teaches that a person maximizes
his utility by engaging in those activities in which his marginal anticipated
benefits equal the marginal anticipated costs to himself (/. e. marginal /wvvate
costs). If a person does not bear the costs of his actions to other members of
society, however, he will ignore such costs when deciding on how to act. In
consequence, he will select actions that maximize his personal utility but of
which the marginal costs to society as a whole may well outweigh the
marginal benefits to society.
Where the law makes a person liable for costs (injury) imposed on others,
he is given an incentive to take such costs into account when making decisions
as they will now be relevant to the calculation of his net private gain from a
contemplated activity. Accordingly, he will compare his anticipated benefits
from a particular course of action to the ^w// costs the action is likely to
generate (including its costs to other members of society). Hence, his behavior
will now reflect cost-benefit calculations at which his marginal anticipated
benefits will be equal to marginal soc/a/ costs. When private participants in
the economy select activities at which marginal social benefits equal marginal
social costs, their behavior is considered to be socially efficient.
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Limited liability for shareholders defies the above reasoning. Shareholders
enjoy the benefits from the activities of the firm in which they invest through
their claim on its profits, but the principle of limited liability sets a maximum
to shareholders' potential costs from the firm's operations. Therefore, their
investment decisions, including the activities they desire the firm to undertake,
have to take account of the potential costs of the firm's operations only up to
the extent of shareholders' investment. Thus, although elsewhere the law
provides that persons entitled to the benefits from an activity or an asset are
liable in full for its costs to third parties, shareholders, in contrast, have full
title to the profits earned by the firm in which they own shares but they are
not liable for the costs of its operations beyond the subscription price of their
shares. Why is it that shareholders are treated differently?
The popular belief is that limited liability promotes investments by risk
averse investors [Manne (1975), 513; Posner (1976), 502; Barber (1981),
371; Thompson (1991), 1039]. Risk-aversion - a common assumption in
microeconomics with respect to individuals - presupposes that a person
attaches greater utility to a certain prospect of wealth than to an uncertain
prospect of equal monetary value (for instance, he would prefer a 100 percent
chance of receiving USD 10 to a 10 percent chance of receiving USD 100).
Expressed negatively, risk averse individuals are assumed to dislike
uncertainty about the potential magnitude of the losses that they might suffer
(they would prefer, for instance, a 20 percent chance of incurring a loss of
USD 100 on an investment to a 10 percent chance of losing USD 200 as the
latter situation would involve a larger possible loss, although both situations
represent the same monetary value, viz. USD 20) [Shavell (1987), 186].
According to the theory that risk-aversion on the part of investors explains
limited liability, the possibility that creditors could reach a shareholder's non-
invested assets would deter risk-averse individuals from making equity
investments as it would create uncertainty about the possible size of their loss.
By setting a limit on investors' maximum potential loss, limited liability
reduces such uncertainty and, in effect, is deemed to alleviate this impediment
to raising capital. Indeed, Blumberg [1993, 337], among others, has stated
that one of the important advantages of limited liability lies in "its
encouragement of entrepreneurial risk taking and new investment". True as
this undoubtedly be, it does not provide us with a full explanation of the
principle of limited shareholder liability.
The risk-aversion argument is incomplete as lenders also enjoy limited
liability. Lenders' risk is limited in three ways: their potential loss is limited to
the amount of their loan, they have a fixed claim on the corporation's assets
and cash flows which is preferential to shareholders" residual claim, and they
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may further limit their risk by stipulating security for the repayment of their
loan. Thus, if shareholders were personally liable for the debts of the
corporation, risk averse investors unwilling to assume unlimited liability
could provide capital by fertd/rtg money. Rather than purchasing equity
shares, they could, for example, invest in bonds issued by the corporation.
Limited liability may be a necessary condition for explaining investment in
equity by risk averse investors but, as lenders also have limited liability, it is
not a s«$?c/e/7f condition [Jensen and Meckling (1976), 331].
The risk-aversion argument is incomplete moreover, because it ignores the
possibility that with unlimited liability, risk averse investors might choose to
take out liability insurance if and to the extent that such insurance were
available [Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (1980), 128; Shavell (1987), 176
fh. 17]. For instance, when subscribing to equity shares carrying unlimited
liability, they could concurrently purchase third party liability insurance
protecting them against tortious liabilities generated by the firm. If full
insurance were available to cover investors' risk of personal liability, limited
liability would not even be a necessary condition for investments by risk
averse investors. (We will discuss the issue of unlimited liability and
insurance in more detail in Chapter 8.) Thus, on the whole, risk-aversion
would seem to be a largely at/ /JOC argument to explain limited liability in
situations in which the firm has attracted capital from sM/?/Nwec//y risk averse
investors not merely in the form of debt and in which insurance would not
provide such investors with suitable protection against unlimited liability.
Another popular belief is that limited shareholder liability somehow lowers
the costs to a firm of obtaining capital. Granted, with limited liability
investors presumably pay more for a share as their losses in the event of
corporate failure are less and, therefore, the relationship between risk incurred
and anticipated returns is more favorable to them. However, the limited
liability of share owners reduces the number (and thus the value) of the assets
from which lenders may seek repayment of a loan in comparison with the
assets which would be available were a rule of unlimited shareholder liability
to apply. If shareholders were subject to unlimited liability, lenders could
collect the loan out of both the assets of the corporation and shareholders'
personal wealth, whereas under a rule of limited liability they are unable to
reach shareholders' non-invested assets.
As limited shareholder liability reduces the assets from which lenders may
collect payment of the corporation's debts, they will probably demand higher
interest rates, or collateral for the repayment of loans extended to the
corporation, or both [Meiners, Mofsky and Tolhson (1979), 359-362]. In this
manner, when a shareholder is protected by a limited liability rule, "market
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conditions force him to pay a price for the limited liability", as Meiners,
Mofsky and Tollison [1979, 361] have observed. Therefore, at this point the
thesis that limited liability lowers a firm's cost of capital would seem to be, at
best, an unproven proposition.
What, then, does limited liability do?
Limited Liability in the Monitorial Model
In Chapter 2 we described two economic models of the corporate form of
organization. The monitorial model explains the corporation as a mechanism
for achieving effective monitoring of input performance in a team production
process. The complementary financial model approaches the corporate form
as an instrument for attracting capital into a firm. Below we discuss the
functions of limited shareholder liability in both models, starting with the
monitorial model.
Coste of Mon/foringr
In the monitorial model, the function of monitor of the other inputs in the firm
is assigned to the joint shareholders, motivated by the possession of the
residual claim. They may delegate a substantial part of their monitoring task
to specialized, hired managers and monitor the performance of these managers
instead of monitoring a// cooperative inputs. Specialized managers will then
direct the use of resources within the firm, measure individual productivities,
apportion rewards, and discipline individual inputs. In brief, they will be
responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm's operations.
The larger the risk to which an individual is exposed, the greater, in all
likelihood, will be his desire to control the factors that determine his exposure.
Likewise, the larger the amount of an investor's potential loss relative to his
total wealth, the greater will be his incentive to actively monitor the
performance of the firm in which he has invested with a view to controlling
the liabilities it incurs. Thus, shareholders' risk is positively related to their
desire to monitor the other inputs in the firm: "The more risk they bear, the
more they will monitor" [Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 94].
Accordingly, shareholders' incentives to participate in the actual decision-
making with regard to the operations of the firm are likely to correspond to
the amount of risk to which they are exposed.
Shareholders' risk is determined by a variety of factors, including the
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nature of the activities of the firm in which they hold shares, its perceived
chances of commercial success, and the legal rule which governs
shareholders' liability for the tortious and contractual liabilities generated by
the firm. Therefore, the form of the liability rule determining their liability for
the obligations of the corporation affects shareholders' incentives to become
involved in the making of business decisions, and affects the degree of
participation in the management of the firm shareholders will demand
[Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (1980), 125].
Since under a rule of unlimited liability, shareholders are subject to the
risk of losing their entire wealth, they would be motivated to participate
actively in the management of the firm in order to protect their wealth. In
other words, they would have risk-minimizing incentives to be closely
involved in the direction of the firm's operations so as to see that they would
not be "ruined by the mistakes that it made" [Hicks (1982), 11]. As Posner
[1992, 393] has put it, with unlimited liability an investor may want "to
participate in the actual management of the firm to make sure it does not run
up huge debts for which he would be liable".
The larger the number of shareholders, the greater will be the number of
bargains needed to take decisions and the larger will be the costs of operating
the firm, if all or most of the shareholders were involved in managerial
decision-making. Substantial resources would be absorbed in making
decisions to direct the use of resources in the firm, and in the acquisition and
digestion of information by the shareholders on the basis of which such
decisions are made. Consequently, Demsetz [1975, 33] concludes that if the
individual shareholders participate in each decision that needs to be made to
run the company, "the scale economies of operating the company will be
overcome quickly by high negotiating cost".
As limited liability sets a maximum on the losses managers may cause
shareholders, it mitigates the risk shareholders take when entrusting their
investment to specialized managers. Given that limited liability reduces their
risk, it lessens shareholders' incentives to participate actively in the firm's
management and increases their willingness to delegate the day-to-day
management to a limited number of managers. Thus, limited liability is likely
to lower the degree of participation in managerial decision-making by the
individual shareholders. In this way, it serves to economize on the costs of
operating the firm relative to operating costs under a rule of unlimited
shareholder liability.
The larger the number of shareholders, the larger will be the reduction in
the costs of business decision-making which is achieved when shareholders
delegate the firm's day-to-day management to a relatively small group of
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managers. Therefore, the larger the number of shareholders, the more
important is the cost-saving function of limited liability as a means of
promoting centralized management by a limited management group.
Spec/a//zatfon /n Mon/foring
In the preceding section we noticed that under the rule of limited liability,
wealth maximizing shareholders are more inclined to entrust their investment
to a relatively small number of managers than they would be were a rule of
unlimited liability to apply. In this way limited liability does not merely
economize on the costs of business decision-making, it also encourages
•spec/W/za/zon in management, that is, it encourages the separation of the
functions of residual risk-bearing and management of the firm. Limited
liability encourages such a functional specialization by limiting the costs
which managers may impose on shareholders through inadequate business
decisions and, in particular, by limiting the potential costs to shareholders of
any divergence of interests between shareholders and specialized managers
which may result from the separation of management and risk-bearing
[Ekelund and Tollison (1980), 718 fh. 5].
In Chapter 2 we argued that specialized management yields the same gains
that are usually associated with specialization. Apart from bringing about a
reduction in the aggregate costs of decision-making, then, management by
specialized managers is likely to produce more extensive and better skilled
monitoring of input behavior, at a lower cost per unit of monitoring, than
management by unspecialized shareholders. This will not merely result in
higher returns to shareholders but it is also beneficial to society as a whole:
better management at less cost per unit will be reflected in increased
productivity of the firm, resulting in the availability of more output for the
satisfaction of consumer needs, at lower costs (prices) to consumers. By
reducing the risk shareholders take when assigning the day-to-day
management of the firm to specialized managers, limited liability supports the
realization of these benefits.
The monitoring of input activity typically has characteristics associated
with economies of scale [Manne (1981), 689]: a large volume of monitoring
can be produced at a lower cost per unit than a small volume, because greater
volumes allow a larger degree of specialization. The larger the amount of
monitoring required, the larger the productivity gains attainable by
specialization and the greater the value of limited liability as a device
promoting functional specialization in monitoring. Therefore, the benefit of
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limited liability as a device for encouraging specialized management is
greatest in large firms that organize complex businesses requiring a large
input of monitoring.
Limited liability not only encourages delegation of a firm's day-to-day
management to specialized managers, it also bears upon the supervision over
the firm's managers. Suppose that shareholders hired specialized managers
even under a rule of unlimited liability. As these managers might impose
indefinite costs on shareholders, the latter would have risk-minimizing
incentives to exercise detailed supervision over the management team. They
would be reluctant to entrust the monitoring of the day-to-day management to
specialized monitor-monitors (/".e. non-managing, supervisory directors).
The exercise of effective supervision over the management by the
individual shareholders would probably absorb higher costs than would be
incurred if the same task were carried out by a limited number of specialized
monitor-monitors. Moreover, apart from a reduction in the overall costs of
monitor-monitoring, supervision of the management team by specialist
supervisors yields advantages of specialization similar to those discussed with
regard to specialized day-to-day management: they presumably monitor
managerial performance more effectively and at a lower cost per unit of
monitor-monitoring than shareholders themselves would be able to do.
Limited liability reduces the risk shareholders take if they refrain from
exercising detailed supervision over the firm's managers. In effect, limited
liability promotes delegation of the monitoring of managerial performance to
specialized monitor-monitors. Thus it serves to reduce the costs of monitoring
the management team and encourages realization of the benefits of
specialization in monitor-monitoring.
Mon/toria/
Under a rule of unlimited liability, shareholders would have risk-minimizing
incentives to demand detailed involvement in the management of the firm.
However, regardless even of the liability rule to which they are subject, if the
number of shareholders increases, r/tt/zV/i/ua/ shareholders may gain by
shirking as a monitor.
Consider a firm that is managed by its shareholders. If a corporation has
multiple shareholders, individual shareholders have wealth-maximizing
incentives to rely upon their fellow shareholders to monitor the cooperative
inputs in the firm. In other words, individual shareholders may attempt to
"free-ride" on the efforts other shareholders dedicate to monitoring input
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behavior. In this manner they could save effort and costs and still benefit from
monitoring done by others, at no charge.
For instance, individual shareholders could save the costs of obtaining or
digesting the information required to take soundly based business decisions.
They could avoid the effort of acquiring and analyzing relevant data,
examining business opportunities, studying the performance of different parts
of the business, comparing the firm's performance to that of its competitors,
and so on. They might simply sit back and wait for others to do the job. The
costs of shirking by individual shareholders are shared by the joint
shareholders in the form of less effective overall monitoring, while the benefits
of less effort (or lower quality effort) and saved costs are enjoyed exclusively
by the individual shareholder concerned.
If enough shareholders shirk the task of monitoring, the effective
performance of the monitoring function per se will be threatened: the amount
of shirking by individual shareholders may become so large that, as a
consequence, input activity is not adequately monitored. This would bring
about opportunity losses to cr// shareholders (lower firm productivity and
lower profits) and may ultimately result in the firm's failure.
In particular, the larger the number of shareholders, the greater becomes
the probability that individual shareholders assume that their fellow
shareholders will act as monitors and that they will benefit from their efforts
in any case. Hence, the larger the number of shareholders, the greater will be
an /rtd/v/Jj/a/ shareholder's incentive to shirk the task of monitoring. On the
assumption that monitoring expenditures are a function of the risk borne, the
larger a shareholder's potential loss, the more he could save by relying upon
others to monitor input activity. Moreover, the more extensive monitoring
required (that is, the larger and the more complex the business to be
monitored), the more significant will be the costs and effort an individual
shareholder could save by shirking as a monitor, and the higher will be his
incentive to shirk.
Centralized management is one device that serves to cope with the shirking
problem among relatively large numbers of shareholders. Limited liability for
shareholders is another, as Alchian and Demsetz [1972, 788] have noted.
Limited liability mitigates the shirking problem among multiple shareholders
in two ways. First, by limiting their potential losses from inadequate
monitoring, it reduces the costs individual shareholders may impose on one
another by shirking as a monitor. Second, since with limited liability, a
shareholder's potential loss is smaller than with unlimited liability, he is likely
to spend fewer resources in monitoring and, consequently, the expenses any
shareholder would expect to save by relying upon others to do the work would
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be less.
Alchian and Demsetz [1972, 788] suggest that individual shareholders are
inclined to shirk as a monitor "since the losses associated with unexpectedly
bad decisions will be borne in large part by the many other corporate
shareholders". This statement is, in our view, incorrect both under a rule of
unlimited liability and under limited shareholder liability. Indeed, a shirking
shareholder may bear less than the entire (opportunity) loss attributable to his
shirking as a monitor. However, under unZ/m/'/ft/ joint and several liability,
shareholders cannot be so sure that losses will be borne in large part by other
shareholders as under this rule, each individual shareholder would be
potentially liable for all of the debts of the corporation. Under //m/ted
liability, on the other hand, any particular shareholder is still subject to the
risk of losing his investment in the firm concerned. The fact that other
shareholders in aggregate might lose more than an individual shareholder
would not preclude or make less serious the latter's loss of his invested
wealth.
A shareholder's benefit from shirking the task of monitoring is not
reflected in the size of his potential loss of wealth, as Alchian and Demsetz
suggest, but in saved costs and effort. Limited liability is related to shirking in
that it limits a shareholder's costs in the event of ineffective monitoring by the
joint shareholders, and reduces the costs he may save by shirking as a monitor
to the extent that monitoring expenditures would be higher under unlimited
liability.
Limited liability mitigates the shirking problem among multiple
shareholders regardless of whether shareholders have delegated the day-to-day
management of the firm to a limited number of managers. If there is no such
centralized management, it limits shareholders' losses that may arise when
individual shareholders shirk the monitoring of the other inputs in the firm. If
shareholders have entrusted the day-to-day management to a specialized
management team, limited liability reduces the losses managers might impose
on shareholders by inadequate performance, should shareholders fail to
properly monitor the management (or the non-managing, supervisory directors
they may have appointed for this purpose).
Transferab/Yrty of Scares
Another function of limited liability is that it facilitates the transferability of
shares. As described in Chapter 2, flexible transferability of shares is a
mechanism for ensuring effective monitoring of input activity over time which
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operates through across-market competition from potential monitors external
to the firm.
If would-be monitors outside a firm are able to employ the firm's inputs in
more profitable ways than the incumbent monitors do, they will anticipate
higher future earnings from possession of the residual claim than existing
shareholders. Accordingly, in order to obtain the residual claim they will be
prepared to pay a higher price for the company's shares than their value to the
existing shareholders. Thus, flexible transferability of shares allows superior
monitors, or investors able to replace incumbent managers by more effective
ones, to take over control of poorly or sub-optimally managed firms [Manne
(1964); (1965)]. As more effective monitors are better able to direct
productive activity so as to satisfy the wants of consumers, unimpeded
transferability of shares is not only beneficial to the parties obtaining wealth
improvements in takeover transactions but also to society as a whole.
Limited liability is considered to be essential to the operation of a market
in which shares can be readily traded, that is, a market that enables shares to
smoothly flow to superior monitors [Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull
(1980); Easterbrook and Fischel (1985); Woodward (1985)]. How does the
liability rule to which shareholders are subject relate to the operation of a
market for equity shares?
Suppose that shareholders are subject to a rule of unlimited joint and
several liability, meaning that in the event of corporate insolvency, every
single shareholder could be held liable for the full amount of the corporation's
indebtedness. Under such a liability regime, the amount a particular
shareholder actually has to pay in the event of the corporation's default is not
only determined by the extent of the latter's debts, but also by the wealth of
his fellow shareholders. The poorer the other shareholders, the larger the part
of the corporation's unsettled debts a relatively wealthy shareholder may have
to shoulder. Also, if other shareholders are richer, the probability becomes
smaller that a shareholder of modest wealth will be pursued by the
corporation's creditors. Thus, the relative wealth of other shareholders is
relevant to the extent of each shareholder's potential loss in the event of
corporate failure.
(Indeed, under a rule of joint and several liability, a shareholder who is
made liable for the corporation's unpaid debts in excess of his proportion of
the total shares issued, has recourse to reimbursement from other shareholders
to the extent of the excess. However, the amount he will be able to recover
from such other shareholders depends on the wealth of the latter and on the
individual shareholder's ability to overcome the costs of collecting other
shareholders' proportionate share of the corporation's debts; enforcement
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costs will be high and potentially prohibitive, especially if there are many
other shareholders of relatively modest wealth.)
Under joint and several liability, the poorer the other shareholders, the
larger the risk a wealthy investor will take by acquiring shares in a particular
firm (/.e. the amount he might lose), and vice versa. Hence, the relative wealth
levels of the other shareholders in a company influence the risk-return
relationship a share in that company poses to a particular investor and, thus,
the value investors will attach to the shares. Since, cetem /KW/6MS, wealth
maximizing investors are likely to attach less value to the shares in a firm as
the risk they would take by becoming a shareholder rises, that is, as the
underlying risk-return relationship becomes less favorable to them, the value a
potential investor places on a share will be less, the greater his personal
wealth relative to the wealth of existing shareholders, and vice versa. Under a
rule of joint and several liability, then, an investor's valuation of a share
would not merely depend on the prospects of the firm concerned but also on
the magnitude of his wealth in proportion to the wealth of the other
shareholders. This argument has been advanced by Halpern, Trebilcock and
Turnbull [1980, 130-131] in a seminal essay on the economics underlying
limited liability for shareholders.
As a relatively wealthy investor would anticipate a higher loss in the event
of the corporation's default, he would therefore attach less value to a share
than an investor of modest wealth in comparison with the wealth levels of the
other shareholders. In other words, wealthy investors and investors of modest
means relative to the levels of wealth of the other shareholders will arrive at a
different valuation of the same shares. From this observation, Halpern and his
co-authors [1980, 131] have concluded that if unlimited liability is the rule,
"there will not be a single price for all shares of a particular company": prices
will differ among investors of different wealth, and a separate price may have
to be negotiated for each share transfer. Easterbrook and Fischel [1985, 96]
recapitulate their argument in the phrase: "With unlimited liability, shares
would not be homogeneous commodities, so they would no longer have one
market price". The alleged absence of a single market price for the shares in
one company will threaten the functioning of a liquid stock market as it forces
would-be buyers and sellers to engage in costly private bargaining over the
price of every separate transaction.
Unlimited liability may impair the smooth transferability of shares in yet
another way. To determine the value he places on a share, taking into account
his potential loss in the event of the corporation's default, a would-be investor
has to examine the wealth levels of existing shareholders no less than the
liabilities of the firm. In addition, in order to keep track of his risk exposure,
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an investor will also have to examine changes in other shareholders' wealth
relative to his own after his purchase of shares since the magnitude of a
shareholder's potential loss in the event of the corporation's default will
change as the relative wealth of his fellow shareholders changes. Trading in
equity shares will only take place if and to the extent that investors are willing
to incur the transaction costs associated with monitoring other shareholders'
wealth.
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull argue that the costs of ascertaining
other shareholders' wealth levels would induce wealthy investors to refrain
from purchasing a small number of shares in a particular corporation. Under
a rule of joint and several liability, a shareholder's maximum potential loss
depends on the relative wealth of his fellow shareholders, and not on the
number of shares he owns. Therefore, a wealthy shareholder owning only a
few shares may have to incur high costs in order to obtain information on
other shareholders' wealth, especially when there are many other
shareholders. Halpern and his co-authors reason that a wealthy shareholder
would rather buy "a large number of shares so as to have some control over
the operations of the company" because this would permit him "to protect his
investment and limit his potential loss through a close scrutiny over the
company's operations" [1980, 136].
The consequent concentration of share ownership by rich investors would,
in their view, probably preclude the operation of a market in which there is
active trading in shares: ' in the extreme, securities markets will not exist"
[1980, 136]. More generally, they conclude that by skewing the distribution
of risks among different shareholders, an unlimited liability regime would
create "a significant measure of uncertainty in the valuation of securities and
threaten the existence of organized securities markets" [1980, 147].
How does limited liability, according to the reasoning set out above,
promote the transferability of shares?
First, given that the limited liability rule limits each shareholder's potential
loss to a maximum equal to the amount of his investment, the size of other
shareholders' wealth is irrelevant to the magnitude of an investor's potential
loss in the event of the corporation's default. With limited liability, an
investor's maximum potential loss is determined by the extent of his
investment only, and the value investors attach to shares will now be based
exclusively on the expected future income stream from the firm's assets.
Therefore, it is maintained that the shares in a corporation will now have a
single price at which share transfers will take place. In this way, limited
liability is considered to make possible securities markets in which shares can
be readily traded [Halpern, Trebilcock and Tumbull (1980), 137, 147;
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Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 92, 96].
The existence of one market price facilitates trade by economizing on the
costs of exchanging shares. As the prevailing market price of its shares
reflects the publicly available information about the prospects of a firm, it is
unnecessary for many, especially small, investors to incur substantial
expenditure in order to examine in detail the firm's prospects [Easterbrook
and Fischel (1985), 96]. Generally, the market equilibrium price of the shares
in a firm reflects the collective knowledge and expectations of investors with
regard to that firm, thus greatly reducing the need for individual investors to
expend resources in examining the firm's liabilities and its chances of
commercial success. If the shares in a company did not have a single market
price but a price had to be negotiated for each separate transaction involving a
share transfer, investors would have to incur larger costs to collect and to
examine information about the firm in order to determine a proper price.
Moreover, if shares have one market price reflecting relevant information
about the firm, buyers and sellers can avoid the costs of extensive
negotiations to fix a price and simply trade at the prevailing market price.
Secondly, since limited liability renders other shareholders' wealth
irrelevant to the risk a particular shareholder bears, it avoids the expenses
investors would otherwise have to incur to evaluate the wealth levels of other
shareholders. The larger the number of other shareholders, the greater would
be an investor's cost of monitoring other shareholders' wealth under an
unlimited liability regime. By avoiding the costs of monitoring other
shareholders' wealth, limited liability lowers the transaction costs inherent in
stock acquisitions. In effect, it encourages the realization of gains from trade
in the stock market and thus facilitates the transfer of shares to superior
monitors.
The /Wü///p/e Pr/ces Tr>es/s
We support the second explanation of limited liability described above but are
rather skeptical about the first. We agree that a single market price
economizes on the resources potential investors need to expend in order to
ascertain the proper price for a share. However, we doubt that limited liability
is necessary to arrive at one market price for all shares in a particular
company.
Standard economic theory teaches that the price an individual is willing to
pay for a good corresponds to his expected marginal utility from that good,
that is, his expected increase in utility from increasing consumption of that
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good by one unit. Prices reflect marg/na/ rather than /oto/ utility as utility
maximizing individuals seek to achieve maximum satisfaction by equating
marginal utilities per dollar spent on diverse goods and services. Accordingly,
they spend their budget in such a manner that the prices they pay will reflect
the marginal utilities of the goods and services purchased rather than the total
utility they derive from acquiring a given quantity of such goods or services.
The same principles apply to the purchase of shares in a given company.
The fact that with unlimited liability, a wealthy investor may suffer a
greater loss than a relatively poor investor suggests that the anticipated /oto/
utility (benefit) from obtaining a given set of shares in a particular company
may be different for investors of different wealth. However, total utility from
a given quantity of shares is irrelevant to investors' valuations of the shares
concerned since for the attainment of maximum satisfaction, only investors'
expected extra utility (wealth improvement) from purchasing one or more
shares is relevant as compared to the ex/ra utility from using the same amount
for a different purpose. Thus, investors' valuations and consequent bidding
prices will be based upon the anticipated marginal utility (wealth increase)
from purchasing one or more shares in a particular firm.
The existence of one market price does not require that all potential
purchasers derive the same total utility from a given set of shares or attach
exactly the same value to it. It merely requires that buyers' expected utility
(benefit) from acquiring a share shall be equal a/ /Ae warg/«, ;.e. that
different buyers derive equal utility from the last single share they obtain in a
particular company. This requirement can be met under limited and unlimited
liability alike. Potential investors expecting high benefits from acquiring one
or more shares (or small losses in the event of a default) will attach a high
marginal value to a share and therefore bid prices higher, whereas investors
expecting a smaller benefit (or a higher default loss) will offer relatively low
prices. From this competitive bidding process a single equilibrium price will
emerge reflecting a share's marg/ra/ utility (benefit) to all investors, even
though individual investors may have placed different values on the shares.
Different valuations will be discounted in the various bidding prices that
eventually culminate in one market price. A relatively high market price then
indicates high marginal utility to investors in the aggregate, and a low market
price indicates low marginal utility.
Contrary to Easterbrook and Fischel's [1985, 96] suggestion, the fact that
under unlimited liability, a wealthy investor bears more risk than an investor
of relatively modest means does not imply that the shares in a particular
company would not be homogeneous goods. Under a/jy liability rule, the
shares in a particular company represent the residual claim on the same set of
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assets and cash flows. The fact that with unlimited liability, a wealthy
investor takes more risk by purchasing equity shares in a firm than a poor one
does not render the firm's assets and the income stream they generate any
different. Thus the shares in one company remain homogeneous goods,
capable of being traded at one price, regardless of shareholders' liability rule.
The law of one price, defined by Kindleberger [1997, 67] as "the law (...) that
in one market there is one price", will continue to apply. Different risk levels
will be discounted in different bidding prices, as are other differences in a
good's appreciation, and do not thwart the operation of the price mechanism
yielding a single equilibrium price.
It is quite usual that different individuals will value a particular good or
service differently as consumer preferences are not identical. The competitive
bidding process among potential purchasers, then, enables the emergence of a
single market price at which the good's or service's marginal utility measured
in money terms is equal to all buyers. Also, differences in risk exposure
among different purchasers are not peculiar to shares carrying unlimited
liability. Such differences can be observed in respect of other goods as well,
and they have not resulted in multiple prices for the same good.
Imagine a non-diversified investor who invests USD 100,000 of his wealth
in a limited liability corporation. This investor runs a larger risk per dollar
invested than an investor of equal wealth holding a properly diversified
investment portfolio who makes an investment in the same firm. The first
investor is subject to firm-specific risk that the second investor has diversified
away. Still, following the approach criticized above, given limited liability,
the shares would be homogeneous goods and would therefore have one market
equilibrium price. Hence, both investors pay the same price for a share, at
which the marginal benefit of the investment is equal to each of them, despite
the difference in risk exposure. This confirms that differences in the risk
borne are as such unlikely to produce multiple prices.
Another illustration of the unlikelihood of differences in risk exposure
resulting in different prices can be observed under Dutch environmental law.
The Dutch Soil Protection Act bestows extensive powers on the public
authorities either to order the clean-up of polluted land, or to effect the clean-
up of polluted land themselves. Under the conditions stated in the Act, the
state may subsequently collect the costs of clean-up that the authorities have
incurred from the relevant polluter (Sections 75 (1) and (2) of the Soil
Protection Act). However, reimbursement of clean-up costs may also be
sought from owners of contaminated land who did not cause the pollution
concerned, if and to the extent that the clean-up has increased the market
value of the land and so enriched the owners (Section 75 (3) of the Act). Both
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wealthy owners and owners of modest means are fully liable to reimburse the
state for the added value by which they are enriched. One may safely assume
that the prospect of the state seeking reimbursement from a poor individual
whose land is cleaned up is less than the chance of the state pursuing a
wealthy owner. Hence, the risk of having to pay clean-up costs is different for
owners of different wealth. However, one does not observe different prices for
polluted land among purchasers of different wealth levels. The same land is
still being traded at one price for rich and poor buyers alike.
Furthermore, the risk taken by buyers of potentially hazardous products
also tends to vary with their personal wealth. When a successful lawyer
charging USD 500 per hour buys a bottle of cola of an inferior brand, he
takes greater financial risk than an unemployed laborer buying the same
product. If the bottle were to explode in the face of the purchaser or if its
contents make him sick, he may be unable to work for some time. The amount
of income so lost would be greater for the lawyer than for the unemployed
worker. If the injured person is not duly compensated for his entire loss of
income, the lawyer will suffer greater pecuniary loss than the unemployed
person. Still, we do not see potentially hazardous products being traded at
different prices depending on the magnitude of individual buyers' potential
losses.
The risk that with unlimited liability, an investor's personal wealth may be
reached in the event of the corporation's default, is in fact a risk of a hidden
liability facing all potential purchasers which is no different from any other
risk of a hidden liability. Therefore, like other hidden liability risks it will be
discounted in investors' bids and in the resulting market price. As with
unlimited liability, every investor's risk is higher than under a limited liability
rule, under unlimited liability all investors will attach a lower value to a share,
thereby lowering its equilibrium price. In this way the market price of shares
will respond to the liability rule to which shareholders are subject.
The proposition that limited liability is not a necessary' condition for the
transferability of shares at a single market price is empirically supported, to
some extent, by Grossman's study of market trading in the shares of the
American Express Company during the 1950s [Grossman (1995)]. In the
years reviewed (1951-1959), the shares in the American Express Company
carried unlimited liability with respect to both contractual and tortious
liabilities incurred by the company. It should be noted, however, that the
shares did not expose shareholders to joint and several liability but (merely) to
/?ro rato liability, that is, liability in proportion to the percentage of the
company's total shares each shareholder owned. Thus, although his entire
non-invested wealth would be exposed, a 2 percent shareholder, for instance,
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would never be liable for more than a 2 percent portion of the company's total
liabilities. American Express shares carrying /^o ra/a liability were traded on
the New York Stock Exchange, whilst investors could have easily ascertained
that share ownership would subject them to unlimited liability as this
information was publicly available [Grossman (1995), 75].
Grossman [1995, 75-77] found that despite unlimited liability, throughout
the 1950s the shares in the American Express Company were actively traded
on the exchange and had a single market price, with no evidence appearing of
prices varying across investors depending on their personal wealth. In
addition, he did not find any indication that stock ownership was concentrated
in a small group of shareholders, which could have disrupted the functioning
of a market for American Express shares: one investor was found to control
approximately 10 percent of the company's stock but otherwise the shares
were widely dispersed, with the average number of shareholders
approximating 25,000. As indicated, American Express stock traded
regularly, witnessing active participation by investors in the market. Although
Grossman's study involved a single case only and one should be cautious,
therefore, in inferring far-reaching conclusions from it, his findings would
seem at odds with the theory that limited liability is indispensable for a liquid
stock market in which shares trade at one equilibrium price.
One may argue, however, that as American Express shares were subject to
/>ro ra/fl unlimited liability instead of joint and several liability, other
shareholders' wealth levels were irrelevant to investors" appreciation of the
shares as pursuant to the pro ra/a rule, any one shareholders exposure was
contingent solely upon his portion of the company's total shares outstanding.
Thus share prices would have been exclusively determined by investors'
expectations with respect to the prospects of the business (just as under
limited liability) and would not. as under joint and several liability, have been
a function of both the company's prospects and the relative wealth levels of
other shareholders. Therefore, Grossman's findings summarized above may
be interpreted as telling something about the stock market's response to pro
rato liability but not on stock market behavior under a rule of joint and
several shareholder liability. This view, however, would oversimplify the
issue as under pro ra/a liability, too. the relative wealth levels of the
shareholders may affect the appreciation of a company s shares by investors,
for at least two reasons
First, given positive costs of collection that would absorb at least a part of
the amount collected, it is more likely that pro ratar liability will be enforced
against a shareholder with sufficient means to cover his proportionate share of
the firm's unsettled liabilities than against an investor with little or no non-
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invested wealth, even if they own an equal percentage of the company's
shares: it would pay creditors better to incur costs to enforce liability against
a wealthy 1 percent shareholder than against a 1 percent shareholder of
modest means. Similarly, the anticipated pay-off from collecting from a
wealthy 1 percent shareholder may outweigh that from enforcing pro rate
liability against a poor investor with a larger percentage shareholding.
Accordingly, in reality an investor's exposure and, thus, his expected loss in
the event of corporate failure may depend on the extent of his personal wealth
relative to the wealth of other shareholders even if pro rata liability were the
rule [Grossman (1995), 71]. Therefore, albeit that under this rule a
shareholder will never have to bear more than his proportionate share of the
company's total liabilities (as he might have to under joint and several
liability), investors would have similar incentives to monitor other
shareholders' wealth levels and to take the latter's wealth into account when
appraising the company's shares.
Second, as Woodward [1985, 604] has noted, under any form of unlimited
liability, the individual shareholders' ability to pay their share of the firm's
liabilities is likely to affect the terms on which the firm will be able to obtain
credit. If, for instance, under a pro roto liability regime, the firm has many
shareholders with insufficient wealth to pay their portion in the event of
failure, this would adversely affect both the amount of credit the firm could
obtain and the terms on which creditors would be prepared to extend credit
given that in this case, pro rato liability of shareholders would not provide
much security to creditors. To the extent that the firm's ability to obtain
credit affects its commercial prospects, therefore, the wealth levels of other
shareholders would affect the value an investor will place on the company's
shares, just as they would do under joint and several liability.
Given that under pro rata liability, as set out above, the wealth levels of
the individual shareholders would continue to be relevant both to a
shareholder's risk of being pursued by the corporation's creditors and to the
corporation's ability to obtain credit - albeit not necessarily to the same
degree as under joint and several liability - , Grossman's finding of a liquid
stock market with a single market price under a pro rata liability rule offers
indirect support for the proposition that under unlimited joint and several
liability, too, a single market price for the shares in one company would
prevail. The same finding must not, however, be interpreted to mean that
unlimited joint and several liability would not in fact induce investors to incur
significant expenses in order to monitor other shareholders' wealth, both
before and after the purchase of shares, thus increasing transaction costs in
the stock market compared with limited liability. It only suggests that in the
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particular case of American Express, z'.e. under a/>ro rato liability rule, such
additional costs did not disrupt the functioning of a liquid stock market, which
in itself leaves open the possibility that even in this case, there might have
been significant extra transaction costs as a result of unlimited liability.
As limited liability is not indispensable to the emergence of a single market
price for the shares in a company and the functioning of a liquid stock market
/?er se, how, then, does it promote free transfer of shares? It does so in four
ways.
First, as described earlier, limited liability reduces the costs of exchanging
shares by rendering it unnecessary for shareholders to obtain information
about the wealth levels of other shareholders [Demsetz (1975), 34; Jensen and
Meckling (1976), 331; Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (1980), 136].
Second, because under a limited liability regime, corporate debts can
adversely affect investors only to the extent of the price of their shares,
limited liability lowers investors' costs with respect to examining the
liabilities of the corporation [Demsetz (1975), 34]. The economics of
information gathering expressed in the optimal-search rule reveal that it pays
investors to expend resources in acquiring information about the firm as long
as the marginal expected benefits of gathering information exceed the
marginal costs. The greater is the magnitude of shareholders' maximum
potential loss, the larger will be an investor's benefit from obtaining detailed
information about the liabilities of the corporation and the longer it will pay
him to expend resources in scrutinizing the corporation's liabilities.
Given that under a limited liability regime, the debts of the corporation can
affect a shareholder only up to the value of his investment, his potential
benefit from examining in great detail the liabilities of the corporation will be
less and the marginal benefit of acquiring more information will sooner be
exceeded by the marginal cost than under an unlimited liability regime. Thus,
under a limited liability rule, investors have wealth-maximizing incentives to
spend fewer resources in examining the liabilities of the corporation. By
making it unnecessary for investors to examine in great detail the liabilities of
the corporation, limited liability reduces the costs attending share transfers.
Third, as noted briefly in Chapter 2, with unlimited liability, investors are
likely to demand restrictions on the transferability of shares [Woodward
(1985), 605]. Suppose a wealthy shareholder would sell his shares in a
corporation to an investor of modest means. Such a transaction would raise
the probability of existing shareholders being pursued by the corporation's
creditors in the event of a default, and increase the amount they might lose.
For instance, if a rich shareholder sells his shares to an investor with no assets
other than his shares in the firm, under joint and several liability, the other
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shareholders would have to make up for the part of the corporation's unpaid
debts that previously would have been borne by the seller. And under pro rata
liability, given positive costs of collection, a relatively wealthy shareholder
may still face a higher risk of being pursued by the corporation's creditors
than an investor of little non-invested wealth obtaining an equal percentage of
the shares
To minimize their losses in the event of corporate default, therefore,
shareholders arc likely to demand devices restricting the transfer of shares to
investors with less wealth than the seller. It is obvious that such restrictions
would impede trading. By rendering other investors' wealth levels irrelevant
to a shareholder's potential loss in the event of the corporation's default,
limited liability eliminates the need for restrictions on share transferability.
Fourth, unlimited liability would discourage wealthy investors from taking
over poorly run firms. Investors considering the acquisition of the shares in a
poorly managed company with a view to displacing its management are
frequently wealthier than existing shareholders [Easterbrook and Fischel
(1985), 96]. Since under an unlimited liability regime, their maximum
potential loss in the event of corporate default would be higher, such investors
would take more risk by becoming a shareholder than the risk borne by the
existing, less wealthy shareholders. This extra risk may prevent wealthy
would-be acquirers from acquiring the firm's shares even if they would be
able to raise its profits.
When would-be acquirers are wealthier than existing shareholders, their
anticipated extra losses in the event of a default may outweigh the extra
income they may be able to obtain from more profitable employment of the
firm's assets. In this event there will not be a Me/ gain for the would-be
acquirer from acquiring the shares. This may not be unusual if the potential
acquirer is wealthy and if the default risk is high, that is, if the target firm is
in trouble, and this category of firms especially would benefit from a takeover
by (investors capable of appointing) superior monitors.
Under a limited liability regime, the loss in the event of corporate failure
will be equal for existing shareholders and new shareholders. Therefore, gains
from trade in the takeover market are now determined solely by potential
acquirers' ability to obtain a higher income from the firm's assets than its
existing shareholders anticipate. As under a rule of unlimited liability, by
contrast, wealthy would-be acquirers would be discouraged by potentially
large losses in the event of a default, the chance that investors able to appoint
superior monitors will take control of a poorly run corporation will be less
than under the limited liability rule. Accordingly, with unlimited liability the
incentives for managers to optimize productivity and profits will be less.
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Unlimited liability, then, would threaten the operation of the stock market as a
mechanism encouraging effective managerial performance.
Limited Liability in the Financial Model
In the monitorial model of the corporation, limited liability economizes on the
costs of intra-firm decision-making by encouraging shareholders to delegate
the management of the firm to a limited number of managers. It encourages
separation of management from residual risk-bearing, thereby promoting
specialization. It mitigates the shirking problem among multiple shareholders
by limiting the costs they may cause one another by shirking as a monitor,
and by effectively reducing individual shareholders' prospective benefits from
shirking. Finally, limited liability facilitates the flexible transferability of
shares. In this manner it promotes the flow of shares to superior monitors,
which in turn provides an incentive to managers to optimize firm productivity
and profits. In all these ways, limited liability is instrumental to the effective
monitoring of input behavior.
However, this is not the only function of limited liability. In addition,
limited liability is considered to be important to a firm's ability to raise
capital. Yet it is less obvious /nw exactly limited liability furthers the supply
of capital to the firm. As said previously, there is undoubtedly some truth in
the idea that limited liability promotes equity investments by risk averse
investors but risk-aversion does not provide a full explanation of limited
liability as a capital-raising device: with ?<Mimited liability risk averse
investors could still supply capital in the form of loans, or take out insurance
where available. Risk-aversion by investors is an fl55!</w/?//o« rather than a
/teory revealing how limited liability helps to raise funds for investment.
In the remainder of this chapter, we examine in some detail the
significance of limited liability for attracting capital into a firm.
Cosf of Cap/fa/
Under an unlimited liability regime, creditors can collect debts of the
corporation from the assets of the latter and from the personal wealth of the
shareholders. The risk that the corporation's assets will be insufficient to pay
its debts is borne by the shareholders. In effect, shareholders bear almost the
entire risk of business failure. Creditors' sole risk is that the sz//w of the assets
of the corporation and shareholders' personal assets is insufficient to meet the
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obligations of the corporation. By reducing creditors' security to the assets of
the corporation, limited liability in fact shifts the risk of corporate insolvency
to the corporation's creditors.
Limited liability does not shift a// costs of business failure to the
corporation's creditors. With limited liability, shareholders continue to bear
the costs of corporate failure up to the extent of their invested wealth.
Creditors in turn bear the part of the corporation's debts that cannot be
satisfied from the assets owned by the corporation.
Firms operated in corporate form may raise funds for investment
essentially in two ways: by borrowing capital in exchange for a fixed claim on
the firm's assets and cash flows which has priority over the residual claim,
and by selling portions of the residual claim to investors. If the residual
claimants were liable for the debts of the corporation to the full extent of their
personal wealth, their losses in the event of business failure would be higher
than if they enjoyed limited liability. As investors would discount the higher
costs facing them in the event of failure, with unlimited liability they will
presumably attach less value to the residual claim than under a limited
liability rule. Consequently, the amount of money investors will be prepared
to contribute to the firm in exchange for (a portion of) the residual claim will
be less under a rule of unlimited liability than under a limited liability regime.
To raise the same amount of capital, the firm would have to borrow more
and have to pay interest on the additional amounts borrowed. Hence, if the
same capital were raised, the firm's debt-equity ratio would increase and the
interest due on the extra debt would add to the firm's total interest
obligations. Unlimited liability, then, would, cetem /xir/6i«, change the
firm's capital structure and cause additional interest obligations to arise. In
contrast, with //mi'tet/ liability for shareholders, the firm could raise more
capital by the sale of equity shares since investors would anticipate fewer
losses in the event of a default. Thus, it would have to borrow less, which
would save interest payments.
On the other hand, however, as limited liability reduces the assets from
which they may obtain payment, creditors of the corporation face higher costs
in the event of corporate default and thus take more risk by extending credit
than under an unlimited liability regime. Under a limited liability rule, in the
event of a default, creditors have to shoulder the difference between the
corporation's assets and its debts themselves and cannot collect the deficit
from the shareholders. Since creditors would anticipate higher costs in the
event of corporate default, they are likely to charge a higher interest rate
under a limited liability rule than under an unlimited liability regime: as
creditors bear more risk, the risk-reflecting interest rate will be higher than if
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shareholders were fully liable [Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison (1979), 359-
362; Posner (1992), 395]. The higher interest rate will come at the expense of
returns to shareholders, and is the price shareholders pay for shifting the risk
of corporate insolvency to the corporation's creditors.
In summary, limited liability improves the firm's ability to attract equity
capital by limiting shareholders' losses in the event of business failure, but it
raises the interest rate the firm must pay to its creditors by limiting the assets
from which they may collect payment. On balance, under a limited liability
regime, the corporation may need less credit as it could raise more capital
from the sale of shares, but interest rates would be higher than under
unlimited liability. Does this imply that the firm's total cost of capital is
independent of the liability rule to which its shareholders are subject?
It does not. Such a conclusion would only be justified if the benefit limited
liability generates for shareholders is merely equal to the costs it generates for
creditors, and if the cost to shareholders of an unlimited liability rule equals
creditors' benefit of enlarged security for payment. In that event, the cost the
liability rule would impose on one party would offset the benefit to the other
party and as a result, the sum of the terms on which theyo/7j/ parties would be
prepared to supply capital would not change. Under a limited liability rule,
then, the extra interest that creditors charge for having less security would
offset the extra amount shareholders would be willing to pay for a share when
compared with unlimited liability. Under an ««limited liability regime, the
reduction in the price shareholders would be willing to pay for a share as a
result of their potentially indefinite losses should the corporation become
insolvent, would be offset by the lower interest rates creditors would charge.
However, if the benefit each liability rule produces for one party were to
exactly offset the cost it inflicts on the other party, limited liability would not
yield a net gain to either party (on the assumption that their basic attitudes to
risk-bearing do not significantly differ). In that event, creditors and
shareholders would yo/«//y be equally well off under an unlimited liability
rule. In other words, they would have no incentive to contract for limited
liability (even if the transaction costs of doing so were zero), and it would be
unlikely that a demand for limited liability would ever have arisen. The mere
fact that the limited liability rule is prevalent in corporations therefore
suggests that limited liability does produce a net benefit to both shareholders
and creditors (or a net benefit to one of them sufficiently large to compensate
the detriment to the other party, with at least one party being better off and
without the other party being harmed after compensation is paid). Below we
will examine w/ra/ that benefit is.
To the extent that limited liability produces net gains for shareholders (net
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of the cost to shareholders of higher interest rates), it will promote the supply
of equity capital to the corporate firm and the extra amount shareholders are
prepared to pay for a share carrying limited liability will exceed (the present
value of) the extra interest payable in exchange for the reduction in their
anticipated default costs. The resulting higher share price then measures
shareholders' gain from limited liability. Similarly, if limited liability yields a
net gain to creditors (net of their anticipated higher costs in the event of a
default), the interest rate differential between limited and unlimited liability
would be less than the differential that could be expected solely on the basis
of creditors' anticipated higher costs in the event of a default. Either way,
limited liability would lower the firm's total cost of capital.
L/m/ted L/ab/7/Yy and Equ/Yy Cap/fa/
Limited liability relieves shareholders of any cost in excess of the amount of
their investment, should the assets of the corporation become insufficient to
satisfy its debts. In this way, limited liability serves as a substitute for an
insurance policy protecting shareholders' non-invested wealth [Arrow (1970),
139-140]. The extra interest creditors will charge to make up for their higher
costs in the event of corporate default compared with an unlimited liability
regime, is the premium shareholders pay for having their non-invested wealth
insured against liability for corporate debts. In a phrase of Arrow [1970,
137], "the interest rate differential is in effect a premium (...) for insurance
against default, the lender being at the same time the insurer".
Investors will discount anticipated higher interest rates from the amount
they are willing to pay for a share carrying limited liability, thereby pushing
downward share prices and thus the amount the firm could raise from the sale
of shares. However, share prices will no less reflect the fact that with limited
liability, shareholders' losses in the event of corporate failure are less than
with unlimited liability, and this will concurrently push share prices upward.
The second effect must dominate the first, since otherwise limited liability
would raise the firm's cost of capital (it would get less for its shares flrtd must
pay higher interest charges) and the price shareholders pay for limited liability
(higher interest rates) would outweigh the benefits derived from it (fewer
default costs, monitoring advantages and potential other benefits) as
capitalized in share prices. In these circumstances, it would have been
unlikely that demand for limited liability would have arisen.
Following the above reasoning, the capitalized value of the benefits
investors derive from limited liability is likely to exceed capitalized higher
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interest rates so that on balance, limited liability will have an upward effect
on share prices. In contrast, albeit that prices of shares carrying unlimited
liability would reflect lower interest rates, investors' potentially indefinite
losses in the event of corporate failure would cause share prices to be less
than if they carried limited liability.
Given that the firm could raise less funds by selling shares carrying
unlimited liability, under an unlimited liability rule, investors would discount
from bidding prices the interest due on the additional borrowings that would
be required if the firm were to raise the same total capital under either rule
governing shareholders' liability. Such additional interest obligations,
although carrying lower interest rates than if shareholders enjoyed limited
liability, would add to the firm's total interest obligations. Therefore, the
additional interest obligations are likely to be discounted in share prices in the
same manner as higher interest rates are discounted under limited liability.
Which would be more important in determining share prices, the higher
interest rate under a limited liability rule or the additional aggregate interest
obligations under an unlimited liability rule, depends on the amounts involved.
Under any rule, however, the effect on share prices will be downward.
Apart from the insurance of shareholders' non-invested wealth against
liability for corporate debts, for which shareholders pay a price through less
favorable credit terms, limited liability yields other benefits to investors which
do not consist in the mere reallocation to creditors of the risk of corporate
failure as reflected in credit terms, or which are not priced by creditors
through higher interest rates or otherwise. Any benefits not priced through
less favorable credit terms make up the net gain shareholders derive from
limited liability, and any such "free" benefits will be reflected in the price
investors are willing to pay for shares. Tftey will cause share prices to be
higher than under an unlimited liability regime, despite the higher interest
rates, and so enhance the firm's ability to raise funds through the sale of
shares.
In the first place, in addition to protecting shareholders' non-invested
wealth, limited liability saves certain costs for shareholders /rafeperafe/tf/y o/
the reallocation of the costs of corporate insolvency which it brings about, and
such cost savings will not therefore be priced through the higher interest rate
charged by creditors in exchange for this reallocation.
As we have argued in our discussion of limited liability in the monitorial
model of the corporation, with limited liability, shareholders will expend
fewer resources on detailed involvement in the management of the firm.
Moreover, as the debts of the corporation can adversely affect them only up to
the extent of their investment, it is unnecessary for shareholders to monitor in
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great detail the corporation's liabilities. Furthermore, since the magnitude of
their potential loss in the event of corporate default is independent of the
wealth levels of other shareholders, limited liability eliminates the need for
investors to expend resources in order to keep track of other shareholders'
wealth. Finally, limited liability saves the costs of making and enforcing side-
arrangements among shareholders to preclude the transfer of shares to
investors with less wealth than the seller. All of these reductions in
shareholders' costs increase the net return on their investment, thereby raising
the value investors place on shares and enhancing the firm's ability to raise
equity capital.
Secondly, limited liability produces "free" benefits to shareholders relating
to the monitoring of input activity which do not consist in a bare reduction of
shareholders' costs as compared with an unlimited liability regime. In our
discussion of the monitorial model, we have argued that limited liability
promotes effective monitoring of input performance by encouraging
shareholders to entrust their investment to specialized managers and by
promoting the transfer of shares to superior monitors. The more effectively
inputs are monitored, the higher will be their productivity and the profits they
generate, and the higher is likely to be shareholders' reward and the price they
place on shares.
Thirdly, limited liability protects shareholders, free of charge, from
tortious liabilities arising from the operations of the firm [Clark (1986), 9]; it
shifts the risk that the corporation may be unable to pay damages for
corporate torts to the tort victims, and this risk-shifting is not reflected in
interest rates, nor do shareholders pay compensation for it in any other way.
Tort victims by definition do not bargain with the corporation for
compensation 6e/b/-e being injured by the latter's operations [Posner (1976),
506]. They do not agree to expose their wealth, health, or otherwise, to the
activities of the corporation in exchange for compensation reflecting the risk
that the corporation's assets ultimately may prove insufficient to pay the
agreed amount. Tort victims, then, are not compensated for bearing the risk of
corporate insolvency through the terms of compensation, and shareholders'
non-invested assets are insulated «/ «o c/rarge from the liabilities in tort
generated by the business.
L/qu/dtfy
A fourth benefit investors derive from limited liability, going beyond the mere
reailocation of the insolvency risk, is that limited liability facilitates liquidity
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of investments [Manne (1975), 514].
As we saw in Chapter 2, shareholders can liquefy their invested wealth in
a particular corporation by selling their shares in exchange for cash. The
operation of organized securities markets facilitated by limited liability in
which shares can be readily traded, enables shareholders to liquefy
investments with few transaction cost impediments. Organized securities
exchanges avoid the costs of face-to-face bargaining, uniform market prices
for the stock in one company economize on market participants' information
costs, and so do compulsory corporate disclosure rules. Except for the cost of
intermediaries (in particular, stock brokers), today's organized securities
markets can be thought to resemble a Coasian environment permitting trading
at (virtually) zero transaction costs. If, by contrast, the transaction costs
attending stock transfers were prohibitively high, even if shares were legally
transferable, no exchanges of shares for cash would take place and
shareholders' invested capital would, in fact, become illiquid.
In the discussion of the monitorial model, we have described Aow limited
liability reduces the transaction costs of exchanging shares, thereby
effectively promoting investment liquidity. Moreover, as also described in the
monitorial model, under a rule of unlimited joint and several liability,
investors have risk-minimizing incentives to demand restrictions on the
transfer of shares to investors of less wealth than the seller, since a
shareholder's risk would go up if another shareholder were to sell his shares
to an investor with less wealth than the seller: the remaining shareholders' risk
of being pursued for unpaid debts of the corporation would rise, as would
their potential loss in the event of a default.
Such restrictions, however, would limit the ability of the individual
shareholders to liquefy their investment; they would be subject to the risk of
becoming "locked in". Restrictions on the transferability of shares would
reduce shareholders' ability to cash in their shares and reinvest the proceeds
elsewhere. In effect, such restrictions would impose opportunity losses upon
shareholders when they are precluded from shifting their invested wealth to
different uses that would yield greater wealth or utility. With unlimited
liability, shareholders would be subject to the risk of such opportunity losses
;>7 odc/;7/o« to shouldering the risk of infinite losses in the event of corporate
insolvency. The same applies if there are no formal restrictions on share
transfers but if high transaction costs would in fact preclude shareholders
from liquefying their investment.
For instance, an investor may expect that the funds he has invested in a
particular corporation will yield a higher return if he reinvests them in another
firm. Suppose that formal restrictions on his ability to exchange his shares or
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high transaction costs preclude him from doing so. The difference between the
investor's actual return and the return he would have earned if he had been
able to shift his invested wealth to the alternative investment opportunity
would then be his opportunity loss. The price investors are willing to put up
for a share carrying unlimited liability will reflect the risk of sustaining
opportunity losses in the future due to impediments to their ability to liquefy
their investment. Limited liability, by eliminating the need for restrictions on
share transfers to investors of less wealth than the seller and by reducing
transaction costs in securities markets, serves to avoid such opportunity losses
and so avoids the possibility that investors will discount bidding prices for
such losses.
The ability to sell shares and reinvest the proceeds elsewhere is especially-
important to investors whose investment in a particular corporation is large in
relation to their total wealth. They would be subject to the risk of suffering
large opportunity losses in proportion to their total wealth if they could not
easily liquefy their invested wealth. Therefore, any impediments to share
transferability would discourage, in particular, investments from relatively
^oor investors. The risk of corporate failure may not as such be a serious
threat to this category of investors, as wealthier shareholders are more likely
to be pursued by the corporation's creditors and as high litigation costs may
deter the former from seeking reimbursements from shareholders of modest
means. However, the larger an investor's invested wealth as a proportion of
his total wealth, the larger his potential opportunity losses in relation to his
total wealth if he cannot easily shift his invested wealth in a particular
corporation to more profitable investment opportunities.
By promoting investment liquidity, limited liability protects investors
against opportunity losses. In this manner it encourages, in particular,
investments from investors who risk large opportunity losses, /.e. investments
from investors considering an investment which is large in relation to their
total wealth. In addition, as the ability to liquefy their investment protects o//
investors against future opportunity losses, it will boost the prices that
investors place on shares.
D/Vers/ffcafron
A final benefit of limited liability for shareholders is that it permits investors
to minimize their risk through diversification. In Chapter 2 we noted that
shareholders can reduce their aggregate risk by holding a diversified
investment portfolio, on condition that the prospects of success or failure for
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the various companies contained in the portfolio is not contingent on the same
set of events: there must be no correlation between the returns on the separate
holdings in the portfolio [Ross and Westerfield (1988), 148], By holding a
diversified portfolio, investors can diversify away firm-specific risk (but not
economy-wide risk) and, consequently, achieve less variability in the total
returns on their invested wealth and diminish the chance of loss, as Knight
[1921, 254] already observed. They can hedge against one company's
misfortune by investing in various, unrelated companies so that losses
resulting from one company's misfortune will be offset by the yield on
investments in other companies. In this way diversification serves to "insure"
the risk of any one particular holding through pooling multiple investments,
eac/j with different risks attached to it [Arrow (1970), 135]. Limited liability
is a prerequisite for the reduction of investment risks by diversification.
Suppose shareholders were fully liable for corporate debts. In that event an
increase in the number of holdings would increase an investor's risk of losing
wealth. If unlimited liability were the rule, an investor would be liable to the
full extent of his wealth for the debts of each corporation in which he would
own shares. Thus, he would put at risk his entire wealth with respect to each
separate company in his portfolio: "If any one firm went bankrupt, an investor
could lose his entire wealth" [Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 97]. Any
additional holding would add another risk of indefinite losses to the portfolio
should the corporation concerned become insolvent. Unlimited liability, then,
would not merely expose an investor to the risk of losing non-invested assets
but it would also deprive him of the opportunity to minimize his total
investment risk by holding a diversified portfolio. Rather, a risk-minimizing
strategy would be to minimize the number of shareholdings [Easterbrook and
Fischel (1985), 97].
Granted, with unlimited liability, investors might still diversify away firm-
specific risk by supplying /oaws to different, non-related unlimited liability
corporations or by investing in bonds issued by such corporations, given that
debt carries limited liability. However, the risk and return features of debt
substantially differ from those of equity shares, irrespective of the liability
issue. Returns on debt are fixed and the probability of repayment is generally
bigger for debt than for equity capital. Equity, on the other hand, offers
investors the prospect of higher returns by taking more risk. Dividends on
equity shares vary with the firm's success and may exceed the fixed returns
on debt, and shares offer a prospect of capital gains too, which debt does not,
or to a lesser extent only. Given the intrinsically different characteristics of
debt, from the perspective of investors, the purchase of bonds and the
provision of loans are no viable alternatives to investments in equity shares, at
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least not to investors who seek the investment characteristics of equity.
Substituting investments in corporate debt for equity would make up a
portfolio, the risk and return characteristics of which would be completely
different from those of a diversified equity portfolio, or a mixed debt-equity
portfolio. To investors desirous to make investments with the risk and return
features of equity shares, debt investments may be complementary to, but not
substitutes for, investments in equity.
Since with unlimited liability, investors would be unable to reduce their
potential losses from one company's misfortune by appropriate diversification
of investments in corporate equity, they would adjust their valuation of shares
for the extra risk attributable to non-diversified equity holdings (or multiple
holdings, each of which would carry unlimited liability). This extra risk would
lower the amount investors would be willing to pay for a share, compared
with an environment in which investors would be readily able to make equity
investments a«d simultaneously reduce risk through diversification, that is,
under a limited liability regime. Under limited liability, because of equity
investors' ability to diversify away firm-specific risks, any one firm operated
in corporate form could obtain a higher price for its shares (and, hence, it
would have to borrow less).
The inability to reduce losses through diversification under unlimited
liability would particularly harm firms' ability to attract small, passive equity
investments from wealthy investors. Wealthy shareholders are probably the
first to be pursued by the corporation's creditors in the event of a default.
Therefore, any additional holding would raise their anticipated cost of
additional capital contributions if one of the corporations in which they have
invested were to become insolvent. As they would risk their entire wealth in
any investment they make, irrespective of the number of shares they hold,
with unlimited liability, wealthy investors would be reluctant to make small,
non-controlling investments in various corporations. From this observation,
Manne [1975, 513] has inferred that if unlimited liability were the rule,
"small investments in corporations would tend to come only from individuals
who were nearly insolvent already. Wealthy individuals would never make
small investments in a corporation." To protect their wealth, wealthy
investors would rather seek to control one (or a limited number of)
corporation(s) in place of making a variety of small investments, or invest in
corporate debt only.
One may hypothesize that reduction of risk through diversification would
also be possible if shares carried unlimited liability, since in addition to
shares, investors could purchase "put options" entitling them to alienate their
shares, together with the accompanying liability risk, to a third party, viz. the
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supplier of the option, at the price stated in the option. By this theory,
investors could obtain ßfe f^octo limited liability by acquiring such put option
rights, so that diversification would still be possible and risk-reflecting share
prices would be more or less similar to those under statutory limited liability.
However, the idea that put options could simply replace limited liability as a
requisite for diversification is unsound for a variety of reasons.
First, the idea hinges on the assumption that there will always be
individuals or firms offering put options of the kind and quantity required to
hedge the risk of unlimited liability. This is unlikely to be the case, especially
because such options would tend to originate from risk-preferring or nearly
insolvent individuals only (or from firms owned by such individuals). In
theory, investors or market intermediaries may establish specialized
corporations (investment funds) to issue put options, for the single purpose of
shifting the risk of unlimited liability to such entities. However, that would not
or, at best, only partially remedy unlimited liability if the shares in the
corporation issuing the put options themselves were governed by unlimited
liability. Then the problem facing the organizers of the issuing entity and the
intended recipients of the options would be to find investors to own such
shares, or to find or create put options, or suppliers thereof, entitling the
future shareholders of the cited entity to dispose of the risk of unlimited
liability. Thus the specialized fund remedy would circle unlimited liability
rather than eliminate it.
Second, in order to obtain de^focto limited liability, in addition to the share
price, investors would need to pay to the supplier of the desired put option a
risk-commensurate price for the option, reflecting ««limited liability. The
amount payable for the option would add to the costs that investors have to
incur to make an equity investment affording protection from personal
liability. This is likely to have a downward effect on the price which investors
would be willing to pay for a share carrying unlimited liability, as compared
with the price of shares carrying statutory limited liability. Moreover,
suppliers of put options for shares with unlimited liability are more expensive
risk-bearers than holders of limited liability shares, since the former cannot
diversify their risk given their assumption of unlimited liability. Since
investors must pay the option supplier for bearing the liability risk and since
the latter cannot reduce the extra risk through diversification, the combined
price of the option and the share will in all likelihood exceed the price of a
limited liability share. Obviously, if investors' anticipated benefit from
bearing less risk were to outweigh the price of the put option right, no option
transaction and consequent risk reduction would take place, and share prices
would reflect full personal liability.
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Third, the making and enforcement of put option contracts may absorb
considerable transaction costs which could either prevent the option
transaction from taking place altogether or which, if surmounted, would have
a negative impact on share prices as they would raise investors' total cost of
making the relevant equity investment. The making of put option contracts
may be rather complicated, since the term for exercising the option to be
specified in the contract (that is, the expiry date) must be more or less
consistent with the anticipated term of the contracting shareholder's
investment in the firm concerned, and since the exercise price of the option
would now be a function, not only of certain expectations about the firm's
future earnings, but also of the option supplier's estimated risk of personal
liability for the time period during which the supplier is to assume the liability
risk (/.e. the term of the option contract). Moreover, the option supplier will
have loss-minimizing incentives to default on the option contract should the
liability risk threaten to materialize, and this is prone to raise enforcement
costs. Potentially large transaction costs would also be involved in the
creation and administration of the above-mentioned specialized funds issuing
put options to assume the risk of unlimited liability.
Fourth, the put option mechanism for obtaining c/e T&cto limited liability
would only work if the law permitted investors to escape from personal
liability in this manner. However, in as much as put options would be used for
the purpose of shifting risk to less solvent individuals or firms, they would
very much be an instrument employed to frustrate the unlimited liability rule
and its underlying objective of enlarging security for creditors; the supplier of
the option would act as a "straw man" who is used to insulate the more
solvent shareholder from liability for corporate debts. The same would apply
to specialized option-issuing funds especially created for this purpose.
Legislatures and courts are rather reluctant to recognize such evasion
techniques designed to thwart the purposes of the law, and may well ignore
them and enforce liability on the shareholders themselves [Hansmann and
Kraakman (1992), 431]. Then the option mechanism would clearly «or be
effective in limiting shareholders' risk.
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We have seen that lenders will charge higher interest rates on loans extended
to corporations in exchange for assuming the risk of corporate insolvency.
With limited liability, hence, interest rates are higher, but investors will pay
more for the shares, which in turn will enable the firm to borrow less at the
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higher rate, the opposite being true for unlimited liability. Furthermore,
parties are free to contract around statutory limited liability, and to arrive at
exactly the same interest rate and other loan terms as would normally be
applicable under unlimited liability.
Some authors have suggested, therefore, that the total costs of borrowing
are unlikely to be affected by the liability rule to which shareholders are
subject [Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison (1979); Meiners (1978), 224]. They
support this proposition by a reference to the theorem developed by Coase
[1960, 15-16], holding that the choice of the legal rule does not affect the
allocation of resources if transaction costs are zero (on the assumption that
property rights are well defined and freely transferable).
Transaction costs do exist, however, and they may well affect the
allocative outcome in credit markets under different legal rules governing
shareholders' liability. As we will demonstrate below, the principle of limited
liability effects substantial reductions in transaction costs in credit markets.
Any reduction in the transaction costs facing creditors raises their net
remuneration from extending credit and so promotes the supply of credit.
Creditors' gain from limited liability, then, is a higher net income due to
transaction cost savings. To the extent that lower transaction costs are
reflected in interest rates, a reduction in transaction costs will also favorably
affect the firm's cost of borrowing and thereby benefit shareholders.
Although creditors may anticipate higher costs in the event of corporate
failure under limited liability when compared with unlimited liability, these
may be partially offset by lower transaction costs, causing the interest rate
differential between limited and unlimited liability to be less than the
differential which would exist if transaction costs under both were equal.
Even though interest rates />er se may still be higher, limited liability then
brings about a ne/ reduction in the firm's cost of credit, net of the interest
premium payable in exchange for the shifting of insolvency risk to creditors.
How does limited liability reduce the transaction costs of contracting over
loans?
First, if shareholders were fully liable for the debts of the corporation,
creditors of the corporation would have to evaluate each individual
shareholder's personal wealth to assess the security for repayment. The
wealth levels of the individual shareholders would determine creditors'
security and, thus, the terms on which the corporation may attract credit.
Creditors would need to obtain information about the repayment capacity of
individual shareholders in order to determine a risk-commensurate interest
rate. By reducing creditors' security to the assets of the corporation, limited
liability makes it unnecessary for creditors to examine the personal assets of
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the individual shareholders. In this way, limited liability economizes on
creditors' costs of obtaining information [Clark (1986), 8-9].
Secondly, under a rule of unlimited shareholder liability, shareholders
could unilaterally increase creditors' risk after they have granted credit to the
corporation. For instance, if a shareholder were to use a part of his (non-
invested) wealth to obtain a virtually unmarketable asset, he would decrease
creditors' security. Similarly, if a wealthy shareholder would transfer his
snares to an investor of less wealth, the magnitude of creditors' potential costs
in the event of corporate default would go up. In either case the interest rate
previously agreed may no longer compensate creditors for their actual risk.
Therefore, under an unlimited liability regime, cred/Yors would have
incentives to demand restrictions on shareholders' freedom to dispose of their
wealth and on the transferability of shares. Creditors (and not just
shareholders) may, for example, demand that shareholders only alienate
shares to investors with a specified minimum wealth level. Such arrangements
may improve the terms on which the firm could obtain credit, but they would
harm its ability to attract equity capital and lower the price investors place on
equity shares [Woodward (1985), 605]. Limited liability, by rendering
shareholders' capacity to repay irrelevant to the creditors of the corporation,
eliminates the need for and the costs of making and enforcing side-
arrangements between creditors and individual shareholders.
Thirdly, unlimited liability may not only create conflicts of interest
between creditors and shareholders, but also among shareholders. The larger
the personal wealth of thcy'o/Mf shareholders, the higher the creditors' security
for repayment and the more favorable the terms on which the firm could
obtain credit. Individual shareholders desiring low interest rates and favorable
repayment terms for the corporation may wish to enter into arrangements
(similar to those demanded by creditors) designed to maximize the repayment
capacity of the joint shareholders [Woodward (1985), 604-605], As noted,
such arrangements may improve the firm's position in the credit market but
since they would limit investors' freedom to reinvest their wealth (thereby
exposing shareholders to potential opportunity losses), they would harm the
firm's position in the market for equity capital.
Fourthly, under an unlimited liability regime, creditors may have to pursue
various individual shareholders in order to collect the corporation's debts in
the event of a default. The costs creditors would be willing to incur in order to
pursue individual shareholders depend on the amount they expect to recover.
In general, the larger the number of shareholders, the higher the creditors'
cost of en/bra>7g unlimited shareholder liability. As Manne [1975, 513] has
observed, "the costs involved in assessing and collecting fractional liabilities
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from large numbers of small investors might frequently be greater than the
anticipated recovery'. Limited liability saves the cost of enforcing payment of
corporate debts against individual shareholders [Clark (1986), 8-9].
Limited Liability and the Corporate Concept
In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have explored the various
functions of limited liability. We observed that limited liability, mter a//a,
fosters the monitoring of input behavior by specialized managers and
economizes on transaction costs in the stock market (including the market for
corporate control). Limited liability is also instrumental in the operation of the
corporation as a mechanism for raising capital, in particular, by reducing the
transaction costs facing suppliers of equity capital and suppliers of credit, by
promoting liquidity of equity investments, and by enabling investors to reduce
risks through diversification. In these various regards, limited liability would
seem to play an important, if not crucial, role in both the monitorial and the
financial model of the corporation.
But is limited liability necessary to the corporation as an organizational
concept? In other words, can we imagine a corporation with centralized
management, residual claims divided into transferable parts and a distinct
personality legally independent of its constituent human beings, but without
limited liability for the residual claimants?
The analysis set out in this chapter reveals the ways in which limited
liability is related to the corporate form of business organization. It does not
follow, however, that limited liability is indispensable to the corporate concept
and its aforementioned other features. Let us examine this a little closer.
As explained at the outset of this chapter, a corporations legal ability to
have rights and obligations of its own, independent of those of its
shareholders, is conceptually different from the rule governing shareholders'
liability for obligations binding the corporation. With full personal liability
for the shareholders, it would still be possible for the corporation to obtain
rights and to incur debts in its own name, with vicarious liability for the
shareholders should the corporation fail to satisfy its obligations to creditors.
Indeed, Shavell [1987, 175] has noted that relieving shareholders of personal
liability is "none other than deciding against imposing vicarious liability on
shareholders", without connecting such a decision to the corporation's legal
entity status. The decision on the liability rule to which shareholders are
subject, then, differs from the decision on whether the corporation should be
entitled to act as an entity legally distinct from its shareholders.
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Similarly, even with unlimited liability, shareholders may choose to entrust
the day-to-day management of the corporate firm to salaried managers,
particularly if they expect such managers to have a comparative advantage in
running the firm, thus being capable of enhancing shareholders' revenue from
the possession of the residual claim, and if the expected costs to them of
managerial self-interest seeking be less than their anticipated net benefit from
employing a salaried management to run the firm (see our discussion in
Chapter 4 next). Depending on the number of shareholders and regardless of
the liability rule, entrusting the management to salaried outsiders may also
save decision-making costs relative to management by the shareholders
themselves. To compare, large professional partnerships exist in which
managerial tasks are performed by specialized "managing partners" or by
hired managers appointed by the joint partners, despite the latter's nominally
unlimited liability. (In practice, however, partners of large professional
partnerships tend to incorporate themselves, thus enjoying limited liability in
the same way as shareholders of a corporation. This supports the theory that
limited liability is instrumental in the delegation of managerial power.)
Finally, the ability to divide the residual claim on the assets and cash flows
of the corporate firm into fragmental parts and to sell such parts to investors
would, in principle, also exist if the acquirers of parts of the residual claim
were subject to unlimited liability. However, the demand for such fragmental
parts would be less and the price investors would be prepared to pay would be
lower for the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter: demand by risk averse
investors would become less if not disappear, investors would have to
surmount higher transaction costs, firm-specific risks could not readily be
diversified away, and liquidity of investments would be threatened. Should we
subscribe, therefore, to Marine's thesis [1975, 513] that "the concept of
limited liability (...) flows logically from the concept of the corporation as a
capital-raising mechanism"?
The answer must be negative in view of the fact that if limited liability
were abolished, it would technically still be possible for corporations to raise
capital by offering parts of the residual claim for sale in the capital markets.
Limited liability is not a necessary condition for this capital-raising technique.
It is conceded, however, that the success of this technique may be ascribed in
great measure to the virtues of limited liability discussed in this chapter.
Limited liability, although not indispensable to the corporate concept, is
clearly instrumental in taking full advantage of the corporation's abilities to
raise capital and to effect specialized monitoring of input behavior. It may
hence help the understanding of the dominance of the corporate concept as a
form of organization for multi-member, capital-intensive businesses involving
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complex teams and requiring input of specialized monitoring. Without limited
liability for shareholders, such businesses are rather unlikely to have the same
degree of specialization in management and residual risk-bearing and the
same level of capitalization through equity. They may also face both higher
costs of organization, probably reflected in lower returns on equity and higher
output prices, and higher costs of capital due to higher transaction costs in
both equity and credit markets, equity investors' inability to reduce risks
through diversification and the latter having to assume the risk that
investments may prove illiquid. Without limited liability, therefore, the
corporate landscape might have had quite a different outlook than it has at
present and the corporate form />er se might not have been so popular.
Notably, to the extent that limited liability facilitates separation of
management and risk-bearing, if unlimited liability were the rule, there would
most likely be a larger degree of shareholder participation in the management
of firms operated in corporate form as would be the number of shareholder-
managed firms. In addition, where the number of shareholders desirous to
become involved in managerial decision-making poses a limit to the size of
firms because of decision-making problems and high management costs
arising as the number of shareholders increases, the average size of firms
would be smaller under an unlimited liability regime than if shareholders
enjoyed limited liability. Similarly, where unlimited liability would raise a
firm's cost of capital and impede the aggregation of large amounts of capital
for investment, firms organized under an unlimited liability rule would on
average be smaller than if they had limited liability [Carr and Mathewson
(1988)]. Unlimited liability limiting firm size is socially costly where it would
preclude economies of scale in the production of output from being fully
exploited. Moreover, in the absence of organizational substitutes suited to
organize multi-member, capital-intensive businesses, the overall (/.e.
economy-wide) degree of capitalization of productive activity would be less,
meaning fewer capital-intensive businesses and less substitution of capital for
labor throughout the economy and, again, threatening economies of scale.
Finally, where higher transaction costs in the capital markets, higher
organizational costs, higher costs of capital and fewer gains from specialized
monitoring of input behavior in the firm would lead to lower profits, unlimited
liability might lower the profitability of firms operated in corporate form,
which in turn would discourage investment in such firms.
Carr and Mathewson [1988] have provided some empirical support to the
hypothesis that with unlimited liability, firms would tend to be smaller in size
than under a rule providing for limited liability of the shareholders. Using
historical data on the use of limited and unlimited liability by Scottish banks
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in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (in particular, over the period
between 1795 and 1879), they noted that in this era, Scotland had both banks
with limited liability and banks the shareholders of which were subject to
unlimited liability. There were three banks, founded over the period 1695-
1746, that had been granted limited liability through a special charter from the
Scottish Parliament, all other banks being subject to statutory unlimited
liability. Entry to the banking industry was free until 1845, when legislation
introducing severe entry restrictions was enacted, meaning that until 1845
new entrants could easily enter the banking business and compete against
existing banks (if only their shareholders were prepared to accept unlimited
liability). Only in 1879 was general legislation introduced which enabled all
banks to obtain limited liability for their shareholders, thus effectively
abolishing the previous unlimited liability rule.
Consistent with the theory, by comparing unlimited liability banks with
their limited liability peers, Carr and Mathewson [1988, 775-778] found that
unlimited liability had a negative impact on firm size: they report that from
1800 onwards, the average size of Scotland's limited liability banks,
measured in average total assets (in pounds per bank), was almost ten times
that of the unlimited liability banks. As until 1845 entry to the banking
business was free, with new entrants being able to compete on the same basis
as existing limited liability banks except for the liability rule, it is likely that
the unlimited liability rule is of paramount importance in explaining the cited
difference in average firm size.
In addition, Carr and Mathewson noted that from 1695, when the first
limited liability bank was chartered, until 1845, over fifty Scottish banks
failed or left banking voluntarily, whilst all three limited liability banks
survived over this period. Looking solely at the period 1810-1850, for
instance, the total number of banks fell from thirty-seven in 1810 to seventeen
in 1850. both numbers including the limited liability banks. To the extent that
survivorship in a competitive market environment, in which both depositors
and investors could chose between limited and unlimited liability banks,
indicates high profitability relative to competitors, these data offer indirect
support for the hypothesis that the limited liability banks were more profitable
than unlimited liability banks, as Carr and Mathewson conclude. This, again,
would be consistent with our above-mentioned predictions on the impact of
unlimited liability.
Both the data on average firm size and the authors' observations on
survivorship and profitability suggest that unlimited liability placed banks at a
comparative disadvantage to competitors that did enjoy limited liability. This
in turn lends support to the proposition that limited liability has become
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dominant in large parts of the economy because of its superior abilities in the
organization of business when compared with unlimited liability, that means,
as a result of it being boosted by market forces.
Limited Liability in the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation
In Chapter 2, we subscribed to the theory that perceives the corporation as a
standard-form contract avoiding the transaction costs that private parties
would otherwise have to incur in order to bring about the same arrangements
through bargaining, and comprising a set of standard rules which parties
would in all likelihood agree if they could bargain at zero transaction costs.
The same is true for statutory limited liability.
Our discussion in this chapter suggests that limited liability is the preferred
rule of both equity investors and creditors of large-scale enterprises with
scattered stock ownership. If limited liability were indeed the preferred rule, in
its absence, investors and creditors would have wealth-maximizing incentives
to create the same through private bargaining. There are several conceivable
legal instruments that they might use for this purpose.
Primarily, limited liability may be effected through direct bargains
between shareholders and prospective creditors. Less cumbersome and less
expensive, the corporation, on behalf of the shareholders, may stipulate in all
contracts it enters into that shareholders are not liable for the obligations of
the corporation (as stated in Chapter 2). Limited liability may also be
achieved by including a provision to this effect in the corporation's articles of
association (on the assumption that such provisions in the articles are binding
upon the corporation's creditors). Indeed, prior to the coming into force of
general limited liability laws, unincorporated English joint-stock companies
reportedly achieved limited liability for their shareholders by including clauses
to this effect, either in business contracts on a regular basis or in the articles
of association [Anderson and Tollison (1983), 114; Butler (1986), 181-182].
However, none of the above-mentioned methods would suffice to effect
limited liability in respect of tortious liabilities incurred by the corporation.
Hypothetically, as we have noted in the preceding chapter, investors may
identify potential tort victims and bargain with them for limited liability in
advance of a tortious liability' arising. However, the transaction costs of
private bargaining would be sizeable in this scenario and may, therefore,
prove prohibitive.
Using a different line of argument, Hessen [1979, 19-20] posited that if
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there were no statutory limited liability, non-controlling shareholders would
still not be deemed to bear unlimited liability for torts generated by corporate
activity. From the legal doctrine of res/ramfeaf s«/?e/7or that underlies
vicarious liability rules in respect of employee behavior, he infers that, as a
rule, liability for torts committed by employees is limited to superiors who are
personally responsible for the selection and monitoring of the employees
concerned. Accordingly, if unlimited liability for shareholders were the rule,
pursuant to ordinary vicarious liability principles, it would still only be those
shareholders controlling employee behavior that would face unlimited liability
for corporate torts. Based on this theory, shareholders' limited liability for
torts would be the rule rather than the exception, irrespective of whether
shareholders /?er se would be subject to statutory unlimited liability.
From this point of view, small, passive investors would not even «eec/ to
bargain with potential tort victims over limited liability if unlimited liability
were the rule. Hence, even if private bargaining were unlikely to take place
given the sizeable transaction costs, that would not raise the significant
barrier to attaining limited liability which it appeared to do at the outset. In
respect of small, passive shareholders, it is implicit from Hessen's approach
that statutory limited liability for corporate torts only reaffirms what
otherwise would have been applicable.
A major objection to Hessen's theory is that if statutory law were to
impose full personal liability on the shareholders, it is likely that this liability
rule would automatically take priority over vicarious liability rules in respect
of torts committed by employees and the underlying /-e.s/?orafea/ super/or
doctrine. To achieve limited liability for corporate torts, then, shareholders
and potential tort victims would still need to contract around the statutory
unlimited liability rule and face the transaction costs of private bargaining.
Where shareholders and creditors were to surmount the hurdle of
transaction costs in order to provide the former with limited liability for the
corporation's obligations (either in tort or contractual), the transaction costs
so incurred would raise the cost of organizing the business, including the cost
of raising capital, which in turn would raise output costs (prices) and
discourage investment. Where transaction costs were prohibitively high,
however, it follows from Coase's theorem [1960, 15-16] that limited liability
would MO/ be achieved, that investors and creditors would remain faced with
the less preferable unlimited liability rule, and that the benefits of limited
liability discussed in this chapter would not be realized. Statutory limited
liability, by avoiding the transaction costs of using private bargaining
mechanisms to create limited liability, avoids such consequences and
produces a rule which minimizes the effects of transaction costs on the
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organization of the business.
In this context, we adhere to Bainbridge's observation [1997, 865]:
"Because the public corporation setting gives rise to prohibitively high
transaction costs, parties cannot depend on private contracting to achieve
efficient outcomes. Instead, a legally-imposed rule must function as a
substitute for private bargaining." Statutory limited liability is such a
substitute and ensures that the transaction costs that would otherwise thwart
private bargaining over the liability rule, do not deprive investors and society
at large of the virtues of limited liability. In effect, the statutory rule ensures
that limited liability can operate to promote the influx of both capital for
investment and specialized monitoring into the corporate firm, and facilitate
the full exploitation of the other characteristics of the corporate concept, viz.
legal entity status, transferability of residual claims and specialization in
management and risk-bearing. For these reasons, given positive transaction
costs, statutory limited liability can be considered a device which, in a phrase
of Dewing [1953, 14], "for reasons of social expediency, it seems desirable to
attach to the modern corporation".

PART
THE CORPORATE DICHOTOMY:
MANAGERS VERSUS SHAREHOLDERS

4. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL
COSTS
IN THE PRECEDING chapter, we examined the various functions of limited
shareholder liability. We argued that limited liability, in addition to
facilitating the smooth operation of stock markets and fostering the corporate
form as a capital-raising mechanism, encourages shareholders to delegate the
management of the corporate firm to specialist managers. Thus limited
liability promotes the centralization of managerial power: it facilitates
centralized management as a method of corporate governance which, like
limited liability in itself, is a prerequisite for investors' accumulation of
diversified portfolios containing passive equity investments in multiple,
unrelated firms.
However, as we saw in the section on principals and agents in Chapter 2,
the interests of shareholders and managers are not necessarily identical.
According to the contractual concept of the firm discussed in Chapter 1, the
firm is viewed as "a set of contracts among factors of production, with each
factor motivated by its self-interest" [Fama (1980), 289]. On the premise that
both managers and shareholders are primarily interested in maximization of
their personal utility or wealth, divergences of interests may result. Where
such divergences exist, self-interested managers may choose to manage the
corporation so as to further their personal interests and ignore those of the
shareholders. In the Introduction to this book we quoted several cases
suggesting that, at least in some instances, specialized managers may indeed
fail to act in shareholders' best interests.
When managers neglect shareholders' interests, they impose a cost on
shareholders: the corporation's profits to which the shareholders are entitled
and the market value of their residual claim will usually be less than if
management had concentrated exclusively on the promotion of shareholders'
interests. In this respect, centralized management and the statutory principle
of limited liability, by discouraging active shareholder involvement in the
management of the corporate firm, may appear as a Trojan horse to the
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to whose decisions the "owners" of the corporation (the shareholders) are
subject. The various shareholders hold "a set of legal and factual interests" in
the firm but they do not have "legal and factual powers" over it [1991, 113].
Berle and Means assumed that professional managers hence possess
substantial discretionary power which they may allegedly use to operate firms
in furtherance of their personal self-interests. The position of Berle and
Means hinges upon the premise that the "separation of ownership from
control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate
manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which
formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear" [Berle and Means
The Berle-Means approach is based on the observation that since the
shares in publicly held corporations are typically dispersed among numerous
(non-controlling) investors, individual shareholders do not have real power to
discipline managers in order to have them act in the shareholders' interest.
Salaried managers are thus to a great extent out of shareholders' control.
Berle and Means concluded that in effect, the use of managerial discretion is
largely unchecked and as a result, managers may abuse their positions to
pursue personal advantage at the expense of shareholders. In other words, the
shareholders are allegedly subject to exploitation by unscrupulous, self-
interested company managers. Thus the conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders is resolved in favor of the former, so the argument
goes.
Unlike Adam Smith, however, Berle and Means were not in principle
hostile toward the operation of corporations by hired managers. They believed
that management by specialist managers could technically serve to improve
the operation of companies, allowing the appropriate selection and
development of more advanced production methods and increasing the
quantities of goods and services which would become available for the
satisfaction of consumer needs. In this respect management by professional
managers would (or could) be beneficial to consumers. Therefore, as a
remedy for managerial abuse of discretionary power Berle and Means did not
propose to tighten the control of ma/rage/we«/ by shareholders, instead they
proposed the enactment of public regulation to control the activities of
corporaf/orts. Such regulation, aimed to direct corporate behavior in the
interest of society as a whole, would at the same time limit the freedom of
managers to neglect shareholders" interests (and those of consumers).
The Berle-Means notion of the "separation of ownership and control" and
the prospect of managerial self-interest seeking at shareholders" expense
connoted with it raises a number of questions. First, as a preliminary
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question, are shareholders indeed the "owners" of the corporate firm? Second,
to what extent are the interests of shareholders and managers different? And
third, do managers really have the liberty to ignore shareholders' interests?
/?/s/f-bearers and Managers .
The contractual approach to the corporation suggests that shareholders are
not properly defined as the "owners" of the corporate firm. If the corporation
is conceived as being a set of contracting relationships, the concept of
ownership of the corporation would appear to have little substance [Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978), 326 fn. 54]. According to the contractual
theory, "corporation" is merely the name the law gives to a particular
collection of contractual arrangements, both explicit and implicit, entered into
to organize a firm. What would be the sense in attaching "ownership" to this
set of contracts?
The contractual concept of the corporation suggests that shareholders'
rights are of a contractual nature and do not represent a proprietary interest in
the corporate firm. In exchange for their respective contributions to the
operations of the firm, the contracting input owners co-operating in the firm
operated in corporate form receive claims to portions of the assets and cash
flows of the firm. The nature and size of such claims depend on the particular
contribution made. Thus, the firm, and the corporation, represents a coalition
of disparate claimants to the firm's assets and cash flows. Creditors are
granted a fixed claim with priority over equity claims and in general, so are
workers. Shareholders receive the residual claim on the firm's assets and cash
flows, the voting rights attached to the residual claim and the right to transfer
the residual claim and the rights it carries. They own the res/i/wa/ c/a/m but
they do not own the corporate firm. As Demsetz [1975, 34] has put it: "What
shareholders really own are their shares and not the corporation".
In principle, cooperative input owners can contract to compensate
themselves for the opportunity costs of their inputs (/. e. the earnings in their
next best alternative use) from the receipts they expect to be generated by the
output they produce. Moreover, they can contract to share in a fixed ratio
possible team revenues in excess of the opportunity costs of the inputs. When
inputs are paid out of receipts from output, at first glance it seems
unnecessary for anyone to put up wealth beforehand to compensate input
owners [Fama (1980), 290]. However, total team revenues may turn out less
than the opportunity costs of the joint inputs and such a difference cannot
usually be predicted in advance: prices, consumer demand and other factors
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influencing a firm's results are inevitably subject to uncertainty of some
degree. Shareholders contract to make up possible negative differences
between team receipts and opportunity costs of inputs by investing, up to the
size of their investment, a specified amount as equity capital on the condition
that they are also given title to positive end-of-period differences between total
revenues and costs. Thus, they guarantee pay-offs to other inputs in exchange
for the residual claim and so assume the risk that input costs may eventually
exceed total revenues (which risk is limited by the amount of their investment
only). By supplying equity capital in exchange for the residual claim,
shareholders provide an input like any other in the firm. In this contractual
context, ownership of the corporate firm is a virtually meaningless concept
[Fama (1980), 290].
7/^  the corporation is to have an owner and if ownership is determined by
the possession of the strongest claim on the corporation's assets and earnings,
«•«//tors may sooner be defined as the corporation's owners than
shareholders, since their claim has priority over that of the shareholders and
since creditors could completely wipe out the funds invested by the latter to
have their claim satisfied. Secured creditors have an even stronger claim on
the resources accumulated in the corporation.
The management of a corporation by hired managers rather than by
shareholders is a result of specialization in risk-bearing by equity investors on
the one hand and specialization in management by professional managers on
the other [Alchian (1977), 144]. In Chapter 2, we identified several reasons
for the separation of the functions of management and residual risk-bearing.
The operation of a company by a centralized management composed of
specialized managers serves to reduce the costs of intra-firm decision-making,
and to cope with the shirking problem which would exist if a corporation with
multiple shareholders were to be managed by its shareholders. Moreover,
specialist managers may realize higher returns on shareholders' investment
than the latter themselves may be able to achieve: the separation of stock
ownership and management is a method of advancing investors' income by
specialization of labor [Manne (1962), 402]. Also, company management by
hired managers permits investors to reduce their aggregate risk by making
diversified, passive investments in corporate equity.
Delegation of managerial authority by shareholders to hired managers
presupposes that managers will act to further shareholders' interests. In a
phrase of Demsetz [1983, 390], "it is foolish to believe that owners of
valuable resources systematically relinquish control to managers who are not
guided to serve their interests". But what is it exactly that shareholders desire
managers to pursue?
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Wealth maximizing shareholders, of course, desire corporate managers to run
the corporate firm so as to maximize stockholder wealth, z'.e. to maximize
shareholders' income from the possession of the residual claim. Wealth
maximizing shareholders are sometimes said to be primarily interested in
having management maximize the corporation's/>rq/?/.s [Manne (1962), 402].
They will obtain such profits directly through pay-outs of dividends or
indirectly in the form of capital gains, that is, through increases in the stock
market value of their shares that they will earn when the shares are sold.
Dividends and capital gains together make up shareholders' return on their
investment.
Maximization of profits refers to the corporation's total earnings without
reference to the amount of capital that shareholders have invested. Hence, the
profit maximization objective may be interpreted as approving any generation
of income that adds to corporate profits. However, individual shareholders
will be interested in profit increases only to the extent that extra profits will
increase returns on the amount they have invested. Therefore, the profit
maximization objective is more accurately defined as maximization of
ear/j/>?g.s /?er s/wre [Van Home (1973), 3].
The profit maximization (or maximization of earnings per share) objective
is sometimes interpreted as inducing management to focus on short-run gains
only and to ignore long-range business planning. According to this view,
profit maximizing managers tend to pursue short-run results only since such
figures are reflected in the company's profits as disclosed to investors by its
annual (or semi-annual or quarterly) income statements, and will neglect the
exploration of and planning for future business opportunities. Accordingly,
profit maximizing managers allegedly forgo long-run profit opportunities in
order to achieve "quick" results.
An alternative formulation of shareholders' interest which purports to
include both short-term and long-term considerations, is maximization of the
value of the residual claim. The market value of shares depends on the net
present value of the corporations future profits as anticipated by investors,
that means, on the corporations prospects of future success. Therefore,
managers who seek to maximize the value of the corporation's shares need to
include in their decision-making the probable effects of alternative courses of
action on the corporation's long-range results [Clark (1986), 18 fh. 46]. Thus,
the formulation that wealth maximizing shareholders are interested in having
management maximize the value of the residual claim implies that managers
should attempt to maximize corporate profits for a/7 accounting periods
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relevant to investors, including those in the long term.
As indicated above, the market price of a corporation's shares (/.e. the
residual claim) is a function of its future earnings as anticipated by investors.
Since the size of the firm's future earnings will depend on its success in
meeting consumers' wants, maximization of the market value of corporate
stock includes maximization of the firm's ability to meet the needs of
consumers. In this regard, value maximization is not only in shareholders'
interests, but also in that of consumers.
The market price of a corporation's shares represents "the focal judgment
of all market participants as to what the value is of the particular firm" [Van
Home (1973), 4]. Thus, maximizing the value of a corporation's shares
amounts to maximizing the value of the firm as measured by the stock market.
Managers' personal interests do not, however, naturally coincide with
maximization of the value of shareholders' residual claim or maximization of
stockholder wealth in general. The Berle-Means thesis that the diffusion of
share ownership and the consequent absence of effective control of
management allows managers to operate the corporation in their own self-
interest rather than in the interests of the shareholders, suggests that there are
managerial interests which are substantially opposed to those of shareholders.
According to Emanuel Stein [1950, 218], corporate managements freed from
effective shareholder control tend "to substitute other motives for those
traditionally associated with private enterprise".
Utility maximizing managers will manage the corporation so as to
maximize their personal M//7/Yy rather than the value of the corporation's
shares [Alchian (1975a)]. They are inclined to substitute aberrant managerial
objectives for stockholder wealth-maximization up to the point of their utility
function at which they attain maximum satisfaction. Thus, managers will
search for the utility maximizing point of their utility function rather than for
the point of the firm's production function which maximizes returns to
shareholders [Demsetz (1983), 377]. The composition of a manager's utility
function depends on the individual concerned and will usually comprise a
variety of components [Machlup (1967), 19-21]. The desire for a higher
pecuniary income and non-pecuniary elements (specified hereinafter) both
enter a manager's utility function.
To maximize his utility, a manager may, for instance, attempt to increase
his pecuniary reward at the expense of the corporation [Berle and Means
(1991), 114-115]. Such attempts may result in "abuse by management of a
position in which it can divert a part of the profit and income stream
[generated by the corporate firm] to itself, as Berle [1962, 437] has noted. In
particular, corporate managers may attempt to use corporate resources to
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achieve excessive salaries (bonuses, emoluments) for themselves. Monsen and
Downs [1965] have reasoned that the self-interest of managers in manager-
controlled firms primarily lies in maximizing the managers' lifetime income.
Similarly, Berle and Means [1991, 114] suggest that in the operation of the
corporation, those who are in control can "serve their own pockets better by
profiting at the expense of the company than by making profits for it".
Mar/ager/a/ L/W/Yy Max/m/zatfon
In order to divert corporate resources into their own pockets, managers may
pursue various types of "get-rich-quick" strategies ("GRQ"-strategies).
The purest form of such behavior occurs when managers steal from the
corporation's treasury and, possibly, disappear with the booty; that is to say,
corporate management may pursue "take-the-money-and-run" strategies
("TMR-"strategies). "Take-the-money-and-run" and other forms of
fraudulent behavior, once discovered, however, would hurt a manager's
reputation so badly that probably no other company would be eager to hire
him as a manager in the future. In effect, then, TMR (and fraud in general)
would deprive managers of future opportunities to obtain personal gains from
managing a company. The anticipated costs of the opportunities so lost are
likely to outweigh the non-recurrent gain a manager could receive from TMR,
except in those (rare) instances in which the booty would be large enough to
afford the manager concerned lifetime maximum utility. Moreover, a
manager's pecuniary gain from TMR or other fraud may be accompanied by
non-pecuniary losses (such as liability to criminal prosecution, loss of self-
esteem and becoming a social outcast), so that, in the aggregate, TMR may
not bring a net improvement to the manager's utility.
Occasionally newspapers do report stories involving TMR or other forms
of fraud by corporate management (for example, excessive private expenses
at the company's account). But more sophisticated GRQ-strategies are
available to corporate managers attempting to increase their pecuniary reward
at the expense of the corporation. Usurpation of corporate opportunities by
managers for themselves is generally recognized as such a strategy.
Transactions between a corporation and its managers that benefit the
manager(s) concerned but harm the corporation are another means by which
managers can improve their personal wealth. Similarly, corporate managers
may realize personal gains by making the corporation enter into transactions
with another business entity which is controlled by the managers themselves
or in which the latter have a significant financial interest. Such transactions
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may benefit corporate management but at the same time injure the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. '
Additionally, managers may attempt to increase their reward in rather
indirect ways. They may do so, for instance, by expanding the size of the
firm's work force, since a positive relationship has been reported to exist
between the amount of management's remuneration and the number of
employees that managers supervise [Simon (1962); Murphy (1985);
Williamson (1986), 8]. However, an increase in the number of staff without a
corresponding increase in the corporation's revenues (sufficiently great to
cover the extra costs of additional labor input) will, cetem /rav/6itf, reduce
corporate profits and returns to shareholders.
Maximization of the firm's sales [Baumöl (1962); (1967)] is another
objective which may appeal to corporate management, since the larger the
firm's sales, the larger its cash flows, and the larger the income stream from
which management may divert a part to itself to improve managerial utility.
Moreover, the larger a firm's product market share, the less competition from
other firms will restrain managers from operating the corporate firm in the
pursuit of personal self-interests. Wealth maximizing shareholders, however,
will not desire managers to wax/Tmze sales, but to expand sales only until the
extra revenue derived from an additional unit of output (marginal revenue)
equals marginal cost, that is, to expand sales up to the profit maximizing
point of the firm's production function.
Another indirect way for corporate managers to improve their reward may
be to maximize the growth of the firm [Marris (1964)], since both regular
income and the range of opportunities for managers to pursue personal
benefits at company expense tend to increase when the firm's size and scope
of activities expand. Shareholders, on the other hand, will desire the firm to
grow only in such measure as growth will serve to maximize stockholder
wealth. Not every expansion will increase returns to shareholders. A firm may
grow through investments in activities yielding a return less than the return
shareholders themselves could realize if the funds associated with those
investments were distributed to them. If shareholders can reinvest corporate
funds in more profitable ways than corporate management does, shareholders
will be better off if those funds are paid out to them (as dividends or stock
repurchases) instead of being reinvested by the corporation [Jensen (1989),
66].
Furthermore, managers may attempt to secure their job and income as a
manager over the long run by limiting business risks and by eschewing new
ventures of which the prospects are, to some extent, uncertain [Galbraith
(1967)]. Incumbent managers may expect that a reduction of the business
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risks and the uncertainty to which the corporate firm is subject will reduce the
risk of corporate failure and thereby serve to protect their personal job and
income security. However, maximization of stockholder wealth does not
require managers to minimize risks but to pursue ventures with a positive net
present value to the shareholders, including risky projects. Shareholders
enjoying limited liability can hedge against any one project's failure by
holding diversified portfolios composed of investments in various non-related
companies. As s/rare/joWery can minimize their risk of losses by
diversification, they will be interested in having management undertake even
risky projects with positive net present values.
Managers may also seek to improve their utility through various forms of
"on-the-job-consumption", a catch-all term referring to the use of corporate
resources for a manager's personal benefit. "On-the-job-consumption"
includes the taking of perquisites and fringe benefits which are not part of a
manager's agreed compensation package. A manager's use of corporate
resources for his personal benefit may at times appear similar to fraud, but
often it is not a clear-cut question of fraud. For instance, managers may
expend corporate wealth on extraordinary offices, overly luxurious furniture,
acquisition of expensive art, non-productive computer software (for example,
games) or superfluous hardware (to operate such games), royal class plane
tickets, company airplanes, private travel, night club visits, excessive business
lunches or dinners, conference holidays, expense accounts used (partly) for
private purposes, use of the internet for private purposes at company expense,
and other such amenities.
Moreover, a manager's utility function may contain such non-pecuniary
variables as a desire for leisure, security, self-esteem, prestige, professional
achievement, leadership, power or social prominence [Machlup (1967), 21;
Williamson (1986), 7], Contributions to charities from the corporation's
treasury and personal relations with employees are other non-pecuniary
elements from which managers may derive utility [Jensen and Meckling
(1976), 312]. Accordingly, utility maximizing managers may shirk the
maximization of stockholder wealth by pursuing extra leisure, by giving away
corporate money or by expending corporate resources on attempts to increase
their personal public prestige. Managerial strategies aimed at increasing the
size of the corporation ("empire building") can not only be interpreted as an
indirect way to increase management's pecuniary compensation but also as a
means of increasing managers' power, prestige and social status.
Likewise, managers may improve their level of utility by taking business
decisions that are motivated by their personal beliefs or convictions (for
example, costly "pet projects") rather than by maximization of stockholder
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wealth. For instance, Stein [1950, 218] holds that hired managers tend to
make decisions which reflect "management philosophy and statesmanship
rather than the desire to earn and to pay in dividends as large an amount as
possible". Accordingly, managers may use their positions to promote personal
opinions or ambitions of whatever nature.
Williamson [1986, 7-8] argues that the above-mentioned managerial
objectives are reflected in "expense preference" by corporate managers. This
notion means that management does not have a neutral attitude toward costs
but values certain classes of expenditures positively, such as expenditures that
increase staff, managerial power or prestige, et cetera. The expenditure of
corporate resources driven by managerial utility maximization may absorb a
part of corporate profits as costs [Williamson (1986), 13]. Managerial
"expense preference" serves to improve managerial utility but at the same
time it is apt to increase corporate expenses, thereby sacrificing profits and
returns to shareholders [Machlup (1967), 20].
Mon/toring by Sharefto/cters
The divergence of interests between shareholders and managers is not hidden
in the obscurity of managers' minds but is perceptible to shareholders. As
they will realize that utility maximizing managers may have other objectives
at heart besides maximization of the value of shareholders' residual claim,
one may be inclined to assume that wealth maximizing shareholders will
actively monitor corporate managements in order to prevent departures from
their interests. The Berle-Means line of argument, however, holds that large
numbers of scattered shareholders are effectively powerless (that means,
unable to influence managerial behavior if they wish to) and, hence, unlikely
to ensure compliance of managerial actions with shareholder interests.
As described, Berle and Means claim that owing to the diffusion of stock
ownership, management is in control of the corporate firm with few
constraints from shareholders. A related observation submits that the
dispersion of stock ownership over a multitude of shareholders diminishes
/HceM/ives for individual shareholders to monitor managerial behavior, since
the smaller each shareholder's proportion of a firm's total number of shares
issued, the smaller the return to any one shareholder from actively seeking to
influence corporate management [De Alessi (1973), 842]. Given the small
relative size of his shareholding and his consequent limited voting and
bargaining power, active monitoring in order to influence managers' decisions
might simply not be worth its costs. Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 3, by
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limiting the magnitude of shareholders' potential losses in the event of
corporate failure, limited liability discourages shareholder involvement in both
the actual management of the firm and in the monitoring of the hired
management. The idea that shareholders not involved in the firm's
management would fail to adequately monitor hired managers' performance
goes back once more to Adam Smith. Smith [1981, 741] observed that the
greater part of the owners of the stock in chartered joint-stock companies
"seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the company; and
(...) give themselves no trouble about it".
However, both limited liability and the dispersion of shares among
multiple non-controlling shareholders do not imply that shareholders will be
/>K/(#k/"e/7/ to the decisions and behavior of management. As their income
from the residual claim depends on whether or not management is properly
acting to maximize stockholder wealth, they do have, in principle, wealth-
maximizing incentives to keep track of the way in which management runs the
business. When it then turns out that management is not operating the
corporate firm in the interest of the shareholders, they may either seek to
displace incumbent managers or liquefy their investment by selling their
shares.
Nineteenth century British economist Nassau Senior has identified three
factors which in his view determine the attention shareholders will devote to
the business in which they own shares [Amsler, Bartlett and Bolton (1981),
784]. Senior held that shareholders' attention to the firm depends on their
knowledge about the business, the time required to monitor the operations of
the firm, and the amount of their investment as a proportion of their total
wealth. John Stuart Mill [1965, 140] added that faithful and effective
performance ("fidelity") by managers of routine tasks and of functions which
are clearly part of the managerial job can be obtained through quite limited
monitoring effort by shareholders [Amsler, Bartlett and Bolton (1981), 785].
A shareholder's initial incentives to monitor management's performance
are determined by the amount he has invested as a share of his total wealth
rather than by the percentage he owns of the total number of shares issued by
the corporation. When a shareholder's investment is large in proportion to his
total wealth, his total wealth level is highly dependent on the performance of
the firm. Should the firm fail, in any case he would lose a large proportion of
his wealth, regardless of the percentage of the firm's total stock his
investment represents. For this reason his initial incentive to monitor will be
large, even if he owns only a small percentage of the total number of shares in
the corporation concerned. Alchian and Woodward [1987, 122] therefore
conclude that it is the absolute amount of his investment, not the proportion of
748 TheProb/e/nof/nterna/Coste
the firm's total shares he owns, which determines a shareholder's incentive to
monitor corporate activity: "The absolute amount, not the percentage share is
pertinent in motivation. Whether a million dollar investment is 100% of an
enterprise or is only 5%, it is still a million dollars at stake".
Suppose an investor has invested a large share of his total wealth in one
particular firm but owns only a small percentage of the firm's shares. In this
event his initial /«certf/'ve to monitor corporate activity will be large but his
actual o^ /V/Yy in practice to influence managerial decision-making will
probably be small. A small individual shareholder has only limited voting,
including bargaining, power, and the subjects on which shareholders can vote
are generally chosen by management, except for those subjects on which the
law or the corporation's articles requires a shareholder vote (such as
amendments of the articles of incorporation, dissolution of the corporation
and election of managers or supervisory directors). Moreover, in general,
shareholders are not entitled to (and, as a matter of fact, small shareholders
cannot) initiate or countermand specific business decisions of the
corporation's managers [Clark (1985), 56-58; (1986), 22-23]. And when
stock ownership is dispersed among numerous small shareholders, individual
shareholders ordinarily are unable to threaten management's position. In
effect, small individual shareholders have little ability to influence managerial
decision-making. As Franke [1987, 147] has observed, although a
shareholder's incentive to monitor depends on "the absolute amount of wealth
he has invested", his actual "monitoring opportunity set" will depend on his
relative stake in the corporation.
If stock ownership is dispersed among a large number of small investors,
in order to exercise effective pressure on management, individual shareholders
will need to form a coalition with bargaining power vis-ä-vis the management:
they need to join in a coalition representing a number of shares (votes)
sufficiently great to credibly threaten management with replacement if it
refuses to follow particular business policies or practices desired by the
shareholders. However, establishing such a coalition may be prohibitively
costly: shareholders must expend resources in negotiating among themselves,
in taking decisions about the actions they should take, in convincing other
shareholders to cooperate against management, in collecting and
disseminating information concerning managerial decisions and their
desirability, et cetera. Thus, if there are many shareholders with small relative
stakes, the cost to individual shareholders of influencing managerial decision-
making is likely to be prohibitively high [Alchian and Woodward (1987),
122]. This reasoning suggests that effective monitoring of managers by
shareholders is not so much impaired by the fact itself that small shareholders
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have limited individual voting and bargaining power but, rather, by the cost of
combining into a coalition the individual powers residing in small, scattered
shareholders. -->'
The establishment of specialized investment funds which assemble capital
from a variety of individual investors for investment in one or more selected
firms or branches of industry and which so concentrate multiple small
investments into one block, is one form of creating a shareholder coalition
with significant bargaining (voting) power towards company managements.
However, the formation, administration and effective operation of such
investment funds also involves considerable organizational costs which may
effectively reduce shareholders' net returns from their investment, when
compared with direct investments by the shareholders in the same firms or
industries, whilst the relationship between fund managers and investors is
subject to similar conflicts of interests (agency costs) as the relationship
between the shareholders and the management of any firm in which they
invest. Thus for one conflict of interests is substituted another, that between
fund managers and investors. Similarly, for one monitoring problem (the
monitoring of the management of the firm in which investors' money is
eventually invested) is substituted another, viz. the monitoring of the
management of the investment fund.
There are two more factors that impede effective monitoring of corporate
managements by the shareholders. First, as described earlier, with limited
liability, shareholders can minimize their aggregate risk by holding a
diversified portfolio containing multiple small investments. The more
diversified an investor's portfolio, the smaller his stake in any particular firm
as a proportion of his total wealth and the smaller his incentive to actively
monitor the performance of the management of any particular firm in his
portfolio, given the costs of trying to influence management's decisions. In
addition, the smaller an investor's stake in a firm as a part of his total wealth,
the lower his anticipated benefit from actively seeking to influence managerial
actions. Hence, the fact that investors desirous to reduce their risk will not
invest a large part of their wealth in any one firm diminishes individual
investors' incentives to monitor managerial behavior. Investment funds
assembling investments from large numbers of investors also tend to pursue
the reduction of investors' risk through appropriate diversification and fund
managers' incentives to actively monitor the performance of the managements
of the firms into which they put investors' money are, therefore, diluted in a
similar way, except if the fund invests in a limited number of firms only.
Second, when a corporation has multiple non-controlling shareholders,
individual shareholders may gain by relying upon the efforts of others to
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monitor the firm's management. This is the shirking problem arising among
multiple dispersed shareholders described in Chapter 2. For instance, an
individual shareholder may shirk the task of obtaining and evaluating
information about managerial behavior, hoping that other shareholders will do
the work anyway. There is a '^ree r/der" problem in that an individual
shareholder may choose not to monitor the behavior of corporate managers as
he may expect that others will make such monitoring efforts and that he will
reap the fruits of their activity, regardless of his lack of effort [Manne (1981),
690; Clark (1986), 94]. In this way he would benefit from monitoring efforts
by others without having to incur monitoring expenses himself. As a result of
individual shareholders' shirking there may be too little monitoring of
managers by shareholders.
In conclusion, it is not so much diffusion of stock ownership />er se that
relieves managers of effective shareholder control, as Berle and Means
suggested, but, rather, the cost of forming shareholder coalitions with
effective monitoring power, the dilution of monitoring incentives which is
inherent in diversified holdings and the free rider problem that arises where
there are multiple non-controlling shareholders. Efforts by individual
shareholders to collect proxies from fellow shareholders in order to assemble
scattered votes into larger voting blocks serve to overcome these hurdles to
effective monitoring of management by shareholders. So do "going-private"
transactions, by which large shareholders or an incumbent management group
financed by outside investors buy out small shareholders so that stock
ownership becomes concentrated and subsequently terminate the active
trading in the corporation's shares, causing it to be no longer publicly held
(for example, through de-listing the corporations shares from organized stock
exchanges).
The Case against Managerial Shirking
Consfra/nte on Managfena/ 0/scretfon
As described in Chapter 2. the divergence of interests between managers and
shareholders is responsible for the existence of agency costs [Jensen and
Meckling (1976), 308], Agency costs arise when the management function is
separated from the function of residual risk-bearing. They are the costs
associated with managerial departures from maximization of stockholder
wealth. They include the costs of obtaining managerial compliance with
shareholders' interests as well as losses to shareholders (including opportunity
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losses) that are caused by managerial failure to act in their interest. In the
words of Fama and Jensen [1983a, 304; 1983b, 327], agency costs are "the
costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents
with conflicting interests [and] the value of output lost because the costs of
full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits".
Agency costs come in addition to the managers' agreed compensation
packages, thus adding to the costs of managerial salaries (and bonuses) to the
firm. Agency costs raise the operational costs of the firm relative to a
situation in which managerial behavior would be perfectly coherent with
stockholder wealth maximization. Agency costs are borne by shareholders to
the extent that they lower returns to stockholders and by consumers in so far
as they are reflected in the firm's output prices. And where agency costs
denote losses (including opportunity losses) ensuing from managerial failure
to allocate resources to their highest value in use, that is, to uses for which
consumers are prepared to pay the highest price, society is hurt since the same
resources could have effected greater satisfaction of consumer demands.
Earlier, we discussed how managers may depart from maximization of
shareholder wealth and what hurdles dispersed shareholders must surmount to
limit such departures. But are hired specialist managers ra?//y at liberty to
ignore shareholders' interests? Do the diffusion of stock ownership and the
absence of effective shareholder monitoring really afford managers a large
degree of autonomy in decision-making?
Based on the apparent inconsistency of managerial and shareholder
interests, as noted previously, Adam Smith [1981, 741, 755] predicted that
incorporated joint-stock companies operated by hired managers which were
not endowed with monopoly privileges were likely to lose in the competition
against investor-managed firms in most instances. Yet to date such an effect
has not occurred. By contrast, firms operated in corporate form have come to
dominate important sectors of the economy. Thus, the corporation has
survived the "market test" against potential alternative forms of organization
[Jensen and Meckling (1976), 357], The success of the corporate form of
organization may be construed to suggest that corporate managements may
«of have or use discretionary power to ignore shareholder interests after all.
What, then, might keep utility maximizing managers from pursuing their own
preferences at the sacrifice of stockholder wealth maximization?
In Chapter 2 we stated that the concept of the corporation contains several
devices which serve to mitigate the agency costs originating from the
separation of management and residual risk-bearing: shareholder voting
rights, monitoring of managers by supervisory directors, limited liability for
corporate debts and alienability of shares all serve to protect shareholders
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against managerial self-interest seeking. These devices are ex pasf responses
to the conflict between managerial and shareholder interests; they mitigate the
conflict's effects without eliminating them.
However, managers are also constrained by the operation of /war/tett.
Market mechanisms which curtail managerial autonomy serve to align the
interests of managers and shareholders ex onte, that is, they provide incentives
to management to act in shareholders' interest, thereby avoiding conflicts of
interests and limiting agency costs. Below we look at the market forces that
curb managerial departures from stockholder wealth maximization.
Prodt/cf ManVete and /ncenf/Ve Confracte
Although dispersion of shares among multiple small investors may result in
the absence of effective shareholder monitoring of managers' use of power,
for the reasons previously described, it does not automatically follow that the
management of such firms will be insensitive to shareholders' interests. There
are several market mechanisms which place checks on managerial behavior
which scattered shareholders may fail to provide, and which induce managers
to use corporate resources to further shareholders' wealth-maximizing
interests.
Managerial discretion is constrained in the first place by competition in the
market for the firm's output. Competition in product markets compels firms
to minimize costs on penalty of being driven out of business by competing
firms. If a firm has higher costs than its competitors, it will have to charge
higher prices for its output to make up for those extra costs and to earn a
profit for its shareholders sufficiently great to attract equity. Because of such
higher prices, ceter/s /KW/ÄMS, in competitive markets consumers will
purchase less of the firm's output and buy products supplied by other firms
instead. Thus, when managerial self-interest seeking raises the firm's costs,
that is, where corporate resources are wasted to benefit management, the
firm's ability to compete in the market for its output will be harmed. In the
end, the firm will have to shut down and managers will lose their jobs and
thereby the opportunity to use their positions to obtain personal gain. A
manager's professional survival, then, depends on the survival of the //rm in
its competition with other firms [Fama (1980), 288], As Williamson [1964, 2]
has concluded, in competitive product markets, persistent sacrifices of
corporate resources to managers' personal self-interests inexorably leads to
the firm's extinction. In this way product market competition curbs the
freedom of management to operate the firm to suit itself.
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Incentive contracts between the corporation and its senior management are
frequently used to link the remuneration management receives to the results of
the firm in the market for its output. By definition, such contracts make (a
part of) a manager's income dependent on the firm's results. For instance, the
contract may entitle him to a cash bonus or a salary increase if profits exceed
a specified amount, to a percentage of profits beyond a fixed amount or to a
share in total profits. Also, the issuance of stock options or equity shares
(stock bonuses) to managers as a part of their remuneration is often used to
give management a direct financial interest in maximizing the value of the
corporation's shares.
John Stuart Mill [1965, 141] already referred to incentive contracting as a
means of motivating hired managers to keep down the firm's costs and to
exploit profitable business opportunities. By linking managerial income and
wealth to corporate performance, incentive contracts aim to direct managerial
behavior towards shareholders' interest. When managers, for example, are
rewarded shares or stock options, they will suffer reductions in their personal
wealth should they depart from maximization of the value of the corporation's
shares. Therefore, they will have pecuniary incentives to behave consistently
with shareholders' interest.
Jensen and Murphy [1990] have produced data indicating a positive, if
small, relationship between changes in the market value of the corporation's
shares and the amount of top management compensation. Their examination
of the pay-performance relation for over 2,000 chief executive officers of
major United States corporations spanning five decades shows that these top
managers experienced average wealth changes of USD 3.25 for every USD
1,000 change in shareholder value. This finding indicates that, on average,
managerial wealth is sensitive to corporate performance as measured by
changes in the market value of equity shares.
Other studies have revealed positive relationships between managerial
stock ownership and corporate profits. Stano [1975, 275] found that
'[a]verage executive stockholdings turns out to be a highly significant and
important determinant of profitability". According to his findings, firm
profitability increases by a significant 1.7 percent if average executive
stockholdings rise from USD 100,000 to USD 1,000,000, with a further
increase of 0.5 percent if managerial stock ownership rises to USD
2,000,000. Stano concluded: "An unmistakable positive relationship between
profit rates among the largest U.S. corporations and executive stock interests
has emerged" [1975, 277]. These findings may be interpreted to imply that
stock ownership by management will enhance managers' incentives to
maximize corporate profits. Indeed, one of the conclusions of the Jensen and
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Murphy study [1990, 261] cited above is that the largest performance
incentives of chief executive officers come from ownership of equity shares in
the corporation they manage.
Jensen and Meckling [1976] suggest that when stock ownership by
management rises, managers will be less inclined to depart from maximization
of the firm's stock market value as they will bear a larger part of the costs of
such departures in their capacity as shareholders. According to this reasoning,
managerial interests become more closely aligned with shareholders' when
managerial stock ownership increases (the "convergence-of-interests"
hypothesis). This hypothesis is consistent with the Berle-Means association of
diffusion of stock ownership with deviations from shareholders' interest: if
dispersed stock ownership leads to insensitivity of management to
shareholders' interest, as Berle and Means argued, it would follow that
deviations from shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests are less likely to
occur as share ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of the
individuals controlling the firm.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988], however, have found that the
relationship between managerial stock ownership and corporate performance
as measured by the firm's market value (more precisely, by the ratio of the
market value of the corporation's shares to the replacement cost of its
physical assets, ;.e. Tobin's 0 is not monotonic. Although they did find a
significant correlation between managerial stock ownership and market
valuation, according to the data they produced, this relationship is not
uniformly positive. In their study of 371 large American industrial firms they
found (i) a positive relationship between firm value and managerial stock
ownership when top management owns between zero and 5 percent of the
corporation's stock, (ii) a negative relationship when managerial stock
ownership is between 5 percent and 25 percent, and (iii) a further positive
relationship when top management owns over 25 percent of the stock.
According to these findings, the view that larger management stakes will by
definition and invariably be reflected in higher market valuation of the
corporation, appears to be too simplistic.
The findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny confirm first, that a rise in
managerial stock ownership from zero causes managerial interests to resemble
more closely those of shareholders [Jensen and Warner (1988), 13]. This
conclusion is implied by the fact that stock market values go up as managers
become stock owners. Second, the results of the Morck-Shleifer-Vishny study
suggest that at less than 5 percent and at more than 25 percent stock
ownership, management will be more faithful to shareholders' interest than
when management owns between 5 and 25 percent of corporate stock. A
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possible explanation is that with stock ownership between 5 and 25 percent,
management may possess enough power to resist successfully attacks on its
position. In other words, with stock ownership in the indicated range,
management may be entrenched in office (the "entrenchment" hypothesis),
meaning that managers can deploy corporate resources in the pursuit of
objectives other than value maximization without risking their jobs and
salaries (although departures from value maximization will perhaps be less
than if management would «or own stock) [Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988), 295].
With less than 5 percent stock ownership, by contrast, management has
generally insufficient power to repulse attacks on its position. Therefore, these
managers are more likely to deploy corporate resources to maximize the
market value of their shares (instead of pursuing alternative objectives to
increase their utility), thereby acting consistently with shareholders' interest.
And with managerial stock ownership exceeding 25 percent, managers'
personal pecuniary interest in maximizing share value will probably have
become so large that managerial interests have become quite similar to those
of shareholders. This may explain the reportedly positive correlation between
market valuation and stock ownership by top management between zero and 5
percent and beyond 25 percent.
To sum up, the findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny can be interpreted
to imply that with stock ownership in the range between 5 and 25 percent,
managers may trade-off value maximization against other components of their
utility function, whereas with less than 5 percent stock ownership,
management will have little power to do so without risking its position and
with stock ownership rising beyond 25 percent, management has little
incentive to depart from value maximization. According to this interpretation,
the value decline that was found with management stock ownership between 5
and 25 percent reflects entrenchment of the management team, while the
reported value increases reflect convergence of interests between managers
and shareholders [Jensen and Warner (1988), 12-13].
Factor Mar/cete
Factor markets (including the market for investment capital), too, constrain
managerial behavior. Firms compete against other firms for the acquisition of
productive resources (raw materials, intermediate goods, capital, labor). The
more corporate wealth managers divert to themselves, the less will be left in
the corporation's treasury to hire or to buy inputs and the lower will be the
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prices the corporation can pay resource owners to attract inputs into the firm.
Hence, the more corporate wealth management absorbs for itself, the greater
is the likelihood that the corporation will be defeated by rival firms in their
competition for scarce resources, and the less managers will have to manage.
Firms compete, /n/er o//a, to attract capital for investment in the assets
and operations of the business. Where managers sacrifice corporate wealth to
pursue their own self-interests, comparatively low profits or a comparatively
low market value of the firm's shares will signal to potential suppliers of
equity capital that they may earn higher returns by investing elsewhere. In
effect, the firm's ability to attract equity is harmed as investors may prefer
investing in those other firms. Thus, when managers fail to operate the firm in
shareholders' interest, the corporation is likely to fail in the market for equity
capital. And where managers fail to raise funds to acquire productive
resources, they will soon find themselves without inputs to manage, and
without funds to appropriate.
Moreover, when a firm's results are poor in comparison with those of its
competitors, potential suppliers of capital (equity or debt) may consider
investing in that firm to be relatively risky. Consequently, investors will pay
less for the corporation's stock and lenders will charge higher, risk-
commensurate interest rates or not provide loans at all. Thus, if a poorly run
firm were still able to attract capital, it would probably get funds less easily
and on less favorable terms than its competitors of superior performance.
This in turn will harm the firm's ability to compete in product markets.
A firm's performance also affects the terms on which owners of raw
materials and intermediate goods would be prepared to do business. The
poorer a firm's results, the less inclined input owners would be to supply
inputs on credit (they may prefer immediate payment in cash) and the higher
the (risk-reflecting) interest rates that trade creditors would charge. Moreover,
a poorly performing firm may have difficulty in acquiring high-quality labor
inputs as workers may expect higher incomes and better career opportunities
from work elsewhere. The more successful a firm, the higher the wages it can
pay and the better the long-term opportunities it can offer to its employees.
It follows that if managers give priority to their personal self-interests in
running the firm, they will have trouble acquiring command over resources,
and ultimately they may be unable to manage at all (what would management
manage if investors do not supply capital, resource owners refuse to supply
inputs on credit and workers prefer working elsewhere?). In effect, thus,
competition for capital, labor and other inputs (including competition for
favorable terms of trade) provides incentives to managers to operate the firm
in shareholders' interest rather than to maximize their personal utility.
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Tfte /Warfref for Corporate Corrtro/ ,•
In addition to competition in product markets and factor markets, managers
are constrained by the threat of a takeover [Manne (1964); (1965); (1981)].
When corporate resources are not used entirely in the pursuit of stockholder
wealth-maximization, the market value of the corporation's shares will
ordinarily be less than it would be if management were exclusively driven by
shareholders' interests. Individual shareholders dissatisfied with
management's performance will sell their shares, and the market value of the
corporation's shares will decline. The more shareholders sell their shares, the
lower stock prices will fall. In this event the market price of the shares will
come to be "an index of stockholder discontent" with incumbent management
[Van Home (1973), 4],
The greater the dissatisfaction among shareholders, the greater the
downward pressure on stock market prices resulting from sales by individual
shareholders. In this way, dissatisfied shareholders lower the cost of taking
over the firm to outsiders. As a consequence, outside investors may observe
potential private wealth improvements from acquiring all or the majority of
the shares in the corporation concerned and replacing incumbent management
by managers whom they expect to operate the corporation more effectively in
shareholders' interests. As investors able to install superior managers (or to
discipline existing managers more effectively) will expect higher future
returns from possession of the corporation's shares than existing shareholders
do, they will normally be prepared to pay a price for the shares higher than
their value to the latter and so obtain all or the majority of the shares and
thereby control of the corporate firm. This takeover mechanism is known as
"the market for corporate control" [Manne (1964); (1965); (1981)]. The
threat of being replaced as a result of a takeover is presumed to be a major
control mechanism limiting managerial discretion to depart from stockholder
wealth-maximization: the "constant pressure provided by the threat of a
takeover" [Manne (1975), 516] renders deviations from shareholder wealth-
maximization less attractive to corporate managements.
"Corporate control" is defined as the right to determine the management of
corporate resources and it includes the right to select and to remove the
corporation's top management [Jensen and Ruback (1983), 5]. The market for
corporate control as a mechanism for aligning managerial behavior with
shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests functions through the impact of
managerial performance on the market value of a corporation's shares
[Manne (1981), 690]. In the words of Van Home [1973, 4]: "The market
price [of corporate stock] serves as a performance index or report card of the
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firm's progress; it indicates how well management is doing in behalf of its
stockholders". The market for corporate control, thus, assumes the existence
of a positive relation between stock prices and management's adherence to
shareholders' interests [Manne (1965), 112].
When management fails to operate the corporation in shareholders' best
interests, the market price of the company's shares will reveal to outsiders the
possibility of realizing wealth gains by providing improved management.
Manne [1965, 112-113] distinguishes between two kinds of rewards which
outsiders can earn by acquiring control of a poorly run company (that is, a
company which is yielding a return to shareholders below the return that
could be accomplished if it were managed more effectively in shareholders'
interests). First, acquirers can take over the compensation associated with the
company's top-level managerial positions. Second, and more importantly,
they may realize substantial capital gains (;.e. increases in the market value of
the company's shares) by improving the company's performance. Because of
the increase in the value of the company's stock an acquirer may be able to
effect, Manne [1965, 113] concludes that "the potential return from the
successful takeover and revitalization of a poorly run company can be
enormous".
Competition in the market for corporate control means that those bidders
will acquire control of a particular firm who expect the highest private wealth
gains from obtaining the right to control the use ofthat company's resources,
that is, those who offer the highest bidding prices for its shares. The highest
wealth gains are likely to be anticipated by would-be acquirers best suited for
improving company performance and thereby enhancing returns to
shareholders. They will most effectively eliminate managerial departures from
stockholder wealth-maximization. As prospective wealth gains from superior
management are reflected in bidding prices, these bidders will offer the
highest price for the company's shares and so obtain control. On the
assumption that higher returns to investors come from superior allocations of
corporate resources to meet society's demands as expressed in the demand
functions for the firm's goods and services, those bidders expecting the
highest private wealth gains from obtaining corporate control will
concurrently be those best able to allocate corporate resources to socially
valuable uses. Thus a smoothly operating market for corporate control will
benefit society as a whole.
Tender offers, usually providing the existing shareholders with the
opportunity during a limited period of time to sell their shares at a more or
less substantial, non-negotiable premium over the prevailing market price,
have been described as an "elaborate signaling device" in the market for
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corporate control: they inform the shareholders that an increase in the value of
the firm is attainable through improved management and that such increased
value can be realized only if corporate control is placed in different hands,
with the extra value attainable being capitalized in the tender offer price (in
particular, in the takeover premium) and disappearing from existing
shareholders when the offer expires [Cohen (1990)]. In effect, tender offers
promote socially beneficial transfers of corporate control to investors capable
of supplying superior management to the firm.
Empirical data relating to the market for corporate control indicate that
companies which are the target of a takeover attempt almost invariably realize
substantial increases in their stock market value in the period of the takeover
attempt [Jensen and Ruback (1983), 10-14; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter
(1988), 51-52]. The evidence also suggests that these value increases be lost
if the takeover attempt fails [Jensen and Ruback (1983), 14-16]. These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that corporate control transactions
serve to improve target company performance: the prospect of higher future
returns to shareholders is capitalized into stock price increases prior to
takeover and these value increases are lost if the takeover does not
materialize, that is, if the "old" management continues to manage the firm.
Moreover, empirical data suggest that managerial actions which eliminate
the possibility of a takeover are attended by a decline in the market value of
the company's shares [Jensen and Ruback (1983), 38-39]. The same
observation has been made in relation to managerial actions which oppose
(but do not eliminate completely) potential takeovers and which are not
subject to shareholder voting approval [Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988),
62-65]. Negative stock price reactions to defensive measures by the target
company's management intended to preclude a potential takeover of corporate
control, indicate that the possibility of a takeover is valued positively by
investors. In other words, the fact that the firm is subject to potential
corporate control transactions is associated with positive wealth gains for
stockholders.
The empirical evidence summarized above confirms that the takeover
mechanism supplied by the market for corporate control operates to curtail
managerial departures from stockholder wealth-maximization. The finding
that shareholders of target companies realize substantial capital gains in
successfully completed takeover attempts, combined with the finding that
shareholders of bidding companies in such takeovers on average do not lose
[Jensen and Ruback (1983), 16-22; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), 53],
indicates that corporate takeovers produce wealth gains, /.e. create value. As
the gains to shareholders from takeovers do not appear to be offset by losses
760 T/ieProö/e/nof/nferna/Cosfs
to other parties, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter [1988, 58] conclude that the
available data confirm that corporate control transactions "reflect
economically beneficial reshufflings of productive assets".
Of course, the reduction in the agency costs associated with managerial
departures from stockholder wealth-maximization is not the only possible
source of wealth gain generated by takeovers. Productivity advances through
availability of new technology and cost reductions through economies of scale
between the target firm and the acquiring firm are other potential sources of
gains to takeovers. The reduction of inter-firm transaction costs, for example
by organizing the relationship between an asset specialized to one particular
user and that user within one firm [Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978)], may
also account for takeover gains.
Many antitrust lawyers (and economists) earn a decent living on the basis
of the suspicion that corporate combinations create market power, enabling
exploitation of consumers by producers through contrived scarcity and
consequential high prices. This reasoning suggests that wealth gains to
shareholders in takeovers may come at the expense of consumers and result
from the increased market power of the target firm and the acquiring firm.
However, the available empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis
that wealth gains created by corporate takeovers in the market for corporate
control generally tend to come from the creation of market power [Jensen and
Ruback (1983), 24-25].
The Maricef for /Wanagena/ Labor
Managers are furthermore constrained by the market for managerial labor
[Fama (1980); Alchian (1975b)]. Corporate managers compete for
managerial jobs in this market. Incumbent managers face competition from
rival (including would-be) managers who seek to displace them, and they
themselves compete against others for new positions from which they
anticipate greater utility. Competition among managers to obtain more
attractive employment offers elsewhere provides incentives to managers to act
consistently with shareholders' interests.
The more successfully a manager advances shareholders' interests, the
greater his value to investors in corporate equity and the higher the price at
which they would be prepared to hire him. Accordingly, by maximizing the
value of shareholders' residual claim, managers establish favorable
reputations in the market for managerial services with respect to investors and
so enhance future compensation for their services in that market. As Alchian
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[1975b, 504] has noted, a manager's superiority to other, competing,
managers is reflected in his higher labor market value. On the other hand,
when a manager T&'/s to maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim,
his value in the market for corporate managers (z.e. the rental value of his
human capital) is likely to decline. In this way the market for managerial
labor establishes a positive correlation between a manager's commitment to
shareholders' interests and his labor market value, with deviations from
maximization of stockholder wealth being reflected in the devaluation of his
human capital [Fama (1980)]. It follows that managers desiring to enhance
the market value of their human capital have a personal interest in
maximizing stockholder wealth.
Firms have incentives to reward managers in accordance with their outside
labor market value since if they pay less, existing managers may leave the
firm to earn a higher compensation elsewhere. Moreover, the firm will have
difficulty in hiring new skilled managers if its reward system is not responsive
to the outside market value of managers' human capital. And if the firm were
to pay managers /wore than their market value, that is, it simply pays too
much for what it gets, this would be at the expense of shareholders' earnings
from the residual claim.
Managers have incentives to maximize their labor market value in order to
bid up their compensation from the corporation they manage, to increase their
chances of being hired by another, better rewarding corporation, and to
diminish the risk of being out-valued (/. e. displaced) by rivals eager to take
over their present job. Thus, it pays managers to increase the rental value of
their human capital by faithfully serving shareholders' interests, both to
maximize their personal salaries and job security in their current positions and
to attract better employment offers elsewhere.
Consistent with this theory, Gilson [1990] found that directors of U.S.
corporations who resigned from the board following the corporation's
bankruptcy, experienced a decrease in the number of directorships held with
other companies: a sample average of 2.2 directorships reduced to an average
of 1.4 over the three year period following resignation from the bankrupt firm.
According to this finding, the firm's bankruptcy which may be deemed
illustrative of, if not synonymous with, bad management, decreases the value
of a director's human capital to other firms. Similarly, Kaplan and Reishus
[1990] reported that dividend cuts have a significant negative impact on the
number of new outside directorships the chief executive officers of firms
cutting dividends receive thereafter, when compared with chief executive
officers of firms which do not reduce dividend pay-outs.
Labor market pressure on managers to advance shareholders' interest
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hinges on the premise that appropriate information about managerial
performance is available to the managerial labor market. The market value of
a company's shares is a source of information about management's
performance. The higher a corporation's share prices, the more successful
management is in maximizing the value of shareholders' residual claim. When
the shares in a particular company are valued low relative to the market
values of the shares in competing firms, share prices signal that from the point
of view of investors, this company's management is not performing as well as
the management of competing companies.
As share prices depend on the net present value of anticipated future
profits, the higher a company's share prices, the higher the profits investors
expect management to realize in the future and, therefore, the more positive is
investors' judgement with respect to management's ability to advance
shareholders' interests. In this way, share prices feed information into
managerial labor markets.
The information revealed in share prices relates to the firm and its
management as a whole and not to the performance of /W/V/ÖW/ members of
the management. Accordingly, Fama [1980, 291-292] has argued that "the
rental rates for their human capital (...) are likely to depend on the success or
failure of the firm [and] the previous associations of a manager with success
and failure are information about his talents". He concludes that "the success
or failure of the team impacts [a manager's] future wages, and this gives the
manager a stake in the success of the team". Thus, a manager's market value
is dependent upon the success of the firm as a whole, which in turn induces
him to enhance the performance of other inputs. This observation is consistent
with the view of the firm as a team in which the marginal products of
individual team members are interdependent [Alchian and Demsetz (1972)].
Managers are not only disciplined by the managerial labor market outside
the firm but also by competition from other managers within the firm. As
noted above, the rental value of a manager's human capital is positively
related to firm performance. Since this principle applies to any manager in a
particular firm, o// managers within that firm have incentives to monitor each
other (both top-down and bottom-up). Where one manager's shirking or
incompetence negatively affects firm performance, the labor market value of
other managers is likely to decline. Therefore, each manager will be concerned
with the performance of other managers.
The firm's top managers have incentives to displace badly performing
lower managers both to secure their own positions and to enhance their
personal market value. Moreover, within a firm, high ranked managers face
competition from lower ranked managers eager to displace them in order to
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further their own careers, income and power: "Lower managers perceive that
they can gain by stepping over shirking or less competent managers above
them" [Fama (1980), 293]. For this reason, lower managers may attempt to
direct the attention of the superiors of their superiors in rank (ultimately the
shareholders) to shirking or incompetence by higher managers. Obviously,
shareholders have wealth-maximizing incentives to displace shirking or
incompetent top managers (or supervisory directors entitled to remove the
incumbent management).
The market for managerial labor outside and inside the firm gives
corporate managers a personal interest in the operation of the corporation in
order to maximize stockholder wealth. Both the need to resist competitors for
their present jobs from outside and inside the firm and the desire to enhance
their rental value to other potential employers [Alchian (1975b), 502] induce
managers to be faithful to shareholders' interests. Managerial departures from
stockholder wealth maximization are likely to decrease the value of their
human capital in the outside labor market and to threaten their positions
within the firm. In both respects, managers who sacrifice shareholders'
interests to other goals would (or might) suffer losses, including opportunity
losses.
Imperfections of the Disciplinary Mechanisms
We have identified several market mechanisms that restrict managerial
discretion to depart from stockholder wealth maximization. Competition in
product markets and in factor markets, incentive contracting, the market for
corporate control and markets for managerial labor within and outside the
firm, all operate to induce corporate managers to serve shareholders' wealth-
maximizing interests by giving managers a personal interest in doing so.
However, the market mechanisms described above do not entirely bridge
the gap between managers' interest in maximization of their personal utility
on the one hand and stockholder wealth maximization on the other. There are
several reasons why the aforesaid markets are unlikely to achieve the
complete assimilation of managerial behavior with shareholder interests and
these we explore below.
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L/m/te of CompeW/on /n Producf
Competition in the market for the firm's output will not eliminate managerial
self-interest seeking at shareholders' expense as the divergence of interests
between shareholders and managers and, hence, the existence of agency costs,
is inherent in a«y firm in which the management function is separate from the
function of residual risk-bearing. Divergences of interests (agency costs),
thus, are an economy-wide phenomenon. Therefore, they are unlikely to
threaten the survival of any one particular firm except where a firm incurs
excessive costs from managerial self-interest seeking, that is, where it incurs
higher agency costs than its competitors do: only when the amount of
managerial shirking is exceptionally large can competition from other firms
threaten the firm's survival and, thereby, managerial jobs. Competition in
product markets, then, will curb solely excessive aberrations by corporate
managements. When the amount of agency costs is more or less equivalent
among competing firms, their existence will not affect competition between
these firms [Jensen and Meckling (1976), 330].
Does it follow that firms which are managed by their shareholders have a
competitive advantage over firms operated by hired managers, given that in
investor-managed firms there is no separation of interests between risk-
bearers and managers? It does not. Indeed, shareholder-managed firms do not
incur costs from the divergence of interests between shareholders and
managers, but the absence of this divergence does not imply that shareholder-
managers will naturally appropriate fewer corporate resources or shirk less
than hired managers. As Demsetz [1983] has pointed out, shareholder-
managers, too, may decide in favor of using corporate resources to provide
on-the-job consumption. He maintains that like hired managers, a manager
who at the same time owns the shares in the company he manages is guided
by utility maximization [1983, 378], The difference is that when A/m/
managers appropriate corporate resources, shareholders are generally harmed,
while .y/Mfre/jo/c/er-managers using corporate resources to provide on-the-job
consumption do so to benefit themselves.
Shareholder-managers may seek to achieve on-the-job benefits instead of
maximizing their earnings from the residual claim as they may expect to
derive greater utility from on-the-job amenities than from extra pecuniary
income consumable at home. For instance, shareholder-managers may decide
in favor of on-the-job consumption as in this way they can obtain tax benefits:
income from dividends is generally taxed and so may be possible capital gains
a shareholder-manager may receive when selling (some or all of) his shares,
but on-the-job amenities may escape taxation. Also, for example, a
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shareholder-manager may seek to maximize his free time subject to the
constraint that his earnings from the residual claim exceed some minimum
amount, as he may prefer extra leisure to overworking himself to earn extra
money [Baumöl (1973), 15]. Other shareholder-managers may prefer
governing an ever larger-growing business empire to managing a firm that
yields maximum returns on their residual claim.
Now let us assume for the sake of argument that on balance the cost to the
firm of on-the-job consumption by shareholder-managers is less than the
agency costs in firms operated by hired managers. It still does not follow that
shareholder-managed firms have a competitive advantage over manager-
operated firms. The management function will not be separated from the
function of residual risk-bearing «n/m the shareholders expect that the
benefits to them from this separation outweigh the agency costs generated by
the resulting divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. And
the mere frequency of manager-operated firms suggests that the benefits to
shareholders from the management of these firms being conducted by
specialist managers do outweigh agency costs.
As discussed in Chapter 2, shareholder-managed firms with multiple
shareholders are burdened with high costs of decision-making and with losses
from shirking by individual shareholder-managers, and they do not benefit
from specialization of labor through professional managers. Moreover, if the
number of shareholders is ///w/7«/, for example, to keep down decision-
making costs and to avoid shirking problems (especially where the shares in a
corporation are owned by a single shareholder), the amount of equity capital
available to finance business ventures will be equally limited; and the less
equity capital is put up by the firm's shareholders, generally the lower the
amount the firm can borrow and the higher the risk-commensurate interest
rates that lenders will charge. In summary, the potential advantage of less
agency costs to a shareholder-managed firm is likely to be offset by
competitive disadvantages in other respects.
L/m/te of /ncenf/Ve Confracfs
Incentive contracts which link a manager's remuneration to the firm's success
in its competition with other firms cause managers' interests to be more
closely aligned with those of the shareholders, but they are unlikely to entirely
e/zm/nate conflicts of interests. We do not deny that incentive contracts can be
a powerful instrument for aligning hired managers' personal interests with
those of the shareholders but their ability to do so is subject to various
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limitations.
First, incentive contracts generally make (a part of) a manager's monetary
income dependent on the financial results of the firm. However, as we have
seen, a manager's utility function typically contains also no/7-/>ecw/7/ary
variables inconsistent with stockholder wealth-maximization (such as on-the-
job perquisites, desire for leisure, or desire for social prominence). When a
manager expects to derive greater utility from such non-pecuniary variables
than from extra pecuniary income, the prospect of extra money from the
incentive contract will not motivate him to behave consistently with
shareholders' interests. For instance, when a manager values extra leisure or
on-the-job amenities higher than increased monetary income consumable at
home (for example, because the former are not taxed), an incentive contract
providing for his financial compensation to be contingent on corporate
performance will not (or will only to a limited extent) discipline him. In
general, incentive contracts will only align a manager's personal interests with
those of shareholders up to the point on a manager's utility function at which
his marginal expected utility from extra monetary income for consumption
outside the firm equals the marginal expected utility derived from increased
on-the-job consumption, extra leisure and other non-pecuniary variables.
Ultimately, the law of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, which dictates
that individuals obtain proportionately less utility from additional increments
of money as their aggregate wealth increases, will put a limit on the
constraints incentive contracts could entail.
By the same law, it is not likely that a manager who receives a very
substantial amount (in absolute terms) as fixed salary, independent of the
firm's results, will obtain much extra utility from additional money from an
incentive contract. In that case, the incentive contract would add little to his
actual incentive to maximize stockholder returns. For instance, a chief
executive officer who earns several million dollars as fixed income will,
according to the cited law, obtain proportionately less utility from increments
of wealth effected by stock options or other performance-related bonuses that
are awarded to him on top of his fixed salary. Instead of being an incentive
for management, such extra income contingent upon the firm's fortunes could
perhaps be construed as a payment-to-performance measure that facilitates
comparison in the market for managerial labor.
Second, incentive contracts primarily motivate managers to maximize their
own remuneration with respect to the contract concerned, that is, for the time
period or periods covered by the contract. For instance, when the contract
provides that management shall have a share in corporate profits or receive a
bonus in cash or a salary increase if profits exceed a specified bottom line,
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managers have incentives to maximize profits for the accounting periods to
which the contract relates. To obtain the cited bonus or salary increase, they
may increase short-term accounting profits at the expense of long-range
business opportunities, /'. e. at the expense of stockholder returns over the long
run. Managers may, for example, raise short-run profits by selling corporate
assets at prices in excess of their book values; although yielding an
accounting profit, such asset sales may well harm the corporation's future
earning power.
Furthermore, when managers are rewarded stock bonuses, they will be
inclined to maximize the value of the corporation's shares by the time they
intend to sell their shares. Virtually the same principle would apply when
management receives stock options: managers would then have wealth-
maximizing incentives to maximize share value by the time they intend to
exercise their option rights. Again, managers may allocate, or attempt to
allocate, corporate assets to maximize their personal income from stock
bonuses or stock options rather than maximize returns to shareholders over
the long run. (Yet note that as stock prices depend on the net present value of
expected future profits, the prospects, in practice, for managers to push up the
market value of corporate equity in the short term at the expense of the long
term is probably limited.)
In brief, incentive contracts may shorten managers' time horizon, whilst
wealth maximizing shareholders desire managers to take into account both the
short term and the long term. To shareholders, in principle all future
accounting periods are relevant, not merely the period(s) to which a
manager's incentive contract relates. De Alessi [1973, 848; emphasis by the
author] has noted that the accounting periods relevant to corporate managers
would "roughly be limited to those occurring during his tenure in office, and
this time horizon would necessarily be shorter than a shareholder's to whom
a// future accounting periods matter". Instead of reducing the difference
between the time horizons of shareholders and managers, then, incentive
contracts for managers may increase it.
Third, where incentive contracts create uncertain prospects of future
income instead of a certain prospect on which managers could simply cash in
if they meet a fixed target, for example, if managers are promised stock
options or stock bonuses whose market value is subject to uncertainty, instead
of a fixed cash bonus if the firm earns a stated minimum profit, these
contracts discourage management from engaging the firm in risky activities
with positive expected returns to the shareholders, to the extent that managers
are risk averse. Risk averse managers will seek to curtail uncertainty about
their own future monetary income and, therefore, prefer low- (or moderate-)
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risk activities with a relatively certain outcome in terms of the expected value
of their incentive contract (for instance, the value of stock options), to high-
risk activities which hold out a less certain income prospect of equal expected
monetary value. One can safely assume that most managers are risk averse in
that, due to the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, they will derive
greatest utility from the initial wealth increments yielded by an incentive
contract and attach less utility to additional increments of monetary income.
Where, for instance, stock options induce managers to engage the firm in a
low-risk activity which they expect will yield a relatively certain option
income, instead of a high-risk venture which might yield more but which
would also subject the variable part of their income to greater uncertainty,
stock options would reward conservatism on the managers' part: where more
risk connotes innovation, development of new products, new production
techniques and (other) venturesome activities, stock options and other
incentive contracts that create uncertain income prospects for corporate
managers discourage exploration and exploitation of new business
opportunities and encourage management to stick to the familiar. This, in
turn, threatens maximization of the value of shareholders' residual claim in
the long run and is detrimental to society at large in so far as innovation
would bring about greater satisfaction of consumers' needs.
Fourth, a point often overlooked is that contracts which provide incentives
to managers to enhance the value of shareholders' residual claim, do so at a
direct cost to the shareholders. Profit sharing by management, performance
related cash bonuses and salary increases for managers all absorb corporate
wealth that would otherwise flow to the shareholders through the residual
claim. Moreover, if new shares are issued for the purpose of granting stock
bonuses or stock options to managers, the existing shareholders' residual
claim on the corporate firm's assets and cash flows is typically watered down;
this may lead to a decline in the market price of the firm's shares unless
investors attach a higher value to managers' presumed increased incentives to
serve shareholder interests than they do to the reduction of shareholders'
proportionate share of the residual claim. Furthermore, if the issuance to
managers of bonus shares or stock options were to come from the
corporation's treasury stock (;.e. shares held by the corporation which issued
them), it would be at the expense of potential capital gains on such treasury
stock which would have been earned if the same stock had been sold to
investors [Machlup (1967), 20J. Thus, in order to bring about a reduction in
managerial departures from maximization of stockholder wealth, shareholders
would incur other costs. Incentive contracts for corporate management yield a
net benefit to shareholders only if the above-mentioned costs of such contracts
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are less than shareholders' increased returns from greater coherence of
managerial actions and stockholder wealth maximization that the incentive
contract would accomplish.
Finally, the findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988] discussed
previously suggest that when stock bonuses or options cause managerial stock
ownership to rise above 5 percent (but still being less than 25 percent), such
bonuses enhance management's ability to pursue objectives other than
maximization of stockholder wealth. In this event the issuance of stock
bonuses (options) to management would be counterproductive from the
shareholders' point of view.
Incentive contracts may also be costly to society at large in so far as their
effect is to lower the sum of the state's revenue from corporate income taxes
and private income taxes owed by corporate managers. Incentive contracts
may reduce the corporation's income tax burden if corporate expenditure on
such contracts is deductible from the corporation's taxable income under the
applicable corporate income tax statute. Lower tax revenue to the state from
corporate income taxes will not necessarily be offset by higher private income
taxes for managers, since managers' private benefits from incentive contracts
(for example, certain fringe benefits) may either escape taxation or be taxed at
a lower rate than corporate profits. For instance, capital gains to managers
from the exercise of stock option rights and subsequent stock sales may,
wholly or partially, escape taxation under the private income tax statute.
Managers may deliberately seek to evade private income tax by having
regular income substituted by income components from incentive contracts
that enjoy more favorable tax treatment. When incentive contracts are
employed as regular income substitutes so as to evade private income taxes,
they reduce total tax revenue to the state (that means, to society as a whole),
even if their impact on corporate income tax levels is neutral. Lower tax
revenue means that society has fewer resources for investment in public goods
or for other public expenditure. Moreover, if the state were to seek
compensation for tax revenue losses resulting from the operation of incentive
contracts for managers by adoption of higher general tax charges, the public
at large is forced to subsidize managerial income and managers' use of tax
evasion techniques.
If, for instance, stock options were to have private income tax advantages
to managers compared with non-performance related income, such tax
advantages would not merely create incentives for managers to have regular
income replaced by stock options but they would also reward short-term
management horizons. As stock options connect managers' time horizons to
the expiry date of the option right, tax benefits associated with option rights
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would promote managerial decision-making for the short term. In the
Netherlands, effective 1998 legislation has been introduced which both
reduces the difference in private income tax treatment between regular income
and income from stock options issued by corporations and opposes the
shortening of time horizons as a result of option components in managers'
income. According to this legislation, which applies to option rights awarded
to managers and employees alike, the actual or estimated market value of any
stock option awarded by the corporation is taxed as private income once the
recipient becomes entitled to exercise the option and in addition, any income
from the exercise or sale of option rights within a three year period after their
issuance by the corporation is also subject to private income tax. Income from
the sale or exercise of option rights realized o/ter three years is, as before,
exempted from taxation. This legislation limits managers' tax advantage from
option income (as compared with ordinary income) to capital gains ensuing
from the exercise of stock option rights realized at least three years after the
option right was received and, thus, encourages managers to extend the time
horizon of their decision-making beyond that period.
L/m/te of Compel/on /n Factor /War/cete
Like competition in product markets, competition among firms to attract
factors of production is unlikely to prevent deviations by corporate
managements from maximization of stockholder wealth. Again, we do not
deny that factor markets supply constraints on managerial discretion but they
are unlikely to accomplish complete coherence of managerial actions with
shareholder interests.
First, as conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders are
common to all firms in which the management and risk-bearing functions are
separate, managerial self-interest seeking is unlikely to harm any particular
firm's ability to compete in factor markets, except where the size of a firm's
agency costs is excessive in comparison with those of its competitors.
Second, competition among firms to acquire funds for investment in the
assets of the business does not force management to mrtv/m/ze returns to
stockholders but only demands that returns be kept at a level sufficient to
content investors. To obtain funds for investment, investors must be
compensated at a level that is satisfactory to them [Berle and Means (1991),
301]. Accordingly, in any firm, the management may seek to produce
m/ni/WM/w returns acceptable to investors rather than maximum returns
[Baumöl (1967)]. Once managers have kept returns at a level acceptable to
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shareholders they may forgo possible extra returns to shareholders in order to
pursue their own self-interests. Williamson [1986, 9] has defined profits
exceeding the minimum level acceptable to shareholders as "discretionary
profits", indicating that beyond the acceptable level managers have discretion
to trade off profits in order to increase their personal utility.
Similarly, competition for loans does not require managers to maximize
the value of cash flows but only to generate enough cash to pay the interest
due and to repay the loan. To attract labor, raw materials and intermediate
goods into the firm, it is only required that input owners be paid enough to
ensure the continued supply of such inputs. Thus, pressure from factor
markets will demand managers to use corporate resources to generate cash
flows large enough to compensate shareholders, creditors, workers and other
suppliers of inputs; it does not, however, require them to refrain from using
corporate resources to further their personal interests.
Third, corporate managements may seek to attain independence from
capital markets by accumulating excessive cash balances in the corporation's
treasury [Jensen (1986); (1989)]. By retaining corporate earnings instead of
distributing them to shareholders, managers create a source of discretion.
Retained earnings which are not necessary to finance on-going business
operations represent a source of funds which may quite easily be allocated to
increase managers' utility rather than to maximize stockholder wealth.
Conversely, distributions of cash to shareholders would reduce the amount of
resources that managers control, thereby reducing the amount of corporate
wealth they may use to benefit their own self-interest. As Jensen [1989, 66]
has argued, although technically they can serve a competitive purpose, large
balances of retained cash "often lead to waste and inefficiency".
In particular, when excess cash is piled up in the corporation's treasury,
managers may finance new projects without having to go out to the capital
markets to raise funds, which implies, without having to face the scrutiny of
potential purchasers of stock should the project be financed through the sale
of new shares, or the scrutiny of creditors should management attempt to
borrow the required amount. In other words, financing projects internally
avoids the monitoring by the financial markets which would occur should the
firm have to raise new funds from external sources [Jensen (1986), 323].
Accordingly, managerial refusals to disgorge corporate cash to shareholders
may be conceived of as attempts to insulate management from the discipline
of the capital markets. When managers use retained cash for purposes
yielding a lower return to shareholders than the latter would be able to achieve
themselves if the money were paid out to them, shareholder interests are
clearly harmed.
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L/m/te of Me /Waricef for Co/po/ate Confro/
As we discussed, the market for corporate control is identified as a major
control mechanism inducing managers to behave consistently with stockholder
interests. However, the operation of this market typically involves
considerable transaction costs that may preclude transfers of corporate
control to investors capable of reducing managerial deviations from
maximization of stockholder wealth.
First, potential purchasers of corporate control need to obtain information
in respect of the corporation concerned in order to determine whether they
would gain by taking over control of the firm. The internal conditions of a
firm, including management's performance, are neither widely known nor
easy to discover, as Williamson [1986, 226] has noted, and the costs of
obtaining sufficiently specific information to evaluate performance are non-
trivial. True, when a corporation's existing management fails to operate the
corporate firm in a way that maximizes the value of shareholders' residual
claim, share prices in the stock market will reveal to outside investors
potential capital gains from taking over that company and improving
company management. But share prices per se do not disclose in what
respects incumbent managers are deviating from value maximization (that is,
what exactly is management doing wrong?) and how corporate performance
could be improved to increase returns to shareholders (that is, where and how
should the firm be revised?). Yet such information will be of vital importance
to investors (and competing management teams) considering to acquire
control of a company.
Second, to obtain control of a company, would-be buyers usually have to
expend resources in raising the funds needed to finance a takeover, in
convincing existing shareholders that they will be belter off by selling their
shares at the price the would-be buyer is prepared to pay, in assembling a
superior management team and in installing mechanisms to ensure lasting
improved managerial performance after the takeover bid has proved
successful. Moreover, in a hostile takeover attempt, the bidder will also have
to incur costs to overcome opposition from the target company's incumbent
management against the takeover. Resistance by incumbent management
against a takeover attempt is apt to raise the bidder's costs, as such resistance
may both consume resources of the target company itself (through
expenditures on defensive measures, including uses of corporate resources
intended to reduce the bidder's returns from taking over the firm) and force
the bidder to spend additional resources in order to overcome managerial
defensive tactics [Easterbrook and Fischel (1981), 1175]. All such costs may
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diminish net potential wealth gains from acquiring control of a particular
firm, thereby reducing the probability of a takeover.
In brief, the transaction costs involved in takeovers include both the costs
of acquiring information on the prospective target and the costs of effecting
and implementing the desired transfer of corporate control. Costs need also be
incurred in evaluating the prevailing market price of the firm's shares and in
establishing an appropriate bidding price at which a takeover bid would likely
be both successful and profitable to the bidder. To obtain the requisite
information, a would-be bidder usually needs to hire the costly services of a
variety of consultants that may include investment analysts, industry experts,
specialists in corporate restructurings and corporate finance experts.
If the information reveals a potential wealth increase from assumption of
control of the contemplated target firm, prior to a corporate control
transaction further resources usually need be expended in preparing the
takeover bid, negotiating with relevant parties such as target company
management, trade unions and existing block owners, and in surmounting
legal impediments (for example, antitrust legislation). This process of
accomplishing the desired takeover also tends to involve the engagement of
expensive consultants, for example, investment bankers, lawyers and
consultants on investor and media relations.
Finally, transaction costs could also arise from litigation following, or
preceding, a corporate control transaction or a takeover attempt (for example,
litigation between the bidder and the target company's management or
between members of the bidding coalition). The presence of such transaction
costs means that the theatre of the market for corporate control is rather noisy
[Scherer (1988b), 801; it is nor a quiet, Coasian environment in which
transactions occur readily and smoothly, and the noise (the transaction costs)
may absorb all or part of the pleasure (the desired private wealth
improvement) which the visitors to the theatre seek to enjoy. According to
Robert Smiley's estimate, based upon empirical research of takeover activity
in the United States, the average per share transaction costs of a tender offer,
probably the most common device to pursue a takeover attempt, amount to at
least 13 percent of the market price of the shares after the offer [Smiley
(1976). 30].
Only when the potential capital gains inherent in the corporation's shares
are large enough to offset the transaction costs attending a takeover, /.e. only
when share prices signal large prospective wealth gains from providing
improved management, is a takeover likely to take place. Indeed, incumbent
management does not have to worry about displacement until the extent of its
departures from value maximization exceeds the transaction costs facing
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prospective bidders for the corporation's stock plus the premium over the
stock's prevailing market price such bidders would need to pay the existing
shareholders in order to urge a transfer of corporate control. Taking into
account transaction costs only, according to the above-mentioned estimate,
this means that the possibility of a tender offer will pose a credible threat of
displacement to incumbent managers solely if the prevailing stock market
price reveals a potential capital gain from a control transfer of approximately
13 percent or more [Smiley (1976), 30]. Consequently, the threat of a
takeover is likely to prevent solely wq/or departures by corporate managers
from maximization of stockholder wealth: because of the costs of a takeover,
managerial malfeasance must be substantial before somebody will attempt to
intervene.
As Eisenberg [1979, 137] has put it, "[tjhe transaction costs of takeover
bids are so high (...) that it is very difficult to oust an inefficient management
with a takeover bid unless the management is so enormously inefficient as to
justify these enormous transaction costs. Management can, therefore, sit
around inefficiently and watch the market go down, and nothing can be easily
done about it." Thus managerial departures from shareholders' interests that
do harm investors, though not enough to offset the transaction costs of a
takeover attempt, would escape discipline by the market for corporate control.
In this way the effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a
mechanism for disciplining corporate managers is limited. Given the
transaction costs which it involves, Scherer [1988a, 54] has properly defined
the market for corporate control as no more than a "last-resort mechanism
(...) for constraining managers to serve stockholder interests".
In the previous section we saw that large retained cash balances insulate
managers from disciplining by financial markets by making it unnecessary for
them to attract funds from outsiders to invest in new ventures. However, as is
often overlooked, excessive cash balances may also pervert the operation of
the market for corporate control: they enable poorly run firms with large non-
disgorged cash to acquire the shares in firms with a superior management that
generate greater returns to investors and to take over control of such firms,
instead of the other way round [Herman (1984), 536-538].
Poor managers of firms with excessive retained cash have an incentive to
take over better managed firms: they can then offer to investors in the poorly
run acquirer firm, the prospect of increased returns from the more effectively
operated (;.e. more profitable) target company and so conceal their own weak
performance from the acquiring firm's shareholders. Managers may also have
other self-interested motives to buy in the market for corporate control, in
particular, the desire to take charge of a larger firm or conglomerate (empire
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building) because of the higher managerial remuneration, fringe benefits,
power and social prestige which tend to be associated with managing a larger
firm or group of firms. In such cases, the operation of the market for
corporate control will be counterproductive from the perspective of promoting
effective shareholder-interested management: contrary to conventional theory,
it will be 6#d management which drives out good management, not the
opposite - a kind of Gresham's law for managers.
L/m/te of rr?e Managena/ Labor
Like the market for corporate control, the managerial labor market also faces
substantial transaction costs. In order for the competition between managers
to attract better jobs elsewhere to be effective, potential outside employers
need to have accurate information about the comparative ability of these
managers to advance the former's interests. In other words, they must know
whether manager A will serve their interests better than manager B Similarly,
for the competition between managers within a firm's internal hierarchy to be
effective, shareholders who have an interest in replacing underperforming top
managers with more effective lower managers must have access to
information about the comparative performance of individual managers.
Equally, managers desiring to outperform other managers and to maximize
the rental value of their human capital must also have information about the
value placed on their services and those of competing managers by both the
shareholders of the firm that currently employs them and by potential outside
employers.
Earlier, we have argued that stock market prices contain information about
managerial performance. Where the market value of a firm's shares is high
compared to that of competing enterprises, stock prices indicate that
management is successful in advancing stockholder interests. However, as
indicated, stock prices contain information about the performance of a firm's
management team but they do not reveal specific information about the
performance of /W/v/cfaa/ managers. It is precisely such specific, individual
information that is relevant to the operation of competitive managerial labor
markets both within and outside the firm.
In general, obtaining specific information about the performance and
talents of individual (would-be) managers is costly. Head-hunting agencies
perform a function in disclosing such information to potential employers
outside the firm. However, such information is not freely available to the
players in managerial labor markets either inside or outside the firm. The cost
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of feeding information about individual managers' performance and abilities
into managerial labor markets is a threshold to effective labor market
discipline. Where such costs are prohibitive, pressure from managerial labor
markets is unlikely to eliminate managerial departures from stockholder
interests.
Information about a manager's human capital suffers both from an
adverse selection problem and from a moral hazard problem. There is an
adverse selection problem in that information regarding a manager's past
performance does not necessarily provide accurate information about his
ability to perform well in a new job or company. A manager may have been
quite successful in his current job but a promotion to a more demanding job
or to another firm may simply be a step too far. Thus, although a manager's
performance record may suggest that he will be a valuable asset to another
company, the task of managing that other company may turn out to be beyond
his level of competency. Such adverse selection problems arise because it
may, and often will, be prohibitively costly, if not completely impossible, to
obtain complete and accurate ex a/7te information about a manager's ability to
be successful in a new job or firm. The difficulty and cost of selecting value-
maximizing managers will be encountered by any firm.
There is also a potential moral hazard problem given that following
appointment a manager may change his behavior to the detriment of the
shareholders of the firm. He may, for example, shirk more or appropriate a
larger amount of corporate resources through on-the-job consumption than he
would have done before. The very fact that he has been hired may change the
manager's performance incentives, and this could invalidate the evaluations
upon which the firm and its shareholders relied when they decided to hire him.
Whilst the adverse selection problem cited above has its origin in the cost of
assessing a manager's current (/.e. pre-contractual) human capital, the moral
hazard problem arises because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate
information about a manager's postcontractual behavior.
In particular, once a manager has achieved his "dream job" or his expected
final appointment (end-of-career job), he may shirk the maximization of
stockholder wealth even though he may have properly served stockholder
interests in his previous appointments. He may do so because labor market
discipline operates through the incorporation of a manager's /ras?
performance in the calculation of the rental value of his human capital, as
Fama [1980, 292] has explained, and when a manager is no longer in the
market for a new job, he is likely to be rather insensitive to the deterioration
of his labor market value: he will not face ex poi'/ settling up by the labor
market for deviations from stockholder interests.
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Fama [1980, 296] argues that "(r)ational managerial labor markets
understand any shortcomings of available mechanisms for enforcing ex /wwr
settling up. Assessments of ex pos/ deviations from contract will be
incorporated into contracts on an ex a«te basis; for example, through an
adjustment of the manager's wage". However, a manager's OC/MO/
postcontractual deviations from stockholder interests may be larger than the
anticipated size of such deviations that is reflected in the ex <3«/e reduction of
his contractual compensation. A contract which from an ex a«/e perspective
appears to adequately incorporate future managerial shirking may prove to be
inadequate ex /?O57. And when a manager anticipates that the rental value of
his human capital will decrease by less than the benefit to him of current on-
the-job consumption, ex pos/ settling up through deterioration of his labor
market value will be insufficient to offset his incentive to maximize his
personal utility at shareholders' expense. As awy manager may shirk the
promotion of shareholder interests once he has been hired, regardless of his
past performance as reflected in the labor market value of his human capital,
and as a«y potential employer will face similar difficulties in anticipating a
manager's postcontractual behavior, labor market competition is unlikely to
resolve the moral hazard problem.

THE QUEST FOR REMEDIES:
MARKETS, MONITORING AND
MANAGERIAL LIABILITY
OUR DISCUSSION IN Chapter 4 reveals that the various market mechanisms
operating to discipline corporate managers do not perfectly align managers'
utility-maximizing interests with shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests.
Neither competition in product and factor markets (including capital markets),
nor competition in the markets for corporate control and managerial labor,
nor incentive contracts related to firm performance eliminate the conflict of
interests between managers and shareholders. All of these mechanisms leave
managers at least some discretion to use their positions to maximize personal
utility rather than to enhance shareholder wealth.
The question posed in the introduction to the preceding chapter, namely
whether managerial self-interest seeking at shareholders' expense is inherent
in the concept of the corporation, must therefore be answered in the
affirmative. The various disciplinary mechanisms discussed earlier m/rt'gate
managerial divergences from shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests but
do not e/zm/nate such divergences.
We reiterate that managerial departures from the maximization of the
value of the residual claim do not merely represent a cost to shareholders but
also to society as a whole: such departures threaten the allocation of scarce
resources to their most valued uses, discourage investors from pooling
investment capital in corporations, reduce the likelihood of investors
exploiting the benefits of specialized management, raise the operational costs
of the corporate firm, and raise the prices consumers will have to pay for the
firm's output. Managerial self-interest seeking increases managers' private
utility while generating extra costs (agency costs) to the firm without creating
extra income to compensate, and this is reflected in lower returns to investors,
fewer investments, higher prices to consumers and lower output levels.
In the present chapter we look closer into three major forces that could be
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promoted to remedy the problem of managers pursuing objectives
irreconcilable with stockholder wealth maximization and, thus, to reduce
agency costs: (i) the market, particularly the markets for managerial labor,
corporate control and investment capital, (ii) the monitoring of managerial
behavior by the shareholders, and (iii) a legal rule imposing personal liability
on managers for deviations from shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests.
On our way, we will see that it is unlikely that a single remedy could be
identified capable of ensuring more or less complete coherence of managerial
actions with stockholders' interests in a cost-effective manner and that, hence,
the best solution might be found in an attempt to combine the merits of the
alternative remedies available.
Facilitating Market Mechanisms
As a preliminary observation, when discussing possible remedies to the
problem of managerial aberrations, it should be noted that the prevalence of
agency costs does not in itself mean that there is a problem in corporate
governance that needs to be remedied. Such a conclusion would follow only if
the administrative costs of introducing measures to reduce agency costs were
less than the agency cost reduction achieved and if such measures would not
involve socially undesirable side-effects offsetting the benefit of less agency
costs. Thus, the relevant measure of comparison is not zero or less agency
costs (the "ideal" norm) but the relative costs and benefits of potential
alternative arrangements devised to limit managerial deviations from value
maximization [Demsetz (1969), 1; Jensen and Meckling (1976), 328; Fischel
(1982), 1265]. The test of any proposed remedy, therefore, is not whether it
reduces agency costs, but its test is in the proposed remedy's own costs and
benefits in comparison with present arrangements.
Alternatively, one may be tempted to argue that, at least from the
perspective of investors, agency costs do not pose a problem requiring remedy
because investors will only incur such costs if their expected gain from having
specialized managers is large enough to outweigh such costs, and because
anticipated agency costs are discounted in the share prices investors pay
[Jensen and Meckling (1976), 313; Fischel (1982), 1266]. According to this
reasoning, investors fully understand and accept the cost of managerial self-
interest seeking at their expense and treat this cost as any other cost, thus it
being reflected in the price investors are willing to pay for a share. Following
this theory, managerial departures from shareholders' wealth-maximizing
interests would not in fact constitute an injury to the shareholders. We find
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this idea unconvincing for several reasons. ••-<••••
The theory that managers' exposf deviations from shareholders' interests
are anticipated by investors and capitalized in share prices ex fl«te, assumes
that investors have full and complete information about such future
deviations. This is unlikely to be the case, for the same reasons that render it
unlikely that the managerial labor market will perfectly align managers'
incentives with shareholders' interests. A manager's past track record may
provide some information but does not contain full information about his
behavior in the future. Moreover, high transaction costs, including high search
and information costs, may preclude investors from obtaining proper
information about a managers past record. There is a moral hazard problem,
too, because once appointed to the job, a manager may decide to pursue his
personal self-interests to a larger extent than before, and so impose larger
than anticipated costs on the shareholders.
Furthermore, the argument that shareholders anticipate and accept the
aberrant activities of managers overlooks the fact that investors entrust the
management of the firm to hired managers or purchase shares in a corporation
directed by hired managers, only g/ve« f/?af there are in existence certain
limitations upon managers' ability to pursue self-interests to the detriment of
the shareholders. These limitations do not merely ensue from the operation of
the disciplinary market forces discussed in the preceding chapter, but also
from existing legal restrictions to managers' discretion to consume corporate
resources in the pursuit of personal utility; we will discuss such restrictions in
Chapter 6. Shareholders' investment decisions will also take into account the
fact that they can protect themselves from exploitation by self-interested
managers by selling their shares or by ousting the management (assuming that
the shareholders' voting rights include the power to do so). Any such
limitations on shareholders' potential losses from managerial self-interest
seeking will also be reflected in share prices. Clark [1985, 78] acknowledges
the same point, stating that "market prices in an efficient market will embody
expectations, not only about managerial taking of "secret profits", but also
about stockholder rights to a remedy when any particular manager is caught".
The theory that agency costs do not pose a problem as such costs are
anticipated in share prices is a weak one because share prices also reflect
existing remedies for reducing such costs, including legal rules. The more
efficacious are such remedies, the lower the agency costs reflected in share
prices and vice versa. Given the relevance of remedies, one cannot conclude
merely from the assumption that agency costs are incorporated in the price of
shares, that such costs do not harm shareholders. If there were no restrictions
to managers' ability to use their positions and shareholders' invested wealth to
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maximize private utility, shareholders would have to spend larger amounts in
monitoring the management to prevent such managerial departures from value
maximization. The larger such monitoring expenditure and the larger
shareholders' anticipated losses from managerial self-interest seeking, the
lower the price any one investor will be prepared to pay for a share and the
fewer funds the firm can raise through the sale of equity shares.
Finally, even if investors were to correctly anticipate agency costs and take
them for granted, the level of agency costs might still be undesirable from the
perspective of society. High agency costs resulting in high operational costs of
firms in corporate form and entailing the adverse effects previously described,
may be undesirable to society at large even if there were no injury to
investors. Thus there might still be a social problem waiting to be addressed.
Yet as indicated, there is a need for remedy only if a reduction in agency costs
can be achieved without undesirable side-effects that absorb the social benefit
ofthat reduction.
What legal remedies do, or may, complement, in a cost-effective manner,
the market mechanisms that operate to mitigate divergences of interests
between shareholders and managers?
There are various methods through which the law may seek to mitigate
divergences of interests in principal-agent relationships: through conferring
rights on the principal entitling him to control and discipline the agent's
conduct, through regulation constraining the agent's behavior, through rules
designed to feed information into market mechanisms exercising disciplinary
power over the agent, through imposing liability on the agent for injury to the
principal, through exit rules enabling the principal to readily opt out of the
agency relationship, or through combinations of such devices. Exit rules
complement other disciplining mechanisms in that they enable the principal to
terminate his exposure to the agent's actions should the other mechanisms fail
to properly align the agent's behavior with the principal's interests.
All such devices are reflections of contractual arrangements which might
arise if the principal and the agent could bargain without transaction cost
impediments. The agent no less than the principal has incentives to enter into
arrangements devised to reduce the latter's costs from divergences of interests
[Jensen and Meckling (1976), 308]. On the assumption that the principal
would discount future departures from his interests in the agents
remuneration package, if the principal were to anticipate greater departures
than the agent desired or expected to be able to realize, the agent would incur
a net utility loss. In addition, if the agent ex/ww/ were to impose a larger cost
on the principal than the latter had expected ex awte, the principal would have
a clear incentive to dismiss the agent to avoid further losses. Finally, if the
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principal ex äwte expects the would-be agent to impose indefinite costs on the
principal by self-interested actions, there would be no job at all for the agent.
In the context of the relationship between shareholders and managers, the
law may seek to diminish agency costs in essentially three ways: by
facilitating the operation of disciplinary market forces, by strengthening
shareholders' control of the management of corporate resources, thus
increasing their practical ability to monitor, and by imposing personal liability
on managers for losses sustained by the shareholders as a result of a
manager's departures from their interests. Any such rules would establish, or
enhance, incentives for managers to maximize the value of shareholders'
residual claim. Let us look into the cited potential legal remedies a little
closer, beginning with rules facilitating the operation of market mechanisms
disciplining managers.
Rules compelling corporations to disclose periodically certain financial
and performance-related information furnish the market for corporate control,
the managerial labor market and factor markets with information on
management's performance. (Such disclosure requirements are contained, for
instance, in Section 16.20 of the Model Business Corporation Act and in
Chapter 9 of the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code, both of which provide
that corporations must disclose annual financial statements, including a
balance sheet and an income statement.) Compulsory disclosure rules should
assure that, in Eisenberg's words [1979, 136], "reliable, comparable, and
objective information (...) concerning top managements' economic
performance" becomes available to market disciplinary forces.
If the disclosed figures reveal that the firm performed poorly relative to its
competitors, a fall in the relative price of the firm's shares in the stock market
will signal to investors that wealth gains may be realized by replacing the
incumbent management through a takeover of the firm's stock. Moreover,
figures revealing relatively poor performance and subsequent price
depreciation in the market for the firm's shares will decrease the value of
management's human capital in managerial labor markets. Such figures will
also inform factor owners, including banks and other professional lenders,
that extending credit to the firm in question becomes more risky and that,
therefore, they should adjust interest rates or restrict credit. Similarly,
disclosure of data indicating weak performance relative to that of competitors
will reduce the price investors will be prepared to pay for new share issues
and, thus, lower the amount the firm can raise through the sale of equity
shares. This would increase the firm's cost of capital relative to that of better
managed competitors, which in turn would, again, have a downward effect on
the firm's stock prices. In all these ways, information disclosure requirements
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facilitate the operation of market mechanisms disciplining managers and
inducing them to adhere to shareholders' interests.
Managers, of course, realize that disclosure of financial figures revealing
relatively poor performance will have the above-mentioned effects. In order to
avoid decreases in the labor market value of their human capital and in order
to prevent the firm from becoming a takeover target which may cost them
their job, managers have incentives to manipulate financial figures in order to
make the firm's financial statements present a more favorable picture of the
firm's performance than is actually the case. Legal requirements that the
firm's annual balance sheet and income statement be verified by an
independent auditor serve to counter such incentives. However, audit
requirements would lose much of their force if the auditor were dependent
upon the incumbent management for his engagement. We agree with
Eisenberg [1979, 138] that the right to hire and fire the independent auditor
should belong to the shareholders, for they have loss-minimizing incentives to
insist on accurate, reliable data concerning firm performance. (Indeed, Section
2:393 (2) of the Dutch Civil Code, for instance, puts the body of the
shareholders in charge of engaging and removing the auditor.)
Disclosure of data concerning the remuneration packages which top
managers receive from the corporation also feeds information into the market
mechanisms disciplining corporate management. Disclosure of such data
enables outsiders to review whether the price of the top managers to the firm
is justified by their performance. If the managers' performance, as measured
by the performance of the firm relative to its competitors, is not worth the
price they charge the firm, not only will existing shareholders have incentives
to reduce the managers' remuneration or replace incumbents by less
expensive substitutes but also their labor market value will be less than their
current value inside the firm. If the labor market value of a manager's human
capital, that is, his future income stream, falls below his current income, there
will be ex /><«/ settling up for current excessive wages should the manager
move to another firm; thus the labor market would fine him by decreasing his
perspectives for future wealth improvements. Moreover, if disclosed data
concerning managers' remuneration show that payments to management are
excessive in relation to the firm's performance, the data will inform investors
in the market for corporate control that wealth gains are available through the
takeover of that firm and the displacement of the management. Finally,
excessive wages will signal to capital markets that lending to or purchasing
shares in the firm in question is risky as the firm uses excessive funds to pay
its management rather than to finance productive activity generating income
to pay creditors and shareholders. Such information would raise the firm's
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cost of capital, triggering a downward effect on stock prices. ,«-.
Labor market discipline would be strongest if remuneration data were
disclosed for individual top managers, rather than for the firm's top
management collectively without individualization, for it is the value of the
manager's //KÄv/tfi«// human capital that is measured in the labor markets
disciplining him. Nevertheless, Section 2:383 of the Dutch Civil Code
compels corporations to disclose in the annual financial statements, rewards
to the "joint present and past" members of the management board and,
separately, rewards to the "joint present and past" supervisory directors,
without individualization, with the express exception that disclosure is not
required if it would reveal a single individual's remuneration (/.e. if the firm's
management board consists of one manager only). To enhance the discipline
of top managers by the labor market, we propose that Section 2:383 be
amended to provide that corporations are to disclose the remuneration paid to
the /m//V«/Ma/ members of the management and supervisory boards in an
unambiguous and clear manner (not mixing up payments to present and past
functionaries). On several occasions in 1998, the Dutch Minister of Finance
also publicly announced that publicly held corporations organized under
Dutch law should be prepared to disclose the salaries of their individual top
managers annually. In April 1999, the government announced it was to
prepare new legislation to this effect; such legislation reportedly, however,
would provide for disclosure only on an anonymous basis. Corporations
would not be required to link the individual salaries to the names of their
recipients as would be advisable from the perspective of feeding appropriate
information into the market.
In addition to the disclosure requirements imposed on corporate entities,
the market mechanisms disciplining managers may also be furnished with
information pertaining to management's performance where shareholders
have the right to inspect the administrative records of the corporation,
including the accounting records. Section 16.02 of the Model Business
Corporation Act confers such a right on the individual shareholders; this right
does not have an equivalent in Dutch corporate law. (Instead, Dutch law
confers on the shareholders the right during a shareholders' meeting to request
and to receive full information on corporate affairs, except if "preponderant
interests" of the corporation demand that such information be withheld from
them; Section 2:107 (2) of the Civil Code.) However, shareholder inspections
of corporate records may involve quite substantial transaction costs that may
prevent appropriate information from becoming available to the markets.
Elaborate corporate disclosure requirements are a means to avoid such
transaction costs as they render it unnecessary, or unprofitable, for individual
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shareholders to inspect the corporation's records. More generally, compulsory
disclosure rules smooth the operation of the markets disciplining managerial
behavior as they reduce the costs of collecting relevant information to the
players active in these markets.
Exit Rules, Voting Rights and Market Discipline
Flexible exit rules, viz. shareholders' rights to sell their shares to any one
purchaser, do not merely enable shareholders to prevent (further) injury from
managers' aberrant activities by opting out of the agency relationship but
such rules also enhance the operation of market mechanisms disciplining
managers: dissatisfaction of shareholders with the incumbent management's
performance will result in high exit numbers which in turn will drive down
stock prices and cause prices to incorporate the selling shareholders'
dissatisfaction with management's performance, thereby informing the market
for corporate control, managerial labor markets and factor markets about
shareholders' dissatisfaction.
Yet both state corporation statutes in the United States and Dutch
corporate law contain or prescribe restrictions on the free transferability of
shares in statutory c/ose corporations (see Subchapter B of the Model
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation
Act and Section 2:195 of the Dutch Civil Code). In addition, Section 2:87 (1)
of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the articles of incorporation of publicly
held corporations, too, may place restrictions on the transferability of
registered shares (not on the transferability of bearer shares), save that such
restrictions may not render share transfers actually or virtually impossible.
Any restrictions on share transferability interfere with the free exit
principle and its above-mentioned beneficial effects. In particular, such
restrictions thwart the operation of the market for corporate control. Still, the
mere survival of restrictions on share transferability suggests that they /wusf
have an economic rationale: wealth maximizing investors will only choose to
incorporate a business in an organizational form imposing restrictions on
share transfers or invest in a business operated in such a form, if they attach a
positive value to such restrictions, exceeding the value they associate with
free exit and with disciplining of managers by and potential wealth gains from
rapidly selling in, the market for corporate control.
Our hypothesis concerning the source of the potential positive value of
transfer restrictions to investors is that in corporations with transfer
restrictions (usually closely held corporations, with a fairly small number of
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shareholders who normally also form the management), the value of any one
investor's shareholding is determined in part by his relationship with the
specific other shareholders of the corporation. (Indeed, that hypothesis
borrows from the asset specificity theory of the firm described in Chapter 1.)
It is rational for investors to opt for an organizational form with exit
restrictions if they have human capital assets complementary to their equity
investment which are specialized with respect to each other, so that the value
of each investor's part of the residual claim becomes mutually dependent
upon his relationship with the other investors. Thus, if the individual
shareholders were free to sell their shares to random buyers, they would
unilaterally deprive the remaining shareholders of the relationship-specific
component of the value of ?/?e/> shares (z.e. the quasi-rental value of their
investment). Transfer restrictions are a means to preserve that value (and the
resulting rents) for the remaining shareholders. Assuming that the restrictions
will not fully impede a transfer, they also serve to preserve that value for
shareholders desirous to exit, for the latter have wealth-maximizing incentives
to overcome the given restrictions only if the price of a share transfer would
capitalize the relationship-specific value of their investment.
Easterbrook and Fischel [1986, 273, 278] have associated the existence of
restrictions on the alienability of shares in close corporations with a perceived
need to ensure compatibility between individual investors, given that in this
class of corporations, the investors usually also are the firm's managers.
Transfer restrictions, then, would serve both to keep out investors whose
views are incompatible with those of the existing shareholder-managers and,
within the firm, to encourage agreement of interests and conduct among the
latter by encouraging them to act in a cooperative manner. In addition,
Easterbrook and Fischel submit that once it is agreed to distribute a part of
the firm's profits as salary, rather than as dividend, to the shareholders in
their capacity as managers, transfer restrictions will serve to preserve the
agreed-upon division of profits. Compatibility between the various
shareholder-managers would seem to be a prerequisite to the procreation and
survival of relationship-specific investment value where investors have human
capital assets specializing with respect to each other. The same applies to
arrangements on the division of (quasi-)rents derived from such relationship-
specificity. Thus, both observations cited above illustrate more the presence
of relationship-specific investment value (and thus confirm our above-
mentioned hypothesis), rather than offer a competitive explanation of
restraints on share alienability.
For the same reason (the preservation of relationship-specific investment
value), restrictions on share transfers should not and, under the
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aforementioned United States and Dutch corporate laws, generally do not
render a transfer entirely impossible. Rigid prohibitions on sale would render
equity investors in a corporation hostage to each other (a hold-up potential
would be created), exposing them to the risk of post-investment opportunistic
behavior by fellow investors which may destroy the relationship-specific
value of each investor's shareholding. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3,
if share transfers were made impossible, any investor would risk relationship-
unspecific opportunity losses by being unable to move his invested wealth to
alternative uses. Both risks would make investment unattractive and lower the
value of the investment, including its relationship-specific component, to any
prospective investor. Exit /7roA/'6/Y/o«j, thus, would be counterproductive
from the perspective of maintaining investment value.
The operation of a market for corporate control disciplining corporate
managements, requires that, in addition to the right for shareholders to
transfer their shares, voting rights are tied to shares and shareholder voting
rights include the right to oust the corporation's incumbent top management
and to appoint new managers (or supervisory directors, who in turn appoint a
new management, as in the United States governance model). However, not
only the transferability of shares but also voting rights, or their effective use
by the shareholders, may be restricted. Voting rights may be restricted, in
particular, in United States jurisdictions, by placing shares in a voting trust
(Section 7.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act) and, under Dutch law,
by technically separating rights to receive dividends and other corporate
distributions (and certain other shareholder rights) from the shares to which
they were originally attached, issuing such separated "dividend rights" to the
original shareholders (as "bearer depositary receipts") and assigning legal title
to the shares per se, including the voting rights attached to them, to a distinct
legal entity (which is usually controlled indirectly by the management of the
corporation which issued the shares). If shareholders voluntarily choose to
have their voting rights restricted, that choice implies that they rely on
mechanisms for inducing management to maximize the value of the residual
claim other than the market for corporate control.
Such a choice is rationally understandable if the percentage of total votes
which a shareholder's shares carry and, thus, that shareholder's ability to
influence the management through voting, is so small that the transaction
costs of using his voting right (including the costs of information gathering
and the costs of forming a shareholders' coalition with bargaining power with
respect to the management) would be larger than the benefit the shareholder
expects from casting a vote. Similarly, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter [1988, 59]
note that "[i]n general, a shareholder with a small amount of shares will not
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invest heavily in the voting process since a small number of shares will not
generally affect the outcome regardless of how they are voted"; then it simply
does not pay to bother about voting. Hence, the corporation's management
may easily succeed in convincing a small shareholder that the voting right's
actual value to him is zero when taking into account his ability to influence
the management through voting, although the same voting right would have
positive value in the market for corporate control. Moreover, the costs a small
shareholder would have to incur in order to ovo/d being stripped of his voting
right or to preclude the emergence of other impediments (takeover defenses) to
the smooth operation of the market for corporate control in respect of the
firm's shares, may be prohibitively high.
The fact that the right to vote does have a positive value in the market for
corporate control, separate from the value of the residual claim on assets and
cash flows to which it is attached, was first recognized by Manne [1964,
1430]. The same fact has been confirmed, mter a/;o, by the empirical study
conducted by Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson [1983] and by the findings
surveyed by Jarrell, Brickley and Netter [1988, 60-61]. The latter conclude
from the empirical evidence that "the market generally values shares with
voting power more than those without" [1988, 60]. The positive value of the
right to vote is acknowledged in the listing requirements of the Amsterdam
stock exchange which, albeit subject to important restrictions, confer certain
rights on holders of listed non-voting dividend rights created in the manner
described above to regain the voting right from the entity nominally owning
the relevant share (Section 5 of Exhibit 10 to the listing rules). (Note that
approximately 30 percent of the companies listed on the Amsterdam stock
exchange, excluding investment funds, have non-voting dividend rights traded
at the exchange.)
So far we have assumed that the shareholders' right to vote includes the
right to vote on the appointment and dismissal of the corporation's top
management and, thus, that this condition for operation of a market for
corporate control is fulfilled. That assumption is correct with respect to
United States jurisdictions following the Model Business Corporation Act,
Sections 8.03 (d), 8.04 and 8.08 of which make it clear that the shareholders
are entitled to elect and to remove the corporation's directors; the directors in
turn appoint the officers in charge of the day-to-day management of the
corporate firm.
According to Dutch corporate law, in most corporations both the members
of the management board and (two-thirds or more of) the members of the
supervisory board are appointed and removed by the shareholders (Sections
2:132, 2:134 (1), 2:142 (1), 2:143 and 2:144 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code).
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However, there is an important exception (known in Dutch as the
",y/rMC/«M/Tege//>jg"): in corporations satisfying certain statutorily defined
quantitative criteria (summarized below), the right to appoint and to remove
the members of the management board is mandatorily bestowed on the
supervisory directors (Section 2:162 of the Civil Code). In addition, except
for the supervisory directors appointed at the corporation's (or the
supervisory board's) inception, in this class of corporations the supervisory
directors are not appointed by the shareholders but by the existing supervisory
directors as a body (Section 2:158 (2) of the Civil Code). Thus, the
shareholders are deprived of the right to designate the management of the
corporation; that right is statutorily shifted to the supervisory directors, and
the existing supervisory directors fill in vacancies in the supervisory board
through co-optation. Furthermore, the supervisory board's approval is
required for many decisions of the management board (as prescribed in
Section 2:164 (1) of the Civil Code), primarily concerning investment and
organizational matters and the issue or repurchase of shares and bonds. This
governance structure applies to over 60 percent (!) of the companies listed on
the Amsterdam stock exchange, excluding listed investment funds. As a
consequence of this governance structure, incumbent managers and
supervisory directors are to a significant extent insulated from the discipline
of the market for corporate control because someone acquiring a voting
majority of the firm's shares still has no right to remove them.
In the governance structure described above, shareholders' rights to
influence the composition of the supervisor}' board are limited to the right to
make non-binding recommendations of candidates for vacancies in the
supervisory board (Section 2:158 (4) Civil Code) and the right to raise
objections, on narrow statutory grounds only, against the appointment of
individuals whom the existing supervisory directors desire to appoint to the
supervisory board (Section 2:158 (6) Civil Code). In the latter event, the
supervisory board may take the issue to court in order to enforce its choice of
candidate upon the shareholders and the corporation (Section 2:158 (9) Civil
Code). Shareholders do not have similar, or other, rights to influence the
appointment of members of the ma/rage/we«/ board by the supervisory
directors.
A corporation becomes mandatorily subject to the above-mentioned
governance structure if during an uninterrupted period of three years
beforehand, it has satisfied each of the following requirements (Section 2.153
(2) Civil Code): (i) stockholders' equity, inclusive of the reserves stated on the
corporation's balance sheet, has amounted to NLG 25 million or more, (ii) the
corporation together with its subsidiaries has employed at least one hundred
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employees in the Netherlands, and (iii) the corporation or a subsidiary has
established a works council as prescribed by the Works Council Act
(pursuant to Section 2 (1) of the Works Council Act, a corporation must have
a works council if it employs either at least one hundred employees,
irrespective of the number of hours they work, or at least thirty-five
employees for more than one-third of the ordinary working time). As soon as
a corporation meets the cited criteria, it must notify the Chamber of
Commerce where it is registered (Section 2:153 (1) of the Civil Code). The
governance structure under which the supervisory directors appoint both the
members of the management board and the members of the supervisory board
itself, will then become automatically effective three years after the date of the
notification, unless the corporation has previously notified the relevant
Chamber of Commerce that the aforesaid criteria are no longer fulfilled
(Section 2:154 (1) of the Civil Code).
However, certain exemptions and exceptions exist (which are essentially
irrelevant for the purpose of our discussion); for instance, a corporation
satisfying the above-mentioned criteria is nonetheless exempt from the special
governance structure if at least 50 percent of its shares are owned by another
corporation which is subject to this structure, or if its sole business is that of a
"holding company", ;.e. to hold the shares in and to provide financing to
affiliated corporations, provided that the majority of the corporate group's
employees is employed outside the Netherlands (Section 2:153 (3) (a) and (b)
of the Civil Code). In addition, the shareholders of a corporation subject to the
special governance structure maintain the right to appoint and remove the
members of the management board (but not those of the supervisory board,
who are appointed by the existing supervisory directors as described) if, in
brief, at least 50 percent of the firm's shares are owned by another
corporation regardless of its governance structure and if more than 50 percent
of the corporate group's employees work outside the Netherlands (Section
2:155 Civil Code). Furthermore, it is of note that corporations which are not
mandatorily subject to the special governance structure may voluntarily adopt
this same structure, with or without the exception according to which the
management is elected by the shareholders and not by the supervisory board
(Section 2:157 of the Civil Code).
In its pure form, as noted, the above-mentioned governance structure
relieves managers and supervisory directors from the discipline of the market
for corporate control as it denies shareholders the right to change the
composition of the management and supervisory boards; thus, this governance
structure largely prevents the effective operation of such a market with regard
to the corporation concerned. Although in itself, it does not prevent the
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acquisition of the corporation's shares (or a voting majority thereof), potential
buyers are unlikely to perceive wealth gains from acquiring those shares if the
market value of the shares were to reveal to them that wealth gains are
attainable from improved management, given that after a takeover they still
lack the legal power to easily displace an existing ineffective management and
take over control of the management and the affairs of the firm. Even if as a
result of another corporation acquiring the majority of the shares, an
exemption or exception as referred to above would apply, meaning that the
right to determine the composition of the management board would no longer
mandatorily have to be bestowed on the supervisory directors, in order for
that right to be shifted to the shareholders, an amendment of the corporation's
articles of association to this effect would be required. The incumbent
management (supported by incumbent supervisory directors) may refuse to
implement such an amendment so that, at least for the time being, the special
governance structure would continue to apply on a "voluntary" basis (in
accordance with Section 2:157 of the Civil Code) [Maeijer (1994), 516-517].
Thus, the statutory governance structure under which the members of the
management board are appointed by the supervisory board, which also fills in
its own vacancies, and the firm's consequent isolation from the market for
corporate control, creates a rather safe haven for utility maximizing managers
who fail to maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim and for like
minded supervisor}' directors who back them. Consistent with this
observation, a recent study by Dutch economists Van der Goot and Van het
Kaar [1997] reports that the above-mentioned governance structure has a
significant negative impact on the market value of the shares of newly listed
companies on the Amsterdam stock exchange that are subject to this
structure, both at the time of their initial listing and at various points in the
subsequent year. This study encompassed a total of seventy-four corporations
(not including investment funds) that were first listed on the Amsterdam
exchange between 1983 and 1992, thirty-one of which were subject to the
special governance structure (that is, 42 percent).
According to the findings of Van der Goot and Van het Kaar [1997, 501],
firms endowed with the special governance structure had on average a price-
earnings ratio of 11.8 at their first listing, whereas firms without showed a
significantly higher average price-earnings ratio of 16.5. Moreover, the
average markct-to-book ratio of firms with the special structure was found to
be 3.2 at first listing, with a market-to-book ratio of 7.7 (!) for other firms
[1997, 501]. These values were obtained solely on the basis of a distinction
between firms with the special governance structure and firms without, that
is, with no regard being paid to other features that might divide these
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categories of firms.
Furthermore, at subsequent points in the course of one year following
listing, the average stock market performance of the thirty-one firms with the
special structure (measured in terms of percentage increase in stock price
from the initial listing price discounted by the performance of the relevant
market index) was found to be significantly worse than those of the forty-
three firms without, especially when compared with firms without the special
governance structure but which did have specific takeover defenses similar to
those adopted by firms with the special structure on top of the latter (note,
only six newly listed firms had no takeover protection at all) [Van der Goot
and Van het Kaar (1997), 504]. This finding suggests that investors value the
constraint on the discipline of management by the market for corporate
control entailed by the special structure more negatively than that effected by
specific takeover defenses. For example, six months after the date of first
listing, firms without the special governance structure were found to have a
market adjusted extra return of 5.3 percent as compared to firms with that
structure. After one year, the extra return had even increased to an average
11.4 percent, a difference solely attributable to the special structure.
Considering these figures, we are of the view that to enhance market
discipline over corporate managers and supervisory directors, including those
who have interests at heart irreconcilable with value maximization, it would
seem to be in the interests of both the shareholders and society as a whole if
Dutch corporate law returned the right to determine the composition of the
management board and the supervisory board to the shareholders.
In terms of thwarting the operation of the market for corporate control, the
effects of the criticized Dutch governance structure are similar to those of
takeover defenses which enable incumbent top management to altogether
prevent outsiders from obtaining a controlling (voting) majority of the
corporation's shares. Such takeover defenses, too, relieve managers (and
supervisory directors) from the discipline of the market for corporate control.
Various survey studies of empirical research in the area report that shares
experience a decline in market value in response to the adoption of takeover
defenses by the corporation (especially if the defensive measures do not
require majority voting approval by shareholders) [Jensen and Warner (1988);
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988); Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), 196-
198]; see sw/>ra pages 159-160. In addition, the re/ec//OA7 by shareholders of
management proposals to adopt defensive measures is reportedly
accompanied by a rise in the stock market price of the firm's shares
[Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), 197]. These findings confirm that in the
perception of investors, managers of corporations who are subject to the
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threat of losing their jobs following a takeover are more likely to maximize
the value of the residual claim than those who are not.
In November 1997, the Dutch government submitted a proposal to
Parliament for enactment of legislation to limit the restraining effect of
takeover defenses on the potentiality of corporate control transactions.
According to the proposed legislation, a shareholder who owns at least 70
percent of the shares in a publicly held corporation, may petition the
corporate law division of the appellate court of Amsterdam to take
appropriate measures to eliminate the defenses which preclude that
shareholder from obtaining active control of the management and the affairs
of the company concerned. Yet a 70 percent shareholder will only be entitled
to bring such a petition if he has owned the stated percentage for an
uninterrupted period of at least one year prior to the petition's submission.
The target corporation, that means, the incumbent management, will be given
the right to object to the adoption of measures eliminating existing takeover
defenses on the grounds that the intentions of the petitioner (z'.e. the would-be
acquirer of corporate control) are contrary to the interests of the firm or that
the petitioner should be expected to act unreasonably or unfairly towards
minority shareholders, incumbent managers, supervisory directors or the
corporation itself upon seizing control of the firm. Before taking a decision on
the petition and the objections raised against it, the court will have to appoint
three experts to advise on the petitioner's intentions as regards future business
management and future composition of the management board and the
supervisory board. We support the object of the proposed legislation but we
are afraid that, if adopted, it will prove all but dead wood in most cases.
The proposal breathes a rather remarkable ignorance of the notions (and
the significance) of investment liquidity and opportunity costs. The proposed
legislation requires a 70 percent shareholder to accept a one year lock-in
period without actual control of the firm he is desiring to control before he
may file a petition as described above. This lock-in period will be extended in
fact by the term of the legal proceedings pertaining to the petition and last
until the court has rendered its decision. During the statutory lock-in period,
the shareholder may not exchange a single part of his 70 percent shareholding
for cash without losing the right to bring a petition. Hence, he will be exposed
to potential opportunity losses by being unable to shift all or a part of his
invested wealth to alternative, more profitable investment opportunities which
may show up during the lock-in term. He will also risk losses resulting from
detrimental actions by the management of the target firm during that period.
Temporary non-liquidity of investment and consequent opportunity losses are
in addition to the purchase price of his shares in the firm concerned and so
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raise the cost of a takeover. Incumbent management may deliberately increase
the 70 percent shareholder's opportunity costs, or utter credible threats to do
so, by taking business decisions unfavorably affecting the value of the firm's
shares during the lock-in period in order to raise his costs of taking over
control of the firm and to attempt to fend-off the attack on their positions.
The litigation resulting from the right of the target firm's management to
object in court to the petition for elimination of takeover defenses will further
raise the would-be acquirer's costs, as will the court's review of the latter's
intentions. The proposed legislation explicitly provides that the fees of the
experts appointed by the court for the purpose of examining the petitioner's
intentions, must be paid by the petitioner. All such costs will add to
transaction costs in the market for corporate control as will error costs
incurred if the court and the experts appointed by it, wrongly assess the
intentions of the acquirer. The very notion that a court may review the
intentions of a would-be acquirer of corporate control is nothing but a source
of transaction costs, raising yet another hurdle to be surmounted by an
investor desirous to take over control of a firm equipped with takeover
defenses.
Finally, the Dutch government's proposal will not alter the special
governance structure previously described under which shareholders are not
entitled to elect or remove the management board and the supervisory board
of certain statutorily prescribed corporations. (The proposal does, however,
permit the court to eliminate that structure if it has been adopted on a
voluntary basis.) Thus, for firms mandatorily subject to the cited governance
regime, even if a would-be acquirer were able to have the court set aside
(other) takeover defenses, he would still be subject to a governance structure
in which he has no right to oust the existing management and supervisory
board. As a consequence, he would be unable to take control of the
management and the affairs of the business, in spite of his 70 percent share
ownership. This means that the proposed new law will «of enhance corporate
control transactions in respect of firms mandatorily subject to the cited
governance structure. All things considered, we are inclined to conclude that
the Dutch proposal, if adopted, will establish a good example of mouthpiece
legislation.
Strengthening Shareholders' Control
Is a larger say for shareholders in the management of corporate resources a
desirable remedy against managerial departures from value maximization?
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Suppose that shareholders had a right to interfere in corporate
management so as to dictate specific managerial decisions, or that
management needed the approval of the shareholders before they could have
the corporation engage upon a particular course of action (for instance, enter
into a transaction, make an investment). Such rules would strengthen
shareholders' control of the management of the corporation, and reduce
managers' discretion to allocate corporate resources so as to further their
personal self-interests.
However, at the same time, they would raise the costs of corporate
decision-making as shareholders would have to incur larger expenditure in
monitoring intra-firm activity and market developments in order to review and
to prepare for managerial decisions, and as the number of interactions
necessary to take a business decision would increase. In addition, the
corporation's ability to take commercial decisions in a speedy manner and to
respond quickly to developments in relevant product and factor markets as
and when appropriate, would suffer. Furthermore, as described in the
monitorial model of the corporation discussed in Chapter 2, the shareholders
have delegated the management of the firm to hired managers precisely
because the latter have a comparative advantage in running the firm. Allowing
shareholders to become actively involved in managerial decision-making
would move management authority away from those having a comparative
advantage in exercising it [McKean (1978), 89], Finally, giving shareholders
rights to interfere in corporate management would create similar shirking
problems among dispersed shareholders as would arise if the shareholders
themselves were to run the firm. In summary, the intended benefit of fewer
divergences from value maximization would come at the expense of higher
governance costs and presumably less effective corporate governance.
The above observations do not mean, of course, that arty device designed
to strengthen shareholders' control of the management of the corporation
would have such effects. The search is, then, for devices that restrict
managerial discretion without the above-mentioned side effects. Such a device
could be, for instance, a right for a specified minority of the shareholders to
call a special general meeting of shareholders in order to discuss one or more
issues pertaining to the management of the corporation. (Such a right is set
forth in Section 7.02 of the Model Business Corporation Act and, in a
somewhat disguised form, in Section 2:110 of the Dutch Civil Code.)
Additionally, the shareholders might be given the right to elect a committee of
shareholders to which managers should account for contemplated business
decisions on important issues, such issues to be defined in the corporations
articles of incorporation or bylaws (for example, investments exceeding a
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specified percentage of the worth of the firm's assets). Furthermore, a
specified minority of the shareholders may be given the right to add issues to
the agenda proposed by the management for the corporation's regular annual
meeting of shareholders (for example, a past decision by the corporation's
management with which that minority is dissatisfied or a proposal from the
requisite minority for future corporate action). As the costs of invoking any of
the suggested rights would ultimately come at the expense of the shareholders'
return, wealth maximizing shareholders will use such rights only if the
anticipated benefits (viz. the benefits from establishing extra incentives for
management to be faithful to shareholders' interests) are large enough to
outweigh these costs.
Earlier we referred to Jensen's observation that the retention of large
amounts of cash in the corporation's treasury, limits the discipline which
capital markets exercise over managers given that large retained cash
balances permit managers to finance new projects without having to attract
new funds from the capital markets, that is, without having to account for the
project's wisdom and viability to suppliers of fresh capital [Jensen (1986),
323; (1989), 66], We also argued that excessive cash balances may pervert
the operation of the market for corporate control as they allow corporations
with poor managements to take over superiorly run firms. Large cash
balances increase the resources over which managers have discretion and are
a source of agency costs; management may allocate excessive cash to uses
which yield smaller returns to the shareholders than the latter could earn if the
same amount were paid out to them. To prevent excessive retained cash
balances and to enhance the disciplinary force of capital markets on
management's expenditure, we propose that individual shareholders be given
the right to challenge dividend proposals made by corporate management and
to present rival dividend and other cash distribution proposals to the joint
shareholders; the competing proposals should then be discussed and voted on
during the corporation's annual meeting of shareholders.
Stock repurchase programs sponsored by corporations are a market-
induced constraint on managers' ability to pile up cash within the corporation,
which serves to curtail managers' independence from the capital markets.
From the perspective of the enhancement of capital market disciplining,
corporate stock repurchases practically are an alternative to direct
distributions of cash to shareholders. Yet the income tax consequences of
stock repurchases to the shareholders may be different from (and preferable
to) those of direct cash pay-outs. Additionally, unlike direct cash distributions
applicable to all shareholders, stock repurchase programs afford individual
stockholders the choice to either maintain their shares and benefit from
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increased capital market discipline over corporate management, which should
positively affect the market value of their shares, or to cash in on their stake
of the corporation's aggregate resources and invest the proceeds elsewhere.
To facilitate such programs as a means for enhancing market discipline on
corporate managers, in our view, individual shareholders representing a
specified minimum percentage of the corporation's total shares should be
given the right to launch proposals to the joint shareholders to effect that
excess cash in the corporation's treasury be used to repurchase outstanding
stock.
As described in Chapter 2, the introduction of supervisory directors, too, is
a mechanism for increasing managers' accountability to the shareholders,
which economizes on the costs of direct monitoring by the individual
shareholders and which takes advantage of specialization in monitor-
monitoring. However, the supervisory directors will only perform such
functions if f/?ey are sensitive to shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests.
To tie supervisory directors to the shareholders' interests, the shareholders
should not merely have the right to vote on the appointment and displacement
of the supervisory directors but a specified minority of the shareholders
should also have the right to nominate candidates for supervisory director
positions to the joint shareholders, including the right to nominate rival
candidates challenging the "official" nominees proposed on behalf of the
corporation. To prevent the costs of such nominations from precluding the
effective use of the nomination right, successful candidates nominated by the
shareholders should have the right to reimbursement of their reasonable
expenditure in the contest for a supervisory directorship out of the corporate
treasury; unsuccessful candidates should not, because that would give rise to
nominations solely intended to extort a payment from the corporation [Dooley
(1978), 83].
Critical observers may object on the basis that, independent of
reimbursements for expenses, free rider problems among multiple scattered
shareholders would jeopardize the efficacy of shareholder nomination of and
voting on the appointment of supervisory directors. Such problems might be
avoided in part if stockholder associations (that is, coalitions assembling
investors in different corporations) also be given the right to nominate
candidates for one or more supervisory directorships in a corporation. In
addition, it would be in the interests of the shareholders if /afto/- w«;ora be
given the right to designate a supervisory director as the use of corporate
resources to benefit incumbent managers rather than to generate income for
the shareholders is as undesirable from the perspective of the workers as it is
from that of the shareholders because it harms the firm's competitiveness in
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product and factor markets, makes the firm a target in the market for
corporate control for takeover and subsequent restructuring, and reduces the
firm's chances of survival. Therefore, with regard to opposition against the
use of corporate resources to advance managers' private self-interests, the
interests of the shareholders coincide with those of the workers, making them
natural allies in this matter.
Managerial Liability for Shareholder Injuries
Making the agent liable for the costs of departures from the principal's
interests obviously creates incentives for the agent to remain faithful to the
interests of the principal and to give priority to the latter in the event of a
collision with the agent's private interests. Personal liability of the agent also
establishes a means for compensating the principal for the injury he would
sustain should the agent nonetheless pursue personal utility at the expense of
the principal. Thus, a rule imposing personal liability on the agent serves to
reduce agency costs both from an ex a«te perspective, by deterring aberrant
activities of the agent, and ex pay/, by entitling the principal to compensation
for residual losses.
Within the concept of the corporation, managers, as a rule, are not liable
towards the shareholders or the corporation for the consequences of actions
committed in the course of their employment. The above-mentioned reasoning
suggests that within the shareholder-manager relationship, agency costs could
be reduced if personal liability were imposed on managers for injury to the
shareholders resulting from managerial departures from shareholders' wealth-
maximizing interests. Personal liability would encourage managers to be
faithful to the shareholders, ;.e. to refrain from pursuing goals other than
maximization of the value of their residual claim, and enable shareholders to
recover residual losses ensuing from aberrant activities from the managers up
to the extent of the latter's wealth. However, personal liability of managers
would also create substantial costs for the shareholders and for society, both
directly and indirectly.
D/>ec^ caste would arise because if they were subject to a risk of personal
liability, in as far as they dislike risk, managers would not merely demand
compensation for supplying their human capital to the firm but also for the
liability risk bome [McKean (1978), 88], The higher the perceived risk of
personal liability, the higher the risk compensation component of managers'
salaries. Managers are expensive risk bearers because unlike shareholders
they cannot reduce risks through diversification: managers' potential for
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investing their human capital is generally limited to one or two firms and any
human capital investment in another firm would raise, not reduce, their risk of
becoming liable.
One may object on the basis that if the liability rule successfully creates
incentives for managers to align managerial actions with shareholders'
wealth-maximizing interests, as the rule is intended to do, the risk that liability
will be imposed is not in practice significant: if the rule effectively induces
managers to refrain from activities which may trigger liability, they will not
have to fear ac/«a/ liability. According to this theory, the wage premiums
managers would demand to compensate them for the risk of personal liability
would be rather small, so that the liability risk would AJO/ result in
significantly higher salaries for managers.
However, this reasoning ignores the fact that under any liability rule,
managers may fail to correctly anticipate which managerial actions will and
which actions will not result in personal liability, and that under any liability
rule managers may encounter substantial expenses in litigation. Courts may
impose liability on the basis of an action that the defending manager
considered safe at the outset. Managers will recognize such a risk and demand
compensation for it in their remuneration packages. The provision of personal
liability insurance at the corporation's expense could lower the amount of
compensation demanded, but only at a cost: the amount of the insurance
premium payable.
Moreover, any manager, including a manager who is perfectly faithful to
the shareholders, may have to incur expenses in defending himself in an action
for damages brought against him. Such litigation costs may well be
significant as a rule providing for managerial liability creates a potential for
"strike suits", primarily intended to extract a settlement from the defendant
equal to the value of the nuisance the suit brings upon him. To save litigation
expenses, a manager may choose to make a settlement payment rather than
defend himself [Morgan (1978), 94]. Utility maximizing managers are likely
to demand compensation from the corporation for any litigation-related
expenditures, either ex o«/e through a higher salary or through a provision in
their employment contract stipulating that the corporation will reimburse them
for litigation expenses, including settlement payments, as and when they arise.
Furthermore, any liability suit, whether or not it is properly founded, may
hurt a managers reputation, thereby lowering the rental value of his human
capital in the managerial labor market. The risk of loss of reputation ensuing
from a rule providing for potential personal liability, too, is apt to raise the
remuneration managers will demand from the corporation. Liability insurance
coverage would not protect managers from reputation loss and would not
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therefore eliminate such compensation demands.
Apart from extra payments to management if managers were subject to a
risk of personal liability, a rule providing for potential managerial liability
would generate significant />w//ratf coste for the shareholders and for society.
First, on the assumption that certain individuals (especially risk averse
persons) are unwilling to assume the risk of personal liability, such a rule
would reduce the pool of managerial talent from which specialized managers
may be recruited: the rule would deter able persons unwilling to bear the
liability risk from becoming a manager [Eisenberg (1988), 39], Thus,
shareholders may have difficulty in finding competent managers to run the
corporate firm who at the same time would assume a risk of personal liability.
In effect, personal liability would impede materialization of the advantages
associated with specialized management and hurt the efficacy of corporate
management. In addition, if the supply of specialized managers decreases, the
price of managerial services would rise, regardless even of wage premiums
for the bearing of liability risk.
Second, a risk of personal liability would establish incentives for managers
to allocate corporate resources so as to minimize the likelihood of liability
rather than to maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim. To avoid
personal liability, managers would be induced to exercise more care in
preparing business decisions and to incur larger expenditure to avoid mistakes
than would be desirable from the point of view of the shareholders [McKean
(1978), 89]. Moreover, managers would be deterred from making investments
in projects with positive net present values to the shareholders if they also
expected such projects to carry a positive risk of managerial liability. Thus
managers may allocate corporate resources to uses motivated by a desire to
avoid liability rather than to enhance shareholder wealth and forgo
investments generating positive returns to the shareholders, thereby creating
opportunity losses for the shareholders. From this angle, introducing a rule
subjecting managers to a risk of personal liability would give rise to problems
of over-compliance [Chapman (1996)], with the rule's OC/MO/ effects on
managerial incentives being counterproductive when measured in terms of the
rule's c/es/ra/ effect of greater consistency of managerial actions with
shareholders' interests.
Note that potentially liable managers are more risk averse than
shareholders with limited liability because the latter, unlike the managers, can
diversify away any firm-specific risks, including the risk of errors by a firm's
management, by holding a diversified investment portfolio. As Chapman
[1996, 1688] has observed, shareholders will therefore be "relatively risk
neutral with respect to the variable fortunes of any one corporation in their
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portfolio". Given that a manager's risk of personal liability, by contrast, is
entirely dependent upon the specific corporation in which he has invested his
human capital, managers are likely to be more risk averse than the
shareholders [Fischel and Bradley (1986), 266; Chapman (1996), 1688],
Accordingly, they may pursue more cautious policies in managing the firm
(for example, hire more external consultants, take out more insurance, install
more intensive intra-corporate monitoring systems and so on) and adopt more
defensive corporate investment strategies than would be preferable from the
shareholders' perspective. Diversified shareholders, on the other hand, would
want to "create incentives for managers to accept all positive net present
value projects, even those that are risky" [Fischel and Bradley (1986), 266].
Third, unless the liability rule would bring about the desired reduction in
agency costs and such a reduction would «of be outweighed by the rule's
direct and indirect costs to the shareholders described above, payments to
compensate management for the liability risk bome and for litigation costs
and opportunity losses resulting from over-cautious management would
decrease returns to shareholders and, hence, the price a shareholder would be
willing to pay for a share. In addition, share prices would also incorporate the
litigation costs .y/7arre/?o/<fers would need to incur to enforce personal liability
on the management as and when appropriate. The consequent share price
reductions would harm the firm's ability to raise capital for investment
through the sale of equity shares.
Finally, any liability rule the enforcement of which would require that
courts second-guess the wisdom or expediency of managerial decisions, would
encounter serious implementation problems. Courts would face fact-finding
problems that may be substantial and difficult to resolve given the complexity
of the management of, and business decision-making processes in, large
organizations. Equally important, courts are simply not educated to review the
way in which the management of a corporation is conducted (a judge is not a
management consultant) and, hence, they lack the skills and expertise to
soundly make second-guesses of managerial decisions [Block, Barton and
Radin (1987), 5; Eisenberg (1988), 39]. Thus, the prospect of wrong
assessments of managerial decisions by the courts would be significant. This
might not merely give rise to substantial error costs; such a prospect would
also create uncertainty for managers with respect to the standards that their
business decisions should fulfil. Such uncertainty would, again, promote over-
cautiousness on the part of management and encourage managers to adopt
overly defensive business policies.
For all these reasons, under any given rule providing for potential liability
of managers, courts should not be required to conduct an in-depth review of a
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challenged managerial decision and the facts underlying it but should confine
themselves to assessing whether the decision exceeded the margin of
discretion belonging to any reasonable, rationally acting manager. A court, or
a division of a court, specializing in corporate legal matters would seem better
equipped to make such an assessment than non-specialized, general courts
dealing with all kinds of legal problems, as the former would be able to
develop greater understanding of and familiarity with business (including
management) practice and customs and the dos and don'ts therein.
Given the aforementioned direct and indirect costs which a rule subjecting
managers to personal liability would give rise to, we submit that the rule's
intended benefit of fewer agency costs is likely to be outweighed by the costs
of the rule itself. The imposition of personal liability on managers should,
therefore, in our view, be strictly limited to cases of intentional misconduct by
a manager constituting injury to the shareholders and the corporation, such as
fraud, theft and similar wrongful conduct, and cases of appalling
mismanagement, that is, mismanagement which no single reasonable manager
committed to running the corporation in the best interests of the shareholders
and the corporation would have considered appropriate. In such instances, the
advantages of having a specialized management (in particular, management
more effective and at less cost per unit of management than if the
shareholders themselves were to run the firm), as discussed in Chapter 2,
would not materialize and, hence, the economic rationales for having
specialized managers would cease to exist. (Indeed, as we will see in Chapter
6, both United States corporate law and Dutch corporate law limit personal
liability of managers towards the shareholders and the corporation largely to
the cited instances.)
Proponents of more extensive managerial liability may argue that also in
cases not involving intentional misconduct or clear mismanagement, personal
liability could serve to create efficient incentives for managers to refrain from
activities detrimental to the shareholders if the liability standard were set in
accordance with the now famous negligence formula that was propounded, in
a tortious liability context, by Judge Learned Hand in £/«;ted Stato v.
COTTO// 7ow/>?g Com/rawy [159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947)]. According to
the Learned Hand formula, a person to whose conduct a particular accident is
attributable, is liable for negligence if the loss caused by the accident
multiplied by the probability of the accident's occurring, exceeds the burden
(meaning the cost) of the precautions that he could have taken to avert it. If
the same standard were applied to determine managerial liability, managers
would face personal liability for losses sustained by shareholders as a result
of their actions or omissions if the amount of the loss in question multiplied
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by the probability of its occurring, exceeded the cost of preventing the loss
(including the cost of careful evaluation of business opportunities, proper
preparation of business decisions, and dismissal of courses of action which
would maximize managers' utility but would be unattractive from the
viewpoint of maximizing the value of shareholders' residual claim). Liability
advocates would submit that under this standard of liability, managers would
have incentives to avoid losses for the shareholders up to the point where the
benefit of making extra loss-preventive efforts (;.e. fewer deviations from
value maximization) would be outweighed by the costs, that means, up to a
socially efficient level - just as the Learned Hand formula itself is deemed to
promote the taking of precautions to avoid accidents until the costs of
additional precautions would exceed their social benefit in terms of lower
expected accident losses.
The above reasoning, however, defies the fact that a rule providing for
extended managerial liability would create costs of its own, as we extensively
discussed in the preceding pages. Therefore, to assess the social desirability of
such a rule, it is not sufficient to note that extended personal liability would
give managers' greater incentives to refrain from activities detrimental to the
shareholders, a proposition to which one could hardly disagree. Nor does it
suffice to note that a liability standard set in accordance with the Learned
Hand formula would induce managers to take measures assuring compliance
of their actions with shareholders' interests until the costs of doing so would
exceed the benefit to the shareholders. The direct and indirect costs of the rule
itself must also be taken into account and we reiterate that these costs could
be so substantial that they could easily outweigh the rule's intended benefit of
fewer agency costs. Any analysis which judges extended liability of managers
to be socially efficient solely by reason of it promoting greater coherence with
shareholders' interests, including analysis acknowledging that the liability
standard should be set so as to assure that managers will not seek to avert
losses to shareholders beyond the point at which more precaution is not worth
its cost, suffers from the fallacies of the "free lunch" and the "grass is always
greener" - which were made part of the standard tools of economic analysis
by Demsetz [1969, 3-4] - , as it focuses on the liability rule's benefits while
essentially ignoring its costs.
The Significance of Liability Insurance
Yet proponents of extended personal liability of managers may claim that
many of the adverse effects of personal liability discussed earlier would be
The Corporate Paradox 205
alleviated if managers, or the corporation on their behalf, purchased liability
insurance. Liability insurance would relieve them of having to bear non-
diversifiable risk, which in turn would reduce the remuneration firms would
have to pay risk averse managers, increase the pool of able persons from
which management could be recruited, and encourage managers to take
appropriate business risks. Moreover, the insurance company would monitor
their behavior so as to avoid having to make payments under the insurance
policy and, by doing so, ensure compliance of managers' actions with
shareholders' interests [Holderness (1990), 115-116, 118]. This idea is wrong
(or, at best, only partially true), however, for at least three reasons.
First, the availability of liability insurance for managers in private
insurance markets is subject to significant limitations both as to scope (claims
based on fraud or illegality, for instance, routinely being excluded as may be
other events triggering personal liability) and as to amount (insurance policies
typically stating both deductibles and maximum amounts of coverage),
meaning that the ability of insurance markets to remedy the adverse effects of
managers' personal liability is equally limited. Generally, on the assumption
that insurance companies endeavor to maximize returns to their residual
claimants just like other commercial firms, insurance will be offered only if
and to the extent that insurers are able to estimate their expected payments
under the insurance policy, that is, their risk. In order for insurers to calculate
their risk, they must be able to identify pools consisting of non-related risks of
similar kind, as both the probability of a claim against the insurance policy
and its potential amount are only objectively determinablc among a large
number of individuals or firms that are each exposed to a similar potential
loss; in insurance theory, this predictability of losses through the formation of
narrowly defined risk pools is known as the "law of large numbers".
Expansion of personal liability of managers beyond the areas of fraud,
dishonesty and clear mismanagement to include other cases where
shareholders suffered accounting or opportunity losses as a result of
managers' decisions, might impair the ability of insurers to estimate their risk
by creating uncertainty concerning expected pay-outs and, to some extent, by
making risks interdependent. In effect, such extended liability would both
reduce the amount of insurance coverage that insurance companies would be
prepared to supply and raise the premiums they would charge.
This is illustrated by the widely acknowledged crisis in directors' and
officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) that struck the supply side of
the market for such insurance in the United States in the mid-1980s (roughly
from 1984 through 1987). The term "crisis" was used to denote the
simultaneous occurrence of the following events: a reduction of the amounts
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covered by D&O insurance policies offered throughout the market, a rise in
deductiblcs further reducing effective coverage, the complete withdrawal of
some insurance companies from the D&O insurance market, and a substantial
increase in premiums for the insurance still available. Uncertainty in the legal
and business communities over how courts would apply existing legal
standards determining managerial liability, in particular, whether and to what
extent they would expand personal liability of directors and officers beyond
the "traditional" cases of fraud and dishonesty, was identified by Romano
[1989. 24-25; 1991, 68] as a principal cause of the D&O insurance crisis.
Such uncertainty was most visibly entailed by the highly publicized,
controversial decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in S/w/7/7 v. For?
Gor/tow |488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)] that/7/-/"/wo>c/e expanded D&O liability
by holding directors liable for gross negligence because of their failure to have
properly informed themselves about their company's value before deciding to
support a take-over bid for their company.
Uncertainty over what courts would consider a breach of duty by a
manager (an officer or a director) justifying imposition of liability and, in
particular, the possibility that conduct previously considered "safe" might
result in personal liability, created difficulty for insurers in predicting when
they would have to make a payment under a D&O insurance policy. This
difficulty arose not merely from the fact that the incidence of managerial
liability became harder to predict, but also from an increase in litigation
frequency probably inspired by the perceived increased prospect for obtaining
a favorable liability award, or a lucrative settlement which the insurance
company would typically also have to reimburse under the D&O policy. In
addition, as a result of the uncertainty concerning the limits of managerial
liability, the rawge of possible settlement payments most likely also increased
as settlement negotiations took place in the context of this legal uncertainty
which, again, made it more difficult for insurers to estimate their risk
(especially when taking into account that in the United States, most liability
suits settle) | Romano (1991), 60, 68], The difficulty for insurers in predicting
their expected payments under any policy that ensued from increased
uncertainty over the application of the D&O liability' standard by the
judiciary, culminated in the above-mentioned manifestations of the insurance
crisis (reduction of coverage, withdrawal from the market by some insurers,
and higher premiums to compensate for uncertainty over future pay-outs).
Another reason why the extension of managerial liability, or the perception
of an extension, beyond cases of fraud and clear mismanagement would
impair insurers' ability to calculate their risk is that through such extension,
the incidence of liability may become dependent on factors other than a
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manager's own conduct. In her explanation of the D&O insurance crisis of
the mid-1980s, Romano [1989, 13J noted that an increase in the number of
liability suits against corporate managers, as occurred during the D&O
insurance crisis years, may have been partially due to general economic
conditions that in themselves are independent of the defending manager's
behavior: "(•••) the economic environment can encourage transactions or
create situations that breed litigation". She identified several such economy-
wide conditions that would seem to correlate with the number of suits against
managers, including, in particular, merger and acquisition activity and
business failures.
Claims seeking imposition of managerial liability may be brought because
of a shareholder's dissatisfaction with the management's role in relation to a
merger or an acquisition in which his company was involved, either as actor
or as target. Mergers and acquisitions would appear to come in waves
touching upon an industry or an entire segment of the economy rather than
being confined to a few individual firms. To the extent that personal liability
is imposed more often as the number of mergers and acquisitions increases,
more merger and acquisition activity would mean a greater risk of personal
liability for managers of all firms in the relevant industry. Bankruptcy cases
are another area conducive to liability suits against corporate managers as
shareholders and bankruptcy trustees may attempt to recover losses from the
firm's management, for instance, in an attempt to obtain payment under the
D&O insurance policy. The number of corporate bankruptcies correlates with
the overall state of the economy: an economic recession typically raises the
probability of business failure throughout the economy, /.e for all firms.
Consequently, to the extent that bankruptcy encourages litigation over
personal liability, if bankruptcy rates increase due to bad performance of the
economy, the average incidence of D&O liability claims will increase for all
firms.
Where the incidence of managerial liability is correlated with industry-
wide or economy-wide developments such as those described above, liability
risks become interdependent among all firms affected by these developments
(for instance, among all firms in the industry that is subject to increased
merger and acquisition activity). The insurance company's pay-outs under
any policy would then come to depend not merely on the insured party's
behavior but also on economic conditions independent thereof that would
increase the probability of insured losses occurring and that would raise the
insurance company's risk of loss under any policy. Where risks arc correlated
in this manner, it will be difficult if not impossible for insurers to calculate
their expected payments under any policy. They will be unable to identify
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separate pools of non-related risks, so that the operation of the law of large
numbers will no longer apply to the prediction of losses [Romano (1989), 15].
In this context, it should be noted that legal uncertainty over the extent of
managerial liability as may ensue from uncertainty concerning the application
of the liability standard by the courts, may also create interdependence of
liability risks as such uncertainty would affect all insureds (meaning that the
risk of personal liability being imposed would be subject to the same legal
uncertainty in respect of every firm), with similar effect [Romano (1989), 25].
Where insurance companies are not readily able to estimate the risk of
loss, they will either be prepared to provide limited coverage only (that means,
a low maximum insured amount, high deductibles and important exclusions)
or not be prepared to provide coverage at all. Moreover, given that
uncertainty over future pay-outs increases the amount of loss that insurance
companies must be prepared to face, to the extent that coverage is provided,
they will charge premiums that may be higher than the risk perceived by
potential purchasers of insurance in order to ascertain that they will meet their
costs under the insurance policy [Shavell (1987), 198]. In the latter event,
potential purchasers of insurance will refrain from taking out insurance or
purchase less coverage as the amount of the insurance premium would
outweigh their expected losses. More specifically, only high-risk agents (;.e.
incompetent and self-centered managers) would in fact be inclined to buy
insurance because premiums would exceed losses anticipated by low-risk
insureds. The departure of low-risks from an insurance pool will force
insurers to further contract coverage (for instance, by raising deductibles) and
to raise premiums once again which will cause more exits from the pool by
insureds whose risk is less than the premium charged. At the end of the day,
the risk pool may completely unravel, to the effect that risks would become
uninsurable [Priest (1988), 208-209].
To sum up, where extension of managerial liability would impair insurers'
ability to predict losses by enhancing uncertainty over the incidence of
liability and by making liability risks interdependent among various firms, the
insurance coverage they will be prepared to provide will become less, which
may ultimately even result in complete reluctance to provide coverage. In
addition, to the extent that coverage is offered, premiums are likely to go up in
order to ensure that they will cover the payments the insurance company may
have to make under the insurance policy given uncertainty and correlation of
risks. This, in turn, is likely both to reduce the amount of coverage that will
be bought and to cause low risks to leave the insurance pool which, at its
worst, again, will cause D&O liability risks to become uninsurable. To the
extent that extended personal liability of managers would disrupt the D&O
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insurance market as described, market provided insurance will obviously be
incapable of alleviating the adverse effects associated with increased
managerial liability. Where D&O insurance would become unavailable or
unaffordable, hence, extended liability would result in managers having to
bear more (non-diversifiable) risk, with the consequences described earlier.
For instance, during the D&O insurance crisis years, United States companies
reported difficulty in finding and retaining outside directors on their boards
because of persons appearing to be unwilling to bear an uninsured risk of
personal liability.
With respect to the area of products liability which in the mid-1980s was
confronted with a similar insurance crisis, by empirically comparing the
performance of products-liability insurance markets under different United
States state laws, Viscusi [1990] found that the availability of liability
insurance varied under different statutory regimes, with more insurance
coverage being available if statutory provisions existed which rendered the
liability risk less volatile by constraining liability and reducing uncertainty as
to maximum exposure levels and which, thus, made it easier for insurance
companies to predict risks. Viscusi's findings confirm that differences in the
scope of legal liability rules have a direct, significant impact on the insurance
coverage that markets will produce, as we suggested above in respect of the
availability of D&O liability insurance under extended managerial liability.
Apart from capacity constraints on the part of insurance markets to
produce D&O insurance, there are two more reasons why liability insurance
could be no more than an incomplete means to remedy the disadvantages of
extended personal liability of managers, viz. the possible divergence between
managerial decisions that would be optimum from the shareholders'
perspective on the one hand and courses of action preferred by insurers on the
other, and the possible dilution of managers' incentives to take care in order
to avoid losses, which might result from the purchase of D&O liability
insurance. One of the benefits associated with D&O liability insurance, as
indicated above, is that the insurance company would monitor managerial
behavior in order to avoid having to pay out under the insurance policy. In
effect, monitoring services provided by the insurance company purportedly
would give managers incentives to act in the shareholders' interests quite
similar to those that personal liability without insurance would create.
As Holderness [1990, 118-123] has pointed out, monitoring services by
D&O insurers are rendered in various ways: (i) before insurance is provided,
by the insurance company's investigation of the firm seeking D&O insurance
for factors that might increase its exposure and by demands it may make for
changes in the firm's organizational structure or business practices to reduce
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its risk, (ii) once the insurance has been supplied, through the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy and through the denial of coverage should
the firm (or the relevant director or officer) fail to comply with these terms
and conditions (for instance, the policy may exclude certain managerial
actions that may trigger personal liability from coverage), and (iii) after a
legal action has been brought against a particular manager for imposition of
personal liability, by the insurance company investigating the allegations
made and demanding that the relevant individuals take remedial action where
appropriate. Moreover, D&O insurers typically monitor managerial behavior
when renewal of an existing policy is sought, by evaluating management's
past performance and its claim record under the existing policy and by raising
insurance premiums or by demanding specific behavioral or organizational
changes as a condition for renewal if the outcome of the evaluation is
unsatisfactory. Furthermore, D&O liability insurance is said to produce
monitoring benefits in a more indirect way, viz. by encouraging managers to
monitor each other's behavior where one manager's actions may result in loss
of coverage for all of them, and by facilitating the recruitment of outside
directors who monitor the performance of the firm's day-to-day management
[Holderness(1990), 119].
However, the insurance company's motive to monitor managerial behavior
and, thus, its objective in monitoring is not necessarily identical to that of the
shareholders. D&O insurers monitor in order to reduce their exposure under
the D&O policy, that is, to avoid claims against managers personally,
whereas shareholders, as we have seen, are interested in monitoring in order
to ensure that management will take actions that maximize the value of their
residual claim and will abstain from activities detrimental to the attainment of
this objective. This distinction is relevant particularly where shareholders and
D&O liability insurers have different attitudes towards risk. Whereas, as we
have also discussed, shareholders holding well-diversified portfolios will be
risk neutral and will want management to undertake risky projects with
positive net present values, there will be a tendency for insurance companies
to be risk averse as more risk-taking by the firm means greater potential
losses under the insurance policy and as catastrophic liabilities covered by the
insurance could drive the insurance company out of business. Risk-aversion
on the part of insurers is supported by their frequently taking out reinsurance,
which they would not do if they were indifferent to the possibility of suffering
losses (including potentially catastrophic losses) under any policy, given that
they have already been compensated for this possibility through the premiums
they charge purchasers of insurance.
Where personal liability of managers is extended, on assumption that
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liability insurance coverage is also extended, the insurance company's
exposure under the D&O policy will increase, with the possibility of
catastrophic liability also increasing. This increased exposure will increase
the importance of risk-aversion on the part of the insurance company, which
will deepen the gap between the shareholders' interests and those of the
insurance company with respect to the actions that they would want the firm's
management to undertake or to reject. To the extent that risk averse insurers
would want management to behave differently than risk neutral shareholders
would, monitoring by liability insurers would serve the insurance company's
interests but not those of the shareholders. In other words, where extended
liability promotes risk-aversion on the part of D&O insurers, monitoring by
insurance companies may exacerbate rather than remedy the risk averse
incentives that extended personal liability would give corporate managers and
may discourage rather than encourage the firm's operation in the risk neutral
way that diversified shareholders would prefer.
Finally, where the insurance company is unable, or merely partially able,
to control managerial behavior, the purchase of liability insurance may distort
managers' incentives in quite the opposite direction: if managers expect the
losses they might cause to be more or less fully covered by their D&O
liability insurance and if at the same time liability insurers have imperfect
ability to influence managers' behavior, the purchase of liability insurance
would dilute managers' incentives to take care in order to avoid losses (/.e.
reduce risk) to the shareholders given that the insurance company would
indemnify them anyway for losses arising from personal liability, except for
possible decreases in the rental value of their human capital [Shavell (1982),
127; (1987), 195-196]. Only where insurers are able to determine managers'
level of care (through direct monitoring, through the use of deductibles and
exclusions, by linking premiums to managers' efforts to prevent loss, or
otherwise through the terms of the insurance policy) will their incentives to
take care be similar to those they would have in the absence of insurance, that
is, if they (and not the insurance company) had to bear the risk of personal
liability, disregarding for the moment the fact that the insurance company
may pursue a greater degree of risk-aversion on the managers' part than
diversified shareholders would choose (which would not substantially change
the argument). It follows that where insurers are only partially able to
determine managers' level of care, the purchase of full D&O insurance
coverage would offset the additional incentives to act in the shareholders'
interests that extended personal liability would create.
Shavell [1986, 46; 1987, 241] has explained that this effect of liability
insurance is even more serious in instances where the insured's personal
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wealth is less than the liability he may incur. In such event, the insured's
wealth being less than the amount for which he may be liable would in itself
reduce his incentives to avoid losses; liability insurance coverage would
further dilute these incentives if the insurer were unable to perfectly monitor
the insured's level of care and link the terms of the insurance policy to it. This
observation is relevant to the matter of personal liability of managers as in
many instances, the amount of loss that managers may cause to the
shareholders, in particular, the depreciation in the value of the latter's residual
claim for which they may be responsible, will exceed managers' private
wealth. Possible personal liability, then, establishes an effective threat only to
the extent of managers' wealth, a threat that will be further reduced if
insurance coverage is obtained and the insurer is unable to determine to some
extent managers' efforts to prevent losses.
In brief, whereas active monitoring by the D&O insurance company may
induce managers to take too little risk from the shareholders' point of view,
the (partial) absence of such monitoring may induce them to exercise too little
care to reduce risks, the latter problem being exacerbated where managers'
personal wealth is less than the losses they might cause to the shareholders.
Both effects are socially undesirable: the former, because it encourages loss-
prevention beyond the point at which more prevention is not worth its cost
and discourages investments in risky activities, the expected benefits of which
to investors would outweigh their expected costs and which, therefore, would
be socially beneficial to make (provided that no costs are shifted to third
parties); the latter, because it encourages over-risky behavior on the part of
management, z.e. courses of conduct which may cause losses that could have
been prevented at less cost than the anticipated loss so avoided, meaning that
society as a whole would be better off if more resources were dedicated to
prevention activity.
6. Disciplining the Unfaithful Agent -
Legal Responses to the Internal
Costs Problem
IN THE TWO preceding chapters we discussed the divergence of interests
between residual claimants and salaried managers. This divergence of
interests is inherent in the separation of investment and management
functions, one of the principal features of the multi-shareholder, publicly held
corporation. Paradoxically, whilst the residual claimants entrust the
management of the corporate firm to specialized managers with a view to
increasing the value of the residual claim, by taking advantage of their
positions to maximize personal utility such specialized managers may
unilaterally appropriate at least a part of the added value resulting from
specialized management.
The prevalence of managerial utility-maximizing behavior at shareholders'
expense was approached essentially from a "market failure" perspective: in
Chapter 4, we described when and why the relevant market mechanisms
disciplining managers fail to resolve the conflict of interests observed and in
Chapter 5, we discussed, from a theoretical point of view, several legal vistas
that might be pursued to alleviate this problem, including the possible
strengthening of these market mechanisms themselves. Now we will outline
where and how in reality the law steps in to correct shortcomings in the
operation of disciplinary market forces, and see whether the principal legal
remedies are consistent with the economics underlying the separation of
business management and residual risk-bearing as a principle of corporate
organization.
For this purpose, we survey what legal remedies United States corporation
law, having emanated from a common law tradition, and Dutch corporation
law, having emanated from a civil law background, have developed in order to
resolve the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. We
concentrate on major issues since our purpose is not primarily to describe
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every detail of the relevant laws but, rather, to examine whether the
fundamentals of the respective legal remedies can be explained from the
perspective of economic theory like the corporate form of organization to
which they relate. In the same context, we attempt to compare United States
legal remedies to Netherlands remedies.
The Internal Costs Problem: U.S. Law
F/duc/ary Duf/es
As set forth in Chapter 5, there are several ways in which the law may seek to
mitigate conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers: by
imposing information disclosure requirements on corporations that feed
information into markets disciplining managers, by bestowing monitoring
rights (including voting rights) on shareholders, by providing for flexible exit
rules for shareholders, by restraining managerial discretion in the management
of corporate resources, and by holding managers liable for aberrant activities.
Both United States law (hereinafter, U.S. law) and Dutch law contain
disclosure requirements for publicly held corporations to feed information into
disciplinary market mechanisms, both U.S. law and Dutch law confer voting
rights on shareholders enabling them to directly monitor the management, and
both U.S. law and Dutch law allow shareholders to protect themselves from
managerial self-interest seeking by selling their shares. However, both laws
fundamentally differ in the manner in which they seek to control managerial
behavior through legal behavior restraints and in the use of personal liability
to remedy managerial departures from shareholders' interests. Therefore, our
focus is on the different legal standards for aligning managerial behavior with
the interests of the shareholders and on the liability rules devised to remedy
aberrant activities of managers.
U.S. corporate law's prime regulatory device to mitigate managerial self-
interest seeking at shareholders' expense is the concept of fiduciary duties of
directors and officers of corporations. Having emanated from the common
law, such fiduciary duties are now included in a large majority of state
corporation acts and have thus been translated into statutory law. Although
there are differences in the manner in which fiduciary duties are described in
state corporation statutes and in the manner in which they are applied by
courts in different state jurisdictions, the concept as such is similar throughout
the United States. Below we describe the fiduciary duties concept as it is
commonly understood throughout state corporation laws.
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Directors, including executive directors who are at the same time officers
of the corporation as well as non-executive directors, and officers who are not
also directors, are subject to two fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the
corporate entity, viz. the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Components of
both duties are reflected in the general standards of conduct for directors
defined in Section 8.30 (a) of the Model Business Corporation Act. Section
8.30 (a) reads: "A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including
his duties as a member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation". Section 8.42 (a) contains a similar standard of
conduct for officers.
The di/fy o//oya/(y obliges directors and officers (hereinafter collectively
referred to as managers) to give priority to the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders when a conflict may arise between the latter
and their personal self-interests. In GK//? V. Zo/f, /«c. [5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
Ch. 1939)] the court construed the duty of loyalty to mean that a corporate
manager must '"refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or (...) deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it, or enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers".
The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from using their position as a
manager to pursue personal profit or other personal advantages to the
detriment of the corporation and its shareholders. Fraud, taking of corporate
property, abuses of office, diversion of corporate resources to uses in which
managers have an interest but for which there is not a rational business
purpose, and self-interested transactions harmful to the corporation, all
violate managers' duty of loyalty. So does a manager's usurpation of
corporate business opportunities in the pursuit of private gain: the duty of
loyalty compels managers to refrain from entering into activities competing
with those of the corporation, from exploiting commercial opportunities in
which the corporation has an interest, and from acquiring property if the
corporation itself has an interest in acquiring that property.
In £u//gre/i v. Afavy Go* * %jp/y Co. [135 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1943)], in
an exemplary definition, the court described the duty of loyalty by holding
that a manager (in this case a director) "owes loyalty and allegiance to his
corporation, a loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in
action by no consideration other than the welfare of his corporation". The
court continued: "He [the manager] is held in official action, to the extreme
measure of candor, unselfishness, and good faith. Those principles are rigid,
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essential and salutary".
The di//)> o / care prescribes that managers should dedicate to the
management of the corporation that level of care, effort, skill, judgment and
diligence that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar
circumstances [Clark (1986), 123]. For instance, in Gra/?a/w v. i4///\y-
C/io/mer^ Mmu/2rcftir;/ig Co. [188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)], the court
stated that "in managing the corporate affairs [directors] are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily prudent men would use in similar
circumstances". As early as 1891, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled, in
5r;gg5 v. 5/K7u/<ftng [141 U.S. 132, 152], that directors must act in the same
manner as would "ordinarily prudent and diligent men (...) under similar
circumstances, and in determining that (...) the usages of business should be
taken into account".
The duty of care in any event requires that managers "give the corporate
entity the benefit of their best judgment and care", as the court in Gmtf
Wester« f/n/Yed Corp. v. Gratf Jfes/er/7 /Vodwcers Coop, noted [588 P.2d
380, 382 (Colo. 1978)]. To this end they must make business decisions in a
conscious and rational manner, giving due consideration to the relevant facts
and the needs of the business [//o^e v. A/ee/t, 795 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986);
De/Wo v. /VovKfert/ Secur/Ty Z,//e //w. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967)],
they must genuinely endeavor to properly perform the tasks and
responsibilities assigned to them [Fra^c/s v. £/«/Yed Jersej 2tort£, 432 A.2d
814 (N.J. 1981); M v . 5/Jto.y, 276 F.Supp. 217 (ED. Mo. 1967)], and they
must assure themselves that they are reasonably informed of the relevant
material facts before deciding what action shall be taken in a particular matter
[Sm/tf! v. ^7« GorArom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985/ //orao« 7>wsr PLC v. ML
SCA/ /fc<7M/M7/ort /«c , 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)]. The obligation to be
reasonably informed which is entailed by the duty of care, may be construed
to include a duty for board members "to attempt in good faith to assure" that
the corporation has an internal information and reporting system designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information concerning the corporation's affairs, as the court of /« re
Care/fMr*/nfernrt/0na//mr. [698 A2d 959. 970 (Del.Ch. 1996)] decided.
In a number of states, courts have applied a somewhat stricter standard of
conduct, requiring managers to use the degree of care that ordinarily prudent
men would exercise in conducting their own affairs. The standard for
determining what level of care is appropriate then is not so much the care
required in similar circumstances but, rather, the degree of care a reasonable
man would exercise in relation to his personal affairs. For instance, in
v. ASuAtego/i /»wtow /toig Co. [82 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Mich. 1957)]
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the court demanded '"that care which every man of common prudence takes in
regard to his own affairs", whilst the court in /<M4 ^ccep/flwce Co. v.
Lea/terAy //wurartce Co. [594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979)] required "such
attention [care] as an ordinarily discreet business man would give to /J/S OHW
concerns under similar circumstances" (emphasis added). However, the
substantive meaning of the cited distinction and the material effect thereof on
judicial decisions, if there is any effect at all, does not appear to be significant
and, thus, the distinction itself would seem predominantly a matter of
semantics.
Sr/are/70/ders'Der/vaf/Ve Su/Y •
The fiduciary duties described above reduce managers* freedom of action.
The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from allocating corporate resources,
including their own human capital, for purposes conflicting with shareholders'
interests, and from usurping corporate opportunities. The duty of care obliges
managers to deploy their skill, effort and so on, so as to further the best
interests of the corporation and the shareholders rather than their personal
self-interests. Both duties operate to align managerial behavior with the
interests of the shareholders, and in this manner they serve to reduce agency
costs.
In the absence of fiduciary duties, managers would have fewer restraints
on the use of their superior knowledge and information about the business for
the maximization of their own utility. Shareholders would then have loss-
minimizing incentives to monitor in detail managerial behavior and,
consequently, to spend extensive resources in gathering and evaluating
information on the performance of the cooperative inputs in the firm in order
to find out whether the management was doing a proper job. Specialized
managers running the firm can obtain such information at less cost than
shareholders, since they are specialists in acquiring and interpreting
information on input behavior in team productive processes. Indeed, they are
hired precisely because of their superior ability to do so. The fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care, by tying in managers with shareholders' interests, are a
legal device for lowering shareholders" costs of monitoring and information
gathering and, thus, for economizing on the operational costs of the corporate
form.
The efficacy of the fiduciary concept requires that the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care can effectively be enforced on corporate managers. To this
end state corporation laws entitle shareholders to institute, on behalf of the
27 8 D/sc/p//n/ng toe l/nfa/f/?fu/ >4genf
corporation, legal action against managers through a derivative suit. A
derivative suit is an action brought by a shareholder in the right of the
corporation in order to claim damages for an injury sustained by the
corporation, or to seek injunctive relief. To make it clear that the action is
brought in the right of the corporation and not in that of the individual
shareholder, Section 7.41 (2) of the Model Business Corporation Act provides
that the shareholder-plaintiff must use the derivative proceeding so as to
"fairly and adequately [represent] the interests of the corporation in enforcing
the right of the corporation".
Shareholders may institute derivative proceedings to impose personal
liability on corporate managers on the basis of a breach of their fiduciary
duties. If a claim for damages raised in a derivative suit against one or more
managers is awarded, the manager(s) concerned must compensate the
cor/?oraf/ort for the injury sustained by it as a result of their breach of duty.
The compensation paid into the corporation's treasury will benefit
shareholders through their residual claim and so indirectly indemnify them for
losses resulting from the manager's failure to observe the duty of care or the
duty of loyalty. Shareholders' rights to bring derivative proceedings and the
liability rule imposing personal liability on managers for breaches of fiduciary
duty complement the fiduciary concept: they deter managers from failing to
exercise the requisite care and from disloyally letting their personal self-
interests prevail over shareholder and corporate interests, and they entitle
shareholders to compensation, via their residual claim on the corporation's
assets and cash flows, should managers nonetheless shirk their duties.
In addition to the right to institute derivative proceedings, state
jurisdictions recognize a right for shareholders to bring direct personal actions
against corporate managers. In such a direct action, which is instituted by a
shareholder in his own right or in the right of the class to which he belongs,
not on behalf of the corporation, the shareholder may seek damages payable
to himself (or to the class he represents) rather than to the corporation.
However, the right to bring a direct suit against a manager is generally
restricted to alleged violations of shareholders' individual rights and
consequent personal injury sustained by the shareholder (or the class) in
question in his individual capacity, distinct from injury suffered by the
corporation. When managers violate their duty of care or their duty of loyalty,
the injury is primarily done to the corporation and affects shareholders only
indirectly, through their residual claim. Therefore, to redress injury resulting
from managerial violations of fiduciary duties, a derivative suit instituted on
the corporation's behalf, and not a direct personal action, is the appropriate
legal means [Clark (1986), 662-663].
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If, on the basis of the fiduciary principles, shareholders were able to
challenge in court virtually every managerial action they felt uncomfortable
with, managers' perceived risk of personal liability would be significant and
high litigation costs would result. As discussed in Chapter 5, managers would
demand compensation for both anticipated litigation expenses and the risk of
personal liability through higher salaries or otherwise, whilst shareholders
would discount at least future litigation costs from the amount they would be
willing to pay for a share. (Only SHCce.s.y/w/ shareholder-plaintiffs are entitled
to recover reasonable expenses from the corporation, as we fuller discuss
below, and any such recovery would absorb corporate resources, which would
also be discounted from stock prices.) Eventually, more expensive
management remuneration packages and high litigation costs may offset the
benefit of fewer agency costs which the fiduciary concept and shareholders'
right to bring derivative proceedings should bring about.
Moreover, as also noted in Chapter 5, if managers were in fear of litigation
in relation to every decision they made, they would spend more resources in
studying, preparing and obtaining information about contemplated business
decisions, even beyond the point at which the benefit to shareholders of such
additional expenditures is outweighed by the cost. In addition, to protect
themselves from personal liability, managers would be induced to avoid
investments in commercially risky projects, even if such investments would
have positive net present values to the shareholders. Shareholders would then
suffer opportunity losses. In other words, if there were a substantial
opportunity for dissatisfied shareholders to successfully sue the management,
managers would be inclined to exercise too much care (they would be "over-
deterred") and to deploy corporate resources to avoid personal liability rather
than to maximize shareholders' wealth. On balance, therefore, the prospect of
liability suits relating to breach of fiduciary duty may produce a net «ego/zve
effect on the value of shareholders' residual claim instead of enhancing
stockholder wealth.
One answer to this problem is the requirement commonly found in state
corporation laws that shareholders desirous to bring a derivative suit must
first request the corporation itself, that means, its board of directors, under
whose authority all corporate powers are exercised (Section 8.01 (b) of the
Model Business Corporation Act), to take suitable corrective measures.
Shareholders may demand that the directors either cause the corporation to
bring an action for damages against the managers who allegedly injured the
corporation by breaching fiduciary duties, or take other appropriate corrective
measures. The demand requirement is defined, for example, in Section 7.42
(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act where it states that a shareholder
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may not commence derivative proceedings unless "a written demand has been
made upon the corporation to take suitable action". Section 7.42 (b) adds that
once the demand has been made, the shareholder must observe a ninety day
waiting period during which the corporation itself may take corrective action,
unless the corporation rejects the demand within that period or unless
"irreparable injury to the corporation" would result if commencement of the
derivative action were to be postponed by those ninety days.
The demand requirement does not usually preclude shareholders from
bringing a derivative suit if corporate management refuses to take suitable
action as demanded. In particular, if the directors refuse to take legal action
against the alleged wrongdoers, shareholders can nonetheless pursue a
derivative action on behalf of the corporation if they establish facts indicating
that the directors were personally involved or interested in the situation
shareholders seek to remedy, or that their refusal to take the action demanded
was motivated by bad faith [Clark (1986), 644]. Accordingly, directors who
allegedly violated their fiduciary duties will usually be unable to preclude
derivative proceedings themselves. Moreover, even if due observance of the
demand requirement would not have caused "irreparable injury" to the
corporation, courts frequently excuse demand if shareholders could
reasonably have assumed that making a demand on the corporation would not
have led to the desired corrective action, especially if the management is
dominated or controlled by the individuals against which shareholders'
complaints are directed. In practice, therefore, the demand requirement is not
a significant restraint on shareholders' ability to bring liability suits against
corporate managers.
The principal, and more important, response of U.S. corporate law to the
above-mentioned adverse effects of liability suits against corporate
managements is the 6i«//?e« yWg/we/rt rw/e. The business judgment rule is a
common law device reducing managers' exposure to the risk of personal
liability largely to clear-cut, unambiguous cases of neglect of duty, including
managerial self-interest seeking at shareholders' expense in as far as such
behavior is outlawed by the standards of care and loyalty.
The Bus/ness Judgmenf Rtv/e
The business judgment rule in essence establishes that courts will not second-
guess management's purely business judgments and will not hold managers
liable for mistakes in business judgment on the sole basis that their decisions
have proven errors, save in certain exceptional instances. The business
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judgment rule may be understood as the corporate legal counterpart of the
concept of judicial self-restraint in U.S. constitutional law. Whilst, according
to the latter concept, the judiciary is not concerned with the wisdom and
expediency of a challenged legislative act, the business judgment rule
precludes the courts from second-guessing the wisdom of managerial acts.
Under the business judgment rule, managers are not liable for losses
resulting from unwise or inexpedient business decisions, even if a reasonable
person would not have made the same judgment, provided "the judgment was
made in good faith and on due inquiry and had a rational basis", as Eisenberg
[1988, 38-39] has stated. The court in /« re Care/war/: /rtte/ratf/ona/ /«c.
[698 A.2d 959, 967, 968 (Del.Ch. 1996)] expressly ruled that a judge or a
jury in hindsight believing a particular board decision to be "substantively
wrong", "stupid", "egregious" or "irrational", provides no ground for
personal liability of a director, by virtue of the operation of the business
judgment rule, so long as the process employed in arriving at that decision
was "either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
interests". Thus, the court concluded, "the business judgment rule is process
oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith board decisions".
The rule in fact comprises a judicial presumption that in making business
decisions, managers have duly complied with the fiduciary duties resting upon
them, unless the facts of the case demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, the
business judgment rule is often referred to as a judicial /jresum/rt/o« o /
regu/ar/Yy [Block, Barton and Radin (1987), 7], for it "presupposes that
reasonable diligence lies behind the judgment in question", as Clark [1986,
124] has put it. In S/rtc/a/r 0/7 Cor/?, v. Lev/en [280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)] this presumption has been phrased as follows: "A board of directors
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not
be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A
court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is
or is not sound business judgment". In /Ironso« v. Lew/s [473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)] the business judgment rule has subsequently been refined as "a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation
[have] acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company".
Section 4.01 (c) of the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations (1994), prepared by the American Law Institute, contains
the following definition of the rule, summarizing the existing case law: "A
director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills [his]
duty [of care] (...) if the director or officer: (1) is not [privately] interested in
the subject of the business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the
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subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3)
rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation."
The business judgment rule does not subject managers to new substantive
standards of conduct other than those already embodied in the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care. Rather, by preventing the courts from second-guessing
mere business judgments, it provides corporate managers with substantive
protection from personal liability and relaxes the restraining effect of the cited
duties on their discretion to make business decisions.
The business judgment rule is foremost a procedwra/ tool applied by the
courts when enforcement is sought of managers" fiduciary duties, in
particular, when managers are alleged to have injured the corporation by a
breach of duty. It is a means by which courts will review managerial decisions
which have received complaint, and on the basis of which they may dismiss
ill-based claims for damages or injunctive relief. Moreover, the business
judgment rule imposes on the shareholder-plaintiflF the onus of proving that in
a particular case the managers were not justified in acting as they did:
shareholders seeking relief against managerial actions must rebut the
presumption that the action concerned was within the scope of managers'
reasonable business judgment as protected by the business judgment rule
IBlock, Barton and Radin (1987), 9-10].
Within the business judgment rule, five component parts can be
distinguished, and managers enjoy the protection of the rule only if all five
elements have been fulfilled [Block, Barton and Radin (1987), 9-17]. If a
managerial decision is challenged, the courts will (or should) confine
themselves to the examination of whether these five elements are present.
First, there must be a business decision, meaning that the rule does not
insulate managers from complaints that they failed to take action if there was
no conscious decision not to act. Indeed, in /frowso« v. Lew« [473 A.2d 805,
813 (Del. 1984)] the court found that the business judgment rule "has no role
[to play] where [managers] have either abdicated their functions, or absent a
conscious decision, failed to act" when action would have been appropriate.
Second, the rule solely protects decisions in which managers did not have a
personal self-interest. As described earlier, the duty of loyalty prohibits acts
of self-dealing detrimental to the corporation, appropriation of corporate
opportunities and other actions intended to bring personal benefit to the
manager concerned at the corporations expense. Departures from managers'
duty of loyalty are not shielded by the business judgment rule.
Third, from the duty of care principle it follows that only those managers
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are protected who have exercised due care both to obtain and to consider
appropriate information prior to taking the business decision concerned.
Consequently, to enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, they must
have attempted to assure themselves that sufficient information to reach an
informed business judgment had come to their attention in a timely manner [/n
n? Care/nfl/vt /«terwartona/ /«c , 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del.Ch. 1996)].
Uninformed decisions, based on intuition and purported commercial feeling
rather than on material information concerning the relevant facts, fall outside
the scope of the business judgment rule, as was established in S/w///? V. Fa«
Gorfom [488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)]. In that case, the court ruled that the
business judgment rule does not protect directors who made an "unintelligent
or unadvised judgment" after failing to acquaint themselves, prior to making
the business decision concerned (relating to a takeover bid for their company),
with "all material information reasonably available to them" [488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985)].
Fourth, only business decisions taken in good faith, that is, honestly
intended and believed to further the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, are protected. Decisions not motivated by a genuine desire to
promote these interests, including, for example, fraudulent decisions, fall
outside the realm of the business judgment rule.
Fifth, the rule does not protect abuses of managers' discretionary power,
including decisions resulting in a waste of corporate resources, such as a
decision to have the corporation enter into a transaction which ''fall[s] short of
intentional or inferred fraudulent misconduct" but which nonetheless is so
disadvantageous to the corporation that no rational business judgment could
sustain that decision, as the court in G//w6e/ v. 7Y7e S/grar/ Com/rames, /«c.
[316 A.2d 599, 610 (Del. Ch. 1974)] considered. Abuse of discretion will
frequently concur with, but does not require, bad faith: decisions honestly
taken to benefit the corporation and the shareholders but in reality so grossly
unfavorable to them that no rationally acting person would have taken that
decision, may be considered an abuse of discretionary power by the
management.
The business judgment rule presumes that managerial actions duly satisfy
all five requirements described above. Shareholders seeking relief against a
particular managerial action must establish facts demonstrating that at least
one element of the rule has not been satisfied. If, for instance, a shareholder
demonstrates that a particular decision was solely driven by a manager's
personal self-interest, that a manager failed to properly inform himself of the
relevant facts prior to making a business judgment, or that his action was
tantamount to fraud, the business judgment rule will not shield managers from
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personal liability.
To sum up, managerial inactivity, self-dealing at the expense of the
corporation, usurpation of corporate opportunities, failure to exercise due
care in preparing business decisions, bad faith, fraudulent behavior, waste of
corporate resources and (other) abuses of discretionary power are not
protected by the business judgment rule. In such instances, shareholders may
institute a derivative action against managers to hold them personally liable
for damages payable to the corporation. As regards the duty of loyalty, any
disloyal behavior through which managers pursue personal gain to the
detriment of the corporation falls outside the protection of the business
judgment rule. As regards the duty of care, a risk of personal liability only
exists if managers have evidently acted negligently, not merely mistakenly, in
one of the manners described above, and personal liability is most likely to be
imposed in instances of conscious misconduct or gross negligence.
In effect, the business judgment rule largely limits the threat of personal
liability to cases of disloyalty and striking mismanagement, and insulates
managers from fiabifity for business decisions which were properly prepared,
made in good faith, rationally defendable and honestly believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In this manner the rule
protects managers from "substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges
or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests", as
the court in //? re Care/want /nternafz'ona/ /nc. [698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.Ch.
1996)] considered, thus providing them with the requisite discretion to run the
business so as to enhance shareholders' wealth, while at the same time
deterring departures from that objective. Indeed, shareholders' benefit from
management by specialized managers is greatest where managers have both
discretion and incentives to use their skills so as to direct productive resources
in the firm in the interest of the shareholders, and where they are not
discouraged by potential personal liability from making decisions which,
judging ex flwte, they may rationally expect to be beneficial to the
shareholders (but which in the end, with hindsight, might fail to yield the
expected result). This rationale underlying the business judgment rule was
clearly understood by the court in F//ra/?c/fl/ /AJcfos/nW FWAK/, /«C. V.
A/cDo/7^// D<wg/<w Corp. [474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir. 1973)], which
found that "in order to make the corporation function effectively, those having
management responsibility must have the freedom to make in good faith the
many necessary decisions quickly and finally without the impairment of
having to be liable for an honest error in judgment".
On the other hand, the instances in which the business judgment rule does
not shield managers from personal liability typically involve cases in which.
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from an ex o«te perspective, the cost to shareholders of management's
behavior outweighs shareholders' prospective benefit from having the firm
run by specialized managers. Such behavior would threaten the whole concept
of centralized management as it would force shareholders into extensive and
costly monitoring to prevent net losses from employing specialized managers,
and this explains the limitations to the protection managers may obtain from
the business judgment rule. In both regards, the business judgment rule is
instrumental to the concept of centralized management in corporations.
Efficacy of DenVaftVe L/f/gaf/on
Shareholders' derivative action to enforce managers' duties of loyalty and
care complements market disciplinary forces, incentive contracting and
monitoring by shareholders on the basis of their voting rights, as a mechanism
for aligning managerial behavior with investor interests. The right to bring a
derivative action provides shareholders with a monitoring instrument in
addition to their voting rights: it enables them to monitor corporate
managements through the court room, and to make use of a public institution,
the judiciary, to enforce managers' private duties towards the shareholders
and the corporation.
As discussed in Chapter 4, effective monitoring by scattered individual
shareholders is threatened as the cost of monitoring managerial behavior
(including the cost of obtaining the requisite information about value
maximizing policies, the cost of detecting managerial actions contrary to
shareholders' interests and the cost of forming powerful coalitions with fellow
investors to enforce desired management actions) may exceed an individual
shareholder's anticipated benefit from incurring such costs. In particular, if a
shareholder owns only a small percentage of the total shares, both his ability
to influence managerial behavior through active monitoring and his
anticipated benefit from monitoring efforts will be small, so that the aforesaid
costs of monitoring may well be prohibitively high. In these circumstances, it
would be perfectly rational for individual shareholders to abstain from
actively monitoring managerial performance.
The same factors would discourage individual shareholders from bringing
a derivative action against managers to obtain compensation for and on behalf
of the corporation for an injury sustained by the latter resulting from
managers' violation of fiduciary duties: if a shareholder owns only a small
percentage of the shares, his proportionate share of the compensation paid to
the corporation would be equally small and probably smaller than the
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expenses he would need to incur to bring the action. Moreover, given such
expenses and given the inevitable uncertainty, present in any suit, with respect
to the court's decision (and the potential attainment of a profitable
settlement), individual shareholders would have incentives to rely upon others
to bring the action. To avoid such free rider problems and, thus, to enhance
the effectiveness of the derivative suit as a monitoring instrument, case law
has entitled shareholder-plaintiffs in derivative proceedings to recover
litigation expenses (including attorneys' fees) from the corporation if the
action constituted a "substantial benefit" to the corporation.
A "substantial benefit" is present if the action resulted in a judgment or an
amicable settlement or in corrective action in fact by the defending managers
which accomplished ' a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which
would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect the
enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest", as
the court in ßosc/j v. Mee/fcer Coo/?era//ve L/g/tf c& Power i4£?oc;'a//on [101
N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. I960)] decided. A "substantial benefit" may exist,
for instance, if the defending manager(s) were ordered to pay damages to the
corporation, or if the relevant judgment or settlement conferred non-pecuniary
relief on the corporation satisfying the aforesaid test. The "substantial
benefit" rule reduces individual shareholders' cost of bringing a meritorious
action based on violation of managers' fiduciary duties and, in consequence,
increases the probability that the anticipated benefit to an individual
shareholder from bringing such an action will outweigh his expected cost.
Yet some scholars, based on empirical data, have questioned the efficacy
of shareholders' right to bring a derivative action as a means of assuring that
managers govern the corporate firm in the interest of the shareholders. Fischel
and Bradley [1986] have examined changes in the market price of the shares
of corporations in whose name shareholders have brought derivative
proceedings to impose personal liability on incumbent managers. They
examined stock price reactions following the dismissal of the derivative suit
by the court for which the action had been instituted, for a sample of firms
listed on the American or New York Stock Exchanges. The judicial decisions
included in their study were rendered between July 2, 1962 and December 31,
1983.
Fischel and Bradley begin from the assumption that if derivative suits
serve the interests of the shareholders as they purport to do, that is, if they
serve to reduce agency costs, the market price of the firm's shares should fall
if the court dismisses the suit. In their own words, the court's termination of a
derivative action might signal to the market "the court's unwillingness or
inability to prevent the firm's management from expropriating the wealth of
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the firm's equityholders" [1986, 278], As a consequence, the market price of
the firm's shares should decrease "by the discounted value of the increase in
agency costs arising from the increased discretion that the court's decision
gives the firm's management" [1986, 279]. However, in reality they did no/
find statistically significant negative stock price reactions to the termination of
derivative actions. From this finding they conclude that investors do not
attach significant positive value to derivative actions and that, therefore,
potential personal liability of managers is relatively unimportant in aligning
managerial incentives with shareholders' interests.
The reported absence of significant negative stock price reactions to the
termination of derivative proceedings does not, in our view, justify such a far-
reaching conclusion. First, on the (realistic) assumption that courts will tend
to dismiss primarily non-meritorious actions, the continuation of a dismissed
action would probably not have yielded a net benefit to the corporation and
the shareholders. Thus, if the action was non-meritorious, that is, if the
defending functionaries had not committed a more or less serious wrong the
action could redress, there is no reason why investors should attach positive
value to the action's continuation and negative value to its dismissal. The
absence of a significant decrease in stock prices in response to the suit's
dismissal by the court then reflects the absence of merit in the action, not a
value judgment by investors on the mere /Mws/6z7//y of holding managers
liable for breach of fiduciary duty.
Second, regardless of the action's merit, investors may have correctly
anticipated its dismissal by the court. Such anticipation would be
incorporated in stock prices prior to the suit's actual termination, so that the
court's decision would not reveal any "new" information to the market to
which stock prices should or might respond. As Goetz [1986, 346] has noted,
if investors' expectation of a dismissal has been incorporated into the stock's
evaluation in the manner described, "there would be no reason to anticipate
any market reaction at all" to the actual dismissal. Fischel and Bradley [1986,
278] have attempted to wave such a criticism away by assuming that market
participants had not fully anticipated the judicial decisions on dismissal
included in their study. This assumption, however, is at odds with standard
economic theory relating to the operation of securities markets which holds
that investors' expectations about the future are capitalized in current stock
prices and in addition, it would seem hard to reconcile with the very purpose
of their study, z.e. the examination of stock market reactions in a real world
context, meaning on the basis of information actually available to market
participants In fact, the assumption they have made is basically the crux of
the question they seek to answer.
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Third, alleged violations of managers' fiduciary duties and derivative
proceedings based upon such alleged violations are firm-specific events, and
so is the termination of a derivative action against a firm's management. On
the assumption that most investors hold diversified investment portfolios in
order to avoid bearing firm-specific risk, the dismissal of a derivative suit
brought in the name of any particular firm in his portfolio is unlikely to have
a significant impact on an investor's appreciation of that firm's shares in so
far as the dismissal would increase his risk of wealth reductions as a result of
self-interest seeking by the firm's management. Given diversification and
investors' consequent relative insensitivity to firm-specific risk, market prices
would not need to decline following the suit's dismissal to compensate
investors for such additional firm-specific risk [Demsetz (1986), 353]. Fischel
and Bradley have failed to take into account such effects of diversification on
stock price responses to the termination of derivative proceedings and on the
interpretation of perceived (non)responses.
Another study that questions the efficacy of shareholders' derivative suit
(and direct class actions) in reducing agency costs has been conducted by
Romano [1991]. She examined shareholder litigation (including both
derivative and class actions) in respect of a sample of 535 publicly held
corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange or in the NASDAQ
system over a period from the late 1960s through 1987. Important findings of
her study are: only 19 percent of the firms in the sample experienced a
shareholder suit in the investigated period, approximately 65 percent of these
suits were settled amicably, only half of the settlements involved a monetary
recovery, 30 percent of all settlements afforded non-pecuniary structural relief
(such as changes in corporate governance arrangements), only 5 percent of
the settlements involved both a monetary recovery and structural relief, and in
the one-third of cases which did not settle, court decisions in favor of the
shareholder-plaintiff were extremely rare. Furthermore, Romano found that in
settlements involving monetary recovery which could be valued, the average
recovery amounted to 1.3 percent of firm assets (or USD 9 million), with
substantial variation in the actual settlement amounts (ranging from USD
226,000 to USD 118 million), and that the per share value of monetär,
recovery in derivative actions was small (USD 0.18 on average, or
approximately 2 percent of the stock market price on the day prior to the
filing of the lawsuit). She concluded that shareholder litigation is an
infrequent occurrence for the publicly held corporation and that with the
majority of shareholder suits settling, settlements provided only minimal
compensation.
Romano [1991, 84] maintains that the data summarized above support the
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conclusion that "shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument
of corporate governance". While not quarreling with the empirical findings,
we are unconvinced that they prove that the shareholders' right to bring a
lawsuit is ineffective in aligning managers' incentives with shareholders'
interests. Even if the number of and the actual relief obtained in shareholder
initiated legal actions may be small, the ng/?/ to bring such an action may in
itself still be important. As Romano [1991, 60] herself has acknowledged, the
fact that the majority of shareholder actions settle does not provide useful
information about the effectiveness of shareholder litigation, since in this
respect they are no different from other civil lawsuits. Little can be drawn
from the reported infrequency of shareholder suits either, since this finding
might also be interpreted to confirm the success of the business judgment rule
in discouraging shareholders from engaging in frivolous, non-meritorious
litigation.
The limited financial recoveries observed might also be attributed to the
operation of the business judgment rule, which mitigates the scope of potential
personal liability and which is, therefore, likely to have a negative impact on
settlement amounts, and furthermore, possibly, to the unknown facts of the
individual cases and wrongdoings concerned. More fundamentally, the
Romano study (and the Fischel and Bradley study as well) assesses the
efficacy of shareholder actions predominantly on the basis of the
compensatory benefits (pecuniary recovery and structural relief) such actions
produced (or could have produced, in the Fischel and Bradley study) for the
corporations included in the study. However, after-the-fact compensation for
injury sustained by the corporation as a result of managerial malfeasance is
not the only goal of, and not the only potential benefit from, shareholders'
right to bring a derivative proceeding.
Shareholders' right to bring a derivative action against managers for
violations of fiduciary duties also serves to cfeter such violations, that means,
to create ex a«te incentives for managers to observe the duties of loyalty and
care. (Remarkably, Fischel and Bradley [1986, 261] have acknowledged
generally that liability rules "create incentives to engage in socially desirable
conduct".) The more effectively violations of managers' fiduciary duties are
deterred, the fewer the actual violations and the lower the demand for
compensation of injuries resulting from such violations will be. The
infrequency of shareholder suits and the minimal compensatory benefits
reported by Romano may be viewed as an indication of a substantial deterrent
effect of shareholders' right to sue corporate managements. The principal
benefit ofthat right would then lie in deterring managerial malfeasance, not in
providing compensation for injury caused by it. In any event, Romano's
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findings summarized above do not provide evidence re/erfing the deterrent
effect of shareholder litigation. Any conclusion concerning the effectiveness of
such litigation as an instrument for reducing agency costs should, in our view,
appraise its deterrence rationale and effect no less than observed
compensatory effects. Romano [1991, 85] recognizes this but refers to the
virtual impossibility of measuring a general deterrent effect of shareholder
suits on managerial behavior. (Measuring a specific deterrent effect of
shareholder litigation on the management of firms that have experienced
shareholder suits, however, might well be possible. Such an examination
would require a comparison of the performance of firms which did experience
such litigation with the performance of firms that did not, during the period
directly after the litigation had ended through a judgment, a settlement, or
otherwise (not after a lawsuit was filed because the suit's filing, the
anticipated outcome of the suit and the underlying facts might already have
been evaluated by investors and reflected in stock prices.) If then the firms
which had undergone litigation were to show abnormal stock price increases
compared with the firms with no previous lawsuits, cetera /W/AMS, a specific
deterrent effect (less agency costs) might be inferred. However, neither the
Romano study nor the Fischel and Bradley study contains such data.)
The deterrent role of potential shareholder suits to redress managerial
violations of fiduciary duties also provides an alternative explanation of the
absence of statistically significant stock price reactions to the termination of a
derivative action which was reported by Fischel and Bradley. The general
deterrent effect of shareholders' right to bring an action on behalf of the
corporation against one or more managers applies to all corporations alike,
and will therefore be reflected in the market's evaluation of any corporation's
stock. If general deterrence (and not compensation) is the principal benefit of
that right, dismissal of a derivative suit (meaning that no compensatory
benefit will be realized) is relatively irrelevant to investors' appraisal of the
shares in the corporation concerned; it does not alter the perceived general
deterrent effect on corporate managements which is capitalized in share
prices. In addition, as the Reporter's Note at the outset of Part VII, Chapter
1, of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance
indicates, even if empirical data were to reveal a significant negative stock
price reaction to the dismissal of a derivative action, such a reaction would
still not reveal, or alter, beneficial deterrent effects of the action on a//
corporate managements; hence, such a finding would not justify the
conclusion that derivative litigation is generally ineffective in deterring
managerial malfeasance.
The deterrence benefit of shareholder derivative litigation has been
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recognized in case law. In this context, the above-mentioned Reporter's Note
refers to the judicial decisions in D/amora/v. Omar/WM/to [24 N.Y.2d 494, 498
(1969)] andM;7/5 v. £7ec/r/c ,4wto-Z./te Co. [396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970)]. In
the first case, the court considered that "the function of such an action (...) is
not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by the defendant
but (...) to prevent them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement
to attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken
for others". In the second case, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that plaintiffs in shareholder litigation may have "rendered a substantial
service to the corporation and its shareholders" even though "it may be
impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit". Deterrence of managerial
self-interest seeking at shareholders' expense may, on its own merits,
constitute the primary social benefit of shareholder litigation, as these court
decisions suggest, regardless of potential compensatory benefits, with the
business judgment rule discouraging non-meritorious actions. From this angle,
empirical studies questioning the efficacy of such litigation on the basis of a
perceived lack of compensatory benefits address, at best, only part of the
issue.
The Internal Costs Problem: Dutch Law
Corporate /ntenssf versus S/jarer<o/der /ntenssrs
Under U.S. corporate law, a business corporation is first and foremost
conceived of as a vehicle for generating shareholder wealth. The court in
Dodge v. Fo/tf Motor Co. [204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919)],
in a seminal formulation, phrased the concept as follows: "A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself (...)".
The same concept is reflected in Section 2.01 (a) of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, stating that "(...) a corporation should have as its objective
the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit
and shareholder gain". True, it is increasingly being recognized in case law,
by commentators and in state corporation statutes, that corporate
managements should have the discretion to utilize corporate resources so as to
benefit widely acknowledged public interests, even at the sacrifice of some
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profit. This view is endorsed by Section 3.02 (13) of the Model Business
Corporation Act, according to which a corporation (meaning its board of
directors) has the power "to make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes", unless its articles of
incorporation provide otherwise. Similarly, Section 2.01 (b) (3) of the
Principles of Corporate Governance provides that the corporation, in the
conduct of its business, may "devote a reasonable amount of resources to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes".
However, the right to devote corporate resources to such public interest
purposes does not fundamentally change the concept of the corporation as an
instrument to earn profit for its shareholders.
First, the aforesaid right pertains to the wse that is made of corporate
earnings, that means, profit spending. It does not alter or prejudice the
generation of profit and shareholder gain as an end in itself and as the guiding
principle for corporate management in running the business. Secondly, the
utilization of corporate resources for public welfare, humanitarian and similar
purposes is subject to a limit of reasonableness as developed in case law.
Important factors in determining what is "reasonable", are: whether the
manner of utilization of corporate resources is somehow related to the
corporation's business, whether the corporation itself derives a direct or
indirect benefit from the resource use concerned, and whether the particular
use (and the amount involved) is customary for a corporation of that kind.
The corporation's financial condition, too, bears upon what is reasonable.
Furthermore, the particular use of corporate resources must not be "(...) so
"remote and fanciful" as to excite the opposition of shareholders whose
property is being used", as Garrett [1967, 297] has stated. The test of
reasonableness illustrates that management's power to favor public and
charitable interests, as opposed to shareholder interests, is «o/ a substitute for,
but is in addition to and independent of management's commission to pursue
corporate profit and shareholder gain.
Consistent with the view of the corporation as a wealth producing vehicle
for the shareholders, directors and officers owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care described above to both the corporation owe/ the shareholders [Block,
Barton and Radin (1987), 1]. As the court in /1//?£T? V. 25 W/7//a/?w 5/. Co/y>.
[63 N.Y.2d 557, 568 (1984)] noted: "[T|hey have an obligation /o a/7
•y/rare/jo/ders to adhere to fiduciary standards of conduct and to exercise their
responsibilities in good faith when undertaking any corporate action"
(emphasis added).
From the perspective of managers' fiduciary duties, there is no difference
between the corporation and the shareholders. As the corporation is to be
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operated for the benefit of the shareholders, the interests of the corporation
are presumed identical to the wealth-maximizing interests of the shareholders.
For the same reason, managers owe identical fiduciary duties to the
corporation and the shareholders.
In Dutch corporate law, by contrast, shareholder interests are
distinguished from the interests of the corporation, and it is the latter which
managers are to serve. Before looking into this a little further, let us briefly
summarize the governance structure of corporations according to Dutch
corporate law that was described in Chapter 2.
Whereas U.S. state corporation statutes provide for the board of directors
to be the corporation's single governance body, under the direction of which
the business and affairs of the corporation are to be managed and which
usually appoints the officers, Dutch corporate law provides for a two-tier
governance structure consisting of a 'management board" and a "supervisory
board". The firm's day-to-day management is conducted by the management
board, whilst the supervisory board monitors (supervises) the performance of
the management board and the firm in general. Both the members of the
management board and the members of the supervisory board are bound to
exercise their respective powers in the interests of the corporation (Sections
2:9 and 2:140 (2) of the Civil Code).
The members of the management board (hereinafter, the managers), to
whom we confine ourselves, are obliged /oveWi f/?e cor/7orflf?e enfrYy to
properly perform the tasks and responsibilities assigned to them (Section 2:9
of the Civil Code). From this obligation it is inferred that in making decisions,
managers must not merely take into account shareholders" wealth-maximizing
interests, but that they must take the interests of the corporation /tae//^ (the
"corporate interest", in Dutch the "ve/7/Jootec//ap/>e///£ 6e/a/7g") as their
directing standard in running the corporate firm. The underlying presumption
is that since the corporation is an entity legally distinct from the shareholders,
it should also have interests of its own, distinct from those of the
shareholders.
What are the distinct interests of the corporation that should guide the
managers? One leading commentator has defined the corporate interest as the
interest of the corporation in its own prosperity, progress and continuity, with
a view to the attainment of the objective for which the corporation has been
organized as stated in the articles of incorporation [Maeijer (1964), 6; (1994),
366]. (Dutch law requires that the articles of incorporation state the purpose
of the corporation (Section 2:66 of the Civil Code). According to the Model
Business Corporation Act (Section 2.02 (b)), by contrast, such a provision is
merely optional: the articles may, but are not obliged to, set forth the specific
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purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized. Pursuant to
Section 3.01 (a), if the articles do not define a narrower purpose every
corporation will have "the purpose of engaging in any lawful business")
Another commentator has construed the notion of corporate interest to
mean the outcome of a balancing process in which the interests of the various
persons involved in or affected by the activities of the corporation are to be
considered [Van der Grinten (1992), 406-407]. Viewed from this angle, the
corporate interest concept is a clear reflection of the nexus-of-contracts theory
of the corporation referred to in Chapter 2, since it recognizes the variety of
private interests inherent in the corporation, ff7jo.se interests should be
balanced in determining the corporate interest depends on the persons
involved in or affected by the corporation in question in each particular case.
In both approaches, shareholders' interests are only one factor which
managers should consider in the making of business decisions. Other factors
include, in particular, the interests of the corporation's employees and
creditors [Sanders and Westbroek (1994), 245].
"Corporate interest" must not be construed to add promotion of public
(charitable, humanitarian) interests to the enhancement of shareholder gain.
Neither does it refer to the sum of shareholders' interests and the interests of
all kinds of outsiders who might potentially be touched, directly or indirectly,
by the corporation's activities. Instead, the notion aims to preclude a single
managerial focus on the shareholders and to compel management to consider
in addition, in relation to the viability and prosperous operation of the firm
itself, the interests of other human agents who enable the operation of the firm
organized in corporate form. The corporate interest way coincide with the
wealth-maximizing interests of the shareholders but depending on the
circumstances it may also have different connotations, given that its scope is
broader. In the latter event, managers must give priority to the interests of the
corporation over those of the shareholders. In Doef/>?c77e/w.se /./zerg/eteny e/
a/, v. t//7gevers Afoatec/ra/YMy C. Msse/ [NJ 1949, 465 (HR 1949)] (a case
involving supervisory directors but the principle also applies to the members
of the management board), the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that if
there is a collision with shareholders' interests, the corporate interest should
always prevail.
In summary, under Dutch corporate law, the notion of corporate interest
has a life and a meaning of its own in the same way and to the same extent
that the corporation itself lives a life of its own, distinct from the
shareholders. The meaning of corporate interest is liable to vary between
different corporations depending on the nature of each corporation's
activities, the persons they affect, the commercial environment in which the
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corporation operates and the objective stated in its articles, and it is not
identical to or a mere derivative of the interests of any particular human
beings, including the shareholders.
Managers are to serve the corporate interest rather than the interests of the
shareholders since according to the Dutch concept of the corporate form,
essentially differently from the U.S. model, they do not stand in a fiduciary-
relation to the shareholders. Their dos and don'ts, therefore, are not defined
by or deduced from a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders. Instead, it
is the managers' _/MMC//OH within the organizational framework of the
corporation that /?er se determines their responsibilities and behavioral
constraints. The managers' function in the legal structure of the corporation is
to run the corporate firm (Section 2:129 of the Civil Code), with the power,
authority and obligation to do so residing in that function. Managers'
obligation to exercise their power and authority in the best interests of the
corporation is based on this conceptual role.
The fact that managers are to serve the corporation rather than the
shareholders does not give them license to sacrifice shareholder wealth in the
pursuit of personal self-interests. Whereas in U.S. corporate law, fiduciary
duties restrain managers' discretion, in Dutch law they are subject to the legal
behavioral constraint compelling them to use their positions to further the
interests of the corporation. From the perspective of discouraging the use of
corporate resources for purposes of managerial self-interest seeking,
managers" obligation to serve the corporate interest performs a similar role to
the behavioral constraints established by managers' fiduciary duties in U.S.
law. Allocations of corporate resources primarily motivated by managers'
personal self-interests, independent of corporate interests, are prone to involve
a departure from both the interest of the corporation and the shareholders'
wealth-maximizing interests. In this respect, managers" obligation to promote
the corporate interest serves to protect the shareholders too.
77?e ftesc/ss/or» Remedy
As we saw earlier, according to U.S. law, shareholders may sue directors and
officers in a derivative action for violation of their fiduciary duties. Dutch law
does wo/ entitle shareholders to commence derivative proceedings on behalf of
the corporation against managers who have acted against the corporate
interest.
However, as we elaborate below, to prevent the corporation or themselves
incurring injury from managerial decisions, shareholders may in their own
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right seek rescission of "unreasonable and unfair" decisions of the
management board, including decisions which are irreconcilable with the
interests of the corporation. In addition, as we will see in the next section,
managers may become subject to personal liability for damage sustained by
the corporation as a result of their improper performance.
Shareholders may institute an action against the corporation to obtain a
court ruling rescinding a particular management decision on the basis of
Sections 2:8 (1), 2:15 (1) (b) and 2:15 (3) (a) of the Dutch Civil Code.
Pursuant to Section 2:8 (1), the corporation and the persons involved in its
constituent bodies (shareholders, managers and supervisory directors) must
act towards one another in conformity with the principles of reasonableness
and fairness. A management decision that sacrifices corporate interests for the
managers' personal benefit is prone to be unreasonable and unfair towards the
corporation and, in so far as shareholder interests are harmed, also towards
the shareholders. Generally, Maeijer [1994, 367J notes that management
decisions solely intended to serve purposes other than the corporation's
interests violate the principles of reasonableness and fairness.
Pursuant to Sections 2:15 (1) (b) and 2:15 (3) (a), a shareholder may
demand that the court rescind an unreasonable and unfair management
decision, provided that the shareholder concerned has a reasonable interest in
management's alleged violation of reasonableness and fairness in the case
concerned. On the basis of the same sections, shareholders may also seek
injunctive relief in order to prevent the implementation of a decision whose
rescission they desire.
Shareholders' right to seek rescission of allegedly unreasonable managerial
decisions is limited in several ways. The right solely applies to decisions of
the management Aoa/Y/, not to decisions by individual managers (Section 15
(1)). The right must be exercised within one year of the decision being made
public or becoming known to the shareholder-plaintiff (Section 15 (5)). The
right itself does not serve to restrain managerial actions that are «of based on
decisions of the management board. Finally, as indicated above, shareholders
that do not have a reasonable interest in the violation complained of may not
demand rescission (Section 15 (3) (a)). For instance, a shareholder who voted
in favor of a particular policy in the shareholders' meeting may not
subsequently demand rescission of a management decision intended to
implement, and complying with, that policy.
Shareholders' right to demand rescission of a management decision is not
confined to decisions violating corporate interest but extends to any
unreasonable and unfair decisions. At least in theory, shareholders may also
attack decisions that in themselves serve the corporate interest but which are
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unreasonable and unfair from the point of view of a particular shareholder's
GW« interests. However, such attacks will only rarely be successful, given that
managers owg/tf to be guided by the interests of the corporation and ought to
give priority to the latter in the event of a conflict with shareholders' interests.
If a management decision is tenable in view of the corporation's best interests,
a cause for rescission may exist only if nonetheless under the circumstances
the decision was so manifestly unfair to the shareholder-plaintiff that the
management board could not in all reasonableness have decided as it did it,
that is. onlv in the most unusual cases.
Tfte L/afr///fy Remedy ;
In addition to the rescission remedy available to shareholders, managers may
become subject to personal liability /o Jfte co/y?orate en//(y, on the basis of
Section 2:9 of the Civil Code, if they fail to properly perform their job. For a
successful liability action, it is a prerequisite that the corporation has suffered
damage as a result of management's allegedly inadequate performance. This
damage requirement does not apply to a rescission action, although a
management decision is more likely to be deemed unreasonable and unfair
and, hence, liable to rescission, if its implementation would (or already did)
result in injury to the corporation.
In Sto/ema« a«J Ä/c/?e//e v. Fa« Je Fe« /lM/0wo&/e/6eJn// e/ a/. [NJ
1997. 360 (HR 1997)], the Supreme Court decided that the standard of
culpability for the imposition of liability on a manager is gross negligence.
Thus, managers do not have to fear personal liability for pure mistakes
committed in the course of running the firm, even if such mistakes are due to
ordinary negligence. The risk of liability is limited to instances in which they
grossly neglect their functions and responsibilities towards the corporation,
that is, cases of clear mismanagement. Mistakes in business judgment falling
below the gross negligence standard are for the account and risk of the
corporation and the joint shareholders. In practice, the gross negligence
standard provides managers with similar protection from personal liability as
the business judgment rule does under U.S. law.
Whether or not there has been gross negligence on the part of a manager
depends on the facts of the individual case concerned. In SWe/wa« a/?J
Ä/c/?e//e v. Fa« Je Few /lwro/Mo6/e/AeJr///e/ o/., the Supreme Court noted
that in determining whether there has been gross negligence, a court should
consider, mter a/;a, the nature of the corporation's activities, the business risk
generally involved in such activities, the allocation of tasks within the
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management board, the existence of intra-corporate guidelines for the
management, the information which the defending manager possessed or
should have possessed at the time he made the decision or performed the
action in question, and the discernment and prudence which should be
expected of a competent manager diligently performing his job.
The gross negligence requirement may be satisfied by individual managers
or by the management board collectively. If only an individual manager (/.e.,
one particular board member) acted in gross negligence, liability may be
imposed upon him but not on the other board members [Van der Grinten
(1992), 457-458], By contrast, if the corporation is found to have been
improperly managed by the management 6oani in a grossly negligent manner,
the board members will be jointly and severally liable for the injury sustained
by the corporation. However, an individual board member may then relieve
himself of liability by demonstrating that not only was fte not to blame for the
board's improper performance but that he also had endeavored to /vevewf
injury to the corporation.
Although the wording is different, the behavioral standards reviewed in the
context of the gross negligence test in Dutch law resemble those comprised by
the duty of care regarding managers set out in U.S. corporate law. Section
4.01 (a) of the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, defining the duty of care, provides that directors and
officers are to perform their functions "in good faith, in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances". A manager who
acts accordingly will also satisfy performance requirements under Dutch law,
and will therefore not become subject to personal liability pursuant to Section
2:9 of the Civil Code.
Manifest departures from corporate interests may well qualify as gross
negligence towards the corporation and therefore subject management to
personal liability. Thus, the allocation of corporate resources to uses solely
motivated by managers' personal self-interests at the sacrifice of corporate
income, may lead to imposition of personal liability. For instance, liability
may be imposed for embezzlement of corporate funds or self-dealing to the
detriment of the corporation, or if managers choose leisure instead of properly
preparing investment decisions or exploiting the corporation's commercial
opportunities. In any event, however, the gross negligence culpability test
must be satisfied, meaning that relatively insignificant departures from
corporate interests are unlikely to result in personal liability.
As in a derivative suit under U.S. law, if liability is imposed, managers
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must pay damages to the corporation; they must then repair the damage that
the corporation has sustained as a consequence of their grossly negligent
improper decisions or actions. However, no liability for damages will exist if
the relevant manager was previously discharged from liability, for example,
upon his leaving office or upon the adoption or approval of the corporation's
annual financial report by the shareholders, provided the facts on which
liability could be based were made available prior to discharge; facts not
disclosed are deemed to have been excluded from the discharge granted.
A liability suit based on a manager's allegedly improper performance must
be brought by the corporation since it concerns the manager's obligations
towards the corporation [Van der Grinten (1992), 458; Maeijer (1994), 416].
It is then for the corporation-plaintiff to demonstrate gross negligence and to
establish the damage the corporation has suffered due to management's
improper performance. (In the event of the corporation's bankruptcy, the
trustee appointed by the court may also commence a liability action against
managers. An action brought by the trustee will, in our view, ordinarily be
intended for the benefit of the creditors rather than that of the corporation or
the shareholders; therefore, we will not discuss this possibility further.)
Unlike the situation under U.S. law, as stated at the outset of the preceding
section, shareholders are m>/ entitled to bring a derivative action against a
manager in the name of the corporation to redress an injury allegedly inflicted
on the latter. However, the shareholders may adopt a resolution by which it is
decided that the corporation itself should bring an action for damages against
one or more managers. Such a decision, which is binding on the corporation,
may also be made by the supervisory board, or by the management board
itself.
If the action is directed against a former manager, the aforesaid decision is
to be implemented by the present management board, which will represent the
corporation in the action as usual (Section 2:130 of the Civil Code). However,
if the target is an incumbent manager, the corporation will be represented by
the supervisory board which will bring the action on the corporation's behalf,
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise and unless the
shareholders designate another person (for example, a shareholder) to
represent the corporation (Section 2:146 of the Civil Code). Also if the
corporation does not have a supervisory board, the shareholders may
designate a person to bring the action on behalf of the corporation [Maeijer
(1994), 375]. Like the derivative suit in U.S. law, the right of the supervisory
board to bring an action against an incumbent manager and the right of the
shareholders to designate another person to bring such an action, are intended
to remedy the conflict of interests which would arise if incumbent managers
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were to bring an action against themselves on behalf of the corporation, and
to avoid frustration of such an action by the incumbent managers. (In
practice, however, if grounds exist for bringing an action for damages against
an incumbent manager, such a manager is usually dismissed, with a potential
subsequent liability suit being brought by the remaining or the succeeding
managers, or by the trustee in the event of bankruptcy.)
/V//wa_/&c/e incumbent managers can avoid personal liability towards the
corporation if the latter does not have a supervisory board capable of bringing
an action (or if the supervisory board refuses to bring the action) and at the
same time, only a minority of the shareholders is of the opinion that one or
more managers have acted in gross negligence towards the corporation and
should be held liable for the injury the corporation has sustained. For
instance, if the management controls the majority of the shares in a
corporation which does not have a supervisory board, the minority
shareholders will be unable to oblige the joint shareholders to designate a
representative to bring an action for damages against incumbent managers on
behalf of the corporation. As a consequence, on the face of it, management
may therefore neglect the interests of the corporation without having to fear
personal liability.
However, in such an event the minority shareholders may, in our view, sue
the corporation, and the members of the management board personally, to
obtain a court order compelling the corporation to bring an action for
damages against one or more incumbent managers. Maeijer [1995, 1346 (1)]
apparently holds the same opinion. Such a shareholder action should be based
on the reasonableness and fairness principles which the corporate entity, as
well as the managers, are to observe vis-ä-vis the shareholders pursuant to
Section 2:8 (1) of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the shareholder-plaintiffs in
the action should demonstrate to the court that they would be treated
unreasonably and unfairly if no liability action were brought against a
particular manager on behalf of the corporation. To this end, they must
submit facts to the court indicative of grossly negligent improper performance
on the part of the manager(s) against whom they desire the liability action to
be brought.
In addition, based on Section 2:345 (1) of the Civil Code, shareholders
satisfying certain quantitative criteria (set forth in Section 2:346 (b)) may
request the appellate court in Amsterdam, which is statutorily designated for
this purpose, to order an official inquiry into the management and affairs of
the corporation. If such an inquiry reveals facts indicating mismanagement,
the shareholders may subsequently take the action described above. The
appellate court may not itself impose liability upon a manager in the course of
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the inquiry proceedings but, at the shareholder-plaintiffs request, it may
order other corrective measures including, /«ter o//o, the dismissal or
suspension of one or more managers and the rescission of management
decisions (Sections 2:349 (a) and 2:356 Civil Code).
for Damages by Sr)are/?o/ders
Are shareholders also entitled to bring personal actions against managers to
seek damages payable not to the corporation, but to the shareholder-plaintiff
personally?
In Poo/ v. ,4ß/> [NJ 1995, 288 (HR 1994)], the Supreme Court ruled that
a shareholder is not entitled to damages from a third party wrongdoer if the
injury in respect of which the redress is sought has been sustained by the
corporation, affecting the shareholder only indirectly via (a decrease in) the
value of his shares. In that event, the Court held, it is solely for the
corporation to seek redress, since the wrong complained of was committed
against the co/ywraf/o«; damages paid to the corporation will make good the
decrease in the value of the shares so that in addition to the corporation itself,
the shareholders will also be compensated.
Gross negligence by a manager in the performance of his managerial
functions, /'.e. in his professional capacity, may constitute an injury to the
corporation and ordinarily affects the shareholders only indirectly; consequent
wealth losses by the shareholders are derivatives from the damage sustained
by the corporation. Therefore, based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
/"oof v. J4JBP, only the corporation will be entitled to claim damages from the
relevant manager.
A shareholder may bring a personal action against a manager only to
redress an injury affecting him in his individual capacity [Van der Grinten
(1992), 459], that is, other than through a decrease in the value of his shares
resulting from an injury to the corporation. If the injury is sustained primarily
by the latter, the manager owes damages to the corporation and not to the
individual shareholders [Maeijer (1994), 416], and liability to pay such
damages may be enforced by the corporation only (as described in the
preceding section). The distinction between actions to redress corporate injury
and actions to redress individual injury is similar to the distinction between
derivative actions and direct actions in U.S. law: a derivative action is
brought in the right of the corporation for an injury to the corporation, with
damages payable to the latter, whereas a direct action is brought by a
shareholder in his own right (or in the right of the class to which he belongs)
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for an injury to the shareholder in his individual capacity, with damages
payable to the shareholder(s). (This distinction is expressly acknowledged in
Sections 7.01 (a) and 7.01 (b), respectively, of the Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations.)
In AT/p W 5/oe/y« v. /?a6o£a™t [NJ 1997, 662 (HR 1997)], a case
involving a claim for damages by shareholders against a third party on the
basis of an alleged wrong to the shareholders in their own right which had
allegedly forced them to sell their shares at a very disadvantageous price, the
Supreme Court affirmed shareholders' right in principle to claim damages for
an individual injury. The Court considered, /»fer a//a, that in the case
concerned, payment of damages to the corporation would «o/ repair the
shareholders' alleged injury (viz. the loss resulting from the sale of their
shares).
Cases not consisting of a wrong primarily affecting the corporation in
which individual shareholders may successfully bring an action for damages
against a manager, on the basis of an alleged wrong directly affecting them,
are extremely rare. They are limited to instances in which the shareholder's
damage is not a mere derivative of an injury sustained by the corporation, and
such cases therefore require a wrong to the individual shareholder independent
of any wrongdoing towards the corporation [Maeijer (1995), 1346 (2)].
Whereas an action for damages brought by the corporation will be based on a
manager's allegedly grossly negligent performance of his managerial
functions, as discussed above, an action for damages brought by an individual
shareholder will ordinarily be based on an alleged tort committed towards the
shareholder-plaintiff.
A manager may become subject to tortious liability, for instance, if he has
violated his obligation pursuant to Section 2:8 of the Civil Code to observe
the principles of reasonableness and fairness towards the shareholder-plaintiff
[Van der Grinten (1992), 407J, for example, by taking a decision or
performing an action solely or predominantly intended to injure the
shareholder-plaintiff. However, as we discussed in relation to the potential
rescission of management decisions, a departure from shareholders' wealth-
maximizing interests will not in itself be deemed unreasonable and unfair.
Accordingly, the mere fact that managers may have given priority to
corporate interests at the sacrifice of shareholder interests, will not //«o /octo
render them susceptible to tortious liability.
If individual shareholders were entitled to claim damages for managerial
actions causing injury to the corporation and affecting shareholders only
indirectly, through decreases in the value of their shares or through dividend
cuts (or both), a far greater number of suits would be necessary to redress the
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same damage than if the right to claim damages were concentrated in and
reserved for the corporation. Both the Dutch rule that only the corporation
may demand compensation for an injury sustained by it and the U.S. rule that
shareholder actions against managers seeking relief for such an injury be
brought in the right of the corporation, serve to avoid numerous suits for
damages by individual shareholders and, thus, economize on the costs of
enforcing managerial liability. In essence, these rules serve to exploit the
transaction cost advantages associated with having the corporation operate as
an entity distinct from the shareholders: as it is the tfrtf/fy which has
encountered the basic injury complained of, minimum transaction costs
requires that also the redress action is brought by or on behalf of that entity.
The right for shareholders to bring a derivative action in the name of the
corporation in order to redress an injury to the latter, will enter into Dutch law
if the proposal for a fifth European directive on company law, dated August
19, 1983, be adopted by the Council of the European Union. According to
Section 16 of this proposal, the member states of the European Union will
have to enact implementing legislation providing that proceedings to enforce
liability of members of the management board (and the supervisory board) for
damage sustained by the corporation may be commenced "on behalf of and
also in the name of the company by one or more shareholders: (a) who hold
shares of a certain nominal value or accounting par value which the Member
States shall not require to be greater than 5 percent of the subscribed capital;
or (b) who hold shares of a certain nominal or accounting par value which the
Member States shall not require to be greater than 100,000 ECU. This figure
may vary up to not more than 10 percent for purposes of conversion into
national currency". The proposal for a fifth directive on company law,
including the proposed right for shareholders to bring derivative proceedings,
applies to publicly held corporations only.
The introduction of a derivative action for shareholders in Dutch corporate
law will make it simpler for shareholders to enforce liability on managers for
an injury to the corporation. They will no longer depend on supervisory
directors to bring an action for damages or on a majority of the shareholders
deciding that such an action be brought, or on a court order compelling the
corporation to bring the action if fellow shareholders and the supervisory
board refuse to cooperate for that purpose. In effect, managers' incentives to
perform managerial functions properly may well be strengthened, whilst the
quantitative hurdle a shareholder desirous to commence a derivative action
must surmount will discourage both frivolous and vexatious suits compelling
managers to incur litigation expenses without cause. In addition, the proposal
for the fifth directive does not, in our view, provide for a relaxation of the
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gross negligence standard for liability of managers. Thus, the adverse effects
of excessive personal liability discussed earlier would probably be avoided.
The only substantive change from current Dutch law contained in the
proposal (in Sections 14 (5) and 18 (1)) which might affect the imposition of
managerial liability, is that the legal effect of a discharge from liability
accorded to a corporate manager by the shareholders would be restricted and
thus be less likely to exempt managers from potential personal liability.
However, a corresponding change in Dutch legislation is unlikely in practice
to have a significant effect on the incidence of managerial liability in view of
the fact that acts which at present may give rise to personal liability of
managers are frequently not disclosed when discharge is given. Such acts are
therefore ordinarily deemed to be excluded from the scope of the discharge
(based on the Supreme Court's ancient decision in Z)ee« v. Per/aÄ:, NJ 1921,
737 (HR 1921)), and may still lead to imposition of managerial liability.
Having arrived at the end of our survey of the behavior constraints and
liability rules operating to align managers' incentives with shareholders'
wealth-maximizing interests under U.S. law and Dutch law, let us briefly
recapitulate. Under U.S. corporate law, managers' discretion to use corporate
resources in the pursuit of personal utility is restrained by the duties of loyalty
and care owed to both the corporation and the shareholders. Under Dutch law,
a similar role is played by the principle of managers' obligation to serve the
corporate interest, a legal notion establishing that managers should direct the
corporate firm so as to further the distinct interests of the corporation.
According to both U.S. law and Dutch law, managers are not liable for
injury to the corporation resulting from honest mistakes in their business
judgment. Under U.S. law, managers are protected from rigorous liability by
the business judgment rule, a judicial presumption that their judgment in a
particular matter had a rational business purpose and was made on an
informed basis, in the honest belief that it was in the best interests of the
corporation. Under Dutch law, managers obtain similar protection from the
gross negligence standard of culpability for the imposition of liability, as a
result of which they face liability in cases of clear mismanagement only.
In summary, the legal concepts applied are different but the results are
similar. The legal restrictions against imposing personal liability as a means
to discipline corporate managers in both U.S. and Dutch law are consistent
with our observation in Chapter 5. that the liability remedy is accompanied by
costly side-effects and that, therefore, the social costs of extensive managerial
liability may well outweigh the benefits.
PART
LIMITED LIABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR

7. The Problem of External Costs
IN PART n OF this book, we addressed the problem of managerial self-interest
seeking at shareholders' expense. However, the divergence of interests
between utility maximizing managers and shareholders interested in value
maximization is not the only conflict of interests bearing on the corporate
firm. As Knight [1921, 254] noticed, apart from the corporation's "internal
problems", viz. "the protection of its various types of members and adherents
against each other's predatory propensities", there is also "the external
problem of safeguarding the public interests against exploitation by the
corporation as a unit".
In Chapter 4 we noted that when self-interested managers use corporate
assets to maximize private utility instead of shareholder wealth, they act
detrimentally to both shareholders' and society's interests. We described
several market mechanisms that operate to discourage managerial departures
from shareholder interests. Although, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 4,
such mechanisms are unlikely to ensure complete coherence of managerial
actions and shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests, they do provide
certain incentives to management to operate the corporate firm in the interest
of the shareholders. However, also when management runs the corporation
entirely in the interest of the shareholders, society will be harmed if managers
maximize shareholders' earnings from the residual claim at the expense of
other members of society. The possibility that shareholders, or managers
acting to maximize shareholder wealth, may pursue wealth gains at the
expense of society at large is what Knight meant by the problem of exploita-
tion of the public interest by the corporate entity.
In Chapter 3 we saw that the statutory principle of limited liability places
a limit on shareholders' potential losses from corporate activities. As the
losses shareholders may suffer from the operations of the corporate firm are
limited to the amount of their investment, they will desire that management
undertake projects with positive net present values to shareholders, even
though the total social costs of the relevant project in the event of failure may
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be well in excess of the amount shareholders have invested. If in the end the
corporation's liabilities to third parties outside the firm were to exceed the
amount shareholders have invested in corporate assets, costs are shifted to
such third parties. Recall from our discussion at the outset of Chapter 3 that
social efficiency in corporate decision-making requires that the marginal
benefits which a contemplated activity is expected to produce for the
shareholders are equated with the activity's marginal anticipated costs to
society as a whole. Limited liability interferes with this principle where it
allows shareholders and managers acting in their interest to ignore a part of
the activity's expected social costs, namely that part which exceeds the
amount of shareholders' investment.
Where a corporation engages in activities that might cause losses which
cannot be satisfied from its assets, limited liability imposes the risk that the
assets will prove insufficient to cover the corporation's losses and thus the
risk of corporate insolvency, on other members of society, viz. the
corporation's creditors. Their risk equals the probability that the corporation
will become unable to meet its liabilities times the amount they could lose in
that event. More precisely, creditors' risk is calculated by adding up the
products of each possible loss they might suffer multiplied by its probability.
For instance, if the corporation's total assets at any time amount to USD
10,000 and if there is a 2 percent chance that its activities will generate total
liabilities of USD 15,000 and a 3 percent probability of liabilities amounting
to USD 18,000, creditors' risk is 0.02 x (USD 15,000 - USD 10,000 =) USD
5,000 + 0.03 x (USD 18,000 - USD 10,000 =) USD 8,000 = USD 100 +
USD 240 = USD 340. On the assumption that under a rule of unlimited
shareholder liability, they could have recovered the corporation's liabilities
entirely from its shareholders, this amount reflects the risk which limited
liability shifts to the creditors.
As our example illustrates, the losses that creditors would suffer should
the corporation become insolvent are reflected in the risk they bear prior to
insolvency. Creditors' risk at a particular point in time indicates their
expected losses (in the example, USD 340) at that point (as opposed to ac/«o/
losses, which they would only suffer should the corporation become insolvent
and which will be zero if the corporation properly pays its debts). Greater
losses ex/ww/, in the event of a shortfall of the corporation's assets over its
liabilities, are reflected in greater risk ex aw/e. Actual losses and risk, then,
are two sides of the same coin.
In the present chapter we examine whether the corporate feature of limited
liability for shareholders permits the more or less systematic shifting of
business risk and, in the event of the corporation's insolvency, a part of the
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actual costs of corporate activities to third parties. In other words, does
limited liability subsidize in either way corporate shareholders at the expense
of other members of society?
The Case for External Costs
Externa/ Coste
Corporations may impose costs on third parties (denoting any parties other
than shareholders and managers) in various ways. Evidently, the corporation
may fail to meet its contractual obligations, thus causing financial harm to the
party or parties with which the contract was concluded. For example, it may
fail to repay a bank loan or to pay the agreed interest, thus injuring the lender.
Moreover, the corporation may cause personal injury or property damage to
third parties through torts generated by its operations. Labor accidents
causing injury to workers in the corporate firm may also be regarded as a cost
of corporate activity. Furthermore, third parties may suffer harm from
corporate activity which does not classify as a tort or a breach of contract but
which does adversely affect them. For instance, environmental pollution from
industrial activities will not frequently establish a tort or a breach of contract,
although it may well reduce other people's welfare (utility).
When victims of corporate actions are not adequately compensated, in
effect they bear a part of the costs of the activity concerned. In fact,
uncompensated victims of corporate activities contribute inputs, at no charge,
to the activity concerned. Where the corporation fails to repay a bank loan or
to pay the agreed interest rate on the loan, the bank is effectively forced to
donate money to the firm. Similarly, a trade creditor supplying raw materials
for which the firm eventually fails to pay effectively contributes inputs free of
charge. And somebody sustaining property damage or bodily harm as a result
of a tort generated by the business who is not properly compensated, is
effectively forced to donate property or welfare to the corporate firm. As a
result, the production function of the corporate firm will include some inputs
for which it has not paid, ;.e. inputs which have been appropriated from other
members of society.
In consequence, the firm's level of output is prone to be inconsistent with
the social costs associated with the production of the output concerned,
especially (but not necessarily) if the firm operates at the point on its
production function which maximizes returns to shareholders: the firm will
simply produce too much output relative to the social costs of the inputs used.
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In standard economic terminology, to the extent that third parties bear a
significant portion of the costs of the firm's operations and, therefore, such
costs are ignored in corporate decision-making, the firm will pursue a pattern
of activity at which marginal social costs exceed marginal social benefits,
meaning that society as a whole would be better off if the firm adjusted its
operations to the point where marginal social costs equal marginal social
benefits (provided that the social cost of making the adjustment is less than
the added benefit obtained).
There are various legal methods for effecting that corporate production
functions will include only those inputs the corporation has properly paid for,
so that no costs are shifted to third parties and management is induced to
equate marginal anticipated social costs with marginal anticipated benefits to
the shareholders when making decisions in respect of the firm's productive
activity. Z)/r«tf regn/öfto« of productive activity and business conduct, for
instance, the prohibition of certain hazardous production processes
susceptible of generating great harm to other members of society, may be
enacted in order to altogether avoid the appropriation of free inputs from third
parties by the firm, thus aiming to reduce to zero, the amount of costs borne
by third parties in respect of the regulated activity.
Establishment of /vo/?eriy r/g/7/5 to scarce resources specifying who is
entitled to determine the use of a productive resource will ordinarily enable
the "owner" of the property right to obtain an injunction from a court
enjoining the appropriation of the resource concerned so that it will not be
included in the firm's production function. Moreover, property rights serve to
foster negotiated voluntary arrangements guided by the market mechanism by
which the firm agrees to remunerate the property right's owner in exchange
for the right to utilize the resource to which the property right is attached;
accordingly, given the agreed remuneration, no cost is shifted.
Imposition of correctve tate? or levies on firms that engage in activities
which may impose costs on parties outside the firm is another means to
oppose such cost-shifting. By appropriately taxing firms engaging in such
activities, management is induced to include costs imposed on others in
corporate cost-benefit calculations and accordingly, to adjust the firm's level
of activity (output) to the point where marginal social costs and marginal
social benefits are equal.
Finally, //'a6i///y rw/es may be established which entitle third parties to
compensation from the corporation for losses imposed upon them as a result
of corporate activity. Liability rules serve both to prevent (/.e. to deter)
actions that would inflict personal injury or property damage upon others and
to allocate the risk of unprevented actions that do injure others. The effective
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operation of such rules forces the corporation to face the full social costs of
its activities, at least to the extent that third parties will in fact be able to
recover any losses they sustained by enforcing the liability rule against the
corporation.
All of the aforementioned techniques have found their place in the law and
regulation of productive activity and each of them has its limitations,
depending on the particularities of the activity and the situation in question.
Which one, or which combination, is preferable, therefore, will always depend
on an evaluation of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the cited
methods in the situation under review.
The costs of corporate activity that are borne by other members of society
and not by the corporation itself (meaning its shareholders, through their
residual claim), are defined as externa/ coste. External costs exist whenever
third parties are not, or are not entirely, compensated for the costs imposed on
them as a result of corporate activity. External costs may include, /«ter 0//0,
the cost to trade creditors of resources they have supplied for which the firm
fails to pay, the cost to lenders of loans not repaid and unpaid interest, and the
cost to tort victims of property damage or personal injury in respect of which
they are not compensated through damages. As indicated above, when
corporate management disregards, in whole or in part, the external costs of an
activity, too much of the activity will be undertaken relative to its total cost to
society. Thus, society will be harmed to the extent that valuable resources are
allocated to uses that do not reflect their full social costs.
Similarly, when in its decision-making, management ignores the
eventuality that the firm's activities may cause losses to others which it might
be unable to repair, and the magnitude of such losses, management will be
inclined to engage the firm to a socially excessive extent in activities that at
the end of the day, may result in the extemalization of costs, that means,
activities which expose third parties to the m £ of suffering uncompensated
losses. Moreover, if such risk is ignored in corporate decision-making, once
the firm has engaged in some risky activity, it may fail to prevent losses that it
could have prevented efficiently, in other words, at a cost less than the
reduction in expected losses that could have been accomplished. In either way,
the firm's level of risk-taking would be socially inadequate.
Friedman [1970, 32] has advocated the proposition that "[t]he social
responsibility of business is to increase its profits". Indeed, corporate
managers seeking to raise profits (or, more generally, to maximize
stockholder wealth) will allocate scarce resources to those uses for which
consumer demand, measured by consumers' willingness to pay, is highest. In
this regard, profit (or value) maximization is consistent with the interests of
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consumers. But the interests of society also require that corporate managers
incorporate in their decision-making the anticipated external costs of
corporate activities: only when the costs of its activities to third parties are
reflected in corporate decision-making will the corporation's allocation of
resources correspond to its full costs to society and, thus, be socially efficient.
The external costs issue is ignored in Friedman's statement quoted above,
which will only be accurate if amended to read: "(...) provided that no
uncompensated costs are imposed on third parties".
In the absence of negotiated voluntary agreements devised to cope with
external cost problems, whether or not third parties will be compensated for
costs imposed upon them by actions of the corporation (for example, losses
resulting from the latter's failure to meet contractual obligations, property
damage, or bodily harm), depends first on the formulation of legal rights, in
particular, the formulation of liability rules: do victims of corporate activity
have a legal right to compensation? In a world without transaction costs, the
initial definition of rights would be irrelevant to the payment of compensation,
as parties would negotiate the utility-maximizing solution irrespective of the
choice of legal rule [Coase (I960)]. However, as we discussed at the outset of
Chapter 2, transaction costs do exist and they may prevent the utility-
maximizing outcome from being reached. Whether existing legal rules are
appropriate for holding the corporation liable for costs imposed on third
parties, is a question beyond the scope of this book. In the discussion to
follow we assume that victims of injury resulting from corporate actions are
protected by legal rights (liability rules) entitling them to compensation from
the corporation for costs imposed on them by corporate activity (including
breaches of contract, torts, and other injury in respect of which a right to
receive compensation exists).
However, whether they will /« raj/zYy receive such compensation depends
on the corporation's capacity to pay, in other words, it depends ultimately on
the value of the assets of the business. If the corporation has insufficient
assets to cover the liabilities in tort generated by its activities, the
effectiveness of the rule imposing tortious liability is threatened, both as a
compensatory mechanism and as a means for inducing management to
incorporate in its decision-making the losses that corporate tortious behavior
may cause to other members of society. Given that it cannot forfeit more than
the money value of its assets if ordered to pay damages, any liability
exceeding the corporation's assets makes sense only eg««/ /o the value of
these assets, both as a deterrent and with a view to repairing tort victims'
losses. Thus, in either respect, the effectiveness of the liability rule is
positively correlated with the magnitude of the assets available for the
T/7e Corporate Paradox 253
payment of damages. The same observations apply, of course, with respect to
corporate liability to pay damages for breach of contractual obligations.
Generally, an injurer who is unable to fully meet his liability to pay
damages is "judgment proof as he is effectively secured from enforcement of
court judgments imposing such liability, to the extent that his assets fall short
of his liability. Accordingly, the frustration, wholly or partially, of legal
liability rules as a means for the remedy of external costs by the injurer's
inability to pay, is known as the "judgment proof problem", a term
popularized by Shavell [1986]. In the context of corporations, this means that
liability rules establish an effective penalty only up to the value of the
corporation's assets, as losses sustained by third parties for which they are
entitled to damages exceeding corporate assets will affect the corporation (/.e.
its residual claimants) only equal to these assets.
One response to the judgment proof problem is the enactment of
administrative regulation immediately opposing the devolution of costs on
third parties (a possibility already mentioned above as a means for preventing
externalization of costs), for example, the enactment of compulsory safety
standards for production processes intended to preclude excessive tortious
liability from arising [Shavell (1984)]. Indeed, where firms have limited assets
relative to the liabilities their activities might entail, such direct regulation of
productive activity may serve as an alternative to, or as a complement of, a
liability rule. However, the introduction of direct regulation such as safety
regulation always requires that the regulatory authority either has adequate
information about the externality-generating activity it addresses or that it is
prepared to spend more or less substantial resources for the purpose of
obtaining such information. Moreover, the enactment and enforcement of
appropriate regulation is itself socially costly, not merely because of
development and enforcement costs and the costs of public decision-making it
entails but also because of the opportunity costs associated with forgone
benefits from productive activity that is not undertaken due to the regulation
which, if it had been undertaken, would in practice not have resulted in
liability exceeding corporate assets. Finally, administrative regulation of
productive activity (safety) would not solve the problem of external losses
arising from corporate activities that would be undertaken notwithstanding the
regulation given that the expected returns from the activity outweighed its
expected private costs to the firm and its shareholders. If the regulation were a
sMÄsf/fHte for liability to pay damages, corporate decision-makers would have
socially excessive incentives to engage the firm in activities that might injure
others as the corporation would not pay at all for losses caused to other
members of society [Shavell (1986), 55]; and if it were co/wp/e/wertta/y to a
254 The Prob/em of Extema/ Cosfs
liability rule, they would have similar incentives to the extent that the
anticipated damages to be paid would exceed the value of the corporation's
assets.
Another response to corporate inability to pay could be the appropriate
definition of liability rules so as to optimize potential injurers' incentives to
exercise care (/.e. to take preventive measures such as the use of safety
devices in order to avoid external losses). In relation to catastrophic accidents
causing many victims and aggregate losses greatly exceeding the injurer's
wealth, Landes and Posner [1987, 256-272] have suggested that a negligence
rule would be preferable to strict liability to oppose such accidents as the
negligence standard would directly connect the liability risk to the potential
injurer's cost of preventing the accident, by relieving him of any liability if he
exercised due care to avert it. If the cost of prevention is less than the
potential injurer's wealth, therefore, he will be induced to invest a part of his
wealth in order to prevent the accident from occurring rather than face
liability to the full extent of his wealth [1987, 257]. With strict liability, in
contrast, he would not have similar incentives to take care as he would still
risk the full extent of his wealth no matter how much care he exercised. In
other words, under a negligence rule, the potential injurer could escape
liability for damages altogether by increasing his level of care beyond the
negligence standard; with strict liability, however, increasing the level of care
would merely reduce the probability of losing his entire wealth and, thus,
reduce expected damages payable but he would still forfeit his entire wealth if
a catastrophic accident occurred. Therefore, the returns to the potential injurer
from investing additionally in care, will tend to be less under strict liability
than under a negligence rule [1987, 259].
However, like safety regulation, the establishment of appropriate
incentives to take care would in itself not solve the problem that given the
corporation's limited ability to pay damages, corporate decision-makers may
engage it to too great an extent in activities that could cause injury to others,
that is, to a point at which the activity's marginal anticipated social costs
exceed marginal social benefits. As a rule, the magnitude of third party losses
that an activity may occasion does not merely depend on the level of care
potential injurers exercise in order to prevent such losses but also on the
extent to which the activity is undertaken. Potential injurers' incentives to take
care at a given level of activity are different from the incentives that determine
their choice of the activity level per se. Generally, strict liability will induce
potential injurers' to pursue a lower level of activity than a negligence rule
would, given that under a negligence rule, they do not have to bear the losses
their activity imposes on others if they act with due care, meaning that the
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activity level will be irrelevant to their expected costs of having to pay
damages as long as due care is exercised; under strict liability, in contrast,
they would have to pay for any loss inflicted on third parties, regardless of
their level of care [Shavell (1987), 23-25]. With strict liability, therefore,
potential injurers' expected damages are normally higher than under a
negligence rule and their incentives to engage in the activity concerned will be
correspondingly lower. Which rule is preferable, strict liability because of its
greater impact on activity levels or negligence because of its presumed greater
effect on incentives to exercise care to prevent losses exhausting the injurer's
assets, will depend on the relative importance of each factor to the incidence
and magnitude of external loss.
Tfte fto/e of L/m/ted Z./ab/7/fy
Limited liability renders the corporation's residual claimants judgment proof
in respect of the tortious and contractual liabilities incurred by the corporation
as it releases them from the operation of the legal liability rules to which the
former is subject. Thus it limits the effectiveness of such rules, both to
provide compensation for injury resulting from corporate activity and as a
means to prevent such injury by establishing appropriate loss-preventing
incentives, to the value of the residual claimants' investment in the
corporation's assets, since any judgment imposing corporate liability may
only be enforced against these assets. How then does limited liability for
shareholders relate to the externalization of costs by the corporation?
It does so in two ways.
First, limited liability «//ratf/y shifts costs to third parties in the event of
corporate insolvency. Under a rule of »«limited liability, the shareholders
would have to make up for the unpaid debts of the corporation. As we saw in
Chapter 3, limited liability, on the other hand, imposes on the corporation's
creditors the costs of corporate insolvency: should the corporation fail to pay
its debts, the unpaid amounts are borne by the creditors. Limited liability
shifts costs to creditors where it keeps them from collecting their unpaid
claims on the corporation from shareholders' non-invested assets. Said
differently, it allocates to creditors the risk of the corporation's inability to
pay and relieves shareholders of any such risk once they have fully paid up
the subscription price of their shares, shareholders' risk thus being confined to
the risk of losing the value of their investment. This is the essence of limited
liability as a risk-sharing arrangement between shareholders and creditors.
The relative size of each party's risk pursuant to this arrangement, /.e. each
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party's portion of total losses should the corporation fail, is determined by the
amount that shareholders have committed to the assets of the business in
relation to the corporation's total debt. The lesser the value of the
corporation's assets relative to its obligations to creditors, that means, the less
its ability to pay, the more the risk that is shifted to the creditors and the
greater will be their losses if the corporation fails.
Second, limited liability encourages corporate activities that may impose
significant losses on third parties such as trade creditors, lenders and tort
victims by diluting corporate decision-makers' incentives to pay regard to the
effects of corporate activities on third parties, including the risk that the latter
will eventually find themselves unable to enforce tortious and contractual
liabilities generated by the firm for lack of assets. The shareholders being
judgment proof in respect of the liabilities incurred by the corporation as a
result of the limited liability rule renders them rationally insensitive to
corporate liabilities exceeding the value of their investment. Because of the
limited liability principle, if a particular venture becomes a success,
shareholders will capture the entire reward, whilst they will bear only part of
the loss in the event of a default. In effect, as we saw at the outset of Chapter
3, limited liability places a ceiling on the losses which may result from the
firm's operations that are relevant to corporate decision-making: given limited
liability, potential losses exceeding the amount of their invested wealth are
irrelevant to the shareholders. Hence, whenever shareholders anticipate
positive net returns from a contemplated corporate activity, they will desire
that the corporation undertakes the activity concerned, regardless of the
liabilities to third parties in excess of their investment which it may entail.
In other words, if from an ex a«/e perspective a venture is expected to
generate positive wealth effects for the shareholders, although ex />o.y/ the
corporation's assets may be insufficient to offset its costs to third parties,
shareholders have wealth-maximizing incentives to desire that the activity go
ahead. Accordingly, the possibility of shifting a part of the costs of failure to
third parties promotes projects with anticipated positive wealth gains for
shareholders but with potentially large losses for other members of society in
the event of failure. As the amount shareholders can lose is limited to the
amount of their investment, corporate decision-makers acting in shareholders'
interests will be induced to ignore possible third party costs in excess of
shareholders' investment, which runs contrary to the concept that the full
social costs of a contemplated activity should be considered in order to
achieve social efficiency in corporate conduct. For instance, they may decide
in favor of investing in a factory that causes pollution if the investment is
anticipated to yield an attractive return to shareholders, although the
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anticipated clean-up costs of environmental spills may well exceed the
corporation's financial ability.
On the other hand, if corporate managers forgo profitable investment
opportunities which would expose third parties to potentially large losses (for
instance, if they were to decide against investing in the above-mentioned
factory because of possible environmental costs), their behavior may be
understood as a departure from maximization of shareholder wealth. Conse-
quently, as we saw in Chapter 4, the rental value of a manager's human
capital in the outside labor market may deteriorate, thereby injuring his ability
to attract better employment offers elsewhere. Also, outsiders may observe
possible wealth gains from bidding on the stock market in order to acquire
control of the company, firing or disciplining incumbent managers and
deciding in favor of the project previously rejected (/.e. build the factory that
causes pollution although the corporation will probably be unable to pay for
future clean-up costs). In this way market mechanisms may punish managers
whose business decisions do take into account the costs of corporate activities
to third parties, that is, those who wou/d take decisions reflecting their full
costs to society as a whole.
The observation that with limited liability, wealth maximizing shareholders
will want managers to ignore potential losses exceeding shareholders' invested
wealth whereas such losses are relevant from a social efficiency perspective,
should not be misinterpreted to imply that for corporate decision-making to be
socially efficient, management should reject each possible activity that one
day might cause losses to third parties in excess of the corporation's assets
(/.e. that might externalize costs). Rather, given that the actual success or
failure of a contemplated activity is invariably subject to some degree of
uncertainty, management should abstain from engaging the firm in activities
that would cause expected losses to shareholders and creditors jointly in
excess of the activity's expected benefits to the shareholders (which would
mean that the activity's anticipated social costs outweighed its expected
benefits). Pote/?fra/ losses will be relevant to corporate decision-making
because in order to determine the expected losses entailed by an activity, each
potential loss must be multiplied by the probability of its occurring (following
which the resulting values must be totaled). Whether the expected amounts
will in fact materialize depends, of course, on the activity's actual results.
From the point of view of social efficiency, if expected losses to society in full
are less than expected returns to the shareholders, it is desirable that the
activity in question be undertaken (even though potertf/a/ losses may outweigh
corporate assets and even though at the end of the day, the corporation may
prove unable to remedy the ac/?<o/ losses imposed on third parties) [Shavell
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(1986), 58 fh. 32; (1987), 169]. If, in contrast, expected losses to
shareholders and creditors jointly in the event of failure exceed the expected
benefits to the shareholders in the event of success, the engagement of the
corporation in the activity concerned would be socially inefficient.
Where corporate decision-makers ignore potential losses inasmuch as they
exceed shareholders' invested wealth, their estimate of the activity's expected
social costs will be too low and in consequence, they will raise the risk to
which creditors are exposed and increase their actual losses should the
corporation become unable to satisfy its payment obligations, in comparison
with the situation where the activity's expected full social costs had been
taken into account. More specifically, shareholders and managers acting in
their interests more or less systematically ignoring potential losses exceeding
shareholders' invested wealth, will affect corporate decision-making in at least
three ways (as Shavell's more general discussion of the judgment proof
problem suggests [Shavell (1986), 45-58]).
In the first place, the level of activities that could cause losses in excess of
the value of the corporation's assets would be higher than if the full extent of
such losses were considered: as limited liability promotes projects with
positive net present values to the shareholders regardless of whether the
project's liabilities might exhaust the corporation's assets, there will be a
tendency for corporate decision-makers to engage the firm in a socially
excessive level of risky activity, that is, to take business risks at which
marginal expected social costs exceed marginal expected benefits to the
shareholders (as is further illustrated by an accounting example in the next
section). In this way, limited liability for shareholders may be considered to
induce managers to pursue over-risky business ventures and investments.
Devra Golbe [1988] has demonstrated that the tendency for firms to pursue
risky projects and, thus, the probability of marginal expected social losses
outweighing marginal anticipated returns to the shareholders, may be even
greater if the firm is approaching bankruptcy: given that limited liability
guarantees that their shares will never be worth less than zero and normally,
the shares will be approaching this minimum value if bankruptcy is near,
increasing the riskiness of the firm's operating returns may produce large
anticipated wealth gains for the shareholders, net of their possible (and
expected) losses, from increases in the value of their shares, on which they
will cash in if the risky project pays off and the firm remains in business, at
the expense of higher expected losses to the firm's creditors. As suggested by
Golbe [1988, 79], this dual effect of increasing risk could foster the formation
of coalitions consisting of shareholders and lenders willing to cooperate with
the firm and with each other to avoid bankruptcy, the latter to avoid loss, the
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former to secure their expected gain from the firm's continuation.
Secondly, at a given level of activity, corporate decision-makers'
incentives to take care in order to avoid losses may be insufficient as because
of the limited liability principle, the shareholders have no incentive to invest in
precautionary measures meant to prevent losses excm//>7g their investment
(which they will treat as imposing on them a loss only equal to their
investment). Given limited liability, the amount of loss which the shareholders
consider worth preventing may be less than the expected total losses
associated with the firm's activities, and their investments in care (/.e. loss-
prevention) will be proportionately less. Therefore, the corporation may fail to
reduce the probability or the magnitude, or both, of the losses its activities
might cause to others (including losses exceeding the firm's assets) to the
socially efficient point at which the marginal social costs of prevention
activity equal the marginal social benefit in terms of lower expected losses.
To phrase differently, by not exercising care to prevent losses exceeding
shareholders' invested wealth, the firm may fail to raise the level of care as
long as the reduction in the risk of loss that extra care would accomplish
exceeds the increment to the costs of exercising care.
Similarly, incentives to have the corporation purchase liability insurance
are diluted given that the insurance coverage desirable from the shareholders'
perspective is determined by their own maximum possible loss rather than by
the full extent of the liabilities the firm's activities may cause. As the amount
shareholders may lose is limited to the value of a corporation's assets, it does
not pay them to have the corporation take out insurance beyond this value,
even though its activities may generate far greater liabilities (for example,
arising from torts attributable to the corporation). In consequence, it will be a
rational decision for corporate decision-makers to confine the corporation's
liability insurance to the value of its assets: if more insurance were obtained,
the shareholders would pay, through the insurance premiums, for losses from
which limited liability had already released them. In this way, limited liability
may adversely affect third parties' ability to obtain compensation through the
corporation's insurance policy for harm imposed on them by its activities. In
addition, where insurers' potential exposure would be less as a result of firms
purchasing less insurance coverage than under unlimited shareholder liability,
insurance companies' incentives to actively monitor corporate activity with a
view to preventing losses (for instance, through demanding additional safety
devices) would be adversely affected as well, since their expected return on
monitoring expenditures decreases as they have less exposure under the
insurance policy.
According to the reasoning described above, the downside of limited
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liability is not so much that it precludes creditors from collecting their claims
against the corporation out of the shareholders' non-invested wealth but,
rather, that limited liability creates perverse incentives to take business
decisions which systematically disregard the potential costs of corporate
activities to third parties in excess of shareholders' investment. Thus limited
liability creates incentives for underinvestment in loss-prevention and the
purchase of liability insurance, and for excessive allocation of scarce
resources to hazardous economic activities or, generally, to activities
involving potentially large social costs [Halpern, Trebilcock and Tumbull
(1980), 126]. As a result, third parties will be exposed to greater risk of
suffering losses from the corporation's actions, and to greater actual losses in
the event of a default, than they would have been if management had taken
into consideration such losses up to the full extent of shareholders' wealth
(/.«. including shareholders' non-invested assets).
L/m/ted Z./ab/7/ry and /wesfrnenr Dec/s/ons
If the amount shareholders have invested in the assets of the corporation turns
out to be insufficient to pay its liabilities, losses are imposed on the
corporation's creditors. Where limited liability actually keeps the shareholders
from having to pay for such losses, that is, in the event of corporate default,
the limited liability rule effectively shifts costs to creditors. And where limited
liability induces corporate managements to take into account in their decision-
making less than the anticipated costs of corporate activities to other members
of society, limited liability encourages business decisions and behavior
patterns that would result in the shifting of costs if the corporation fails and,
thus, raises the probability of third parties having to bear losses as a result of
corporate activity. This is the core of the argument which states that limited
liability externalizes risk.
This potential effect of limited liability was already indicated by
nineteenth-century political economist John Ramsey McCulloch [1965, 363-
364], when he argued that limited liability would induce men "to engage in
desperate adventures". McCulloch believed that such over-risky activities
were the inevitable result of limited liability disconnecting the decision to
undertake a venture from bearing responsibility for the full consequences
(including the costs of possible failure) of that decision [Amsler, Bartlett and
Bolton (1981), 787].
In his discussion of limited liability. Landers [1975; 1976], too, suggests
that limited liability externalizes business risk. Through the statutory principle
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of limited liability combined with low capitalization requirements, he submits,
"the law has, to a large extent, placed the costs of promoting new businesses
on the creditors of the corporation and, through them, on the public as a
whole" [1975, 593]. Ignoring the significance of limited liability to the
separation of management and residual risk-bearing in the corporate firm and
limited liability's other functions as discussed in Chapter 3, Landers [1975,
618] regards the shifting of risk as the very origin of the limited liability
principle: "(...) it is relatively clear that the doctrine of limited liability was
envisioned as a protection for individuals who invested in business
enterprises. Insofar as the corporation itself could not pay its debts, society at
large was to bear the costs of the corporate enterprise". From a similar
perspective but with a more negative undertone, Otto Kahn-Freund [1944, 54]
advocated that limited liability has "often become a means of evading
liabilities and of concealing the real interests behind the business".
Let us now illustrate the impact of limited liability on investment decisions
by a simple accounting example. Imagine a corporation which has raised 4
million U.S. dollars in equity capital from its shareholders and whose
management is considering investing the entire amount in a chemicals
manufacturing plant. Suppose that if the corporation were to invest the
amount put up by its shareholders in constructing and operating such a plant
over a ten year period, there would be a 65 percent chance that the
corporation would earn aggregate profits of USD 7 million, a 20 percent
chance of a combined profit of USD 12 million and a 10 percent chance of an
aggregate USD 2 million loss for the ten year term (all amounts being
discounted to present values on the date of the investment). Suppose further
that there would be a 5 percent probability that at one point during the
relevant period the corporation would incur a catastrophic loss of USD 120
million, for instance, as a result of an explosion generating massive liabilities
in tort. Ignoring, for argument's sake, changes in the investment value (the
market value of the plant), on balance the expected return to shareholders, net
of expected losses, would be USD 750,000 positive over the full ten year
period (0.65 x USD 7,000,000 + 0.20 x USD 12,000,000 - 0.10 x USD
2,000,000 - 0.05 x USD 120,000,000), if the full potential tortious liability
of USD 120 million is taken into consideration. That means, shareholders
would earn a return of USD 75,000 per annum, amounting to a return on
equity rate of 1.875 percent a year.
This return rate would render the investment clearly unattractive to
investors, given that the yield on (virtually) risk-free government bonds (for
example, United States Treasury bonds) tends to be well above 1.875 percent
per annum, so that they would be unlikely to support a management decision
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in favor of making the investment concerned. The investment in the
contemplated chemicals manufacturing plant would also be disadvantageous
from the perspective of society as a whole: the relatively low rate of return on
invested capital, compared to returns on alternative investment possibilities
(such as government bonds), signals that the same resources are valued higher
by society if allocated to a different use.
Now take into account the liability rule to which the shareholders are
subject. If they were subject to unlimited liability, the relevant cost-benefit
calculation desired by the shareholders would follow the pattern set forth
above. As they would lose their entire non-invested wealth, the full expected
tortious liability (a 5 percent chance of USD 120 million) would be relevant
as a cost (subject to the amount of shareholders' total non-invested wealth
only). But if the shareholders, by contrast, enjoy limited liability, the
calculation (and the resulting investment decision) would be completely
different: instead of USD 120 million, shareholders would wish the potential
tortious liability be taken into account only up to the value of their
investment, /.e. USD 4 million, being their maximum loss. Adjusted accordin-
gly, over a ten year period on balance, the expected net returns to
shareholders on the investment in the above-mentioned chemicals plant would
now be USD 6,550,000 positive (0.65 x USD 7,000,000 + 0.20 x USD
12,000,000 - 0.10 x USD 2,000,000 - 0.05 x USD 4,000,000), which equals
a return rate of USD 655,000 per annum and an annual return on equity rate
of 16.375 percent. This return is clearly more attractive to investors than the
return in our previous calculation (and higher than the usual yield on
government bonds) and is therefore likely to lead to a positive investment
decision, although the social costs of the plant (the expected liability in tort)
are unchanged.
As our example illustrates, limited liability inducing investors (and
managers acting in their interests) to ignore potential third party losses
beyond the value of their investment is not an isolated datum. The more
fundamental issue is that as a consequence of external costs being ignored in
the making of investment decisions, limited liability leads to a use of socially
valuable resources different to that which would be chosen if the investment's
full anticipated social costs were taken into consideration. If full social costs
are taken into account, a different use of resources having greater regard for
the interests of third parties would result, which would expose other members
of society to less hazard and reflect greater concern for their welfare (for
instance, carry fewer tort risks), which would not, or to a lesser degree,
pursue stockholder wealth maximization through actual or potential wealth
transfers from the corporation's creditors, and which would result in smaller
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losses to third parties in the event of the corporation's default - that means, a
use of resources more consistent with its actual cost to society as a whole.
Thus, the partial ignorance of an activity's social costs provoked by limited
liability shatters the logic that consumers' willingness to pay alone compels
firms to allocate society's scarce resources to the uses that are valued highest
by society as a whole.
The Case against External Costs
The idea that limited liability externalizes risk to the corporation's creditors is
based on the premise that creditors are not compensated for the extra costs
they would bear in the event of a default in comparison with their costs under
unlimited shareholder liability. Several scholars have questioned this premise.
Manne [1975, 514], for instance, has argued that the risk of corporate
insolvency is generally understood by the corporation's creditors and treated
by them as any other cost. In addition he points out that mandatory disclosure
of corporate financial data serves to inform creditors about the magnitude of
this cost. These observations suggest that limited liability does nor shift
uncompensated business risks to the corporation's creditors as the risk of
corporate insolvency is voluntarily assumed by the latter, and likely to be
reflected in the interest rates they charge the corporation.
For the same reason, Posner [1976] has submitted that the limited liability
principle does not disadvantage creditors. Posner assumes that creditors are
fully aware that under limited shareholder liability, the costs of corporate
insolvency will lie with them. Therefore, he maintains, they will make up for
the extra loss they would suffer in the event of the corporation's default by
insisting upon interest rates higher than those they would charge if the liability
rule permitted them to recover their unsatisfied claims from shareholders'
non-invested wealth. The interest rate creditors will charge, then, is not merely
compensation for the provision of credit but also for the bearing of the risk
that the corporation's assets will prove insufficient to repay the amount
extended [1976, 501]. By this theory, creditors are compensated ex ante for
their higher costs ex pa?/ should the corporation become insolvent:
"[Creditors are] fully compensated by the higher interest rate that the
corporation must pay by virtue of enjoying limited liability" [1976, 503].
Thus the interest rate charged will compensate creditors for shouldering
the risk of corporate insolvency, regardless of whether this risk will ever
materialize. In estimating the default risk and in setting a risk-commensurate
interest rate, creditors may take advantage of the information on companies'
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creditworthiness which is available from specialized rating agencies, in
addition to information disclosed by the corporation itself. But creditors may
also actively seek to reduce the amount of risk shifted to them, which in turn
will reduce the risk-reflecting interest rate. By reducing their risk of non-
payment, creditors would reduce their actual costs should the corporation
become insolvent. For this purpose they may demand, for instance, that the
corporation effects the encumbrance of certain assets as security for the
fulfillment of its payment obligations to them. Moreover, creditors may insist
upon a contract provision compelling the corporation to provide additional
security in the future at the creditor's first request. Such a provision would
permit creditors to stabilize their risk if the corporation were to undertake
business ventures that would increase the risk of non-payment.
Furthermore, creditors may reduce their expected loss in the event of
corporate default by requiring that the corporation's shareholders personally
guarantee the payment of the corporation's debts. Similarly, they may demand
that individual shareholders supply collateral (/.e. non-invested wealth) for the
payment of corporate debts. By such means, creditors may effectively
contract around the statutory principle of limited liability.
In conclusion, according to the reasoning stated above, as creditors are
free to charge risk-commensurate interest rates and to adjust other contract
terms to the limited liability rule, limited liability is unlikely to transfer
uncompensated business risks to creditors of the corporation. Since creditors
may mitigate their loss in the event of corporate default through various
contractual devices as indicated above and since they are compensated ex a«/e
through higher interest rates for the (remaining) costs of corporate insolvency
which limited liability shifts to them, there is, so the argument goes, no
externality [Posner (1976), 503; (1992), 395].
The question of whether limited liability externalizes the risk of corporate
insolvency to creditors is similar to the question of whether liability insurance
allows potential injurers to externalize the costs of accidents. With liability
insurance, potential injurers generally have less reason to avoid accidents than
if they were to pay from their own pockets the costs of accidents attributable
to them. The same applies to corporate attitudes to business failure when
shareholders have limited liability. It should be noted, however, that liability
insurance for potential injurers does not externalize the risk of accidents
where victims of extra accidents which may occur as a result of potential
injurers' decreased incentives to avoid accidents, are fully compensated out of
the liability insurance and where liability insurers are compensated ex ortfe,
through insurance premiums, for the payments they make to the beneficiaries
of the insurance policies. If an insurer agrees to bear the liability risk and if
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victims of accidents are fully compensated, there is no externality [Shavell
(1982); Landes and Posner (1987), 13].
By requiring creditors to assume part of the risk of business failure, the
statutory principle of limited liability creates a form of non-market insurance
of shareholders' non-invested wealth, as Arrow [1970, 139-140] has
observed. From this angle, creditors (the "insurers") provide insurance of the
non-invested assets of the shareholders (the "victims") against the risk of
corporate failure (the "accident"). The insurance premium paid is the
differential between the interest rate creditors charge under limited liability for
shareholders and the rate they would charge if they could collect corporate
debts from both the assets of the corporation and shareholders' non-invested
assets. Accordingly, creditors' costs (as insurers of shareholders' personal
wealth) in the event of corporate failure (corporate insolvency being the
insured risk) may be larger with limited shareholder liability but so are their
(pre-insolvency) revenues as insurers. Where creditors agree to "insure"
shareholders' liability for corporate debts in this way, there is no externality.
And where creditors were to reduce the insurance coverage they provide, for
example, by demanding personal guarantees from shareholders for debts of
the corporation, the insurance premium they could charge as a part of the
interest rate would be proportionally lower.
To constrain the risk that the corporation's assets will be insufficient to
pay its debts, creditors frequently use instruments similar to those used by
liability insurers. First, creditors may incorporate into loan contracts clauses
designed to prevent behavior that would increase the probability of realization
of their risk (/.e. non-payment of their claims), just as insurers do.
Contractual restrictions on the corporation's ability to alienate assets at less
than their market value and limitations on the pay-out of dividends may be
viewed as such preventive arrangements. Second, creditors may reduce their
aggregate risk of non-payment by pooling risks, that is, by supplying a large
number of small loans to different borrowers rather than a few large ones. In
the same way, liability insurers choose to insure numerous potential liabilities,
each of which may result in a relatively small exposure for the insurer. And
third, just like insurers, creditors may relieve themselves of some or all of
their risk by reinsuring the risk of non-payment of their claim, for example,
through selling their claim at a discount in exchange for immediate cash or by
taking out credit insurance where available.
Let us assume for the moment that creditors are indeed compensated ex
owte, as reasoned above, for the extra loss they would suffer in the event of
corporate insolvency. How will such compensation affect corporate decision-
making?
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As the corporation must now pay, through higher interest rates and less
favorable contract terms, for the risk that is shifted to creditors, corporate
managements are induced to take into account the full risk that the
corporation's assets may become insufficient to pay off its creditors: when the
corporation is to pay for shifting the costs of future insolvency to creditors,
these costs are relevant to calculating the net anticipated private gain to
corporate shareholders from a contemplated activity. As a result, the
corporation will now engage in activities of which the risk that they will lead
to corporate insolvency is consistent with the expected losses to shareholders
and creditors jointly, that is, with the activity's anticipated •soc/a/ costs.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the risk that the corporation
will default in the future represents a current cost to creditors equal to the
probability of corporate insolvency times creditors' potential loss in the event
of default. When this cost is reflected in interest rates (and other contract
terms) facing the corporation, it will almost unavoidably be taken into
account in corporate cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, management will
select activities carrying the level of default risk at which marginal anticipated
benefits to corporate shareholders from the activity concerned equal marginal
social costs [Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 107]. Thus, although total
losses to creditors in the event of corporate insolvency may still be higher than
with unlimited shareholder liability, the amount of risk shifted to creditors will
not exceed the amount for which the corporation has compensated them (as
would be the case if creditors were not properly compensated for bearing the
risk of insolvency).
Where creditors are compensated ex awte for bearing the risk that the
corporation's assets may be insufficient to pay off its debts, the corporation
will choose activities which maximize anticipated stockholder returns taking
into consideration the expected costs of a default to shareholders awd to
creditors. Similarly, once the corporation has engaged in an activity that may
cause losses in excess of corporate assets, the level of care it will exercise to
prevent losses and the amount of insurance it will take out, will correspond to
expected social losses instead of only to shareholders' expected private losses.
Consequently, the total degree of corporate risk-taking will be commensurate
with its social costs and hence, socially efficient; there will be no "excessive"
risk-taking by the corporation.
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Flaws in the Compensation Argument ,^  ,\......
CrecWors .
The theory that creditors are compensated for the risk limited liability shifts to
them assumes that creditors negotiate ex «me to obtain compensation for the
loss they may suffer later owing to shareholders' non-liability for the debts of
the corporation. Such negotiations in turn require that creditors vo/i/ntar/'/y
provide credit. Indeed, when a bank grants a loan or when a supplier of inputs
sells on credit, it is their voluntary decision to do so. But not all credit is given
voluntarily. Corporations may have two categories of creditors who have not
consented to giving credit.
First, there are creditors whose extension of credit, and the applicable
rates, is prescribed by public regulation. These statutory creditors include the
tax authorities and public agencies authorized to collect amounts payable
under social security laws. Tax rates and social security premiums are fixed
by statute law and their magnitude is independent of the risk that a particular
debtor-corporation may default. Unlike lenders and trade creditors, tax
authorities and social security agencies do not negotiate ex a«/e with a
particular corporation to set a rate reflecting the risk of that corporation's
insolvency. Thus, the amount of taxes and social security premiums a
corporation is to pay will not incorporate a premium to make up for the
insolvency risk ofthat corporation.
Statutory rights of preference for, for example, the tax authorities over
other creditors in the event of bankruptcy, establish an ex posr remedy for the
state treasury's inability to bargain for ex o«fe compensation for the
insolvency risk. However, such preferential rights do not alter the fact itself
that no compensation for the insolvency risk shifted by limited liability is
agreed, and that the state treasury is unable to bargain ex a«/e for protection
against that risk or for adjustment of tax rates to the corporation's risk of
insolvency. Statutory rights of preference are primarily a means for after-the-
fact loss ra/Hc/zort rather than an instrument for loss ovo/t/awce as they come
into play only after the insolvency risk has materialized. They do not preclude
the uncompensated transfer of business risk in itself which ex owte
negotiations, in contrast, would serve to avoid.
The charging of advance levies is a means to altogether avoid the shifting
of risk to the state treasury or social security agencies. In that event, the
charging authority does not become a creditor at all and, hence, does not
assume the risk of corporate insolvency in respect of the amount levied in
advance so that it is not affected by the rule governing shareholders' liability.
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A second category of involuntary creditors consists of victims of torts
generated by the corporation's activities. They are creditors by virtue of their
right to receive damages once the corporation's liability in tort has been
established. A tort constitutes a transaction by which the victim is ybrcet/ to
contribute to the activities of the tortfeasor. The damage to a tort victim's
property, personal health or otherwise is an input to the corporation's
activities, just like labor, capital and raw materials. The single, yet
fundamental, difference is that tort victims have not agreed to supply their
property, health or otherwise as an input to the corporation. In other words,
they have not consented to being injured by the corporation's activities. A
bank loan or a contract for the supply of raw materials requires bilateral
agreement between the supplier and the corporation. Tort victims' damage, in
contrast, is the result of a unilateral action of the corporation, with their
compensation being determined ex/wsf.
Potential tort victims are not merely subject to the risk of suffering injury
but also to the risk that eventually the corporation will be unable to satisfy
their claims for damages. As no bilateral negotiations take place in advance,
potential victims of corporate torts will not be compensated for bearing the
risk that the corporation's assets may be insufficient to cover its liabilities in
tort [Posner (1976). 506; (1992). 396], Limited liability, then, permits the
shifting of uncompensated business risks to the corporation's involuntary
creditors.
As the corporation does not have to pay a premium to involuntary
creditors for bearing the risk that their claims may exceed the value of the
corporation's assets, potential liabilities to involuntary creditors in excess of
corporate assets are irrelevant to the corporation's cost-benefit calculations.
Hence, potential losses to involuntary creditors that it may be unable to pay,
will not be taken into account in corporate decisions relating to whether or not
a particular project should be undertaken or to how much the corporation
should invest in order to prevent losses to other members of society.
Therefore, with limited shareholder liability, corporate management is likely
to decide in favor of undertaking projects which may generate tortious
liabilities well exceeding the value of the corporation's assets if only they
have a positive net present value to its shareholders. In this way limited
liability promotes externalization of costs to involuntary creditors.
Management's decision would probably be different if the corporation
were to compensate potential tort victims for bearing the risk that the
corporation may default on its liabilities in tort. In that event future tortious
liabilities exceeding corporate assets would be a current cost to the
corporation, represented by the risk premium it must pay, and would therefore
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become relevant to the calculation of shareholders' net expected private gain
from a particular project. The higher the tortious liabilities a project may
generate, the higher this cost would be, and the less likely it is that the project
would have a positive net present value to shareholders. However, as
involuntary creditors are not /« yoc/ compensated for the risk imposed upon
them and as their losses in the event of a default are therefore irrelevant to the
corporation's cost-benefit calculations, the risk the corporation will take is
likely to be too great in relation to the costs its activities may impose on this
class of creditors.
Clark [1986, 10] argues that the extemalization of risk to tort victims by
the limited liability rule is chiefly a "theoretical problem", as so far excessive
liabilities in tort have caused very few large, publicly held corporations to go
bankrupt. This observation, however, understates the problem. The problem
is not so much that with limited shareholder liability, some of the costs of
corporate activities may be borne by the corporation's involuntary creditors in
the event of corporate failure (as they cannot collect their unpaid claims from
shareholders' personal assets) but, rather, that these creditors are not
compensated for the risk that the corporation's assets may be insufficient to
satisfy their claims. Therefore, corporations' incentives to reduce risks, that
is. to lower the probability or the magnitude of the losses that their activities
may impose on others, will be diluted to the effect that they will
systematically take greater business risks than they would if they had to pay
compensation to involuntary creditors for the risk of non-payment of their
claims.
As a consequence, corporations are apt to follow behavior patterns -
which can range from their engagement to a socially excessive extent in
activities that may cause losses exceeding corporate assets and the exercise of
inadequate care to prevent losses at a given level of activity, to the purchase
of insufficient liability insurance coverage - that are inconsistent with the
anticipated social costs associated with their activities and that, therefore,
may be regarded as socially undesirable regardless of whether or not at the
end of the day, the corporation will be in default. Also, if a default would
occur in fact, given the greater risks taken, the s«w of the corporation's
unpaid debts will most likely be higher than if the corporation had to pay its
involuntary creditors for the default risk imposed upon them.
It is true, of course, that the dilution of incentives to reduce risks that is
entailed by the limited liability rule, is most significant where there is a
significant probability of losses exceeding corporate assets given that in the
absence of such a probability (for instance, if the value of the corporation's
assets outweighs the liabilities it might incur by any measure), limited liability
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would not in fact release the shareholders from risk and, hence, would not
allow them to shift risk to parties outside the firm. However, one may not
conclude from this observation that limited liability will lead to a dulling of
incentives solely with respect to firms with modest assets. Even firms with
substantial assets may engage in activities which may cause losses exceeding
their ability to pay (for instance, they may engage in hazardous production
processes that could cause catastrophic injury in the event of a breakdown, or
they may manufacture products that might give rise to mass tort claims in the
event of a manufacturing defect) [Shavell (1987), 168].
Perhaps more importantly, firms with substantial assets may deliberately
incur substantial liabilities to voluntary creditors (for instance, by contracting
bank loans in order to acquire capital for new investment, to obtain cash for
distribution to the shareholders, or to enhance the monitoring of management
by the capital markets). This would raise the firm's total debt burden (and,
cetem /«jr;A«j, its debt-equity ratio) which in turn would raise the
probability of total liabilities to voluntary and involuntary creditors
collectively exceeding the corporation's ability to pay. In this event, despite
the presence of substantial assets in the firm, limited liability will tend to
dilute the corporation's incentives to avoid losses inasmuch as anticipated
losses exceed corporate assets. Note that even where the probability of losses
exceeding corporate assets is rather small, for instance, if there is a slight
chance of a catastrophic event triggering enormous liabilities in tort,
incentives may be diluted with respect to the reduction of the chance or the
possible magnitude of such a catastrophic loss as, given limited liability, the
greater part of the loss would be borne by the corporation's creditors anyway
and as, therefore, this part would not be worth preventing from the
shareholders' perspective.
Cred/Yors
With limited liability for shareholders, involuntary creditors and voluntary
creditors each bear a part of the risk of corporate insolvency. Whilst
involuntary creditors are not compensated for bearing this risk, voluntary
creditors are, so the theory goes. But will money lenders and trade creditors,
in reality, raise the risk-free rate on credit by a premium that reflects the risk
of corporate insolvency?
In a world with zero transaction costs in which complete information about
insolvency risks is available at no cost, indeed they would. In such a world,
would-be creditors could readily make themselves acquainted with the
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corporation's capacity to pay, bearing in mind the risk of corporate assets
felling short of the corporation's obligations. Moreover, as negotiations would
be cost free, no barriers would exist to creditors negotiating risk-
commensurate interest rates. In this Coasian world, individual credit
arrangements would not be affected by the statutory rule governing
shareholders' liability. Negotiations between corporate borrowers and
creditors would in any event result in ex awte payment of risk premiums
accurately reflecting the underlying insolvency risk.
If transaction costs were zero, parties would simply negotiate until they
eventually arrived at an arrangement under which the terms on which
investors in corporate equity were prepared to borrow equaled the terms on
which creditors were prepared to provide credit. This equilibrium
arrangement would be independent of the statutory liability regime. If
shareholders preferred having a low interest rate to enduring less risk, the
credit arrangement would provide for unlimited liability. On the other hand, if
they chose to have their non-invested assets insulated from liability, the
arrangement would offer limited liability to investors at the price of a higher
interest rate [Meiners (1978), 224; Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison (1979);
Anderson and Tollison (1983), 114-115].
However, there are several reasons why, in the real, non-Coasian world,
not only /«voluntary creditors but also vo/««/ary creditors are rather unlikely
to obtain adequate compensation for the risk of corporate insolvency which
limited liability imposes upon them. First, statutory restrictions may exist
which prevent creditors from obtaining risk-reflecting interest premiums.
There may be statutory control of interest rates, either in the form of interest
ceilings or in the form of fixed interest percentages. Such regulation would
obviously limit the ability of creditors to charge risk-commensurate interest
rates.
Second, prospective creditors' ability to charge compensation for the risk
of non-payment is dependent upon the information they have about the
corporation's capacity to pay. To assess the risk of a default, creditors
require, in particular, "accurate information about the existing and expected
assets and liabilities of the borrowing corporation (...)", as Posner [1976,
508] acknowledges. Such information is not freely available. Reliable
information about the insolvency risk may be hard to obtain and in any event
there is a real cost to acquiring such information. This cost will tend to
become higher as more accurate information is sought. Prohibitive costs of
information gathering may keep creditors from charging risk-commensurate
premiums.
Mandatory disclosure of corporate financial data does not merely feed
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information into market mechanisms disciplining managers, it also serves to
reduce creditors' and would-be creditors' costs of gathering information about
corporate ability to pay. However, a corporation's disclosed financial
statements merely reveal information about the past. They do not normally
inform a creditor about the actual risk of default as at the date at which he
contracts with that corporation. Moreover, the balance sheet and income
statement of a corporation may fail to disclose certain data relevant to the
assessment of its capacity to pay. For instance, a corporation may have issued
guarantees for the payment of debts incurred by companies affiliated to it.
Such guarantees may not be shown in its financial statements, although they
could cause the issuing corporation to run into serious financial trouble if the
company to which the guarantee relates were to default. When a creditor is
unaware of such a guarantee or of other information relevant to assessing a
corporation's capacity to pay, the risk premium he demands is unlikely to
accord with the true risk of non-payment.
Third, the costs of negotiating compensation for the default risk may be
prohibitive (even when a creditor has more or less reliable information),
especially when those costs are large relative to the creditor's anticipated
return from the transaction concerned. Similarly, high negotiation costs may
stand in the way of a contractual modification of the statutory limited liability
rule, even if, in the absence of transaction costs, the creditor and the
corporation's shareholders chose to reduce the former's exposure by
extending shareholders' liability in exchange for a lower interest rate.
The larger the stake involved, the greater the probability that a creditor
will be prepared to incur substantial information and negotiation costs to
achieve an arrangement which properly compensates him for the risk of non-
payment, and which at the same time creates a risk-return relationship in
accordance with that creditor's preferences. For instance, for a bank
considering the extension of a large loan, it probably pays to surmount high
transaction costs in order to set a risk-reflecting interest rate, and to adjust the
limited liability rule should the bank desire to reduce its risk. But for a small
trade creditor, transaction costs are rather more likely to be prohibitive. Thus
the existence of positive information and negotiation costs provides a possible
explanation of why large creditors more often than relatively small creditors,
devote resources to negotiating a deviation from the limited liability rule: the
larger the amount of credit supplied, the greater the likelihood that it will pay
a prospective creditor to expend resources in negotiating a shareholders'
guarantee providing him with additional security for payment.
Fourth, competition among would-be creditors may enhance
uncompensated transfers of business risk from corporate borrowers to
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creditors. For instance, if there are many potential suppliers of a particular
input who are willing to sell it on credit, to stay in business any one of them
may have to settle for a price incorporating a lower premium than the
premium which would make up for the actual risk of non-payment. Similarly,
if there are many would-be money lenders relative to the amount of credit
demanded, competition among them is likely to drive interest rates down.
Market interest rates may then force individual lenders to accept a lower
interest rate on a loan than the rate that would compensate them for the risk
that the corporate borrower will fail to repay it. In brief, in a competitive
market, the struggle for commercial survival may preclude creditors from
obtaining proper compensation for the risk of corporate insolvency.
Fifth, possibly, but not necessarily, as a result of competition among
would-be creditors, bargaining power may be unequally divided between
would-be creditors and the corporation [Clark (1986). 76]. The corporation
may have greater bargaining power, for example, if it already has substantial
credit outstanding which is due to the creditor concerned, it may threaten to
default unless new credit is extended on favorable terms. The greater the
corporation's relative bargaining power, the lower the probability that
creditors are able to obtain risk-commensurate interest and other credit terms.
Sixth, the risk of insolvency may change as time passes [Posncr (1976),
503]. Suppose a creditor is able to charge compensation for the debtor's
default risk when the credit arrangement is negotiated. This compensation
may still not reflect his actual risk should the anticipated risk of insolvency
increase afterwards. Credit terms are negotiated on the basis of information
available when the credit arrangement is made. Accordingly, the terms of the
arrangement are based on the default risk as it is estimated at that time
[Posner (1992), 395]. However, the risk of insolvency may increase after the
credit terms have been agreed upon. In that event the agreed compensation
may prove to be too little to compensate the creditor for the actual risk of
default.
One may object on the basis that creditors will anticipate such <?.t /?o.W
changes in the default risk so that they will be reflected in the terms of the
arrangement (Posner (1976), 503-504]. Indeed, loan agreements entered into
by banks frequently include a provision entitling the bank to demand
additional security from the borrower after execution of the agreement,
thereby protecting the bank against future increases in the risk attached to the
loan. The amortization of loans (meaning the repayment of the amount
outstanding in regular periodic amounts throughout the loan term as opposed
to a single lump sum payment at the end) is another way of protecting lenders
against future increases in the risk of non-payment. Nevertheless, increases in
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the default risk after the terms of the credit arrangement have been agreed
upon are hard to predict and to quantify at the outset. Where creditors have
not anticipated such future changes of the default risk and where credit terms
have not been set accordingly, creditors will not be compensated properly for
the added risk if the risk attached to the loan increases.
R/sfc-s/wff/ng Sfrafeg/es
For the reasons discussed above, in a world with positive transaction costs,
limited liability permits the uncompensated transfer of business risks to
involuntary as well as to voluntary creditors: creditors from either category
may not receive adequate compensation for shouldering the risk of corporate
insolvency. In effect, limited liability creates an opportunity for shareholders
(and managers driven by shareholders' interests) to pursue benefits for
shareholders at the expense of creditors. Corporate managements may exploit
this opportunity through a number of risk-shifting strategies.
In the first place, as is apparent from our discussion of the impact of
limited liability on investment decisions, managers may deliberately have the
corporation engage in ventures with a positive net present value to
shareholders but with a high default risk. In this way they can exploit risky
projects, the benefits of which will flow to the shareholders but the costs of
which in the event of failure will mainly be borne by the creditors. Where
creditors are not adequately compensated for bearing an activity's default
risk, they in fact provide a subsidy to shareholders equal to creditors'
estimated default costs (i.e. the probability of failure multiplied by creditors'
loss in that event). The larger a project's chance of failure and the greater the
loss it may cause to creditors, the greater their subsidy to shareholders.
Increasing the probability of default after the corporation has obtained
credit is a related strategy through which shareholders may shift risks to
creditors. By deliberately increasing the default risk after the terms of the
credit arrangement are set, the corporation unilaterally amends the
arrangement to the detriment of creditors. In particular, corporate managers
backed by shareholders may increase the default risk by raising the debt-
equity ratio after a credit arrangement has been agreed upon [Posner (1976),
504; (1992), 395]. The higher a corporation's indebtedness, the higher the
risk that it cannot fulfil its obligations in case of business adversities.
Managers may increase the debt-equity ratio, for instance, by selling assets
of the business and distributing the proceeds to the shareholders.
Alternatively, they may alienate assets owned by the corporation to
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shareholders at less than their market value. Moreover, managers may burden
the corporation with additional loans. A corporation's risk of defaulting on a
loan and the amount creditors may lose may also be increased by the
withdrawal of funds from the corporate treasury in the pursuit of
shareholders' personal needs, for example, by using a loan granted to the
corporation to purchase goods for consumption by its shareholders. In each of
these events, creditors' security for payment is reduced after the credit
arrangement is made.
Undercapitalization of the corporation is probably the most
straightforward means by which corporate managers can exploit the limited
liability principle at the expense of creditors. The term "undercapitalization"
is usually, albeit somewhat imprecisely, applied to indicate that a corporation
has been furnished with inadequate assets to cover the reasonably foreseeable
liabilities which its operations might entail. In particular, undercapitalization
is deemed to be present when the marketable value of the assets owned by the
corporation is too low to cover the probable liabilities incident to the business.
The fewer assets a corporation has in relation to the liabilities it may generate,
the greater will be creditors' losses in the event of failure. Accordingly, the
lower a corporation's level of capitalization (;.e. the value of its assets), the
greater the cost externalized to creditors if they are not properly compensated
ex a/Jte for the risk of non-payment. Limited liability induces corporate
managers to undercapitalize the corporation in order to shift the greater part
of the costs of failure to creditors and, prior to failure, to maximize the
subsidy provided by creditors to shareholders through the bearing of business
risk. Therefore, undercapitalization is not an isolated problem but largely a
consequence of the incentives to externalize risk to which statutory limited
liability gives rise.
Legal capitalization requirements provide some protection to creditors
against trading with undercapitalized corporations, but only to a limited
extent. Statutory provisions may prescribe a specified minimum initial capital
for a firm to obtain a certificate of incorporation (as is the case, for instance,
in the Netherlands but is nowadays uncommon in the United States; see
Chapter 9 /«/ra). However, once the certificate of incorporation has been
issued, the minimum initial level of capital may not be maintained in the
assets of the business or the corporation may, deliberately or not, incur
liabilities well exceeding the prescribed minimum capital. In addition to initial
capitalization requirements, business corporation statutes may provide that
during their existence corporations must maintain certain minimum financial
reserves. However, such requirements still allow scope for corporate
management and shareholders to engage the corporation in activities, the
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probable costs of failure of which may exceed the prescribed reserves.
Moreover, the firm may simply fail to maintain the prescribed reserves and so
deny creditors the protection they should be awarded. In either event,
corporation statutes typically continue to grant limited liability to the
shareholders.
Statutory capitalization requirements oppose externalization of risk in as
far as they increase the amount that corporate decision-makers will take into
account as relevant losses when deciding whether to engage the firm in a
particular activity and when determining the level of care following the
engagement in that activity: the more invested wealth shareholders have at
stake, other things equal, the greater the proportion of the total social costs
the activity may generate which will be relevant to the shareholders as private
costs. As a consequence, the greater the capital invested, the less will be
shareholders' incentives to engage the firm in activities that might cause
losses exceeding corporate assets and, thus, the smaller the probability that it
will externalize risk. Moreover, the more capital is maintained in the assets of
the business, the smaller the probability that at the end of the day creditors
will come to suffer unrecoverable losses. However, it is important to note that
legal capitalization requirements do not as such eliminate the incentives to
externalize risk entailed by the limited liability rule since under a limited
liability regime, shareholders and managers acting in their interests will at any
prescribed capital level have wealth-maximizing incentives to pursue ventures
with positive net present values, irrespective of the possibility of losses
exceeding the corporation's capital. Thus, capitalization requirements will
provide too little deterrence where shareholders' expected private benefits
from an activity are outweighed by its expected social costs but are still
greater than the prescribed capital times the probability of a loss (/.e. where
shareholders' expected private costs are less than expected social costs). If,
for instance, shareholders expect a benefit of USD 100 at an 80 percent
chance, with a 20 percent chance that the activity in question will cause total
losses of USD 1,000 and with a capital requirement of USD 250, they will
desire that the activity go ahead: their expected benefit of 0.80 x USD 100 =
USD 80 is less than the expected social costs of 0.20 x USD 1,000 = USD
200 but still greater than their expected private loss of 0.20 x USD 250 =
USD 50.
There is a second, perhaps more fundamental negative aspect to, in
particular, minimum initial capitalization requirements that demand a certain
amount of capital to be invested in the business as a condition for permission
to incorporate. This is that they exclude from doing business as a corporation
any party that is unable to put up the requisite minimum amount, including
Corporate Paradox 277
parties that would not engage the firm in activities which may cause losses in
that amount and parties that would be able and willing to make an investment
sufficient to cover expected losses less than the prescribed minimum. As
Shavell [1986, 54; 1987, 169] has explained, a requirement that potential
injurers have some minimum level of assets before they be allowed to engage
in a particular activity requires them to have assets sufficient to compensate
either all or a certain portion of the actual losses they may cause. However, it
is socially beneficial that the activity is permitted not if the injurer is able to
pay oc/Ma/ losses but if expected social costs are less than the expected
benefits from the activity (or, more precisely, if at the margin they are equal)
[Shavell (1987), 169],
For instance, if a 5 percent chance exists that an activity would cause total
losses of USD 100,000 and a 95 percent chance that it would not cause losses
at all, its expected loss is only USD 5,000 and whenever expected benefits
exceed this amount, engaging in the activity will be socially desirable despite
the fact that flcfwo/ losses may be twenty times higher. Any party willing to
put up USD 5,000 will be induced to take into consideration the activity's full
expected social costs (as they equal his expected private loss) when
determining the activity level and the amount of care he will exercise and
should, therefore, be permitted to engage in the activity. Accordingly, it is
socially desirable that a contemplated activity, the expected social costs of
which are less than the acting party's expected benefits will go ahead if that
party has assets equaling expected social costs, even though in the event of
failure the activity might result in ac/wa/ losses exceeding his assets. For the
same reason, any firm with sufficient assets to pay the expected losses
resulting from its activities ought to be permitted to incorporate even though it
may be unable to pay actual losses. The problem with minimum capitalization
requirements, then, is that they deny access to the corporate form to firms
able to pay expected losses where such requirements demand that resources
be put up to make good actual losses in excess of expected losses. Returning
to our example, a requirement that parties put up more than USD 5,000 to
pay future liability awards would simply exclude some parties whose actions
would have been socially efficient had they been permitted to engage in the
activity concerned (namely, those willing to pay USD 5,000 expected losses
but not USD 100,000).
To sum up, a requirement that firms have some minimum initial level of
capital as a condition for being permitted to do business as a corporation
would under-deter to the extent that it would still allow firms to engage in
activities, the expected social costs of which exceed the prescribed minimum,
and it would over-deter to the extent that it would exclude the use of the
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corporate form from parties willing and able to pay expected losses that are
below the minimum level. As the undercapitalization problem is largely a
consequence of the incentives to externalize risk that arise from limited
liability, it would probably be tackled more effectively by rules aimed at
mitigating such incentives than by the direct regulation of a corporation's
level of capital.
Undercapitalization is frequently associated with the establishment by a
wealthy parent corporation of subsidiaries with low capitalization levels. By
organizing different parts of a business in separate corporations, the assets
from which creditors can enforce their claims are limited to the assets of the
part of the business from which the claim concerned has arisen. In this way,
limited liability insulates parts of the business from liabilities generated by
other parts, although the activities of affiliated corporations may be related or
even interdependent. By virtue of each individual corporation enjoying limited
liability, the use of subsidiaries enables the shareholders of the parent
corporation to limit their potential losses from any subsidiary's default to a
part of the assets over which they ultimately have the residual claim (through
their shares in the parent).
Thus, limited liability does not merely limit investors' risk to the amount
of their investment, it also enables them to further reduce their risk to a part
ofthat investment. CraZ/tors' risk will rise proportionately to the reduction of
shareholders' risk, that is, proportionately to the reduction in the assets from
which they may recover their claims. Accordingly, limited liability enables the
use of subsidiary corporations to shift risks to creditors. The use of subsidiary
corporations is particularly appealing to investors when it enables them to
dispose of much of the risk associated with projects with uncertain prospects
of success or that are capable of generating large liabilities: by organizing
such projects in a separate corporation, investors can isolate high-risk
activities from the rest of the business and place the risk (cost) of their fortune
or misfortune in great measure on creditors.
8. Extended Liability and Other
Possible Remedies
LIMITED LIABILITY MOTIVATES shareholders and managers acting in their
interests to ignore in their decision-making the social costs of corporate
activities that exceed the value of the corporation's assets. As a result, the
corporation's incentives to reduce risks will be diluted, causing it to engage to
a socially excessive extent in activities that may entail losses in excess of
corporate assets, to take inadequate care to prevent losses to others at a given
level of activity, and to take out too little liability insurance coverage.
In Chapter 7, we argued that both involuntary and voluntary creditors are
unlikely to obtain full compensation for bearing the risk that the corporation's
assets ultimately prove insufficient to pay off its debts. /«vo/M/Jtary creditors,
such as tort victims and tax authorities, are simply unable to negotiate
compensation for the default risk which limited liability imposes upon them.
Ko/wwta/y creditors, including both lenders and trade creditors, have to
overcome significant transaction costs to obtain such ex awte compensation.
In addition, they may not have sufficient information to assess the ex a«te
default risk correctly. Moreover, the corporation may unilaterally increase the
risk of insolvency after a premium to compensate voluntary creditors for
bearing the default risk has been agreed.
In effect, the limited liability principle is liable to externalize business risks
to the corporation's creditors. As a consequence, the risk of loss to which
creditors are exposed and their actual loss in the event of a default will be
higher than it would be if the corporation were to include in its business
decisions the anticipated costs of its activities to creditors, through risk-
commensurate premiums payable to the latter. The problem of
uncompensated transfers of business risk is exacerbated, in particular, by
undercapitalization of the corporation and by its use of undercapitalized
subsidiaries.
The externality problem entailed by limited liability indicates a conflict of
interests between the corporation and its wealth maximizing shareholders on
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the one hand and other members of society on the other, which is not resolved
through private bargaining in the market place. In the present chapter we
discuss several possible remedies that, at least in theory, may help to narrow
this conflict by correcting the inefficient incentives created by limited liability
and, thus, opposing the shifting of uncompensated risk to parties external to
the corporation. First we discuss the possibility of extending shareholders'
liability, following which we address other possible remedies, including an
insurance requirement complementing the present limited liability rule and the
establishment of a fund to be sponsored by corporations from which unpaid
creditors may obtain compensation in the event of corporate insolvency.
The Social Costs of Unlimited Liability
As described previously, socially efficient decision-making requires that the
corporation equate the marginal anticipated benefits of a contemplated
activity (j.e. the expected proceeds for shareholders if the venture becomes a
success) to its marginal anticipated social costs (including losses to
shareholders, voluntary and involuntary creditors in the event of failure).
Limited liability interferes with this principle as it renders losses to creditors
exceeding the marketable value of corporate assets irrelevant to corporate
decision-making. In effect, the limited liability rule allows shareholders to
pursue personal gain potentially at the expense of other members of society.
Should limited liability for shareholders as a statutory principle therefore be
abolished?
Unlimited liability for shareholders would undoubtedly induce
corporations to consider the perceived social costs of corporate activities up
to the combined value of shareholders' invested wealth and the value of their
non-invested assets. As under an unlimited liability rule, creditors can recover
a corporation's unpaid debts from shareholders' non-invested wealth,
corporate decision-making would now pay regard to potential losses to
creditors exceeding corporate assets, up to the size of shareholders' personal
assets. Accordingly, corporate managers would select that level of risk at
which marginal anticipated benefits to shareholders in the event of success
equal marginal anticipated costs to shareholders and creditors jointly in the
event of failure. In this manner, unlimited liability would encourage
corporations to pursue socially efficient courses of action.
However, apart from the benefit of promoting greater consistency of
corporate activities with their actual social costs, unlimited liability would
also generate costs to society. Abolition of the statutory limited liability rule
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in favor of an unlimited liability regime would be desirable only if the above-
mentioned benefit of unlimited liability were to exceed its disadvantages
compared with the existing limited liability rule.
The economic functions of limited liability were described in Chapter 3.
The social costs of introducing unlimited liability can in great measure be
inferred from that discussion. Below we review the main effects of a change
to unlimited liability on the monitoring of the corporate firm and on the
corporation as a capital-raising device.
Unlimited liability would thoroughly upset the monitorial model of the
corporation. Given that under unlimited liability, managerial decisions may
ruin a shareholder, shareholders would have risk-minimizing incentives to
demand detailed involvement in the firm's management. In other words, with
unlimited liability, centralization of decision-making authority with a
specialized management would be a less rational decision for shareholders to
make than it is under a limited liability regime. Active shareholder
involvement in managerial decision-making does not merely imply that more
resources will be absorbed in running the firm but, more fundamentally, it
entails that the advantages associated with separation of the respective
functions of operational management and residual risk-bearing will not be
exploited. Thus, the degree of specialization in management would be less and
as a consequence, production processes would forgo the greater ability and
dexterity of management by specialist managers at a lower per-unit cost. In
addition, where the higher costs of intra-firm decision-making were to absorb
prospective gains to factor owners from cooperative production, team
production would not be organized at all.
As indicated above, as with unlimited liability they bear more risk than
with limited liability, shareholders would have increased incentives to monitor
the behavior of cooperative production factors in the firm. The aggregate
amount of resources shareholders are likely to spend in monitoring input
behavior would therefore be larger. However, //K/;v;'c/ua/ shareholders will
have a stronger temptation to rely upon others to monitor productive activity
in order to avoid such larger monitoring expenditures. In this way unlimited
liability would add to the free rider problem which exists among a multitude
of non-controlling shareholders.
Furthermore, as set out in Chapter 3, a rule of unlimited liability (in
particular, a rule of joint and several liability) would induce shareholders to
expend resources in monitoring the relative wealth of other shareholders as
any shareholder's risk of becoming liable for corporate debts would depend
on the value of his fellow shareholders' non-invested assets in relation to his
own wealth. For the same reason, unlimited liability would raise the
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transaction costs associated with share transfers: to assess the risk he would
take by acquiring shares and to determine whether he would gain from
purchasing at the prevailing market price, a prospective investor would have
to examine the relative wealth levels of the existing shareholders in addition to
the firm's earning potential and liabilities.
Unlimited liability would not only threaten the transferability of shares by
raising transaction costs, but also by inducing investors to demand restrictions
on share transfers to purchasers of less wealth than the seller. High
transaction costs as well as restrictions on share transferability would
diminish the prospect of share transfers to superior monitors or to investors
able to effect wealth gains by displacing ineffective managers, thereby
threatening the operation of the stock market as a mechanism which compels
managers to deploy resources to their most valuable uses.
It is often overlooked that unlimited liability may also have different tax
effects upon investors when compared with limited liability. With »«limited
liability, in the event of corporate bankruptcy, every personally liable
shareholder's proportional stake in the corporation's unsettled debts may
qualify as a deductible loss for that shareholder's taxable income and so
reduce his private income tax obligation. In this case, there would be a tax
subsidy on the corporation's deficit favoring shareholders, consisting of
personal income tax savings, that is, a wealth transfer from the state treasury
to investors, equal to a part of the deficit. With ///»/tai liability, however,
shareholders' ability to deduct investment losses from their taxable private
income is largely limited to depreciation deductions based on capital losses on
the value of their shares. If, as a result of the corporation's bankruptcy, his
shares become worthless, a shareholder may have an income tax deduction for
the lost value of the shares but not for a proportionate stake in the total debt
which has accumulated in the corporate entity.
Although the implications of the above-mentioned tax difference with
respect to shareholders' behavior are not without ambiguity, it may not be
construed to imply that with unlimited liability, shareholders have tax-
motivated incentives to let a firm burdened with debts go down as their more
favorable tax position would by no means offset their losses from personal
liability; by contrast, the higher income tax deduction would be aywrtcfto« of
the higher loss arising under an unlimited liability regime. Yet with unlimited
liability, the tax subsidy is on the firm's liquidation, not on its survival. Thus,
if one were to look solely from a tax perspective, shareholders' incentives to
monitor the management of the corporate firm so as to ensure that the firm
stays in business would unfavorably be affected by unlimited liability.
Apart from disrupting the monitoring functions of the corporate form, the
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introduction of general unlimited liability would adversely affect the
corporation's ability to raise funds through the issuance of shares, and it
would probably raise the firm's cost of capital. First, unlimited liability would
reduce the overall supply of equity capital in as far as it discourages
investments by risk averse investors.
Second, on the assumption that investors' valuation of shares varies with
their anticipated level of risk, with unlimited liability, investors would pay
less for a corporation's shares than the amount they would be willing to pay if
they were to enjoy limited liability. In effect, unlimited liability depresses the
amount of capital a firm can obtain from the issue of shares.
Third, the price investors are likely to pay for a share carrying unlimited
liability would be further reduced because of investors' anticipated costs of
monitoring other shareholders' relative wealth, their prospective costs of
designing and enforcing restrictions on the transfer of shares to investors of
less wealth than the seller, and because of the opportunity costs of investment
illiquidity which such restrictions and increased transaction costs in stock
markets might entail.
Fourth, unlimited liability would reduce the ability of investors in
corporate equity to diversify away firm-specific risks. When firm-specific
risks cannot be diversified away, minimizing the number of holdings would be
a risk-minimizing strategy for investors. This strategy is likely to result in a
further discount on share prices because of the extra risk associated with non-
diversified holdings which investors would incorporate in their bids.
True, under an unlimited liability regime, lenders may be prepared to
charge lower interest rates on loans as they have greater security for
repayment. However, because of the reasons mentioned above, with unlimited
liability the firm is likely to raise less money from the sale of shares and as a
consequence, it will have to borrow more in order to obtain the same amount
to finance its operations. A firm's total interest /Toy/we/fte, therefore, may be
larger with unlimited liability, even if interest rates were lower.
In addition, although creditors' increased security for repayment would, in
principle, have a downward effect on interest rates, in other respects unlimited
liability may push up interest rates. It may have such an effect because with
unlimited liability, creditors face certain costs which they would not face
under a limited liability rule. Such costs may, wholly or partially, offset the
reduction in interest rates creditors would be prepared to accept because of
shareholders' individual liability. In particular, unlimited liability makes it
necessary for creditors to expend resources in investigating the recoverable
wealth of individual shareholders, in collecting corporate liabilities from
individual investors, and in designing and enforcing arrangements to prevent
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shareholders from reducing creditors' security after the latter have agreed to
provide credit to the corporation. :
Finally, the more money a firm were to borrow because of the reduced
funds it would be able to raise through the sale of shares carrying unlimited
liability, the greater the risk of bankruptcy, given that the firm would usually
be also obliged to pay interest (and to meet repayment obligations) in the
event of commercial adversities. In other words, with general unlimited
liability, high debt-equity ratios may raise the number of corporate
bankruptcies because interest and repayment obligations represent fixed costs
to a firm [Posner (1992), 395]. Bankruptcy imposes a cost on society not only
where creditors' claims remain wholly or partially unpaid, but also because of
the transaction costs involved in the collection of liabilities from large
numbers of personally liable corporate shareholders and because of the costs
of business restructuring in bankruptcy, and finally because it is indicative of
the use of resources at less than their opportunity costs (meaning that the
resources used by the bankrupt firm would have generated more value for
society if used elsewhere, which implies a waste of socially valuable
resources).
To recapitulate, abolition of the statutory limited liability principle in favor
of general unlimited liability would produce a cost to society, as described in
the preceding pages, in that it would adversely affect the ability of the
corporate form to raise capital for investment and to bring about effective
monitoring of productive activity.
Where unlimited liability were to result in more expensive and less
effective monitoring of input behavior, output quality and quantity are likely
to suffer, while production costs and, hence, output prices are apt to go up.
And where unlimited liability would detrimentally affect the firm's ability to
obtain capital to finance its operations, the overall level of productive activity
would shrink. Moreover, where higher costs of capital were to raise the firm's
costs of production, again, output prices would go up.
In effect, to the organizers of a firm, unlimited liability would raise the
opportunity costs of the corporate form of organization and lessen, or even
remove, the corporate form's comparative advantage over other forms of
business organization. If subsequently the use of alternative forms of
organization were to raise the costs of establishing any firm, transaction cost
savings of firms over market exchange transactions would diminish, and
ultimately economic activity would less likely come to be organized in a firm
In that event, the advantages associated with large-scale production and
specialization of production factors would not, or to a lesser degree only, be
realized (see the discussion in Chapter 1).
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A shift to unlimited liability, then, would involve considerable social costs,
primarily consisting in the forgone benefits of limited liability. Where the
social cost of abolishing the limited liability rule would outweigh the social
benefit of the greater efficiency in corporate decision-making that unlimited
liability would bring about, substitution of unlimited liability for the limited
liability principle would produce a net loss to society
Taking into account the social cost of introducing general unlimited
liability, the relevant question now facing us would seem to be how the
external costs problem can be remedied while concurrently maintaining the
beneficial effects of limited liability (described extensively in Chapter 3): how
can we maintain the virtues of limited liability, while at the same time
remedying its sins? We examine this question in the remainder of this chapter.
Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts?
Tfte Proposa/ for Pro Rafa L/ab/V/ry
Hansmann and Kraakman [1991] have proposed the abolition of the limited
liability rule in respect of torts committed by corporations. According to their
proposal, shareholders' limited liability should be preserved in relation to
debts arising from co/?fracte entered into by the corporation. The distinction
between contract creditors and tort creditors is based on the assumption that
unlike tort creditors, contract creditors, as voluntary creditors, are able to
negotiate credit terms providing adequate compensation for the risk which
limited liability shifts to them [1991, 1919-1920]. However, in Chapter 7 we
set out several reasons why contract creditors, like tort creditors, are unlikely
to receive such adequate compensation in every case. Hence, unlimited
shareholder liability for corporate /orte would not solve the problem of
uncompensated cow/racr creditors and corporate decision-making that ignores
the cost of corporate insolvency to contract creditors.
Unlimited, joint and several liability for corporate torts has similar
disadvantages as the introduction of general unlimited, joint and several
liability for shareholders would have. To avoid at least some of those
disadvantages, Hansmann and Kraakman have proposed a rule of />ro rato (or
/voporfrortflte) liability. As we saw in Chapter 3, pursuant to a /?ro ra/a
liability rule, a shareholder's liability is determined by the proportion he holds
of the total number of shares issued by the corporation. For instance, a 10
percent shareholder is liable for 10 percent of the corporation's tortious
liabilities exceeding the marketable value of corporate assets.
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The proposal for /?ro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts is based
on the idea that by increasing shareholders' exposure to liability,
proportionate liability creates incentives for shareholders and for corporate
managements driven by shareholder interests to adjust corporate behavior to
take into account its full social cost. In other words, the idea is that />ro rate
liability changes incentives by increasing shareholders' risk.
Hansmann and Kraakman submit that /?/*o rata liability will influence
corporate decision-making by causing share prices to reflect potential costs to
shareholders of tortious liability in excess of corporate assets. In their own
words: "If shareholders faced full liability for potential tort losses, share
prices would incorporate available information about the full extent of these
possible losses" [1991, 1907]. According to this reasoning, the greater the
perceived probability of tortious liability exceeding corporate assets and the
larger the perceived magnitude of such liability, the lower the market price of
the shares in the corporation concerned. Hence, if a corporation were to
engage in activities having a substantial risk of triggering excessive tortious
liability, such behavior would be reflected in a decline in share prices. Indeed,
the very purpose of the proposed />/-o rato liability rule is "to make share
prices reflect tort costs" [1991, 1903].
The asserted fact that with pro rata shareholder liability, market prices
would decline to reflect the actual probability and magnitude of future tort
losses, including losses exceeding corporate assets, is said to provide
incentives to both shareholders and managers to consider the full expected
social costs of corporate torts [Hansmann and Kraakman (1991), 1907]. As
set forth in Chapter 4, wealth maximizing shareholders desire managers to
maximize the value of their shares, and various market mechanisms operate
which, to a certain extent, provide incentives to managers to behave
accordingly. According to the analysis presented by Hansmann and
Kraakman, under a pro rato liability rule, maximizing share value requires
managers to internalize the tort risks of corporate activities in corporate
decision-making so as to reduce shareholders' potential exposure to
proportionate liability.
This, in turn, requires the adoption of higher standards of care towards
third parties and the selection of less hazardous business activities, based on
cost-benefit calculations which incorporate the full extent of the tort losses
that the corporation's activities may generate. In addition, to keep stock prices
up, managers will be induced to take out liability insurance covering the full
costs of corporate torts. Such insurance would not merely eliminate
prospective losses for shareholders resulting from proportionate liability,
thereby boosting share prices, but it would also provide compensation for the
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victims of corporate torts. Managers would have incentives to expend
corporate resources for these purposes until the marginal benefit to
shareholders of measures reducing their exposure to liability claims in excess
of corporate assets, equals the marginal expected soc/a/ costs of corporate
torts.
E/fecte of Pro Rate/./ad/7/fy
With pro ratar liability, the amount a shareholder can lose is legally
independent of the wealth of his fellow shareholders. Wealthy or poor, any
one shareholder is liable for only a percentage of the corporation's unsettled
tortious liabilities in proportion to his share ownership. He does not have to
make up for the deficit arising from other shareholders' inability to pay their
proportionate part of the burden. Consequently, Hansmann and Kraakman
[1991, 1906] submit, individual shareholders would not have an interest in
expending resources to monitor other shareholders' wealth levels. Similarly,
would-be acquirers of shares would not have incentives to examine the wealth
of the seller and the relative wealth of existing shareholders. In these ways,
pro rate liability would save transaction costs in comparison with joint and
several shareholder liability.
Moreover, at first glance, pro rato liability may be deemed to remove the
demand for restrictions on share transfers to investors of less wealth than the
seller as shareholders' potential exposure to liability is no longer
interdependent. By taking away the need for such restrictions and by avoiding
the transaction costs incurred in monitoring other shareholders' wealth levels,
proportionate liability would purportedly enable the continuous operation of a
flexible securities market which a joint and several liability regime would
threaten.
However, despite the fact that under pro ra/a liability, any one
shareholder's potential legal liability is exclusively determined by the
proportionate size of his investment, individual shareholders would still have
well-defined incentives to monitor their fellow shareholders' personal wealth
levels. As we set out in Chapter 3 (in our discussion of the significance of
limited liability to the functioning of stock markets), even under a pro ra/a
rule, a relatively wealthy shareholder's risk of being pursued by the
corporation's creditors for his proportionate share of the corporation's
unsettled debts would be greater than that of an investor of modest means,
given positive costs of collection. Collection costs might be quite substantial
particularly if there are many different shareholders, especially if they are
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Grundfest's criticism is based on the argument that a change in
shareholders' exposure to liability by the introduction of pro rato liability will
be countered by financial instruments and transaction techniques available in
today's capital markets. In brief, he holds that the dynamics of the capital
markets will deprive a pro rata liability rule of its purported effects of
increasing investors' risk and causing stock prices to reflect the risk that
corporate liabilities will exceed corporate assets. As a result, so he contends,
proportionate liability will «of induce managers to internalize the full-
expected social costs of corporate torts.
According to Grundfest, if proportionate liability were the rule, investors
with few assets which can be reached to cover tortious liabilities of the
corporation, would specialize in holding the shares in corporations whose
activities might generate tort losses in excess of corporate assets. Investors
having substantial investable wealth but few assets susceptible to third party
damage claims (denoted as "attachment-proof investors), have a comparative
advantage in holding shares in corporations with high expected tort costs
because they will lose little in the event of third party claims for proportionate
damages. Attachment-proof investors include both investors with little non-
invested wealth and investors who have shielded their personal assets from
claims under a pro rata liability rule, for instance, by transferring assets to
jurisdictions which do not recognize proportionate liability judgments or by
placing their shares with nearly insolvent nominee owners. Attachment-proof
investors would also include offshore investors, i.e. investors domiciled in
jurisdictions in which pro rofa liability is unenforceable [Grundfest (1992),
397-399].
Investors having substantial wealth at risk would, in contrast, specialize in
holding shares in corporations, the activities of which are unlikely to generate
proportionate liability exposure. Moreover, to enable investors to evade
proportionate liability exposure, corporations may, instead of equity shares,
issue debt instruments (for example, bonds) and equity substitutes, i.e.
securities (such as warrants) which are not equity and thus not subject to
unlimited liability but the characteristics of which are more or less similar to
those of equity shares. In addition, specialized intermediaries holding shares
in corporations with high tort risks may design schemes which separate
unlimited liability from equity shares by the issue of equity derivatives and
debt instruments.
The risk and return characteristics of shares in corporations that may
generate proportionate liability exposure are likely to differ from those of
corporations with low expected tort costs as the economic features of both
types of firms are different. Firms of the latter category normally engage in
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less hazardous economic activities (for example, trade and the rendering of
services) than firms belonging to the former category (including for example,
manufacturing industry, chemicals and construction). To obtain a balanced
portfolio, Grundfest submits that both attachment-proof and other investors
will want to hold equity securities relating to safe firms and to firms having
high expected tort costs. To satisfy their diversification demands while at the
same time shielding investors with assets susceptible to third party claims for
proportionate damages, attachment-proof investors and investors with
assessable assets can use a variety of arbitrage techniques such as futures,
options or swaps transactions.
Futures, options or swaps transactions in the capital markets could provide
both classes of investors with diversified investment portfolios, the risk and
return characteristics of which would not substantially differ from those
attainable under the existing limited liability regime. Such transactions would
in fact arbitrage away the effects of a /?ro rato liability regime. In effect,
Grundfest concludes, /?ro rata liability for corporate torts will «or produce
changes into shareholders' and managers' incentives.
First, given that investment portfolios will purportedly reflect the same
risk and return characteristics as under a limited liability regime, market
prices of shares will be unchanged from prices under limited shareholder
liability: the equilibrium prices of shares carrying pro rate liability will be
"identical to those in a limited liability regime" [Grundfest (1992), 404].
Hence, pro rata liability will not occasion stock price signals inducing
managers to select business activities and to adopt standards of care which
reflect the full social costs of corporate activities. Second, as attachment-
proof investors will hold the shares in corporations, the activities of which
may generate proportionate shareholder liability, there will be no net increase
in the pool of assets available to tort creditors of such corporations. For both
reasons a pro rata liability rule arguably will not result in corporate decision-
making which internalizes the costs of corporate torts in excess of corporate
assets.
The proposition that in reality, share prices will not be different from those
under limited liability is supported, to some extent, by Grossman's study of
market trading in American Express shares during the 1950s [Grossman
(1995)], to which we referred in Chapter 3. In these years, American Express
shares were subject to pro rota unlimited liability with respect to both
contractual and tortious liabilities incurred by the American Express
Company. Still, Grossman found no indication that these shares traded at a
discount in the market to make up for the additional risk in comparison with
shares in other companies that carried limited liability: "(...) there is no clear
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indication that the stock was, in fact, discounted because of its liability
status" [1995, 80]. However, the apparent absence of a discount because of
unlimited liability may have been due to investors perceiving the acfaa/ risk
that the American Express Company would incur liabilities in excess of its
assets as zero or close to zero, so that the pro rata liability rule would not in
fact expose them to a risk of personal liability of any significance. Indeed,
Grossman [1995, 80] concludes: "American Express was considered a low-
risk stock, and the market did not appear to regard unlimited liability as
adding special riskiness (...)". This finding leaves open the possibility that
market prices of pro rato liability shares in companies to which investors
would attach a significant positive risk of liability in excess of corporate
assets, would be depressed by a risk premium compensating investors for the
risk of personal liability.
To prevent the evasion of proportionate liability discussed by Grundfest,
Hansmann and Kraakman [1992] have proposed the adoption of legal
measures to preserve a core of shareholders who have assets which can be
assessed for the corporation's excess tortious liability, and to block routes for
evasion of proportionate liability. In particular, they propose "regulatory
measures to facilitate collection from small domestic shareholders and to
discourage a wholesale flight of equity in risky firms" to jurisdictions which
do not allow the enforcement of pro rata liability [1992, 435]. Grundfest
[1992, 391 fh. 13] has replied that such restrictions "would prove impossible
to implement and would add further costs to a proportionate liability regime".
One may add that any regulatory measures which impose restrictions on
capital flows are likely to impede the operation of capital markets, increase
transaction costs and curb the supply of equity capital.
Prospecfs for D/Vers/7/caf/on
Central to Grundfest's criticism of /?ro rata liability described above is that
under a pro rata liability rule, investors will be able to achieve the same
reduction of risks by portfolio diversification as with limited liability, through
arbitrage techniques and financial instruments available in the capital
markets. This view is based on a rather optimistic perception of the ability of
capital markets to adapt to proportionate liability. In contrast, in our view,
pro rata liability- does raise serious impediments to portfolio diversification
along the lines described by Grundfest, both on the supply side and on the
demand side of the capital markets.
As regards the supply side, portfolio diversification as contemplated by
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Grundfest requires first, that corporations and intermediaries issue debt
instruments and equity substitutes instead of equity shares carrying unlimited
liability and second, that such alternatives for shares shall enable the
construction of investment portfolios having risk and return characteristics
identical to those of portfolios under a limited liability regime. Indeed,
corporations can limit the issue of equity shares and sell bonds (or other debt
instruments) instead but, as discussed in Chapter 3, the risk and return
characteristics of bonds and debt in general are essentially different from
those of equity shares. Corporations may also choose to sell equity substitutes
such as warrants and convertible bonds but, again, the economic features of
such instruments do not exactly match those of shares. Therefore, it would
seem at best questionable whether debt instruments and equity derivatives
enable investors to construct investment portfolios which do not contain
equity shares but which do have the same risk and return characteristics as
portfolios including shares carrying limited liability.
Intermediaries will only enter capital markets to sell equity substitutes
(options, futures) if they expect to make a profit from carrying on such a
business. Consequently, equity substitutes created by intermediaries would
probably sell at a premium over the value that would be commensurate to the
stock market price of the shares in the corporation concerned. Such a
premium would increase the costs to investors of assembling a balanced
portfolio and these added costs may discourage investors from doing so.
Likewise, solely if they can earn a profit, intermediaries will offer to organize
arbitrage transactions enabling diversification, with similar effect.
In any event, the creation and sale of debt instruments and equity
derivatives would not enable corporations to avoid the issue of shares
carrying unlimited liability: apart from legal requirements compelling
corporations to issue shares, any corporation desiring to raise equity capital to
finance its operations cannot avoid issuing shares. If investors with assessable
assets were to exclude equity shares from their portfolio to evade liability
exposure, as Grundfest suggests, this would substantially change the nature of
their portfolio in comparison with a portfolio including equity shares, in such
measure as equity' substitutes would not bring about the same risk and return
characteristics as shares.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Hansmann and Kraakman [1992, 428-
429], Grundfest's assertion that with /vo rato liability, investors will be able
to assemble diversified portfolios resembling those achievable under general
limited liability, is contingent upon the existence of a pool of attachment-
proof investors who will hold the shares in corporations having a large
exposure to tortious liability. Only if non-assessable investors hold high-risk
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shares can potentially assessable investors confine their investments to equity
substitutes and low-risk shares. Accordingly, the supply of equity substitutes
carrying limited liability in a world of unlimited shareholder liability will
depend on the existence, and the size, of a pool of attachment-proof investors.
To become attachment-proof, investors of non-trivial wealth will have to
surmount substantial transaction costs (for instance, by transferring assets to
other jurisdictions, by placing non-invested wealth with straw men or by
hiring nominee owners to hold high-risk shares). Such transaction costs might
well threaten the generation of the requisite pool of attachment-proof investors
capable of holding high-risk shares. To the extent that transaction costs would
prevent the capital markets from procreating attachment-proof investors,
prospects for assembling balanced investment portfolios that diversify away
/?ro rato liability are diminished.
Diversification under an unlimited liability regime will not merely be
troubled with supply side problems of the kinds referred to above, but also
with problems on the demand side.
Investors with assets assessable for excess corporate liabilities in tort and
desiring to achieve portfolio diversification by adding firms in areas of
business which run substantial tort risks, would have to incur higher costs
than under general limited liability. First, they would have to incur the
transaction costs of arbitrage transactions in the capital markets. Such costs
may be quite significant if buying and selling commission payments to market
traders (brokers) are included. Second, as indicated above, investors
presumably have to pay intermediaries (or the corporations themselves if they
are the issuers) for their efforts to create equity substitutes, in addition to the
payment of the bare value of the investment instrument itself. Third, insofar
as equity substitutes are derived from existing shares, the ultimate holders of
those shares (attachment-proof investors) may well demand compensation for
bearing the risk of proportionate liability. The same applies in relation to any
investment instrument requiring the issuer to assume the liability risk, such as
put options; we refer to our discussion of put options and unlimited
shareholder liability in Chapter 3.
Each of the aforesaid costs would increase an investor's cost of
assembling a diversified portfolio when compared with a limited liability
world, thereby impeding diversification strategies. To the extent that these
costs exceed an investor's expected benefit from evading proportionate
liability, they would inhibit portfolio diversification. In such an event,
investors obviously would not achieve the same degree of diversification as
under limited liability and would not arbitrage away the effects of/>ro
liability.
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We recall that Grundfest's theory that />ro rata liability will not influence
share prices and corporate decision-making depends on the assumption that
investors can and will assemble diversified investment portfolios with risk and
return characteristics equal to those attainable under a limited liability rule.
This assumption is contradicted by the supply side and demand side problems
discussed above. If in fact a pro rato liability rule will not enable investors to
evade liability exposure by diversification, as we believe, pro rota liability
would create incentives inducing corporations to internalize the full expected
costs of torts. However, such beneficial effect of proportionate liability would
be at the cost of the disadvantages of such a liability regime described earlier.
In particular, as pro rota liability would threaten investors' ability to
diversify away risks, it would impede the corporation's capital-raising ability.
If, in contrast, a pro rata liability regime wow/d permit the evasion of
liability exposure, as claimed by Grundfest, it would not bring about its
asserted benefit. In such event, a shift to proportionate liability would "simply
impose additional transaction costs on investors and issuers alike", as
Grundfest [1992, 420] has stated. The higher the transaction costs which
investors face in the capital markets, the harder it will be for corporate firms
to raise capital by the sale of shares because investors will discount share
prices by the amount of those transaction costs.
Alternative Remedies
Trte Spec/a/ Case of C/ose Corporafrons
For the reasons discussed above, a shift to pro ratar liability for corporate
torts would not, in our view, establish a viable solution to the problem of
externalization of risk which is posed by limited shareholder liability. Either it
would not accomplish the asserted benefit of bringing greater efficiency to
corporate decision-making or it would do so only at the expense of raising
decision-making costs, thwarting the separation of the functions of
management and residual risk-bearing, and crippling the corporation as a
capital-raising device.
General unlimited liability may only be preferable to limited liability in
cases in which limited liability is not instrumental to the effective monitoring
of input behavior, or to the inflow of capital into the corporate firm. In such
cases, unlimited liability would induce managers motivated by shareholder
interests to consider the full social costs of corporate activity whilst it would
not at the same time impede the monitoring or financing functions of the
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corporate concept. A particular class of corporations can be identified in
which limited liability would seem to be rather unimportant to the monitoring
of input behavior and the procurement of capital. This class consists of
closely held corporations, the shares of which are owned by a single
shareholder or by a few shareholders, with no active stock market trading in
the corporation's shares.
As stated in the introductory chapter, this book is concerned primarily with
publicly held corporations, which were defined as corporations, the shares of
which are scattered amongst a large number of shareholders and which can be
readily traded on an organized stock exchange or in an over-the-counter or
other private market. Hence, the bulk of the observations advanced so far
focuses on these publicly held corporations. This should not conceal the fact
that limited liability also creates incentives for shareholders of closely held
corporations to engage the firm in a socially excessive level of risk-taking,
both when determining what activities the firm should undertake and when
selecting the level of care that should be exercised at a given activity level in
order to avoid injury to third parties. In addition, the subject of the close
corporation is related to that of its publicly held counterpart not merely
because they share the limited liability feature, but also because publicly held
corporations frequently incorporate distinct parts of their business as separate
close corporations, all or virtually all of the shares of which they directly or
indirectly own and of which they control the management.
Different from publicly held corporations, however, the degree of
shareholder involvement in the management of close corporations would seem
to be largely independent of the limited liability rule. In the present limited
liability world, closely held corporations with one or few shareholders,
whether private individuals or corporations themselves, are predominantly
shareholder-managed or have a large degree of shareholder involvement in
managerial decision-making. In effect, the ownership of the residual claim in
this class of corporations is largely restricted to the firm's decision-makers
[Fama and Jensen (1983a), 303, 322]. Limited liability, then, does not operate
to separate the management function from that of residual risk-bearing, at
least not in a similar degree as in respect of publicly held corporations
[Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 110; (1986), 271]. Given that in closely
held corporations the shareholders are in control of the firms management
and own the residual claim, the incentive to externalize risk which limited
liability creates for such shareholder-managers is prone to be more severe
than it is for the specialized managers that run publicly held corporations (as
Easterbrook and Fischel [1985, 110] have noticed). This is because in close
corporations, the shareholder-managers will capture all of the benefits if a
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risky venture becomes a success, whereas in publicly held corporations such
benefits are diluted in a multitude of shareholders, with salaried managers
benefiting only to the extent that their incomes are tied to corporate
performance and to the extent that other disciplining mechanisms discussed in
Chapter 4 will reward them, for instance, through an increase in the rental
value of their human capital.
Not only does limited liability in close corporations not operate to separate
management from residual risk-bearing, other advantages associated with
limited liability for shareholders of publicly held corporations are also absent.
For instance, as there is only one or a small number of shareholders, limited
liability does not bring about significant savings in shareholders' expenses
incurred in monitoring fellow shareholders' wealth. For the same reason,
limited liability cannot be construed as a response to a perceived "free rider"
problem among the shareholders relating to the monitoring of productive
activity. Moreover, the operation of a securities market in which shares can
be freely traded is relatively unimportant as a mechanism for promoting
effective corporate management, given that the shareholders of closely held
corporations are subject to restrictions to the alienability of shares (the
rationales of which were briefly touched upon in Chapter 5) which limit their
ability to move their invested wealth to alternative investment opportunities
promising greater returns. Hence, limited liability does not play any
meaningful role in facilitating the operation of such a market.
Furthermore, the significance of limited liability to the raising of capital by
closely held corporations is rather limited and tends to be overestimated. True,
limited liability may be regarded as encouraging investments by risk averse
investors but, as we discussed in Chapter 3, risk-aversion cannot in itself
explain limited liability given that risk averse investors could invest in bonds
issued by the corporation or purchase third-party liability insurance where
available. In addition, investors in closely held corporations who choose to
run the firm themselves or to be closely involved in its management and who
accept being subject to exit restrictions limiting their ability to liquefy their
investment, can hardly be considered risk averse. Thus, they are quite unlikely
to belong to the category of investors whose making of investments limited
liability may be thought to promote.
Perhaps more fundamentally, in reality, limited liability for shareholders of
closely held corporations towards professional lenders, including banks and
other financial institutions, is largely a myth. Such creditors more often than
not require shareholders to voluntarily assume unlimited liability as a
condition for the extension of a loan to the corporation, or they demand that
shareholders assume liability up to an amount greatly exceeding the
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subscription price of their shares. Accordingly, shareholders must waive their
right of limited liability towards these creditors in order for the corporation to
attract loans [Posner (1992), 423]. The "shareholder guarantee" would seem
to be the legal instrument most commonly used for this purpose. In this way,
the statutory principle of limited liability is subverted by private transactions
in the market place.
Where creditors demand and shareholders are prepared to accept unlimited
liability, shareholders' statutory limited liability is irrelevant to the
corporation's ability to raise equity capital. Creditors demanding unlimited
liability apparently take for granted the additional costs of assessing
individual shareholders' repayment capacity and bringing collection suits
against individual shareholders. In these circumstances, statutory limited
liability raw« rather than lowers transaction costs by compelling lenders and
shareholders to contract around the limited liability rule.
Finally, investors" prospects of diversification are not as important to the
ability of closely held corporations to acquire capital as they are to
corporations with multiple non-controlling shareholders. Diversification is a
risk-minimizing strategy available to passive investors who are unwilling to
become actively involved in the management of any of the firms in their
portfolio. However, as indicated, shareholders in closely held corporations
generally do not bestow the management of the firm upon a specialized
management and are not averse to actively participating in managerial
decision-making themselves. They are not, generally, passive investors
assembling a portfolio composed of manifold unrelated investments to
diminish risks. And even if they did wish to pursue diversification in order to
reduce their investment risk, their ability to do so effectively would be less
than that of shareholders of publicly held corporations, because there is a
physical limit to the number of firms they could manage or co-manage
simultaneously and because increasing their number of holdings would not
reduce risk if lenders stipulated for personal liability of shareholders. With
respect to close corporations, limited liability as a prerequisite for
diversification is not, therefore, as important to the procurement of capital
from investors as it is with respect to publicly held corporations.
What, then, does limited liability do for closely held corporations?
Firms operated in different organizational forms compete against each
other in the markets for investment capital and managerial labor with a view
to attracting both capital for investment and management skills to run the
firm. Both investors and managers are free to choose one form of organization
over another when deciding where to invest or to work. In order to survive.
any one firm competing in these markets must offer to investors, a risk and
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return package and to managers, a reward package that, on the whole, is
competitive with the packages offered by other firms. The meaning of limited
liability for shareholders of close corporations is probably best understood in
the context of this competition rather than from the perspective of its
contribution to the operation and organization of the firm.
As is apparent from our discussion so far, close corporations may be
deemed to have several comparative disadvantages over publicly held
corporations in the competition among differently organized firms to attract
equity capital: shareholders of close corporations largely forgo the benefits of
specialization of function (as the firm is not run by a specialized
management), investment liquidity through easy transferability of shares
(given that transfer restrictions apply) and diminution of investment risks
through diversification. Also, there being no liquid market for their shares,
closely held corporations lack the benefit of the stock market both as a
mechanism through which investors could easily determine the value of their
residual claim (by simply looking at the market price of the corporation's
shares), and as a mechanism creating incentives for value-maximizing
management through the impact of managerial decisions on the market price
of the shares and the threat of a takeover [Easterbrook and Fischel (1986),
275-276]. Similarly, close corporations have a comparative disadvantage in
the market for managerial labor: whereas publicly held corporations seek to
recruit managers who have to supply management skills only, close
corporations are looking for persons who are prepared to provide to the firm
management services, investment capital and risk-bearing (as residual
claimants), which forces the number of qualified (and willing) managers down
[Easterbrook and Fischel (1986), 274].
Statutory limited liability for shareholders of closely held corporations
may be conceived as being a premium for investors which serves to secure the
close corporation's ability to compete in the markets for investment capital
and managerial labor notwithstanding the aforementioned competitive
disadvantages and which, thus, serves not only to encourage investment in
firms operated as close corporations but also to enhance the joint supply of
management and risk-bearing services to such firms. It is in fact a reward for
the supply of joint management and investment rather than an organizational
instrument which it is in the framework of the publicly held corporation. As
closely held corporations tend to organize small-scale firms and starting
businesses in particular, limited liability may be viewed as a premium
encouraging investment in these types of firms - not, at least not primarily, a
premium to overcome risk-aversion on the part of investors, but a premium to
enhance the close corporation's power to compete against firms organized
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differently in the markets for investment capital and managerial labor.
L/n//m/fed L/aö/7/Yy for Snareno/ders of C/ose Co/poratfons
Although the upside of limited liability is different for publicly held and
closely held corporations, the downside is essentially the same: it permits
shareholders and those acting on their behalf to ignore losses exceeding the
amount of shareholders' investment that the corporation's activities may
generate, and compels both involuntary creditors and voluntary creditors
unable to contract around the limited liability rule to subsidize corporate
activity by bearing the risk of such excess losses, thus forcing them to suffer
the costs of corporate insolvency if and when the business fails. In this way,
subject to shareholders' obligation to pay the subscription price of their
shares only, it places the cost of developing and promoting new businesses on
the creditors of the corporation [Landers (1975), 593]. As a result, in the
words of Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull [1980, 148], limited liability of
shareholders of close corporations creates incentives for investors "(...) to
exploit a moral hazard and transfer uncompensated business risks to
creditors", as it enables them to pursue personal benefit irrespective of the
costs of their strivings to the latter.
As explained in the preceding section, this downside of limited liability is
not offset by monitoring and financial benefits similar to those that limited
liability creates for publicly held corporations with numerous shareholders
and a separate management. In addition, the fact that limited liability may be
understood as a premium which supports firms organized as a close
corporation in their competition against differently organized firms, does not
mean that limited liability is indispensable for the survival of closely held
firms or for the survival of the close corporation as a form of organization.
Other factors independent of the limited liability principle (and independent of
possible tax advantages) may exist explaining why a firm's organizers may
choose the close corporation to set up a business.
For instance, where the cost of separating management and residual risk-
bearing is greater than investors' expected return from such specialization of
function, the close corporation, to the extent that it concentrates management
and residual risk-bearing, has an advantage over organizational forms that are
characterized by strict separation of these functions (such as its publicly held
counterpart). Similarly, Fama and Jensen [1983a, 322; 1983b, 346] have
interpreted the close corporation as a device to avoid the agency costs
associated with separation of management from risk-bearing. This could
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explain why close corporations have become prominent in two types of firms
in which the costs of separating these functions are likely to be prohibitive:
firms in which the number of cooperating input owners is small and in which
the shirking problem among the input owners, therefore, is unlikely to be so
significant as to justify the costs of specialized monitoring by a separate
management, and firms in which there are no important economies of scale in
the production of output that demand large accumulation of wealth from a
variety of suppliers for investment in firm-specific assets [Fama and Jensen
(1983b), 346].
Inasmuch as in closely held corporations the same persons are both
managers and residual claimants, the close corporation also allows greater
flexibility in the size and format of managerial rewards than organizations run
by a specialized management. In publicly held corporations, for instance, the
management usually receives the bulk of its compensation through agreed-
upon salaries, which are quite independent of the firm's earnings and present
fixed costs to the firm it is also obliged to pay in the event of business
adversities that diminish the firm's earnings. By contrast, in close
corporations, shareholder-managers may choose to lower their fixed income
as managers in order to reduce the firm's costs and, if the firm's earnings so
allow, to raise their income component from the possession of the residual
claim, ;.e. the part of their income that is contingent on the firm's results. This
may help to explain why the close corporation is often chosen to organize
starting firms, the earnings of which tend to be subject to a greater degree of
uncertainty than those of existing firms with established product markets and
for which, therefore, it is necessary to keep their cost structures flexible (;.e.
adjustable) if they wish to stay in business when actual earnings fall short of
projections.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, given that close corporations
generally have a limited number of shareholders who are concurrently closely
involved in the firm's management, restrictions on the alienability of shares
which are typical of this class of corporations (but not of its publicly held
counterpart), may operate to preserve for investors relationship-specific
investment value that would be forgone if individual shareholders were free to
dispose of their shares to any third party purchaser.
Not only does the close corporation possess certain features apart from
limited liability which may account for its use in the organization of small-
scale and starting businesses, also if, as a matter of public policy, it were
considered desirable to subsidize firms operated as close corporations in order
to support small businesses and to promote the development of new firms, it
is not at all obvious why such a subsidy should be provided strictly by the
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firm's creditors, through the bearing of uncompensated business risk and the
suffering of losses in the event of business failure. If subsidizing closely held
firms is judged to be desirable as a public policy goal, it would seem more
plausible to have such a subsidy provided by the state on behalf of society as
a whole, paid from the state's tax revenues.
Therefore, taking into account that limited liability in closely held
corporations is a premium for investors and not an organizational essentiality,
that it does not yield monitoring and financial benefits as in publicly held
corporations and that the close corporation form bears advantages for the
organization of (small-scale) businesses other than limited liability, we
support the view (advanced, among others, by Halpem, Trebilcock and
Turnbull [1980, 148] and by Shavell [1987, 176]) that in order to induce
shareholders, including shareholder-managers, to internalize the full social
costs of corporate activity when making decisions on behalf of the firm,
unlimited liability would be the preferred statutory regime for closely held
corporations. On the assumption that they have assets at stake in addition to
their shares in the firm, unlimited liability will give the shareholders a direct
pecuniary interest in controlling the corporation's activities in order to avoid it
taking excessive risk, whilst their involvement in the firm's management will
give them both the knowledge and the ability to reduce risks and to enhance
care. This applies to cases in which all the corporation's shares are held by a
single shareholder as well as to cases in which there are several shareholders
who are jointly involved in the management of the firm. In both cases,
therefore, unlimited liability should be introduced.
However, if a close corporation has several shareholders, unlimited yb/nf
am/ severa/ liability may well create monitoring costs among the shareholders
and demands for a complete ban on share transfers to purchasers with less
wealth than the seller similar to those which would be provoked by unlimited
liability for shareholders of publicly held corporations. A rule providing for
pro ra/a liability instead of joint and several liability would obviate such side-
effects. Moreover, in order to avoid the transaction costs that creditors were
to surmount if they had to collect the corporation's debts from individual
shareholders, creditors should first be required to seek payment from the
corporation itself [Halpem, Trebilcock and Tumbull (1980), 148 fh. 51]. In
the event that the corporation would have insufficient assets to cover its
payment obligations or would simply refuse to pay, they should be required to
file a petition with the appropriate court for the establishment of the
corporation's insolvency (meaning bankruptcy) and for the appointment of a
trustee to handle the case. The trustee appointed by the court should
subsequently enforce pro rato liability upon the individual shareholders on
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behalf of the corporation's joint creditors and distribute the proceeds to the
latter in proportion to their respective claims. Creditors themselves should not
be permitted to bring independent collection suits against individual
shareholders. For the same reason (avoidance of transaction costs), an
unlimited liability regime should preserve the corporation as a legal entity
capable of contracting debts and incurring tortious and other liabilities in its
own name so that parties wishing to deal with the firm would not have to
transact with individual shareholders. The individual shareholders, then,
should be vicariously liable for the obligations incumbent on the corporation,
subject only to the corporation's inability to pay.
iV/wtf jfac/e, an unlimited liability regime would work only if shareholders
were unable to relieve themselves of personal liability by disposing of their
shares in the face of corporate insolvency. If solvent shareholders were able to
evade liability by simply transferring their shares to, probably, less solvent
acquirers who would then become liable in their place (or by causing the
corporation to repurchase shares previously issued), it would seem that
unlimited liability would not have its proclaimed beneficial effect on
shareholders' incentives and corporate decision-making as shareholders would
<&ycfc/o enjoy limited liability. This proposition, however, is not entirely, at
least not necessarily, true.
To the extent that potential purchasers of shares would anticipate future
personal liability arising from corporate activities prior to their acquisition of
the shares, they would most likely attach negative value to the shares in
question as they would expect the same to consume all or part of their
personal wealth rather than add to it. This would practically render the shares
unsalable, except to purchasers who are already judgment proof at the time of
purchase and to purchasers who are unaware of the imminence of liability.
This, in turn, would give existing shareholders an interest in avoiding
excessive risk-taking, not merely to keep down the risk of their own personal
liability but to secure the shares' alienability in fact and to enhance the
shares' value to potential purchasers and accordingly, the price the latter will
be prepared to pay [Shavell (1987), 176]. Such incentives are likely to be
inadequate in cases where existing shareholders anticipate that imminent
personal liability can be hidden from would-be purchasers or that the latter
will be unaware of past corporate activities that may trigger liability
following their acquisition of the shares, where the transaction costs facing
potential purchasers to obtain correct information on the risk of personal
liability will be prohibitive (given that existing shareholders ordinarily have
an information advantage over the former), and where the existing
shareholders expect that they will be able to evade liability in any event
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through the use of evasive constructions (for instance, by transferring their
shares in the face of corporate bankruptcy to an insolvent figurehead
purchaser, possibly located in another jurisdiction). In each of these cases,
existing shareholders would not have adequate incentives to reduce risk if they
could relieve themselves of imminent liability by transferring their shares.
Therefore, we propose that unlimited liability should extend to former
shareholders that owned shares prior to the corporation's insolvency, at the
moment or during the period in which the activity generating losses in excess
of the corporation's assets was carried out.
On December 21, 1989, the Council of the European Union adopted a
directive addressed to the Union's member states which specifically deals with
close corporations of which the shares are owned by one shareholder only
(and which does not cover close corporations with more than one
shareholder). This directive, named Council Directive (EEC) 89/667, is
known as the twelfth European directive on company law. The directive
aimed to harmonize, to a rather limited extent, the laws of the Union's
member states pertaining to statutory close corporations with a single
shareholder and obliged the member states to take such implementing
measures as were necessary to make their national laws comply with the
directive's provisions.
Contrary to abolishing limited liability with respect to single-shareholder
corporations, the twelfth directive aims to ensure that throughout the
European Union, the limited liability principle will be available to single
shareholders of close corporations so as to enable individual business owners
to limit their liability for the obligations incurred by the business.
Consequently, as a rule, any sole shareholder, owning all of the shares in a
close corporation incorporated in a member state of the European Union,
should be able to enjoy limited liability, irrespective of whether he has become
the corporation's sole shareholder at the occasion of its formation or at a later
date.
However, the twelfth directive grants the member states the discretion to
deny the limited liability privilege to sole shareholders who are corporations
or other legal entities themselves and also to natural persons who hold all of
the shares in more than one close corporation (Section 2 (2) of the directive).
Accordingly, the directive does not oblige individual member states to confer
limited liability on corporations desirous to establish wholly owned subsidiary
corporations, or on individuals who are the sole shareholder of two or more
corporations at the same time [Boschma (1997), 20]. The reason that limited
liability is not prescribed in these instances - although member states are free
to allow it - , does not lie in a policy judgment by the European legislature
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against corporations establishing wholly owned subsidiary corporations or
against natural persons owning all shares in several corporations but rather,
in the fact that the laws of the various member states differed on these points
and that there was no legislative desire, at least no political majority, amongst
the member states to uniform their laws with a view to eliminating such
differences.
The twelfth directive embracing limited liability as the general rule for
single-shareholder close corporations, albeit with the above-mentioned
qualifications, must not be interpreted such that the European legislature
disavowed the possibility of limited liability hurting creditors or that such
possibility has been ignored in the directive. However, instead of attempting
to altogether remove the perverse incentives limited liability entails by
prescribing unlimited liability for sole shareholders of close corporations, the
directive relies on other techniques to protect creditors.
First, whenever all of the shares in a close corporation come to be held by
a single shareholder, this fact and the identity of the sole shareholder must be
made public, either through its registration with the appropriate official
commercial registers or by its entering into a register kept by the corporation
itself which must be accessible to the public (pursuant to Section 3 of the
directive). Which manner of making the information public will apply,
depends on the implementing legislation enacted by the individual member
states and, thus, can vary between the different states. The disclosure
requirement concerning the fact that all the corporation's shares are owned by
a single person, together with this person's identity, serves to feed information
into credit markets, thus enabling would-be creditors of single-shareholder
close corporations to take appropriate measures in order to protect themselves
against the risk of being exploited by the corporation's sole shareholder.
Moreover, the disclosure requirement economizes on the transaction (/.e.
search) costs which would-be creditors would have to incur if they had to
collect the same information through investigations of their own. All of this,
however, applies to voluntary creditors only: /«voluntary creditors, by
definition, are unable to collect and respond to corporate and shareholder
information before being forced into a transaction.
Second, the twelfth directive seeks to directly protect both voluntary and
involuntary creditors by prescribing certain formalities which, to some extent,
restrict the sole shareholder's discretion to intermingle the affairs of the
corporation with his personal affairs. The directive contains two such
requirements: any decision that is made by the shareholder on the basis of the
powers residing in the shareholders as a body must be properly recorded in
writing (Section 4 (2)), as must be any contract between the sole shareholder
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and the corporation if the latter is represented by the shareholder in respect of
the contract concerned, with the exception of contracts concluded in the
ordinary course of business (Section 5). These requirements further that the
corporation be operated as a separate business and may in addition, be
conceived as opposing improper self-dealing (including fraud) by the
shareholder at the expense of the corporation and its creditors. This in turn
helps voluntary creditors to set risk-commensurate terms when extending
credit to the corporation and, to the extent that the cited requirements oppose
the arbitrary appropriation of corporate resources by the sole shareholder,
they enhance both voluntary and involuntary creditors' ability to collect from
the corporation.
Third, in its fifth recital, the directive states that it does not intend to
prejudice the laws of individual member states of the European Union which,
in exceptional circumstances, provide for imposition of personal liability on a
corporation's sole shareholder in spite of limited liability being the rule.
Accordingly, the twelfth directive allows member states to set aside the
limited liability of a close corporation's sole shareholder in "exceptional
circumstances", the definition of which is left to member state jurisdictions
and which in all likelihood require seriously improper conduct on the part of
the relevant shareholder [Boschma (1997), 17]. This exception to the rule
would seem to endorse member states' right to impose unlimited liability as
an after-the-fact remedy once the sole shareholder has used his limited
liability to externalize losses to creditors, with a view to allowing creditors to
recover such losses from the shareholder's non-invested assets. The disclosure
and recording requirements described above are essentially ex fl«te techniques
devised to oppose externalities before they arise, whilst the imposition of
personal liability is an ex />osf remedy which may come into play when
preventive instruments have failed. To what extent this remedy is available
under the laws of one member state of the European Union, the Netherlands,
and under the laws of a non-member state, the United States, is examined in
Chapter 9 /«/ra.
Prior to the adoption and implementation of the twelfth directive, unlimited
liability for shareholders owning all of the shares in a close corporation used
to be the statutory rule in several member states, Italy being one. Section
2497 of the Italian Civil Code used to provide that in the event of insolvency
of the corporation, the sole shareholder was personally liable for the debts the
corporation had incurred during the period in which he had been its sole
shareholder. Experience in Italy under this rule revealed that exposure to
unlimited liability was easily avoided by the issue of one or a small number of
shares to an associate of the corporation's majority shareholder, who held all
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remaining shares. Similar evasive constructions were reportedly used in
Greece and in the United Kingdom, where the national corporation statutes
also provided for unlimited liability of single shareholders in certain cases.
This experience would seem to support the view that for unlimited liability to
be effective, its realm should not be limited to single-shareholder
corporations.
As indicated, under Section 2 (2) of the twelfth directive, the member
states of the European Union may provide for unlimited shareholder liability
if all shares in a corporation are owned by a different corporation or by
another legal entity. Thus, until the Council of the European Union adopts
legislation to the contrary, member states' national laws are at liberty to
provide that a parent company which owns all of the shares in a subsidiary
corporation, shall be liable without limitation for the latter's obligations.
Indeed, in our view, an unlimited liability regime for shareholders of close
corporations should extend to close corporations whose shares are owned by
another corporation such that parent companies shall be liable for the
obligations of their subsidiaries. Such liability would create incentives for the
shareholders of parent corporations and for parent company management to
avoid liabilities by subsidiary corporations in excess of the latter's assets.
Similarly, Shavell [1987, 176] has argued that a parent company liable for
the debts of its subsidiary would have both the motive and the ability to
reduce risks created by the subsidiary. Where a subsidiary has a management
different from that of its parent, through the operation of markets for
managerial labor inside corporate groups, managers of subsidiary
corporations would have similar incentives.
In what is probably one of the first comprehensive explorations of the law
and economics of corporate groups, Berle [1947] associated the imposition of
liability on a parent company with the existence of one underlying firm, of
which the parent and the subsidiary represent integrated, more or less
indistinguishable parts. According to his "theory of enterprise entity", where
the activities of affiliated corporations together form one firm, this economic
reality should lead to their joint liability for the liabilities generated by the
enterprise, irrespective of the legal entity in the name of which they were
incurred [1947, 348]; a theory that was later embraced and refined by
Landers [1975]. Thus, liabilities should follow the economic enterprise from
whose operations they have ensued rather than the legal entity nominally
accountable. However, it is not the integrated firm per se but the very use of
separate affiliated corporations to avoid liability which shifts business risks to
third parties. This can also be observed in the absence of a single underlying
firm. Therefore, in our view, there would seem to be a good case in favor of
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holding parent corporations liable for the debts of their subsidiaries regardless
of whether they carry on an integrated business collectively.
Unlimited liability for parent corporations would discourage the use of
"special purpose" subsidiary corporations established to perform activities
with a high risk of generating excessive liabilities. As described earlier, such
special purpose corporations are used to isolate high-risk activities from the
other activities of a corporate group. In particular, they are aimed at
insulating the assets of other group companies from the liabilities generated
by such high-risk activities. In this way, the risk of failure of the activity in
question is shifted to creditors of the subsidiary concerned who have been
unable to obtain parent company guarantees. Unlimited liability for parent
companies would discourage such practices and would compel parent
companies, including their shareholders and managements, to incorporate the
costs of high-risk group activities into their private cost-benefit calculations
up to the combined value of the joint assets of the member companies of the
corporate group concerned.
Finally, with limited liability, corporations may seek to reduce risks by
setting up incorporated joint ventures with other, non-affiliated corporations
for the purpose of performing activities carrying a substantial risk of
generating excessive liabilities. In order to avoid extemalization of risks
through the establishment of such joint ventures, each company participating
in an incorporated joint venture should be liable, on a /?ro rato basis, for the
unsettled debts of the joint venture company. Such "dual liability" would
induce each participating corporation to incorporate a proportional part of the
expected social costs of the joint venture's activities as part of their internal
cost structures and, in consequence, to have the joint venture company
exercise appropriate care in order to avoid its operations generating liabilities
exceeding its assets (which would have to be paid by the respective parent
companies). Likewise, in the case of torts committed by multiple injurers
acting in concert, imposition of liability on each injurer has been shown to
create incentives for each injurer to take optimal care, it being in their mutual
interests to avoid liability [Shavell (1987), 165-166].
77?e PuMc/y He/d Co^poraf/or?
We have argued that the advantages of limited shareholder liability to publicly
held corporations do not apply to closely held corporations which by
definition have only small numbers of shareholders and the shares of which
are not traded in regular stock markets. Similarly, the rationales for limited
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liability in respect of publicly held corporations do not apply to subsidiary
corporations and to incorporated joint ventures, the shares of which are held
by other corporations. In order to remedy the externality problem posed by
limited liability, therefore, unlimited liability would seem to be the preferred
rule for these classes of corporations.
However, as we have also seen, unlimited liability does not provide a
viable alternative with regard to publicly held corporations with multiple
diversified shareholders and with freely transferable shares. Still, the
advantages of limited liability to this class of corporation do not alter the fact
that limited liability induces shareholders and managers driven by shareholder
interests to ignore the social costs of corporate activity exceeding the value of
shareholders' investment, which may result in uncompensated transfers of the
risk of business failure to creditors. Is there a remedy which preserves the
advantages of statutory limited liability while at the same time aligning
corporate decision-making, particularly corporate cost calculating, with the
full social costs of corporate activity?
Independently of his proposal (with Hansmann) for /?ro rata liability of
shareholders, Kraakman [1984] has promoted the idea that expansion of
personal liability of mortage« for corporate liabilities, especially corporate
liabilities in tort, towards third parties, would induce the intemalization of
external costs in management decisions: personal liability purportedly would
give managers incentives to avoid excessive risk-taking by the corporate firm,
and to ensure that liability insurance levels be adequate to cover injury
sustained by third parties as a result of corporate activities. Much of our
discussion in Chapter 5 relating to the social costs of managerial liability for
injury inflicted on shareholders also applies here: imposition of personal
liability on managers would create both direct costs (compensation payments
to management for the bearing of undiversified liability risk and for litigation
expenses) and indirect costs (shrinkage of the pool of recruitable managers,
over-investment in risk avoidance, stock price discounts for compensation
payments to management and anticipated costs of litigation), whilst most
likely D&O liability insurance would only be able to partially alleviate such
effects for essentially the same reasons that were discussed at the end of
Chapter 5. However, making managers liable for corporate liabilities towards
third parties would also give rise to another, more fundamental problem.
Personal liability for liabilities generated by the corporation's activities
would effectively force managers to assume the risk of those activities.
Accordingly, managers would not merely be in charge of running the firm but
they would also perform a risk-bearing function. This would interfere with the
separation of business management and risk-bearing functions underlying the
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corporate form and defy the specialization rationales from which that
separation has emerged (as discussed in Chapter 2). As McKean [1978, 89]
has pointed out, managers would no longer be specialists in managerial tasks
but, rather, in some mixture of managerial and risk-bearing responsibilities,
whilst the shouldering of business risk would no longer be concentrated in the
shareholders. This would both limit the possibility of specialization in any one
of these functions according to comparative advantage and create a demand
for a different type of manager, who should combine management and risk-
bearing features. We are afraid that this type of manager is quite similar to a
non-specialized shareholder-manager, whom the publicly held corporation has
long overthrown precisely to avail investors of the benefit of an organizational
structure in which management and risk-bearing functions are each assigned
to specialists. In effect, imposition of personal liability upon managers would
both threaten the effectiveness of the firm's management and reduce the
attractiveness of the corporate form to investors which would be reflected in
fewer investments, higher operative costs, lower output levels and higher
prices for consumers [McKean (1978), 89].
In a different theory, Posner [1976, 520] has suggested that every
corporation engaged in high-risk activities should be obliged to post a bond
equal to the "highest reasonable estimate of the probable extent of its tort
liability". By restricting the corporation's discretion to pay out resources to
its shareholders, the posting of such a bond would unquestionably raise the
assets available to satisfy the corporation's tortious liabilities, thereby not
merely increasing shareholders' potential loss but also compelling them to
bear more of the expected losses from torts caused by the corporation's
activities. This in turn would induce corporations to consider in their decision-
making processes a greater part of the costs of corporate activity to tort
victims so that they would be less likely to engage in activities where
anticipated social costs exceed expected benefits to the shareholders. In
addition, the posting of a bond may create extra incentives to exercise care as
wealth maximizing shareholders would not want to forfeit the value of the
bond. For these reasons, we empathize with the object of Posner's proposal.
However, having at least four objections to his proposal, it cannot persuade
us.
First, requiring corporations to post a bond to provide for future liabilities
in tort may accommodate tort victims, but it ignores the problem of
uncompensated risk transfers to other involuntary creditors such as the tax
authorities and to voluntary creditors unable to obtain ex ow/e compensation
for the risk of corporate asset insufficiency. Posner's suggested remedy, then,
is unlikely to promote greater efficiency in corporate decision-making with
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respect to these categories of creditors.
Second, the "highest reasonable estimate of the probable extent" of a
corporation's tortious liability may prove difficult to implement as a standard
for determining the amount of the bond to be posted. What is a "reasonable
estimate" and who should be responsible for making such an estimate? Who
should be responsible for acquiring the relevant information to estimate the
corporation's probable liability in tort, and who should administer the bond
posted? Should there be a fall-back if the odds change and the estimated
amount turns out later to be insufficient to cover the corporation's probable
(or actual) liability in tort?
Perhaps more important, at least from the perspective of providing
adequate compensation to tort victims, the "probable extent" of the
corporation's tortious liability, which is at the center of Posner's bond
formula, is rather unlikely to generate sufficient means to compensate tort
creditors for losses exceeding corporate assets if such losses actually occur:
except in extraordinary cases (in particular, where the corporate form is
deliberately used to commit torts and shield shareholders from the resulting
liabilities), a corporation's pro6aA/e liability in tort will be less than its tfcfwa/
liability if a tort is committed so that the amount of the bond posted will be
insufficient to cover tort victims' actual losses. For instance, if the likelihood
of a severe loss exceeding corporate assets is small, the amount of the bond
will be equally small and, thus, be grossly inadequate to compensate tort
victims in the event of occurrence of such a loss. To summarize, although the
"bond" remedy could work, at least in theory, from a deterrence perspective
as it would compel corporate decision-makers to face the expected tort losses
associated with the corporation's activities, it would still be inadequate from
the point of view of providing compensation to tort victims for non-prevented
losses exceeding corporate assets.
Fourth, if we understand Posner's proposal correctly, it requires
corporations engaged in dangerous activities to earmark a part of their
resources as security for future tortious liabilities and assumes that the same
resources may not also be pledged as security for the repayment of loans
extended by voluntary creditors. (If the bond to be posted for the benefit of
tort victims were unsecured, the intended beneficiaries would only have a
general, non-preferential claim against the corporation's assets alongside the
claims of voluntary creditors. In that event, posting a bond would not provide
any advantage over the situation that would apply if no bond were posted at
all.) Accordingly, the bond requirement would proportionately reduce the
collateral the corporation may put up to banks and other voluntary lenders. In
effect, the corporation's ability to attract capital by raising debt would be
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harmed. Thus, the greater protection for tort creditors and the perceived
increased efficiency in corporate decision-making the bond requirement is
intended to bring about, would come at the expense of the corporation's
capital-raising ability. Obviously this would have an adverse effect on the
level of corporate investments, including investments in projects ««likely to
generate excessive liabilities.
The basic idea underlying Posner's bond proposal is that the benefit of
limitation of liability should require the reservation of a minimum amount to
cover future liabilities in tort and that this amount should be correlated to the
extent of such future liabilities. The same idea has been applied, even before
Posner advanced his proposal, in the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage which was agreed on November 29, 1969.
Article III of this Convention provides that, as a rule, the owner of a sea-
going vessel carrying oil in bulk as cargo shall be liable for any pollution
damage resulting from the escape or discharging of oil from the vessel.
However, Article V (1) entitles the owner of the ship to limit his liability
under the Convention in respect of any one incident causing pollution damage
to an amount calculated on the basis of the ship's tonnage, except if the
incident occurred due to "the actual fault or privity of the owner" (Article V
(2)). In order to avail himself of such a limitation of liability, the owner of the
vessel must "constitute a fund for the total sum representing the limit of his
liability" with a court or other authority indicated in the Convention (Article
V (3)). Article V (3) provides that this fund can be constituted "either by
depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee,
acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State where the fund is
constituted, and considered to be adequate" by the relevant court or other
authority.
Only two years after the adoption of the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the compensation system for victims of
pollution damage set forth by this Convention was considered to be
inadequate by the Convention's contracting states. On December 18, 1971,
they adopted a supplementary convention entitled the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage. The supplementary convention states in its recitals,
as one of the reasons of its being agreed, that the compensation system
provided in the earlier convention "does not afford full compensation for
victims of oil pollution damage in all cases while it imposes an additional
financial burden on shipowners". The similarity with the objections raised
above against Posner's bond proposal is notable. The supplementary
convention of 1971 has established the "International Oil Pollution
7?>e Corporate Paradox 373
Compensation Fund" which both provides compensation to persons suffering
pollution damage if the compensation obtainable pursuant to the earlier
convention proves inadequate (Article 4) and which relieves the financial
burden of shipowners under the earlier convention (Article 5). A shipowner is,
subject to certain limitations, entitled to reimbursement from the International
Fund for liability payments made under the convention of 1969, including
payments from the private fund he may have constituted pursuant to that
convention in order to limit his liability, if the aggregate amount of liability
exceeds a certain threshold (to be calculated on the basis of Article 5 (1) of
the supplementary convention). In effect, a shipowner's cost of limiting his
liability for oil pollution damage under the convention of 1969 is reduced by
the amount he can recover from the International Fund in the event of an
incident triggering liability.
/nsurance
An alternative to the bond remedy discussed above could be, in principle, to
complement the limited liability rule with a legal requirement that
corporations take out insurance against any liabilities, whether arising from
contracts or torts, that may exceed corporate assets. Such a requirement
might take the form of requiring corporations to purchase third-party
insurance coverage against tortious liabilities generated by the firm and
against corporate liabilities based on the non-performance of contractual
obligations and would, in fact, oblige corporations to carry insurance against
their own insolvency. By taking out third-party liability insurance, a
corporation would obtain coverage against having to pay for other parties'
losses resulting from its activities, and the latter's ability to recover such
losses would be secured to the extent that losses are covered by the firm's
insurance policy.
The major advantage associated with a compulsory insurance requirement
as described above is that in a competitive insurance market, insurance
companies would charge premiums at rates approximating the full extent of
the corporation's anticipated liabilities (instead of anticipated liabilities
limited by the value of corporate assets), so that insurance premiums would
also cover the risk that corporate assets fall short of the liabilities generated
by the business. Hence, corporations engaging in activities with a high risk of
generating excessive liabilities would have to pay high insurance premiums,
whereas corporations engaging in less risky areas of business would be
charged proportionately lower premiums. Through the amount of insurance
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premium due, corporate decision-makers would be compelled to internalize
the full anticipated social costs of contemplated activities in their cost-benefit
calculations. This in turn would cause the firm to engage in risky activities
only up to the level at which marginal expected social costs equal marginal
expected benefits to the shareholders. Thus, corporate decision-makers would
take socially efficient decisions on whether or not to engage the firm in an
activity and accordingly, make socially efficient investment decisions.
However, there are serious disadvantages, too, to a requirement that
corporations purchase third-party liability insurance. First, although to the
extent that they reflect expected corporate liabilities, insurance premiums
would induce corporate decision-makers to engage the firm in a socially
efficient level of activities that may trigger liabilities exceeding corporate
assets, their incentives to exercise care in order to avoid liability at a given
level of activity (/.e. once the investment is made), might be diluted. Thus,
although the level of risky activity would be socially efficient, the
corporation's level of care (z.e. its efforts to prevent losses) might not be. This
is because the presence of insurance coverage may itself alter the
corporation's incentives to take care as it would not have to bear the losses
resulting from failure to do so, which would be paid from the insurance policy
[Shavell (1982), 127; (1987), 195-196; 241-242]. (The changing of incentives
by the insurance policy is known as the "moral hazard" problem, the
implications of which are further discussed on pages 317-318 /n/ra.) The
presence of insurance coverage would diminish incentives to prevent loss
particularly where insurers are unable to observe the corporation's level of
care and consequently fail to link the insurance premium payable, or the other
terms of the insurance policy, to the corporation's taking of preventive
measures (for instance, the use of safety devices) aimed at avoiding liability
(see our discussion of the effects of D&O liability insurance in Chapter 5
5«/?ra). In the extreme, if the corporation has full liability insurance coverage
and insurers are unable to control its level of care in any respect, corporate
decision-makers would have no motive at all to invest in loss-prevention.
Second, insurance markets, as any other markets, are tainted by positive
transaction costs, which attend the supply of insurance: insurers must
examine firms' risk levels in order to determine risk-commensurate insurance
premiums, they have loss-minimizing incentives to monitor the firm's actions
after the insurance is provided in order to oppose changes in behavior that
would increase their risk, they must incur administrative expenses in order to
both devise and administer insurance policies and premiums and to cope with
claims made under a policy, they will often incur expenses in negotiations
with other insurance companies in order to reinsure their risks, and they have
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to maintain an organizational infrastructure (overhead) capable of performing
all of these tasks. To the extent that liability insurance premiums will cover
the transaction costs facing the insurer in addition to his expected payments
under the policy (/.e. the insurer's risk), transaction costs may cause
insurance premiums to be significantly higher than a corporation's expected
liabilities. If corporations are subject to a requirement to purchase liability
insurance coverage, this would result in a corporation desirous to engage in
an activity being forced to pay more than the expected liabilities it would
generate. In consequence, when evaluating the activity in question, through
the insurance premiums associated with it, corporate management would be
induced to consider more than the anticipated losses from the activity, so that
it might well decide against the activity although in reality, its anticipated
social costs would be less than anticipated returns to the shareholders and
although it would, therefore, be socially desirable that the activity be
undertaken. Accordingly, when insurance premiums exceed expected
liabilities as a result of the transaction cost component included in premiums,
the firm may wraferinvest in risky activities: the level of risky activity might
simply be too low in relation to the anticipated losses associated with the
activity (which, indeed, would be the exact opposite from the situation we
seek to remedy but which from the perspective of efficiency, would be equally
undesirable).
Third, limited shareholder liability combined with a requirement for
corporations to take out third-party liability insurance would change the
nature of the insurance that would be obtained as compared with the situation
under limited liability without an insurance requirement: if corporations are
not subject to an obligation to carry liability insurance, it will be for the
corporation's voluntary and involuntary creditors to purchase insurance
against their own losses in the event of corporate insolvency. Thus they would
have to take out "first-party" insurance (;.e. insurance against the insured's
personal loss) if they wish to reduce their risk (provided, of course, that such
insurance would be available in the market). Accordingly, the introduction of
an insurance requirement for corporations would involve a shift from first-
party insurance to third-party insurance, which in turn would most likely have
an upward effect on the level of insurance premiums, for the following
reasons.
As Priest [1988, 207] stated with respect to United States insurance
markets, the administrative costs associated with third-party insurance are
considerably higher than those accompanying first-party insurance (he
estimates the former at 2.75 to 5.75 times higher). In effect, the component of
insurance premiums covering transaction costs under third-party insurance
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will be higher than the same component under first-party insurance, with the
consequences described above. The difference in transaction costs follows, at
least in part, from the fact that third-party insurance gives rise to more
extensive litigation - particularly on the establishment of liability, meaning a
right to claim under the insurance policy - , than first-party insurance, which
generally does not require that a liable party be identified. Furthermore, as
also indicated by Priest [1988, 207] on the basis of United States data,
coverage for the same potential loss under third-party insurance tends to be
clearly higher than coverage under first-party insurance (by a factor 2.34, on
average) which again entails higher premiums. To the extent that this implies
that under third-party insurance, coverage would exceed potential liabilities,
with the firm carrying too much insurance relative to the losses it might cause
and, consequently, that insurance premiums would be higher than the
anticipated losses associated with an activity, the corporation would, through
the insurance premiums, have to bear wore than the activity's expected social
costs. In this event, corporate decision-makers would, once more, have
incentives to decide against some activities, the anticipated social costs of
which would be less than their anticipated returns to the shareholders and
which, hence, would be socially desirable to undertake.
Alternatively, where demand for the firm's products is sufficiently
inelastic and the firm can increase returns from an activity at its own
discretion by raising output prices in order to offset high insurance premiums,
corporate decision-makers can decide to undertake the activity at a higher
price, so that consumers would collectively pay for the firm's over-insurance
and for additional transaction costs and would, therefore, other things equal,
be worse off than under first-party insurance. On assumption that they could
not claim more than the amount of their loss, third-party liability insurance
coverage exceeding the losses that the firm could cause, would also not better
the position of victims of corporate activity.
Fourth, perhaps most important, a compulsory insurance requirement
would only work if insurance markets were to produce insurance policies
providing (more or less) full coverage against the tortious and contractual
liabilities entailed by the corporation's operations, including liabilities
exceeding corporate assets. Yet it is questionable whether insurance
companies will be prepared to offer such coverage, in particular, with respect
to liabilities based on non-performance of the corporation's contractual
obligations. Indeed, Arrow [1970, 139-140] has associated the very origin of
statutory limited liability with a failure of insurance markets: through limited
liability, he argues, "[t]he law (...) steps in and forces a risk-shifting not
created in the market place" [1970, 140]. Although we agree with Woodward
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[1985, 605] that failure of insurance markets cannot alone account for the
prevalence of statutory limited liability because insurance presupposes risk-
aversion (only parties willing to eliminate the risk of suffering potentially
large losses choose to buy insurance) and because risk-aversion, as mentioned
earlier, cannot in itself explain limited liability, Arrow's basic point that the
market's ability to produce insurance is subject to limitations, can hardly be
disputed (as has been demonstrated in Chapter 5 with respect to D&O
liability insurance). He observed that generally, the insurance available in the
market is limited with regard to scope (the range of insurable risks) and
amount (the insured amount usually being limited to a certain maximum and
insurance policies often stating deductibles to be paid by the insured).
Moreover, insurance policies frequently include provisions that restrict the
insured party's liberty of action and subject him in one way or another to the
insurer's control [Arrow (1970), 141-142].
Two factors can be identified which, apart from prohibitively high
transaction costs in some situations, limit the insurability of risks through
market supplied insurance: the "moral hazard" problem and the "adverse
selection" problem. "Moral hazard" refers to the fact that when protected by
insurance coverage, insured parties might cause losses which they would have
endeavored to prevent in the absence of insurance, that is, which would not
have arisen if they had had to bear the loss themselves. More generally, it
refers to the incentives for the insured party created by the insurance policy to
increase either the probability of a loss or its possible magnitude or both.
Such behavioral changes would be detrimental to the insurer inasmuch as they
would alter the assumptions upon which he relied when setting the insurance
premium and defining the other terms of the policy, he would then be exposed
to more risk and, thus, to potentially higher losses than he agreed to insure.
Where a significant "moral hazard" problem is present that cannot be
resolved by the insurer through active monitoring of the insured's conduct or
through the terms of the insurance policy, he may not be prepared to supply
coverage at any premium as his risk would be indefinite and as, therefore, he
would not be able to set risk-commensurate premiums (and other contract
provisions). Thus, insurance coverage diminishing the insured's incentives to
avoid losses could not merely lead to too little exercise of care (as we
discussed above), in the end it could lead to the non-availability of insurance
The "moral hazard" factor is likely to be especially important in relation to
the insurance of corporate liabilities following from inadequate performance
of contractual obligations: if the corporation were insured against having to
pay for losses caused by the non-performance of a contract previously entered
378 Exfended L/ab/7/ry and Ofner Remed/es
into, its incentive to properly perform the contract in question (for instance, to
repay a loan or to pay the agreed interest rate) would be greatly reduced. In
other words, the presence of insurance coverage would allow corporations to
default on obligations it has contracted without having to face the losses so
imposed on others. For the same reason (diminishment of incentives to
perform properly), one may safely assume that insurers will be reluctant to
provide third-party insurance covering corporate liabilities to voluntary
creditors, except where they are able to control the corporation's performance
of its obligations to such creditors (which in turn would require them to
actively survey corporate behavior). Similarly, in Arrow's view the "moral
hazard" factor explains why "(...) insurance against failure of businesses or of
research projects has not arisen; the incentive to succeed may be too greatly
reduced" [1970, 143]. This view is shared by Shavell [1987, 198], who
maintains that the problems with incentives entailed by the presence of
insurance coverage are responsible for the fact that parties "do not generally
have insurance against business losses".
Apart from the "moral hazard" problem on the part of the corporation,
there is also a "moral hazard" on the part of creditors that contract with a
corporation which carries insurance against inadequate performance of its
contractual obligations. Such creditors have little reason to set credit terms in
accordance with the corporation's actual risk of becoming insolvent or to
avoid becoming a creditor of a corporation with assets which may prove
insufficient to meet its obligations, given that in the event of corporate default,
their losses would be covered by the firm's insurance policy anyway. In other
words, they would have little to fear from the corporation's failure.
The "adverse selection" problem, which operates in addition to the "moral
hazard" factor, refers to the fact that insurers may lack the information
necessary to adequately define risks in advance of offering insurance and
may, therefore, fail to segregate high-risk insureds from low-risk ones when
creating separate risk pools according to expected risk levels and setting
insurance premiums. As a result, low-risk insureds might have to pay
insurance premiums higher than their expected losses (/.e. their risk), meaning
that they will pay more than they get from the insurance, and will therefore be
induced to cancel the insurance. In the extreme, risk pools will completely
unravel and the insurer will be left with high risks only, in respect of which he
may find himself unable to sell coverage at a profit so that insurance will
become unavailable. A requirement for corporations to carry third-party
insurance against any liabilities that they might generate would impede the
definition of risks and the creation of separate risk pools consisting of risks of
similar value in several ways.
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Priest [1988, 208-209] has explained that in addressing third-party
insurance, it is more difficult for insurers to define risks appropriately than
when addressing first-party insurance (that is, under limited liability without
an insurance requirement for corporations) because in the case of third-party
insurance, insurers' risk is contingent on the interpretation and application of
legal liability rules by the judiciary, which could create substantial
uncertainty concerning both the probability of a claim against the insurance
policy arising and the possible magnitude of such claims. For instance, the
courts may expand liability beyond the level anticipated by the insurer when
calculating his odds by imposing greater liability awards (;.e. higher amounts
of damages) or by expanding the range of events covered by the liability rule
to which the insurance policy relates. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 5 in
relation to D&O liability insurance, in the mid-1980s, such developments
have caused insurance companies in the United States to reduce coverage or
to completely withdraw insurance from the market in areas where their risk
had become largely undefinable. With respect to first-party insurance, on the
other hand, insurers' risk is predominantly determined by the probability that
the insured will incur a personal loss (not: will have to pay for a loss suffered
by another party) and by the possible size of such losses, which relieves
insurers of the uncertainty and consequent difficulty in determining risk
described above.
Given that the application of liability rules (/.e. how far courts will extend
liability) is beyond the insurer's control, not merely are absolute risks harder
to predict, in third-party liability insurance it is also more difficult for insurers
to distinguish high-risk insureds from low-risk insureds than in first-party
insurance. This will make it more difficult for them to pool risks of similar
size, with the above-mentioned consequence that low-risks will be induced to
drop out and that coverage may be denied [Priest (1988), 209]. Indeed, as
Viscusi [1991, 35] has observed, rational insurance companies will deny
liability insurance coverage "when risks cannot be effectively pooled and
spread or when risks are highly unpredictable".
Furthermore, if every corporation were required to carry third-party
insurance in respect of corporate liabilities to both voluntary and involuntary
creditors, the risks facing various firms would, to some extent, be correlated
(that is, an increase in one firm's risk would mean an increase in other risks in
the same pool) and, consequently, become even more difficult to predict and
to segregate: if every corporation had to take out insurance, insurers' risk in
respect of each corporation would increase should an event occur affecting all
or most corporations that raises the probability or the possible amount of a
claim against any one insurance policy, for instance, an economic depression
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that would raise the rate of corporate defaults, a natural disaster or a war, a
change in products liability laws increasing all manufacturers' exposure to
liability, or the manifestation of a defect in a product manufactured by an
entire industry. If risks are correlated in this way, insurers' ability to diminish
their aggregate risk through pooling would be reduced. Insurers would then be
inclined either to deny or limit coverage or to charge premiums higher than
their expected payments under the policy in order to protect themselves
against unanticipated risk increases and this, again, would mean than
corporations would have to bear more than the expected losses their activities
could cause to others.
The above discussion should not be misinterpreted to suggest that if
corporations were made subject to a requirement to carry third-party
insurance against the liabilities generated by the business, insurance markets
would not supply such insurance at all. Obviously, under the present limited
liability rule without a complementary insurance requirement, insurance
against liability in tort is available in many cases and this is unlikely to
change if an insurance requirement were introduced. However, with respect to
liabilities based on the non-performance of contracts, the situation is different.
In addition, because of the reasons discussed above, if corporations were
required to take out liability insurance covering the full size of their potential
liabilities, there would most likely be limitations to the insurance coverage
that would be available in the market, whilst the insurance premiums charged
by insurers might well exceed the expected losses from the corporation's
activities to third parties (which in turn would induce them to decide against
certain activities that might be socially desirable to undertake). One may
argue that to the extent that markets would fail to produce private insurance,
the government should step in and arrange for the supply of social insurance
against corporate liabilities. However, in a way, social insurance would do
exactly the same as limited liability: it would impose the costs of corporate
insolvency on society at large instead of on those who reap the fruits from the
firm's activities in the event of success.
In the preceding pages, we discussed an insurance requirement
complementing the existing limited liability rule. At least in theory, it is also
possible to altogether abolish statutory limited liability and oblige either the
shareholders or the corporation itself to purchase third-party insurance
against corporate liabilities to voluntary and involuntary creditors, such that
the insurance requirement would function as a substitute for limited liability.
However, an insurance requirement combined with unlimited shareholder
liability would not merely give rise to the very same problems as limited
liability with complementary insurance, it would even exacerbate them. If
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insurers had to negotiate with each individual shareholder on the purchase of
liability insurance, transaction costs would be huge. In addition, in order to
determine their risk, insurers would not only have to evaluate the value of the
corporation's assets, but also the individual shareholders' personal wealth
levels, which would create additional transaction costs [Easterbrook and
Fischel (1985), 101]. Furthermore, as Woodward [1985, 605] observed,
conflicts might arise among shareholders on the amount of insurance coverage
that should be purchased as shareholders' levels of non-invested wealth would
be different and, thus, the risk to which each of them would be exposed under
unlimited liability. Hence, it would seem difficult to rebut Posner's conclusion
that a requirement to take out liability insurance would not be a "satisfactory
alternative to limited liability" [1976, 520].
Este6//s/7/77enf of a Compensator) Fund
For the reasons discussed above, private insurance requirements would at best
provide only a partial remedy to the externality problem posed by limited
liability. However, the principle of obliging corporations to pay risk-reflecting
premiums for the purpose of providing compensation to creditors whose
claims exceed corporate assets and creating appropriate incentives to reduce
risks, is a promising starting point for a more complete remedy. Based on the
same principle, we submit that publicly held corporations should be required
to pay a certain fee, for example on an annual basis, into a newly established
fund from which creditors of the corporation should be satisfied in the event
of corporate failure, to the extent that the corporation's assets prove
insufficient to meet its payment obligations.
Such a fund should be administered independent of any particular
corporation and the fees payable by individual corporations should be based
on each corporation's risk of insolvency. Even if this risk could not be
completely defined, the marketable value of the corporation's assets relative
to the size of its potential liabilities would provide some indication of the risk
of failure. The higher the insolvency risk, the higher the fee a corporation
should be required to pay into the creditors' compensation fund. Thus, firms
engaged in activities which are generally acknowledged as sources of
potentially excessive liabilities, such as chemicals manufacturing, hazardous
waste, oil and chemicals transport, medical drugs and equipment industries
and manufacturing of potentially hazardous (for example, toxic) products,
should be required to pay higher fees than firms engaged in less dangerous
lines of business. Similarly, ideally fees should be responsive to the level of
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care that a firm exercises in order to prevent excessive liabilities from arising
and also to the size of its insurance coverage protecting creditors against such
liabilities.
Through the fees payable, firms would be compelled to internalize the
costs of failure to their creditors: as they have to pay for the risk that is
shifted to creditors, they will have incentives to match the marginal
anticipated benefits of a particular project to the shareholders with the
marginal anticipated costs to both shareholders and creditors in the event of
failure. In effect, the level of risk selected will reflect the project's anticipated
soc/a/ costs, and not only projected costs to the .y/rare/jo/der.?. The same will
apply to the firm's level of care and to the extent of its insurance coverage,
provided that fees respond to these factors.
If corporate management were to select activities, the anticipated social
costs of which in the event of failure would exceed the anticipated benefits to
shareholders in the event of success, the shareholders would have to bear the
deficit (;.e. the risk of a default occurring) through the fee which the
corporation must pay into the compensation fund and which would eventually
come at the expense of shareholders' return. Hence, on condition that fees
increase if more risk is shifted, where managers would ignore potential losses
that corporate activities may cause to creditors, thus increasing their risk of
non-payment, shareholders would be harmed through the operation of the fee
mechanism. Accordingly, the disciplining market forces described in Chapter
4 would provide incentives to managers to balance expected benefits to
shareholders with the social costs of corporate activities in order to avoid fee
increases, at least to the extent that such fee increases are not outweighed by
higher returns to the shareholders. In effect, the market mechanisms operating
to induce managers to act in the shareholders' best interests, will now also
operate to induce managers to choose activities in the best interests of society
as a whole: instead of inducing managers to externalize risk in order to
maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim, they will now create
incentives to internalize the full social costs of corporate activity as this would
maximize the residual claim's value (by saving fees), thereby enhancing social
efficiency in corporate decision-making.
The notion of a compensation fund established for the purpose of
compensating creditors of corporate activity who are unable to obtain
payment from the corporation itself, is not new. Especially in relation to
involuntary creditors who have suffered property damage or personal injury
as a result of corporate activity, compensation funds have occasionally been
mentioned as an alternative to the payment of damages through the tort
system, particularly in cases involving a large number of victims practically
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unable to obtain reparative damages from the injurer on the basis of a tort
claim [Bocken (1987); (1988); Dommering (1996)]. Cases in which the tort
system fails to provide adequate compensation include cases involving
multiple victims whose combined damage greatly exceeds the injurer's assets,
or in which no specific liable party can be identified, or in which the legal
requirements for tortious liability are not satisfied despite the fact that third
parties did suffer significant harm that in all likelihood is attributable to the
activities of one or more identifiable corporations (for instance, as the relevant
standard of causation cannot be fulfilled).
In the real world, compensation funds have been set up in a number of
settings characterized by one or more of the aforementioned features in which
victims of corporate activity were unable, or were deemed to be unable, to
obtain damages through the tort system. One may think of, to name a few, the
compensation fund for sufferers of asbestos related diseases which was set up
by the United States' leading asbestos producer, the Manville Corporation in
1988 (the "Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust"), the fund established
by AH. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon shield (a contraceptive), to
pay damages to women who suffered injury from the use of the Dalkon shield
(the "Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust"), the Air Pollution Fund that was set up
by the Dutch government pursuant to Section 15.24 of the Dutch
Environmental Control Act in order to redress harm caused by unexpected
exposure to air pollution and irrecoverable from the polluter, and the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund referred to a few pages ago.
The establishment of a compensation fund to make up for external costs
ensuing from corporations' activities is not a panacea but has its own
demerits, which to a greater or lesser extent may threaten the fund's effective
performance and which have led to a rather critical appraisal of the fund
remedy in academic circles. In relation to funds operative in the United States
to compensate victims in mass tort cases (and with express reference to the
Manville and Robins' funds referred to above), Viscusi [1991, 167] reports
that major problems facing such funds are (i) inadequacy of the financial
resources available to meet claims for damages, (ii) uncertainty concerning
the fund's ability to pay claims arising in the future, and (iii) high
administrative costs associated with the operation of the fund itself, including
high litigation costs (legal fees), which may absorb a considerable part of the
resources intended as compensation. Thus, the fund's capitalization may be
insufficient in relation to the total damage for which compensation is sought
and the fund's long-term viability may be questionable as the number of
claims on the fund may be greater than originally anticipated, especially in
cases in which more claims arise as the years evolve, such as in the event of
324 Extended L/ab/ffify and Ofner Remed/es
asbestos related claims and other cases involving long tail liability risks.
There could also be continued expensive litigation concerning the validity of
claims and the amount of damages to which claimants on the fund are entitled.
For all these reasons, compensation funds are not generally viewed as the
"ideal solution" to the compensation problem which exists if parties suffering
injury from corporate activity are unable to obtain damages on the basis of
existing liability rules [Viscusi (1991), 169].
Compensation funds have been criticized not only with respect to their
ability to efficaciously provide compensation but also on the basis of their
potential detrimental effect on the prevention of injury, in particular, their
effect on injurers' incentives to take care [Faure and Hartlief (1996), 38]. If
the existence of a compensation fund would in fact relieve injurers of the
obligation to pay damages due to victims being entitled to receive
compensation from the fund, potential injurers' motives to take measures
aimed at preventing personal injury or property damage to third parties would
be diminished. In this case, the fund's existence would add /o the problem of
external costs rather than resolve it as less prevention by injurers would lead
to more injury and greater losses to other members of society (meaning more
extemalization of costs).
The preservation of loss-avoiding incentives on the part of injurers would
in any event require that the compensation fund's managers have the right to
recover from the injurer any payments made from the fund, which in turn
requires that victims should assign to the fund their rights to receive damages
from the injurer, as a condition for being entitled to compensation from the
fund. Through a recovery action by the fund, the injurer could be compelled
to reimburse the fund if a claim is made on it in respect of an injury
attributable to him, so that indirectly he would have to bear the injury's costs.
His incentives to take care would then be more or less similar to the incentives
he would have if he were to pay damages directly to the victim (on the
assumption that the latter can claim from the fund, and the fund can recover
from the injurer, an amount similar to the amount that the victim could
otherwise have claimed directly from the injurer on the basis of existing
liability rules). Indeed, Dutch legislation concerning the Air Pollution Fund
referred to above expressly provides that if compensation is paid from the Air
Pollution Fund, the fund automatically acquires the victim's rights to receive
compensation in the same amount from other sources (Section 15.26 (4) of
the Environmental Control Act). The International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund has a similar right to recover any amount of
compensation for pollution damage paid by the fund from the owner of the
polluting vessel or his liability insurer (pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the 1971
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Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage).
There are several reasons why none of the above concerns are likely to
pose a fundamental threat to the compensation fund we propose to establish.
With respect to the fund's ability to make payments to claimants,
insufficiency of financial resources is mostly a problem for funds that are
established fl/te/" a particular loss-causing event has occurred, for the purpose
of providing compensation to victims of that event who could not obtain
compensation through the tort system (such as in the Dalkon shield and
asbestos cases). In such a case, the financial resources necessary for the
operation of the fund need to be assembled on an ad /;oc basis, once it has
become clear that the injurer himself has insufficient means to pay
appropriate damages (or cannot be traced at all). Thus, the injurer's ability to
contribute to the fund will be less than the total compensation sought. This ad
/IOC nature is at least partly responsible for the perceived difficulty in raising
adequate financial resources (who will make up for the injurer's failure to
pay?).
In addition, if a fund is set up to compensate losses resulting from an event
which occurred in the past (for example, the marketing of a medical device or
the release of a hazardous substance), typically the fund is called into being to
cope with losses not anticipated at the time, the ultimate amount of which is
subject to a substantial degree of uncertainty that does not disappear with the
establishment of a compensation fund. For instance, new losses may reveal
themselves many years after the loss-causing event took place (such as in the
case of asbestos related disease), and the numbe, of victims (claimants) may
be unknown at the time the fund is established. Such factors may interfere
with the original estimate of the total resources that would be required to
enable the fund to compensate the relevant losses, and threaten the long-term
viability of funds set up to deal with historical loss-causing events, in
particular, events involving long tail liability risks.
A compensation fund set up to compensate creditors of corporations in the
event of the corporations insolvency, however, would neither be an ad Aoc
fund created for the purpose of satisfying creditors of one or more specific
insolvent corporations, nor a fund set up to cope with the consequences of a
particular loss-causing event that occurred in the past. The proposed fund
would be of a general nature, intended to provide relief to the creditors of each
corporation participating in the fund in the event of non-payment, and it
would be financed ;>? advance q/"the loss-causing event (viz. the relevant
insolvency) through the fees that individual corporations would be required to
pay in: corporations would pay ex a«/e to repair future losses that would fall
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should the corporation fail. If fees are set appropriately, this should warrant
that the fund will always have sufficient resources to meet the costs of
creditors' claims.
Moreover, unlike funds which are set up to provide compensation for
losses in respect of which no compensation is available on the basis of
existing liability rules, the fund we propose would not act as a substitute for
existing liability rules. Rather, it would co/wp/eme«/ the existing rules and
provide a guarantee to creditors of corporations effecting that if on the basis
of an existing liability rule they have a claim on a particular corporation,
payment of that claim is guaranteed by the fund should the corporation prove
insolvent. Thus, creditors would remain bound by the requirements of existing
liability rules and must have a valid claim against an insolvent corporation
under these rules before they could claim from the fund. Accordingly, the
fund would be a mere fall-back of, not an alternative to, existing liability
rules, ensuring that creditors will in fact receive the amount to which they
would be entitled under these rules [Bocken (1988), 4]. As a guarantee ywra/,
the scope of the fund we propose would be more limited than that of funds
established to provide compensation in lieu of payment of damages through
the tort system, and this would also be likely to support the fund's financial
soundness and long-term viability.
The fact that the proposed fund would not in any respect limit or prejudice
existing liability rules means that the deterrent effect of such rules would
remain basically unchanged as corporations would not be relieved of any
liability they incur. Rather, the continued operation of existing liability rules
would entail that liability of the corporation would have to be established
before a claim could be made on the compensation fund. Thus, as before, the
corporation's assets could be wiped out completely by the liabilities it incurs
(and should be wiped out completely before a claim on the fund were
possible), so that the incentives of corporate decision-makers to prevent
external loss would not be diminished by the existence of the proposed
compensation fund. Granted, the fact that the fund will provide compensation
for losses exceeding the corporation's assets will induce corporate decision-
makers to treat such losses as imposing liabilities only equal to the
corporation's assets but, as we have seen in Chapter 7, this is no different
from the situation which exists in the absence of a fund. In addition, such
effect could be alleviated by conferring on the fund the right to recover the
costs of claims on the fund from the remaining assets of the insolvent
corporation. Furthermore, in order to effect that the incentives of the
individuals behind the corporate veil (shareholders and managers) to avoid
external loss will not be reduced by the existence of a compensation fund, the
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fund should be given the right to recover from such individuals any payments
made from the fund in cases in which under the applicable law, individual
creditors of the corporation would have a right to hold such individuals
personally liable. Accordingly, claimants on the fund should be required to
assign to the fund any such right and any rights they have against the
corporation itself in respect of the amount paid by the fund.
The final threat to the effective performance of compensation funds
consists of the operational costs of the fund itself and the costs of litigation
between the fund and claimants wishing to collect from it. Neither of these
factors, however, is apt to form an insurmountable hurdle to a fund set up to
provide relief to unpaid creditors of insolvent corporations.
First, it is rather unlikely that the fund will provoke new litigation on a
large scale as a claim on the fund would be no different from a claim on the
corporation that failed to pay and as, hence, the validity of a claim on the fund
would have to be established no different from a claim on the corporation
itself; there would, in other words, not be a material change in the claim
concerned or in the claimant's position except that the claim must be brought
against a different entity. In addition, given that the proposed fund would
compensate creditors of insolvent corporations only, the procedural rules
applying to the submission of claims to the fund should link up with the rules
that apply to the bringing of claims in any bankruptcy case. Thus, if under the
applicable law a claim against an insolvent corporation would have to be
acknowledged by the trustee in charge ofthat corporation before any payment
may be made from the corporation's estate, the same principle should apply
with respect to claims submitted to the fund, and claimants should have the
same rights to challenge a decision by which the trustee refuses to
acknowledge their claim. In other words, the rules concerning the treatment of
claims in any bankruptcy case should extend to claims directed at the
compensation fund so that no new prospects for litigation would emerge.
Second, the costs of operating the compensation fund, including the costs
of administering claims and payments, could probably be kept down if the
fund were organized as a separate branch of the tax authorities and as such
could take advantage of both the information already available with the tax
authorities in respect of a corporation's liabilities, assets and cash flows, and
the organizational infrastructure of the tax system. For instance, a rule could
be introduced requiring that claims on the fund be submitted on an annual
basis together with the claimant's annual income tax form, and claims could
be processed in a manner similar to the processing of income tax forms, with
payments from the fund being administered similarly to income tax returns.
The compensation fund that we propose to establish should, in principle,
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pay compensation to both voluntary and involuntary creditors in the event of
corporate failure. However, if owy unsatisfied creditors were permitted to
collect their claims from the compensation fund, regardless of whether they
could have avoided their losses, the existence of such a fund may
unintentionally and counterproductively add to the aggregate social costs of
corporate insolvency by diluting creditors' incentives to take care themselves
in order to prevent the occurrence of a loss. If creditors were to be satisfied
irrespective of whether they had taken precautionary measures to protect
themselves against the corporate debtor's insolvency, it would not pay them to
expend resources in order to avoid losses from bankruptcy. Voluntary
creditors might even deliberately enter into contracts with nearly insolvent
corporations intending to collect claims pursuant to such contracts from the
compensation fund should the corporation prove insolvent. In this manner,
creditors could realize gains from trade which, taking into account the value
of the debtor's assets, they would not normally have been able to accomplish
and which in reality would not probably have existed given the debtor's
inability to perform the contract as agreed. On the other hand, if creditors
were assured that they would obtain payment of their claims notwithstanding
the corporation's bankruptcy, they would have stronger incentives to aim at
the corporation's bankruptcy and involuntary liquidation rather than to
collaborate with management to achieve a restructuring of the business and to
preserve the corporation's assets as a going concern.
If the establishment of a compensation fund for creditors of insolvent
corporations were accompanied by the above-mentioned side-effects, the
envisaged internalization of the costs of insolvency in corporate decision-
making would come at the expense of an increase in the total costs of
corporate bankruptcies. Such an increase would be reflected in the fees which
corporations would have to pay into the compensation fund and through
which corporate decision-makers would balance anticipated benefits to
shareholders against anticipated costs of corporate activity to society as a
whole. As a consequence, corporate decision-makers would probably abstain
from projects to which they would have dedicated resources (and which would
have had a positive net present value to society) if total insolvency costs (as
reflected in the fees payable to the compensation fund) were less.
The costs of business insolvency invariably present a loss to society, as
noted earlier, because insolvency cases by definition are liable to involve uses
of scarce resources at less than their opportunity costs, not to mention the
transaction costs (including costs of business restructuring) they entail. The
problem currently facing us, then, is how to promote the internalization of
insolvency costs in corporate decision-making through the fees corporations
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should pay to our proposed compensation fund, whilst at the same time
avoiding the situation that the existence of such a fund would raise total
insolvency costs by rewarding careless creditors or creditors opportunistically
dealing with nearly insolvent corporations.
For this purpose, we propose that access to the compensation fund should
be restricted to those creditors who could not reasonably have avoided the
non-payment of their claims, for example, by obtaining appropriate security
for payment or by not extending credit at all in cases in which the corporate
debtor was already approaching bankruptcy when credit was extended. In
relation to voluntary creditors, therefore, a "reasonable care" standard should
be introduced which would restrict access to the compensation fund to
unsatisfied creditors who had exercised reasonable care in order to prevent the
non-payment of their claim. For instance, creditors dealing with a corporation
that was visibly approaching bankruptcy at the time, and whose single most
important aim was apparently to seek compensation from the fund, should be
denied access. Similarly, creditors who failed to protect their interests against
non-payment by the corporate debtor but, rather, relied upon having recourse
to the compensation fund should not be entitled to receive compensation from
the fund. "Reasonable care" tests are already applied elsewhere in private
law, especially in tort law, in order to discourage socially costly behavior, and
the test proposed here should therefore be a feasible instrument for
encouraging creditors to avoid bankruptcy costs.
Whether an unsatisfied creditor meets the "reasonable care" standard
should be assessed by the trustee in the corporation's bankruptcy as he has, or
is best equipped to obtain, appropriate information on the merits of the
insolvency case concerned. If, according to the trustee, a creditor has passed
the "reasonable care" test, the trustee should refer the claim concerned to the
compensation fund which should then pay the part of the claim which cannot
be satisfied from the assets of the insolvent corporation. No change in the
rules concerning the distribution of the proceeds from the liquidation of the
business should be necessary.
In relation to tort creditors, there is no need to introduce a special
"reasonable care" test as a requirement for access to the compensation fund
considering that such a test is, in one form or another, already present in
existing tort laws: in determining whether or not a victim of injury is entitled
to receive damages from a third party based on tort, the courts usually take
the victim's own behavior into account. A victim who suffered injury
primarily through his own negligence is not, or is to a limited extent only,
entitled to damages. In this manner, a tortfeasor's liability to pay damages is
limited by the requirements of care which tort law imposes on victims. As
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regards the payment of compensation to victims of torts committed by
corporations unable to fulfil obligations to pay damages, the compensation
fund should adhere to the requirements of care inherent in existing tort laws
and not introduce new standards.
In relation to involuntary creditors other than tort victims, a "reasonable
care" standard similar to that proposed for voluntary creditors would not
make sense either, as such other involuntary creditors are generally unable to
limit their losses by exercising care. For instance, the claims of the tax
authorities (and, hence, their potential losses) are fixed by statute law and are
essentially unrelated to the tax authorities" own behavior. The same applies to
claims for the payment of social security premiums. Requiring such
involuntary creditors to exercise "reasonable care" in order to avoid becoming
creditors of an insolvent corporation would not alter the corporation's
liabilities to them or the amount they may be unable to recover from the
corporation's assets, given that those liabilities follow directly from statute
law. Therefore, their access to the compensation fund should not be restricted
by the "reasonable care" test set out earlier. .
9. In Search of Souls to Damn -
Legal Responses to the External
I Costs Problem
WE HAVE SEEN that the corporate form of organization is tainted by two
conflicts of interests: that between utility maximizing managers and wealth
maximizing shareholders, and that between the corporate entity and its
shareholders on the one hand and other members of society (in particular, the
corporation's voluntary and involuntary creditors) on the other.
The first conflict arises as utility maximizing managers may pursue
objectives irreconcilable with maximization of the value of shareholders'
residual claim, thus furthering their personal self-interests at the expense of
the shareholders. The second conflict of interests arises as shareholders
shielded by limited liability have wealth-maximizing incentives to ignore the
social costs of corporate activity beyond the maximum amount they may lose
in the event of default, given that limited liability insulates them from losses
exceeding corporate assets. By virtue of the limited liability rule, shareholders
may use the corporate form to pursue personal gain potentially at the expense
of other members of society. It is in the interest of society at large, however,
that corporate activity be based upon cost-benefit calculations which
incorporate not merely the shareholders' anticipated private costs but the full
social costs of the activity concerned.
/V/ma yac/e one may object that the first conflict of interests facing the
corporation is irreconcilable with the second or that, in any case, both
conflicts of interests are incapable of being remedied simultaneously. For
instance, Fischel [1982, 1265] has accused proponents of reforms in
corporate governance of a "failure to recognize that management cannot be at
the same time too little and too much dedicated to profit maximization".
Our discussion, in Part II of this book, of the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers suggests that the latter may pay too //7/fe attention
to the former's wealth-maximizing interests. However, the argument that
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limited liability encourages shareholders (and managers, to the extent they do
act in shareholders' interests) to partially ignore the social costs of corporate
activity, suggests that the corporate form may well suffer from over-
subservience to the shareholders. In other words, our discussion of the conflict
between shareholders and managers implies that the efficiency of the
corporate form is threatened by the neglect of shareholders' interests, whereas
the discussion of the discrepancy between shareholders' and society's
interests may be construed to mean that managers should not pay too /wwc/j
attention to shareholders' private interests.
The reasoning summarized above, although perhaps having some intuitive
appeal, oversimplifies the issues and is therefore largely incorrect. The first
conflict of interests is essentially independent of the second, both conflicts
originate from different and competing incentives and involve different
behavior patterns (utility maximization versus wealth maximization), and
both conflicts can, and should, be tackled simultaneously. It is true, however,
that that each conflict requires a solution of itself, precisely because both
conflicts have different origins.
A utility maximizing manager may neglect the wealth-maximizing interests
of the shareholders ara/the interests of the corporation's actual or prospective
creditors. A wealth maximizing shareholder may desire that that manager
ignore social costs exceeding the value of his investment and at the same time
he may sustain wealth losses (including opportunity losses) as a result of the
manager's pursuit of personal utility. Devices aimed at inducing managers to
maximize the value of shareholders' residual claim would mitigate the
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers, but they would
also induce managers to pay less attention to the interests of society at large,
thus adding to the conflict of interests between shareholders and society. On
the other hand, devices aimed at inducing shareholders and managers to
incorporate the full social costs of envisaged corporate activity into business
decisions would mitigate the conflict between shareholders and society, but
not that between managers and shareholders.
Utility maximizing managers may endeavor to raise the value of the
residual claim by ignoring a part of the social costs of corporate activity, and
concurrently usurp a part of the added value by allocating corporate income
to uses aimed at maximizing managerial utility. Thus, managerial self-interest
seeking at shareholders' expense and externalization of risk to other members
of society may in fact occur at the same time. To utility maximizing
managers, the interests of such other members of society are relevant only to
the extent that they have entered into their personal utility functions. This
applies regardless of whether or not shareholders desire that managerial
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decisions reflect the full social costs of corporate activity. Permitting
managers to depart from shareholders' interests, hence, will not remedy the
externality problem posed by limited liability - such permission does not
mean that they will duly incorporate the social costs of corporate activity in
business decision-making.
Suppose that the externality problem posed by limited liability were
resolved, so that maximization of the value of shareholders' residual claim
would now require managers to balance the anticipated benefits from
corporate activity to the shareholders with the anticipated costs of the activity
concerned to society at large. To the extent that managers have discretion to
depart from shareholders' interests, they may still not act accordingly and fail
to fully incorporate the social costs of corporate activity in business decisions.
For instance, rather than scrutinizing the long-term external effects of a
contemplated project, managers may limit themselves to their expected tenure
of office, or they may intentionally disregard such external effects and pursue
high short-term profits in order to maximize the flexible part of their personal
income depending on short-term corporate earnings. For other examples of
aberrant activities we refer to Chapter 4.
The larger the degree to which managers are motivated to pursue
shareholders' wealth-maximizing interests, the more pressing the need for
society to create incentives for shareholders to demand that management fully
consider the social costs of corporate activities. On the other hand, the more
effectively such incentives are created, the greater will be the benefit to
society if managers adhere to shareholders' interests.
In Chapter 4, we saw that corporate managers' discretion to pursue
personal self-interests at shareholders' expense is primarily due to
imperfections in the market mechanisms that discipline them. Likewise, as
discussed in Chapter 7, the inefficiencies in corporate conduct that arise from
limited liability are largely a matter of market failure, /.e. the market's failure
under limited shareholder liability to establish appropriate incentives for
shareholders and managers to consider in their decision-making the full social
costs of corporate activities and set risks accordingly. In the previous chapter
we discussed, from a theoretical perspective, several remedies that might be
pursued in order to correct this failure. Now we will survey how in reality one
possible remedy, viz. extended liability of shareholders, is applied under U.S.
law and under Dutch law.
Some two centuries ago, Edward, Baron Thurlow, who was at the time the
Lord Chancellor of England, referred to the corporation's perceived
indifference to the interests of other members of society in the now classic
phrase: "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has
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no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?" [Coffee (1981), 386]. In the
present chapter, we explore where and when U.S. law and Dutch law impose
personal liability on shareholders in deviation from the prevailing general
limited liability rule so as to enforce a conscience on at least the corporation's
shareholders, prompting them to do the same to the corporation.
As for our survey of legal remedies to the problem of managerial self-
interest seeking at shareholders' expense in Chapter 6, we concentrate on
major issues as our purpose, again, is not so much to give an exhaustive
description of the relevant laws. Rather, we intend to see whether existing
legal concepts under U.S. law and under Dutch law providing for unlimited
shareholder liability can be understood from the perspective of the economics
underlying the corporate form of organization and the limited liability rule as
an organizational principle.
The External Costs Problem: U.S. Law
Persona/ L/ab/V/fy and Ofner fiemed/es
Personal liability is not merely applied as an instrument to induce managers to
refrain from shifting the costs of furthering their own self-interests to
shareholders. Deviating from the limited liability rule, both U.S. and Dutch
courts have also occasionally imposed liability upon shareholders in instances
in which the corporation's assets have fallen short of its obligations to
creditors. In such cases, personal liability serves to confront shareholders with
the costs of the operations of the business exceeding their invested wealth. Yet
personal liability is not the only legal means employed to tackle the problem
of externalization of costs to creditors of corporations.
The law of fraudulent conveyances, for instance, known in both the U.S.
and the Netherlands, limits shareholders' ability to shift costs to creditors
through the transfer of funds or property belonging to the corporation to a
shareholder [Clark (1977), 505]. When such a transfer is harmful to a
creditor in that it renders the corporation unable to fully meet its obligations
to him (or exacerbates existing payment difficulties), the creditor may have
the transaction set aside on conditions specified by the law, in particular, if
the transfer is deemed to be deceitful or made without fair consideration being
paid by the shareholder. In effect, the creditor will be able to collect corporate
debts from the funds or assets that were conveyed from the corporation to the
shareholder concerned.
Furthermore, mandatory disclosure requirements do not only feed
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information into market mechanisms disciplining managerial behavior, they
also provide would-be creditors with information about the corporation's
creditworthiness and the risk of a default. Creditors can take advantage of
such information in determining whether they are willing to extend credit and
in setting risk-commensurate interest rates and other terms on which they are
prepared to grant credit. Accordingly, public disclosure requirements
facilitate bargains for ex aw/e compensation for the risk shifted to creditors.
As we saw in Chapter 7, mandatory disclosure requirements economize on
creditors' information costs and thus lower the transaction cost hurdle they
must surmount to obtain such compensation. However, as also argued in
Chapter 7, mandatory disclosure of corporate financial information may
operate to prevent externalities from arising only in relation to voluntary
creditors whose bargaining power is more or less equal to that of the
corporation.
Another category of legal responses to the externality problem posed by
limited liability (also addressed in Chapter 7) includes minimum initial capital
requirements, capital maintenance rules, dividend limitations and other
statutory restrictions on the distribution of corporate funds to shareholders.
Such rules exist, in one form or another, both in various U.S. jurisdictions
and in the Netherlands. All such rules aim to ensure that the corporation
actually has assets from which its debts can be collected once due. Whilst
disclosure requirements oppose externalities from an ex awfe perspective, by
facilitating risk-reflecting credit arrangements, rules belonging to the present
category aim to do so ex /wwf, by opposing the occurrence of uncompensated
losses after the credit terms are set.
Minimum capital requirements, capital maintenance rules and restrictions
on distributions to shareholders purportedly oppose externalization of costs to
creditors in three manners. First, they should directly increase the probability
that creditors will duly receive payment of their claims once they have
extended credit. Second, capital maintenance rules and restrictions on
corporate distributions serve to stabilize the capital on which creditors relied
when they agreed to extend credit. In this manner, they try to establish that the
ex ame risk premium and other terms contained in credit arrangements will
continue to accurately reflect the risk of a default after the arrangement is
made so that no externality will arise. Third, minimum capital requirements,
capital maintenance rules and restrictions on corporate distributions oblige
shareholders to commit a certain part of their wealth to the corporation and
this they may lose in the event of failure. By raising shareholders' potential
loss, these rules ideally increase the level of costs shareholders wish
management to consider in the making of business decisions.
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Fraudulent conveyance law, mandatory disclosure requirements and the
capitalization rules discussed above do not prejudice the distinguishing
organizational characteristics of the corporate form (legal entity status,
transferable shares, centralized management and limited liability). Imposing
personal liability upon shareholders for corporate debts, by contrast, does
have such an effect. It interferes both with the principle that shareholders'
non-invested wealth is secured from the corporation's creditors and with the
principle that the corporation is an entity legally distinct from its
shareholders, with independent rights and obligations. The first aspect is
emphasized in the expression "piercing the corporate veil", the second in the
expression "disregard of corporate entity", both of which are interchangeably
used by U.S. courts and commentators to refer to imposition of shareholder
liability despite statutory limited liability.
Given that unlike the other remedies mentioned above, personal liability of
shareholders is a clear departure from the basic rules of the corporate form, in
the remainder of this chapter we will have a closer look at when and how, this
response to the externality problem is applied. While acknowledging that
deficiencies in the formalities for incorporating a business may also be a
reason for personal liability of shareholders, we focus on personal liability as
it may arise in the course of the operation of the firm, assuming that the firm
has been incorporated properly. As with managerial liability, we concentrate
only on the major issues.
P/erc/zigf toe Co/porate Ve//
Where the corporate veil is lifted to impose personal liability upon a
shareholder, creditors of the corporation may collect the latter's debts from
that shareholder's personal assets, up to the full extent of his wealth. A
collection suit intended to inflict personal liability upon a shareholder for a
corporate obligation is brought against the individual shareholder in question,
in his capacity as a shareholder, and is based on the obligation incurred by the
corporation. If the court finds for the plaintiff, the obligation concerned
remains that of the corporation but the shareholder is held liable for its
fulfillment.
Although the concept of piercing the corporate veil is, as such, accepted
universally throughout the U.S., deviations from the limited liability rule in
different U.S. jurisdictions seem united in the following respects only.
First, imposition of personal liability on shareholders is a matter of case
law as developed and applied by the courts, with no statutory standard of
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shareholder liability existing and with state and federal legislatures largely
silent on the subject. The concept of piercing the corporate veil, then, has
developed from the common law and leaves considerable discretion to the
courts as to its interpretation and its application to individual cases. This
discretion is well recognized by the courts.
Second, personal liability of shareholders is limited to cases in which the
assets of the corporation are insufficient to pay its debts once they have fallen
due, meaning that the corporation's creditors have no discretion to choose
whether to collect from the corporate entity or from its shareholders. In
ji/Kferso« v. ^Wott [321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)], the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly acknowledged that "[ljimited liability is the rule, not the exception
(...)', whilst the court in Cof/yjenters' Z)/s/. COWMC/7 V. W.O. /^sse/ Co. [487
F. Supp. 54, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1980)] noted that "the general rule [is] that the
corporate entity should be recognized and upheld except in the most unusual
circumstances". Creditors are bound by that rule and there is only scope for
attempts to invoke personal shareholder liability as the exception to the rule if
the corporation's collectable assets have fallen short of its debts due,
regardless of whether substantive law requirements for shareholder liability
(to be discussed below) can be met.
If personal liability is imposed, however, the shareholder in question is
liable for the full amount of the corporation's outstanding debts, irrespective
of the percentage of the shares he owns. Thus, the corporation and any
shareholder whose defense the court has rejected will become jointly and
severally liable for the former's unsettled debts, and so will be all individual
shareholders upon whom liability is imposed; if the court rules to lift the
corporate veil to reach the non-invested assets of a number of shareholders
(i.e. more than one), each shareholder involved ordinarily becomes subject to
the same joint and several liability rule as prevails in partnership law
[Hansmann and Kraakman (1991), 1893].
Third, cases in which courts have decided to pierce the corporate veil are
reportedly limited to closely held corporations, including corporations with
shares owned by one or a small number of private individuals as well as
corporations whose shares are held by another corporation in a corporate
group context [Barber (1981), 372-373; Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), 109;
Thompson (1991), 1055], Indeed, consistent with our analysis in Chapter 8
suggesting that personal liability should not be imposed on shareholders of
publicly held corporations, in an extensive study of about 1,600 cases from
all over the U.S. in which piercing-the-veil claims had been instituted,
Thompson [199L 1047] found that "[i]n the entire data set, piercing did not
occur in a publicly held corporation". Earlier, on review of the case law,
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Barber [1981, 372] had made a similar observation.
In addition, Thompson [1991, 1055] found that the success rate of
piercing-the-veil claims against shareholders of close corporations decreased
as the number of shareholders increased. In respect of close corporations
whose shares were held by a single private individual, courts reportedly
entered judgment for the plaintiff in 49.64 percent of the cases. However, if
the number of private shareholders amounted to more than three, plaintiffs'
success rate dropped to 34.98 percent. This finding is consistent with our
hypothesis in Chapter 3 that the reduction in transaction costs brought about
by statutory limited liability becomes more significant as the number of
shareholders increases. Taking into account the upward effect of unlimited
liability on transaction costs as the number of shareholders rises, then, it is no
surprise that courts are more reluctant to depart from the limited liability rule
as the number of shareholders becomes greater.
Fourth, courts have imposed personal liability on shareholders both for
corporate obligations arising from contract and for tortious liabilities
generated by the operations of the firm. Thus, courts have decided to lift the
corporate veil for the benefit of voluntary as well as involuntary creditors.
The substantive criteria which are applied to impose personal liability do not
differentiate between claims based on a contractual obligation incumbent on
the corporation and claims based on tortious liability of the corporation:
courts tend to approach both categories of claims in a materially identical
manner [Barber (1981), 380-381].
In his above-mentioned study, Thompson [1991, 1058] found that courts
were prepared to pierce the corporate veil more often in cases involving
claims based on transactions between the plaintiff and the corporation entered
into in a bargaining situation than in cases involving claims based on
corporate torts (41.98 percent compared to 30.97 percent success rate of
piercing claims). Thus, the requirements for imposing personal liability were
considered satisfied more often in contract than in tort situations. Judging
from the numbers, the greater success rate of contract claims is well
recognized by creditors' attorneys: of the total number of piercing claims
(both successful and unsuccessful) in the cases in Thompson's study, claims
were based more frequently on contractual than on tortious liabilities incurred
by the corporation (contract claims outnumbering claims based on tort by a
factor of 3.45, with successful contract claims outnumbering successful tort
claims by a factor of 4.67).
When holding a shareholder liable for the contractual obligations of the
corporation, courts are in fact finding that voluntary creditors have not
willingly assumed the risk of corporate insolvency and have not already been
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compensated through the terms of the contract. Thompson's findings are,
therefore, at odds with the theory that voluntary creditors bargain for ex ante
compensation for the insolvency risk that limited liability shifts to them, and
support our competing view set out in Chapter 7 that they are relatively
unlikely to receive adequate compensation through the terms of the contract.
Finally, as regards the substantive standards for imposing personal
liability on shareholders, the various U.S. jurisdictions are united primarily by
the lack of a uniform, unambiguous concept of the substantive criteria by
which piercing-the-veil claims are adjudicated. As the federal court in
ß«cyn«-£We Co. v. Gewera/ /Wwct t Cor/>. [643 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir.
1981)] admitted, "[n]o precise test for disregarding the corporate fiction has
been articulated by the courts, each case being regarded as "sui generis" and
decidable on its own facts".
Case law has induced one commentator to state that veil-piercing cases are
characterized by "their general failure to articulate reasoned grounds of
decision, thus affording little predictability in an area in which conduct is
ordinarily highly planned" [Note (1958), 1123). Likewise, Clark [1986, 73]
has observed that lifting-the-veil cases are unified "more by the remedy
sought (...) than by repeated and consistent application of the same criteria for
granting the remedy". A similar observation had been made by Ballantine
[1946, 312] several decades earlier: "The formulae invoked usually give no
guidance or basis for understanding the results reached".
Still earlier, the same Ballantine [1925, 15] had referred to the case law on
veil-piercing as "a legal quagmire", whilst Justice Cardozo in ßertey v. 77?/«/
i4ve. fly. Co. [244 NY. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926)], in a corporate group
context, stated that this area of law was "enveloped in the mists of metaphor".
Although little seems to have changed since then, through these mists certain
minimum requirements can be identified which must be satisfied before courts
will impose personal liability upon a shareholder. Although variations exist
between different state jurisdictions, both in the terminology used and in the
application of the law, these requirements form the bedrock of the law of
piercing the corporate veil throughout the U.S. We explore this bedrock a
little further in the next sections.
As a preliminary observation, we note that courts adjudicate piercing-the-
veil claims on the basis of the same set of standards regardless of the identity
of the defending shareholder concerned. Thus, the same rules apply whether
the shares in a corporation are owned by a private individual or are held by
another corporation in a corporate group context.
Nonetheless, in his above-mentioned study, Thompson [1991, 1055-1057]
found that courts are somewhat less inclined to pierce the veil when the shares
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are held by another corporation (the parent company) than they are when the
shares are owned by one, two or three private individuals (a combined
piercing rate of 48.05 percent for corporations belonging to the latter category
compared with 36.79 percent when the shares are held by a parent
corporation). In our view, this finding may be explained by the fact that
parent corporations frequently incorporate subsidiary companies in the
pursuit of diversification policies aimed at minimizing risk for both
shareholders and creditors of the parent company, with a view to enhancing
the group's aggregate capital-raising ability. Limited liability of the parent in
this context has a clear function in facilitating such diversification, which
courts may be willing to uphold when the parent's holding is intended for the
cited purposes only and the parent does not actively use its limited liability to
inflict injury on creditors of the subsidiary company.
By contrast, when a corporation has a small number of private
shareholders (in Thompson's study: less than four), such shareholders are less
likely to hold their shares purely for diversification purposes which the courts
will respect. As the number of private shareholders rises, however,
transaction cost considerations as well as diversification observations similar
to those made for parent companies become relevant and this may explain
why courts then become less inclined to impose personal liability.
T/ie /nsfriymente//ry Tesf
The first hurdle that creditors seeking to lift the corporate veil in order to
access any one shareholder's non-invested wealth must surmount is the
"instrumentality" (or "alter ego") test. According to this test, the corporation
must have been the "mere instrumentality" of its shareholders, meaning that
there was virtually no separation in fact between the shareholders and the
corporate entity. The corporation, then, although being a separate legal entity,
did not in reality function as an entity distinct from its shareholders.
In /lMtomo/r/z <te/ Go//o </e Ca///o/wa v. ÄeswcÄ: [47 Cal. 2d 792, 796,
306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957)] the court indicated that for satisfaction of the
instrumentality requirement there must be "such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual
[shareholders] no longer exist". Slightly more specifically, the court in £/«/7ed
States Abrtona/ &»i* q/'Oma/ra v. .%«? [207 Neb. 131, 135, 296 N.W.2d
474, 477 (1980)] held that the instrumentality criterion requires that "the
corporation is a mere facade for the personal dealings of the shareholder and
that the operations of the corporation are carried on by the shareholder in
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disregard of the corporate entity".
fP7?e« precisely a corporation may be deemed a "mere facade" for its
shareholder(s) is highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. In //erforr v. 07<?g/aw/ [207 So.2d 882, 887 (4th Cir.
1968)], the court considered that "[e]very act purportedly to have been done
by or in the name of the corporation was entirely dictated and controlled by,
and was in fact the act of, [the defending shareholder] personally". Similarly,
in Lowewfo/j/ v. ßa/f/wore cfe O/»o Ä.Ä. [247 App. Div. 144, 157, 287
N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1936)] and in Zaifrf v. O/son [227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn.
1967)], the courts, using similar wording, maintained that the instrumentality
criterion required "complete domination" of a corporation by a shareholder,
including domination "not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to
this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its
own". The domination requirement captures the essence of the instrumentality
rule, and explains why the concept of piercing the corporate veil is not
invoked in respect of publicly held corporations with multiple non-controlling
shareholders and run by specialized managers.
Elements recognized in case law as indicating that a shareholder
dominated a corporation in such a manner that he turned it into a mere
instrumentality of himself, include Je ybcto control of managerial decision-
making by the shareholder, intermingling of funds and other assets belonging
to the corporation with the shareholder's personal assets, the use of corporate
assets or funds by the shareholder personally (including acts of self-dealing),
failure to maintain separate corporate and financial records and to pursue
separate accounting policies, the shareholder representing his personal
business and that of the corporation as being identical, and other such
interference of the shareholder in the affairs of the corporation. In f/«;7eJ
Stof« Ata/ora/ 5an£ o/Oma/ra v. /tope [207 Neb. 131, 135, 296 N.W.2d
474, 477 (1980)], for instance, the court related the instrumentality criterion
to the "[diversion by the shareholder or shareholders of corporate funds or
assets to their own or other improper uses". Courts and commentators
frequently cite such instances of shareholder interference with the corporation
as "disregard of corporate formalities" [Barber (1981), 377].
In the context of parent-subsidiary relationships, courts have also
considered important such factors as: identity of the managements of the
parent and the subsidiary corporation, operations of both companies being
organized in and conducted from the same offices, commingling of the
commercial activities of the parent and the subsidiary, the activities of the
subsidiary being directed by the management of the parent company, virtual
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absence of distinct business attributable to the subsidiary except for business
conducted with affiliated companies, absence of separate meetings of the
shareholders and directors of the corporations concerned, similarity of the
trade names which the parent and the subsidiary use when dealing with third
parties, control of the subsidiary's capital flow by the parent, in particular,
systematic '"milking" of the subsidiary's financial resources by the parent, and
payment of the salaries of the employees of the subsidiary by the parent
corporation. From such facts the court may deduce that the subsidiary
corporation is not in reality an entity distinct from its shareholder, the parent
company, but, rather, a puppet of the parent.
In the ancient case of F/nwwA 7emperance Sbc [y Sbv/Yta/a v. F/WJ/'SA
&c/a/wfic ftiWw/H/ig Co. [238 Mass. 345, 355, 150 N.E. 845, 848 (1921)],
for instance, the court found that parent company intermeddling in the affairs
of the subsidiary corporation had resulted in "complete identity of interest",
which led the court to infer that the subsidiary in reality was no more than a
''creature or mouthpiece" of the parent company. However, the mere existence
of a parent-subsidiary relationship, without more, is not per se sufficient to
trigger veil-piercing, as, for example, the court in A//7/er v. D/xon //iäf2«/r/e.s
Corp. [513 A.2d 597 (R.I. 1986)] noted [Kindlund (1987), 370]: the parent
company must have impinged on the subsidiary in one or more of the manners
described above.
In summary, if a court is requested to disregard the corporate entity, on the
basis of the instrumentality rule, the plaintiff must prove that the shareholder
in question disregarded the corporation's distinct entity status and treated it as
if the corporation's dealings were his own. To this effect, the plaintiff has to
demonstrate that the degree of shareholder domination was substantially
beyond the level of influence that an ordinary majority shareholder would
exercise and that it extended well beyond the incident use of voting rights.
There must have been active, direct shareholder intermeddling in the affairs of
the corporation, to such an extent that the corporation's dealings can hardly
be distinguished from those of the shareholder, the borderline between the two
having become dim if not virtually invisible; there must have been "a pattern
of ignoring the separateness of the corporation", as the court in Sb/o/no« v.
Greeno/atf [812 S.W.2d 7, 19 (Tex. 1991)] has put it.
Some courts demand, moreover, that the domination by the shareholder
must have resulted in the non-fulfillment of the specific corporate obligation
for which the creditor concerned seeks to impose personal liability upon the
shareholder. In other words, the acts of the shareholder must have been the
proximate cause of the particular corporate liability the creditor seeks to
collect. Accordingly, the courts in Lowe«da/j/ v. ßo//;/wore c& O/wo Ä.Ä. [247
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App. Div. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1936)] and Zawr v. Ofron [227 A.2d
552, 558 (Conn. 1967)] have construed the instrumentality rule to require that
the shareholder's "control and breach of duty must [have] proximately
cause[d] the injury or unjust loss complained of.
However, such a specific "proximate cause" requirement is not
consistently applied by the courts throughout the U.S. Often it is sufficient for
the plaintiff to convince the court that the involvement of the shareholder in
the affairs of the corporation has been the predominant factor in causing the
corporation to incur the liabilities which it incurred, including the liability in
respect of which the plaintiff has requested the court to lift the corporate veil.
In Gfew? v. % n e r [313 N.C. 450, 457, 329 S.E.2d 326, 331 (1985)], for
instance, the North Carolina Supreme Court maintained that if a corporation
is a "mere shell, created to perform a function for an affiliated corporation",
in order to pierce the veil, the assessment of shareholder domination need not
be "narrowly limited to control over the particular transaction attacked".
According to such case law, it is sufficient that a reasonable relationship can
be shown between the domination by the shareholder and the injury suffered
by the plaintiff (the non-fulfillment of the corporation's obligation to him),
without the plaintiff having to prove that the shareholder has directly caused
the particular injury of which he complains [Krendl and Krendl (1978), 27J.
The instrumentality requirement protects non-controlling investors from
personal liability. By doing so it encourages proportionately small, passive
investments and makes diversification a rational investment strategy, thereby
enhancing firms' ability to raise equity capital. In addition, it discourages
shareholder intrusion on managerial decision-making, thereby encouraging
investors to take full advantage of specialized management when the benefits
of having specialized managers outweigh the costs and, in effect, promoting
efficacy in monitoring.
In contrast, when a corporation is found to be the mere instrumentality of a
dominant shareholder who "used the corporate entity for solely personal
purposes and disregarded the corporate form" [Conor/o v. L/tfe/co, /we, 782
F.Supp. 749, 760 (NY. 1992)], the advantages associated with incorporation
discussed in Chapter 2 are not realized.
First, there are no productivity gains and cost reductions from specialized
management, the dominant shareholder himself dictating virtually all
managerial decision-making.
Second, the corporation's legal entity status will not produce significant
transaction cost reductions in the operations of the business and the
administration of its assets. As described in Chapter 2, legal personality
serves to maintain the assets in the firm as a going concern, insulates the
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firm's assets from the individual investors, and enables the firm to operate in
the market as a concern independent of the shareholders. Transaction cost
advantages are realized because there is no need for the individual
shareholders to become involved in the ownership of the assets in the firm and
in transactions pertaining to such assets, or in other business transactions.
However, if a corporation is found to be a mere instrumentality of its
shareholder, there is virtually no divide between the assets and dealings of the
business firm and those of the shareholder. Thus, the very source of the cited
transaction cost advantages does not exist. By contrast, as they cannot readily
distinguish between the personal assets and business of the shareholder and
those of the corporation, legal entity status will /«crawe transaction costs to
would-be creditors, it becoming more difficult for them to identify what
security the corporation (or the shareholder) provides and to determine the
risk they would take by extending credit to the corporation.
Third, a shareholder choosing to dominate a firm on the basis of a majority
shareholding is unlikely to take advantage of limited liability to assemble a
diversified portfolio so as to reduce that firm's cost of capital. Instead of
becoming a passive diversified investor, he has deliberately elected to become
an active investor in the firm concerned and to shoulder the investment risk of
holding a majority of the shares in that firm. This decision points to risk-
preference rather than to a desire to reduce risk through diversification.
Moreover, if the dominant shareholder of one firm were to diversify by
making substantial investments in other corporations, each of them
subsequently being operated as his puppets (or as puppets of the others), that,
again, would raise transaction costs to creditors. Where the latter would be
precluded from ascertaining the insolvency risk of the relevant debtor
accurately, the shareholder's reduction of risk would come at the expense of
creditors.
Fourth, if a firm is dominated by a majority shareholder, there is unlikely
to be an active market for the stock of that firm promoting efficacy in
managerial decision-making by that shareholder. Thus, there is no reason to
retain limited liability in order to ensure stock market discipline.
As the above observations reveal, when a shareholder uses a corporation
as a mere instrumentality of himself, the economic rationales for upholding
the separateness of the corporate entity are absent. Shareholders' limited
liability then raises transaction costs in credit markets and may be used as a
shield to externalize costs to creditors while the corporate form as such,
including limited liability, does not produce its desired social benefits. When a
shareholder uses the corporation as an instrumentality, therefore, there is a
"perversion of the privileges to do business in a corporate form", as the court
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in Wattowafcy v. Cor//o« [18 N.Y.2d 414, 420, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1966)] has
put it. This is what the instrumentality test reflects. The threat of personal
liability posed by the instrumentality test will not only induce dominant
shareholders to duly consider the costs of the firm's operations to creditors
but also to let the corporate firm function as one economic entity, whose
ability to pay off creditors will first and foremost depend on its own fortune.
7/7e /nec/u/Yy Tes/
In addition to the instrumentality requirement, when adjudicating piercing-the-
veil claims, courts ordinarily apply a second test which creditors must also
pass in order to obtain permission to access shareholders' non-invested
wealth. This second test entails that in the case concerned, it must also be
shown that retention of the limited liability rule would have an "inequitable
effect" on creditors of the corporation, to the extent that the principles of
equity would call for a correction of the rule in that case. The "inequity"
hurdle encourages would-be creditors not to rashly extend credit to potentially
insolvent shareholder-dominated corporations, thereby reducing the likelihood
and social costs of corporate bankruptcy and, in effect, opposing the use by
corporate firms of scarce resources below their opportunity value.
In y4M/o/wo//-/'z cfe/ Go//o cfe Ca/z/o/wor v. /tew/c/fc [47 Cal. 2d 792, 796,
306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957)], the court defined this requirement to mean that "if the
acts [of the corporation] are treated as those of the corporation alone, an
inequitable result will follow". Likewise, the court in DefP//Y 7Vwc/t ßro£ers,
Aic. v. W. /toy F/emm/ng Frw/Y Co. [540 F.2d 681, 686-687 (4th Cir. 1976)]
stated that there must be "an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness".
The inequity (or "unfairness") test and the instrumentality requirement
discussed above constitute a cumulative, "two-prong" test which a creditor
seeking to lift the corporate veil must satisfy [Barber (1981), 376].
When will retention of the limited liability rule have an inequitable result
that may prompt a court to set it aside? Courts have given various, often
rather inconclusive, answers to this question. In Lfa/rW States v. M'/wauAree
/fe/r/gerafor 7>WM/7 Co. [142 F. 247, 255 (Wis. 1905)], in a classic
formulation the court noted that "when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons", that means,
hold the shareholders personally liable. In Lowem/a/?/ v. ßa/Z/more <£ O/?/o
ftft [247 App. Div. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1936)] and in Zo/5/ v.
[227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967)], the courts stated a requirement that
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the defending shareholder had used his domination of the corporation "to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other
positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of the
plaintiffs legal rights". Accordingly, some courts and commentators have
referred to the inequity test as the "improper purpose" requirement [Krendl
and Krendl (1978), 18].
There arc three factors that are generally recognized which may cause
limited liability to produce inequitable effects on the corporation's creditors:
fraud, undercapitalization, and misrepresentation. Fraud (deceit) by a
shareholder ordinarily satisfies the inequity test but it is not in itself required
to impose personal liability upon a shareholder: "[t]he corporate identity can
be pierced to prevent not only fraud, but any injustice", as the court in
Pflum/er v. ßarge BT. 7073 [395 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (1974)] noted.
Likewise, in /Werso« v. /16£otf [321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)], the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that cases of fraud make up part of the
exception justifying that the corporate veil be lifted, but that fraud cases do
not exhaust that exception.
A shareholder's desire to take advantage of limited liability so as to shield
his personal wealth against claims from creditors is not in itself fraud ara/ is
not sufficient on its own to give rise to injustice. Indeed, courts have
recognized that a business may be incorporated precisely to afford
shareholders the benefit of limited liability. In £7e«Är/eg v. S/e6rec/j/ [238
NY. 254, 262, 144 N.E. 519, 521 (1924)], for instance, the court
acknowledged that an investor is entitled to incorporate a business "for the
very purpose of escaping personal liability". Avoidance of liability was also
recognized as an acceptable reason for incorporation in, for example,
/Iwferso* v. /iA6ort [321 U.S. 349, 361 (1944)] and Wa/Wsaty v. Cor/ton
[18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966)]. Thus, a shareholder's motives for
incorporation do not subject him to personal liability: it is not for the courts to
judge whether a firm was "incorporated in good faith, or whether
incorporation was (...) an evasive device (...) to escape an individual
responsibility for the conduct of the business", as was established in [fer«er
v. //ea/-^ [177 NY. 63, 67, 69 N.E. 221, 222 (1903)].
Whether or not a court will lift the corporate veil depends on its evaluation
of the e/fccte of limited liability, not on the reasons that prompted
incorporation. It comes down, thus, to the actual use that is made of limited
liability. If it is used to defraud creditors, courts have consistently maintained
that it would then be inequitable if limited liability were upheld. For instance,
the court in C/KJ«? Wfl«/w(ton iton/t v. 264 ffater Sfree/ /Iss. [571 N.Y.S.2d
281, 282 (1991)] denied the application of the principle of limited liability to
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a parent company which had employed a scheme devised "to denude the
subsidiary of its assets in order to render it unable to honor its obligations" to
the complaining creditor. Fraud cases by nature involve extemalization of
costs to creditors, and veil-piercing in the event of fraud counters such effect
both directly and by correcting shareholders' perverse incentives. Moreover,
the protection created by the ability to access shareholders' non-invested
wealth will reduce the transaction costs would-be creditors' are to incur to
ascertain a corporation's true payment capacity and to detect or prevent
fraud.
!..• A second factor which may cause limited liability to be deemed to be
inequitable to the corporation's creditors is m/.sre/ve.ye«tafrort, which does not
require plaintiffs to demonstrate fraud (deceitful or dishonest artifices) on
behalf of the controlling shareholder(s) [Krendl and Krendl (1978), 31]. When
adjudicating veil-piercing claims that invoke misrepresentation, courts
examine whether creditors were misled as to the identity or solvency of the
party with which they were dealing as a result of the behavior of, or acts
attributable to, the dominating shareholder(s).
Misrepresentation cases in which courts have lifted the corporate veil,
such as fWn/<?r v. 5arge ßT. 7O7i [395 F. Supp. 1019 (1974)] and Za/sf v.
O/50/7 [227 A.2d 552 (1967)], involved cases in which a prospective creditor
had been given an incorrect, overly favorable picture of the extent or the value
of the assets of the company seeking credit (and to which he would eventually
have recourse should he wish to collect the company's debt to him). For
instance, a creditor may have received the impression that he was dealing with
the more solvent parent company (or majority shareholder) rather than the
less solvent subsidiary, that the debtor corporation owned more (or more
valuable) assets than it did, or that the dominating shareholder would repay a
loan extended to the corporation if the latter failed to do so. Facts such as the
mixing up of the assets and operations of the corporation with those of the
shareholder, the use of similar trade names, and the direction of operations
from the same offices that may suggest the corporation to be an
instrumentality of the shareholder, may also prompt a finding of
misrepresentation. A corporation's simple inability to pay, however, does not
constitute misrepresentation (or fraud).
Where a prospective creditor is misled into believing that there are more
(or more valuable) assets providing security for the fulfillment of the
corporate debtor's obligations, he may be lulled into extending credit which he
would not have provided if he had known the actual financial situation of the
debtor, or into extending credit at terms more favorable to the debtor. If the
creditor could then only collect his claim from the assets of the corporation in
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the event of a default, limited liability would have increased his loss compared
to the loss he would have suffered if he had possessed accurate information,
the misrepresentation having deprived him of the ability to refuse credit or to
assume the undercapitalization risk and charge ex a«te compensation through
the credit terms.
Piercing the corporate veil on the basis of misrepresentation by a dominant
shareholder is not merely a means to prevent externalization of costs to
creditors, it is also an application of the "cheapest cost avoidance" principle:
to ascertain the true identity or the real payment capacity of the corporate
debtor and to set credit terms accordingly, a would-be creditor would have to
incur higher expenses than the dominating shareholder would have to incur in
order to inform him correctly. Put another way, misrepresentation, like fraud,
raises transaction costs in credit markets, and the threat of personal liability
for shareholders serves to reduce such costs [Posner (1976), 520-521].
Tfte t/nctert;ap/te//zaf/o/7 Factor
is a third factor which courts may deem to result in
injustice if limited liability is retained. In i4M/o/Ho/r/z Je/ Go//b de Ca/z/fcrn/a
v. /tome* [47 Cal. 2d 792, 797, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (1957)], for instance, the
court considered that "inadequate financing, where such appears, is a factor,
and an important factor, in determining whether to remove the insulation to
stockholders normally created by the corporate method of operation". "An
obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the nature and magnitude of the
corporate undertaking" was also quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
/*mte/\N»7 v. /lAfcoff [321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)] as a factor which may trigger
veil-piercing, "even in the absence of a legislative policy which
undercapitalization would defeat". Undercapitalization is used by the courts
as a catch-all term referring to situations in which the equity capital that
shareholders have invested in the assets of the corporation has proven grossly
insufficient to meet its liabilities. There must be a gross disproportion, then,
between the capital that shareholders have paid in as reflected in the value of
the corporation's assets and the debts it has incurred.
Whether such a disproportion exists needs to be analyzed on the basis of
the facts of each case and is largely a matter of hindsight. Although there are
no absolute quantitative standards for determining whether a particular
corporation is undercapitalized, courts often consider the following questions.
Have shareholders furnished the corporation with sufficient capital to enable
it to carry on its business as a distinct economic entity, operating
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independently of the shareholders? Does the amount shareholders have
invested provide a reasonable cushion for the corporation's creditors, taking
into account the businesses prospective liabilities, or have they created a
financial structure prone to unduly jeopardize creditors in the event of
commercial adversities? Is the portion of total corporate assets represented by
the capital that shareholders have contributed reasonably sufficient to
withstand the ordinary stresses and strains of the business [Note (1958),
1128]? The answers to such questions vary with the nature of the business
concerned, the scope of its operations, the amount of risk (hazard) it involves,
the normal financial requirements of the business, and the reasonable
foreseeability of the adversities encountered and the liabilities incurred, and
occasionally depend on a comparison with other firms in the same industry.
Courts have sometimes applied the undercapitalization factor by reviewing
whether the corporation had "substantial capital reasonably regarded as
adequate to enable it to operate its business and pay its debts as they
matured" [0/?/o fitf/so« Co. v. Warner Coa/ Cor/?., 79 Oh. App. 437, 72
N.E.2d 487 (1946)]. Such a phrase, however, does not set a fixed measure for
assessing the adequacy of a corporation's capital but, rather, restates the issue
so as to require the court to evaluate whether shareholders have paid in
enough capital to cover the business's reasonably foreseeable liabilities.
Courts have frequently pierced the corporate veil in cases where a single
shareholder has incorporated a business with virtually no assets of its own,
where the business is heavily dependent on the assets of the shareholder to
conduct operations, and all the while its revenue is being siphoned off by the
shareholder. Early examples of such case law are Gorc/e« C/Yy CompaAjy v.
ßurafen [186 F.2d 651 (C.A. 10th, 1951)] and Kb/face v. Tu/ra Xe//ow Cc*
7axi ortrfßagage Co. [178 Okl. 15, 61 P.2d 645 (1936)]. However, as the
court in Wa//tov.yzAry v. Cor/ro« [18 N.Y.2d 414, 419, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9
(1966)] noted, "[t]he corporate form may not be disregarded merely because
the assets of the corporation (...) are insufficient to assure (...) the recovery
[of its debts] sought".
Absence of sufficient capital to satisfy corporate obligations, then, is,
according to this case law, not in itself enough to impose personal liability
upon a shareholder: the corporation must be undercapitalized by the standards
cited above, this undercapitalization must have given rise to injustice, and the
instrumentality test must have been satisfied. Thus, there must be something
more, and clearly more, than mere inability to pay. If insufficient capital alone
were decisive, the limited liability rule would become meaningless and this is
what the court's above-cited consideration in Wo7£ov.yz£y v. Cor/to«
expresses. Consistent with this, Thompson [1991, 1063, 1065-1067] found
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that in just over 26 percent of the cases in his study in which courts found a
case for undercapitalization, limited liability was nonetheless retained (the
corporate veil being pierced in 73.33 percent of undercapitalized
corporations).
The significance of the undercapitalization factor in the adjudication of
piercing-the-veil claims lends indirect support to our view in Chapter 7 that
statutory minimum equity capital requirements and capital maintenance rules
are unlikely to eliminate the perverse incentives created by limited liability.
Despite such requirements, shareholders may deliberately shelter themselves
behind the limited liability rule and have the corporation engage in activities
the costs of which to creditors in the event of failure may by far exceed the
amount shareholders have invested, minimum capital requirements and
restraints on corporate distributions being no assurance that the corporation
will have sufficient assets to pay its creditors. It is when a court finds that a
corporation was both undercapitalized and operated as a mere instrumentality
of its shareholder(s) that it will find that the corporate shield was in fact used
to externalize a part of the costs of the business to the corporation's creditors.
Veil-piercing then corrects the externality that limited liability has provoked,
whilst the /Area/ of personal liability serves to discourage such use. By
treating undercapitalization as a factor relevant to the adjudication of
piercing-the-veil claims, courts admit that minimum capital provisions, where
existing, and capital maintenance rules may not prevent extemalization of
costs to creditors.
The failure of minimum capital requirements to protect creditors has come
to be recognized by the custodians of the Model Business Corporation Act (in
the Official Comment at Section 6.21). For this reason, the requirement that
the articles of incorporation must state a minimum equity capital which
shareholders are to pay in, was deleted from the Model Act in 1980.
Similarly, modem state corporation statutes have reportedly dropped
minimum equity capital requirements of any meaning as a condition for
incorporation [Clark (1986), 67].
Some commentators have suggested that the presence of
undercapitalization would trigger veil-piercing earlier in state jurisdictions
which do not have statutory minimum capital requirements than in
jurisdictions which do impose such requirements [Conard (1976), 432J.
However, consistent with our view concerning the relative unimportance of
minimum capital requirements to opposing externalities, Thompson [1991,
1050-1052] has not reported statistically significant differences in piercing
rates for different state jurisdictions.
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The External Costs Problem: Dutch Law
iSfafutory Concepts
In the preceding sections, we have surveyed the two-prong test of
instrumentality and inequity applied by U.S. courts in piercing-the-veil cases.
We do not aim to argue, however, that every U.S. court in every single
piercing case consistently and systematically investigates whether the
instrumentality and inequity requirements described above have been
satisfied. Rather, we submit that U.S. courts are gw/äfo/ by these
requirements, and that they can be observed in one form or another in the bulk
of existing case law. In some cases, instrumentality and inequity standards are
applied explicitly, whilst they (or one of them) are rather implicit in other
cases. For instance, a typical fraud case hinges on inequity, with
instrumentality being implicit when fraud is established (for fraud by a
shareholder via the corporate entity ordinarily presupposes shareholder
dominance). All in all, in our view, the instrumentality and inequity tests
provide a key to understanding U.S. case law with respect to piercing the
corporate veil.
Let us now see how the concept of shareholder liability is applied in the
Netherlands to remedy externality problems arising from limited liability. Our
focus on liability should not conceal, however, that Dutch law relies more on
other techniques to protect creditors than on the imposition of personal
liability on shareholders. These other techniques include mandatory disclosure
requirements, minimum capital requirements, statutory limitations on
distributions to shareholders, and restrictions on the use of corporate funds to
repurchase stock.
Dutch corporate legislation traditionally attaches greater importance to
minimum equity capital requirements than U.S. corporation statutes tend to
do. As a condition for incorporating a business, Dutch law demands that
shareholders put up at least NLG 40,000 in equity capital if they intend to
establish a close corporation ('"ites/otert F<?Hrtootec/?a/?") (Section 2:178 (2)
of the Civil Code). Based on European Community law (viz. the second
European Community directive on company law), a minimum equity capital
of NLG 100,000 is prescribed to found a publicly held corporation
("Afaam/oze Fewootec/ia/?") (Section 2:67 (2) and (3) Civil Code). After
incorporation these amounts must be maintained in the assets of the business
at book value, and represent shareholders' minimum permanent investment.
For the reasons stated earlier, we are rather skeptical of the efficacy of such
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requirements. If anything, they are misleading to creditors as they suggest that
the assets of the business are worth at least the relevant minimum capital,
which may not be true at all. Hence, there would not seem much to be lost if
the aforesaid capitalization requirements were abolished.
The same applies to another, cfe /ac/o minimum capital requirement
contained in the Dutch corporation statute. This second requirement is the
result of a combination of the following three rules. First, business
corporations may only issue equity shares having a par value (Sections 2:67
(1) and 2:178 (1) Civil Code) and, generally, shares may not be issued at less
than their par value (which must be stated in the articles of incorporation)
(Sections 2:80 (1) and (2) and 2:191 (1) Civil Code). Second, when
purchasing a share from the corporation, investors must put up either the
entire par value of the share or, if expressly agreed, a lower amount equal to
at least one quarter of the par value and in this case the corporation (or the
trustee in the event of corporate bankruptcy) is entitled to demand payment of
the remaining amount later (Sections 2:80 (1) and 2:191 (1) Civil Code).
Purchasers of bearer shares (which only publicly held corporations may
issue), however, must always directly pay up the full par value of the shares
(Section 2:82 (3) Civil Code). In any event, the initial consideration paid by
the joint shareholders must equal at least the relevant minimum capital stated
above. Third, no distributions may be made to shareholders from the
consideration which investors have paid in as payment of the par value of
their shares (Sections 2:105 (2) and 2:216 (2) Civil Code). These rules
combined aim to effect the situation that the corporation will always have a
minimum cushion of capital for creditors equal to at least the number of
shares issued times the par value of the shares.
However, the salable value of the corporation's assets from which
creditors may seek payment, may be far less than the cited amount. The par
value concept and the legal restraints on distribution that are based on it, have
a bearing on the vo/ume of shareholders' equity capital as shown on the
corporation's balance sheet, but not on the ra/i/e of corporate assets. Par
value merely represents an ///itf/ow of value, the sum of par values being no
reflection of the actual worth of the assets in the firm. The par value/ no
distribution-requirement, therefore, does not provide creditors with any
security of payment or with reliable information on the creditworthiness of the
corporation, but may instead mislead them. Creative legal accounting methods
may create an accounting profit and a corresponding earned surplus on the
equity side of the balance sheet so as to allow for a distribution of funds to be
made entirely out of the earned surplus. Such a distribution would /rähee the
net worth of corporate assets and, so, reduce creditors' capital cushion.
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although the above-mentioned legal restraint on distributions would be
properly complied with.
We agree in principle that statutory limitations on corporate distributions
encourage shareholders to take into account potential losses to creditors up to
the amount which, pursuant to the limitations, must remain in the business
and that such limitations protect creditors up to this amount, but restrictions
on distributions based on the sum of the par value of equity shares issued fail
to serve such purposes. The par value concept, then, does not provide
creditors with any significant protection and may therefore, from a creditor
interest perspective, be abolished as well. The same observations and
conclusion apply to the statutory requirement (Sections 2:67 (1) and 2:178 (1)
Civil Code) that the total of the par values of the shares which the corporation
may issue, at its inception or at a later date, must be stated in the articles as
the corporation's "legal capital" (which must satisfy the minimum capital
requirements described earlier): the salable value of the assets, and not the
stated "legal capital" ("/waatec/?oppe///£ to/7/Yaa/"), determines the size of the
capital cushion protecting creditors.
Moreover, regardless of the corporation's legal capital and the par value of
its shares, it is the capital mar^ef which determines how much money the
corporation can raise from the sale of shares, and it is the corporation's
perceived capacity to earn money for its shareholders, not par value and legal
capital, which determines the capital market price of the shares. The legal
capital and par value requirements suggest that the shares represent a value
that in reality may not exist. Thus, for the purpose of raising equity capital,
these concepts need not be maintained either. (Indeed, the custodians of the
U.S. Model Business Corporation Act reached the conclusion many years ago
that the notions of "par value" and 'legal capital" do not serve a meaningful
purpose, and they were thus eliminated from the Model Act in 1980.)
We share the view of the custodians of the Model Business Corporation
Act that restraints on distributions which are based on insolvency tests related
to the value of corporate assets rather than on the volume of the equity
capital, provide more effective protection to creditors than do minimum
capitalization, par value and legal capital concepts like those embraced by
Dutch corporate law. The Model Act states such insolvency tests in Section
6.40 (c), as follows: "No distribution [to or for the benefit of shareholders]
may be made if, after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to
pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or (2) the
corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus
(unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the
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distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders
whose preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution." In
our view, a provision like this one, directly aimed at maintaining sufficient
assets in the firm to pay creditors, would be preferable to the current Dutch
concepts discussed above.
Persona/ L/a/j/7/fy of Snareno/cfers
The concept of piercing the corporate veil, meaning rendering shareholders
personally liable in their capacity as shareholders for the fulfillment of
obligations incumbent on the corporation, does not exist in the Netherlands.
Dutch law does recognize the notion of personal liability of shareholders in
spite of statutory limited liability. However, unlike U.S. law, the legal basis of
such liability does not lie in the obligations of the cor/?ora//on, but in the
obligations of the individual s/iare/io/cfer concerned towards the corporation's
creditors. In other words, when personal liability is imposed by a court, the
shareholder will not be ordered to fulfill a corporate obligation but to fulfill
an obligation of his own. Accordingly, creditors of a corporation desirous to
collect payment of a corporate debt from a shareholder must demonstrate that
the latter is subject to a personal obligation to pay an amount equaling that
debt. There are several sources from which such an obligation may arise and
these we explore below.
The first source of shareholder liability is Section 2:403 of the Civil Code,
which applies in corporate group contexts only. In brief, this section provides
that a corporation belonging to a corporate group is exempt from the
requirement to make up and to disclose a detailed annual balance sheet and
income statement in the manner statutorily prescribed if, /«/er o//o, the
following conditions are met: the financial figures of the company concerned
must be consolidated into the financial statements of another company of the
same group (which is usually the group's parent company), and the latter
company must have stated in writing that it has assumed joint and several
liability for debts of the first company ensuing from juridical acts (including,
in particular, debts arising from contract). The "statement of liability" is to be
filed with the Chamber of Commerce at which the corporation claiming the
exemption is registered.
From Section 2:403 it follows that creditors of a subsidiary company may
hold the subsidiary's shareholder, the parent company, liable for certain debts
of the subsidiary if the parent has filed a statement of liability as described in
order to relieve the subsidiary of financial disclosure requirements. However,
777e Corporate Paradox 355
the liability which the parent company would so assume does not extend to
involuntary creditors. Victims of torts committed by the subsidiary, then, will
find themselves unable to recover judgments for damages from the assets of
the parent company. Likewise, the tax authorities will not be entitled to collect
payment of taxes owed by the subsidiary from the parent.
The basis of shareholder liability pursuant to Section 2:403 of the Civil
Code is not the liability of the subsidiary corporation itself but the statement
of liability given by the shareholder (the parent company) in compliance with
this section. Obviously, both U.S. law and Dutch law permit shareholders to
voluntarily guarantee the due fulfillment of corporate obligations as they
wish, notwithstanding the limited liability rule. However, shareholder liability
pursuant to Section 2:403 is different from genuine voluntary liability, as this
section creates a statutory o6//gaf/on on the shareholder to accept unlimited
liability for certain corporate debts if the debtor (the subsidiary) is to be
relieved of public disclosure requirements.
If a subsidiary corporation is exempt from its legal obligations to disclose
financial statements, its financial figures being consolidated into the parent
company's annual financial report, would-be voluntary creditors of the
subsidiary would have to incur higher information costs to ascertain the
creditworthiness of that corporation. They would now have to gather for
themselves the information that they would otherwise have been able to
deduce from the subsidiary's balance sheet and income statement. As
information costs become higher, the threat of externalization of risk would
increase. The obligation of the parent company to assume liability for debts of
the exempted subsidiary serves to avoid such higher information costs and
consequent externalities. The result of the parent assuming liability is that it
becomes unnecessary for would-be voluntary creditors of the subsidiary to
examine in detail that company's creditworthiness: they can rely upon the
joint payment capacity of the subsidiary and the parent company and may
obtain information on their joint ability to pay from the latter's consolidated
financial report, which must satisfy the statutory requirements concerning
financial disclosure.
The above reasoning does not, however, apply to /«voluntary creditors.
Debts to involuntary creditors by definition do not arise out of bargaining
situations. As there is no bargaining before credit is extended, disclosure of
less financial data by a particular corporation will not result in higher
information costs for prospective involuntary creditors. To them, the extent of
the data the corporation discloses is irrelevant. Thus, shareholder liability
would not reduce /«formation costs of involuntary creditors and this probably
explains why Section 2:403 excludes this category from the statement of
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liability it prescribes.
However, the exclusion of involuntary creditors makes Section 2:403, in
our view, a topsy-turvy rule: given that involuntary credit is not extended in a
bargaining situation, involuntary creditors cannot protect themselves against
corporate insolvency by reviewing the financial figures disclosed and as they
could not in any case have protected themselves even if the relevant
subsidiary corporation was under an obligation to disclose elaborate financial
information, they are denied the protection which Section 2:403 affords
voluntary creditors, although they might well have bargained for the same
protection if they cow/d have bargained. Thus, the weaker party (involuntary
creditors) is denied the protection given to the stronger party (voluntary
creditors), for the very reason that it w the weaker party, being unable to
bargain. In effect, Section 2:403 rewards rather than discourages the use of
subsidiary companies to externalize risk to involuntary creditors, thereby
adding to the externality problem in relation to this class of creditors rather
than reducing it. We propose, therefore, that the shareholder liability
prescribed by Section 2:403 be extended to include involuntary creditors.
There is yet another ambiguity relating to the kinds of creditors protected
by Section 2:403. The statement of liability which Section 2:403 prescribes is
a substitute for the protection that voluntary creditors could derive from the
subsidiary's annual financial report if it had not been exempted from statutory
disclosure obligations. Therefore, the statement of liability should be filed no
later than the date on which the relevant subsidiary was to disclose its annual
financial report had it not been exempted [Maeijer (1994), 609]. Does it
follow also that only creditors of the subsidiary who extended credit after the
statement's filing, that means, who lacked the information of the subsidiary's
financial report, are entitled to invoke the stated liability?
Although the wording of Section 2:403 is inconclusive, the answer to this
question must be negative. If creditors who extended credit prior to the filing
of the statement of liability were excluded from its scope, they would become
unable to keep track of their risk once the debtor ceased to satisfy the
statutory disclosure requirements. The consolidated financial statements
released by the parent company that issued the statement of liability would be
irrelevant to this category of creditors as they would be unable to invoke
liability of the parent. As a consequence, they would be unable to take risk-
reducing measures if their risk of non-payment increased after the debtor had
become exempt from disclosure. For instance, they would be unable, because
of lack of knowledge, to demand additional security in the event of an increase
in the insolvency risk (though the credit terms may have entitled them to do
so), to sell and assign their claim to a third party in exchange for cash, or to
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renegotiate the terms of the credit arrangement in order to incorporate the
additional risk.
For this reason, wouW-be creditors of a corporation currently complying
with statutory disclosure rules but which may be exempted later (that is, a
corporation which belongs to or may become part of a corporate group),
would have risk-minimizing incentives to demand contractual devices limiting
the corporation's liberty of action so as to prevent unilateral increases in the
insolvency risk, to install costly monitoring and detection mechanisms, and to
oblige the prospective debtor to keep disclosing certain financial data to the
creditor even if it were legally exempt from disclosure. Obviously, any such
devices would raise the transaction costs attending corporate borrowing.
Alternatively, potential creditors might limit nsk by not extending credit at all,
in particular, if the prospective corporate debtor refuses to accept devices like
those described above. Such effects are avoided if existing creditors also be
afforded the protection of the statement of liability* issued pursuant to Section
2:403. Therefore, we share the view of Maeijer [1994, 610] that Section
2:403 should be construed to include creditors who extended credit prior to
the statement ~s filing, in addition to new creditors.
L/ab/7/ty Based on
The second source of shareholder liability in Dutch law is
However, the scope of misrepresentation as a basis of shareholder liability is
more limited than the equivalent concept in U.S. case law relating to the
piercing of the corporate veil.
Misrepresentation, according to Dutch law, is present when a shareholder
made such statements or behaved in such a manner that a creditor of the
corporation could have reasonably presumed that he was either contracting
with the shareholder instead of the corporation, or that the shareholder was
personally guaranteeing the obligation entered into by the corporation. In such
an event, the shareholder is deemed to have dealt personally with the creditor
and the latter may hold him liable for the fulfillment of his consequent
personal obligation (on the basis of Section 3:35 of the Civil Code). Likewise,
in De Fos v. De ATor? [NJ 1977, 119 (Hof Adam 1975)], a case pertaining to
two affiliated companies (not involving a shareholder-corporation
relationship), the appellate court found that one affiliate was bound by a
contract which according to that affiliate had been entered into by the other
company given that the first affiliate had created the impression that // was
the contracting party.
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Alternatively, the statements or conduct of a shareholder may have
furnished creditors with the impression that the corporation was not acting in
its own right but on behalf of the ^/jore/jo/c/er [Maeijer (1994), 896]. If in the
circumstances the relevant creditor could have reasonably relied upon the
accuracy of such an impression, the shareholder is deemed to have been duly
represented by the corporation as his legal agent and, consequently, the
obligation contracted by the corporation is considered that of the shareholder
personally: not a corporate obligation but a .sÄareAo/i/er obligation has arisen,
which the creditor concerned may subsequently demand the shareholder to
fulfill (by reference to Section 3:61 (2) of the Civil Code).
Misrepresentation as a source of shareholder liability is limited to the
instances described above. In both cases, the legal basis of the shareholder's
liability is the shareholder's ow« obligation as a contracting party: the
shareholder is deemed either to have directly contracted with the creditor
concerned (the first case) or to have been represented by the corporation
acting as his agent (the second case), and creditors may hold the shareholder
liable based on his /jersona/ obligation which is presumed to have so arisen.
A misrepresentation action against a shareholder is most likely to succeed
if the shareholder was involved in the day-to-day business of the corporation
and he mixed his personal dealings with those of the corporation, which may
have misled creditors as to the identity of the party with which they were
contracting. However, mere CO/J/MS/'O« on the part of the creditor-plaintiff is
not enough, as the Supreme Court has noted in ß/o/t v. De //ao/7 [NJ 1985,
446 (HR 1984)]; there must have been some positive act attributable to the
defending shareholder which occasioned the creditor-plaintiff to presume that
the shareholder was bound. For instance, in N&V/v. Secwr/cor [NJ 1995, 170
(HR 1994)] concerning an action not formally based on misrepresentation
(but on tort; see below), liability was imposed upon a shareholder (the parent
company) for non-performance of a contract by a subsidiary corporation in a
case in which employees of the parent company had been involved in the
contract negotiations, had made it known that they were parent company
employees, and had verbally represented that the parent would treat the
subsidiary's creditors decently.
Misrepresentation, by its very nature, may only lead to shareholder
liability in relation to voluntary creditors; this is no different from its U.S.
equivalent. As we saw in our discussion of misrepresentation and shareholder
liability under U.S. corporate law, misrepresentation is apt to raise voluntary
creditors' information costs and promotes externalities. Personal liability of
shareholders is the law's response, which aims to avoid such effects.
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L/aö/7/fy Based on Tor/
A forf committed by a shareholder is the third source of shareholder liability
recognized in Dutch law. A creditor of a corporation may hold a shareholder
liable for damages based on tort (Section 6:162 of the Civil Code) if the
shareholder behaved wrongfully towards the creditor concerned and if such
wrongful behavior resulted in the corporation's failure to pay, wholly or
partially, its debt to that creditor. If in a tort action the court enters judgment
for the creditor-plaintiff, the shareholder will be ordered to repair the loss
which that creditor has sustained through the corporation's failure to pay; the
shareholder must then pay damages to make up for the corporation's unsettled
debt.
The shareholder, again, is not held liable to fulfill a corporate obligation
but to fulfill a personal obligation, viz. an obligation to pay compensatory
damages. Liability is not imposed upon him in his capacity as a shareholder
but as a tortfeasor. Accordingly, the creditor-plaintiff for whom the court has
found is not permitted access to the shareholder's assets in order to collect a
corporate debt but, solely, to collect the amount of the shareholder's personal
liability for damages. Thus, the corporate veil/?er se is not lifted. The amoH«/
of the shareholder's liability, however, is determined by the extent of the
corporation's unpaid debt.
Most litigation by creditors of a corporation who seek to inflict personal
liability upon a shareholder is based upon alleged torts by shareholders. A
prerequisite for a successful tort action against a shareholder is the
corporation's failure to pay the creditor-plaintiff: unless the corporation has
defaulted on the payment of its debt to that creditor, the creditor has not
suffered a loss for which he may seek reparation from a shareholder. Such a
prerequisite does not apply to actions based on misrepresentation or on a
statement of liability issued pursuant to Section 2:403 of the Civil Code.
Whereas only voluntary creditors may successfully claim liability on the
basis of misrepresentation or on the basis of the cited statement of liability, in
a tort action voluntary as well as involuntary creditors of the corporation may
claim damages from a shareholder. Thus, tort actions against shareholders
may be brought for any unpaid debts of the corporation, regardless of whether
the relevant debt has arisen from a contract entered into by the corporation or
from a corporate tort. In practice, however, plaintiffs in shareholder tort
actions are mostly voluntary creditors.
A tort action against a shareholder may be brought irrespective of whether
the shareholder is a private individual or a corporation. The same applies to
misrepresentation actions but not to actions based on the liability statement
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pursuant to Section 2:403, which require a corporate group context. If the
court in a tort action directed against several shareholders holds more than
one shareholder liable for the creditor-plaintiffs damage from the
corporation's default, each shareholder whose defense is rejected will be
jointly and severally liable for the damages payable (Section 6:102 Civil
Code).
Tort actions may be brought by individual creditors of the corporation or,
in the event of corporate bankruptcy, alternatively, by the trustee appointed
by the court acting on behalf of the creditors as a class. The trustee's right to
bring a tort action for the benefit of the joint creditors was recognized by the
Supreme Court in its decisions in Peetery v. Ga/re« [NJ 1983, 597 (HR
1983)] and Aff/wox v. Fan rfe« £ W [NJ 1992, 174 (HR 1991)]. It will be
appropriate for the trustee to bring a tort action against a shareholder if the
latter's allegedly tortious conduct harmed the creditors as a class and not
merely a single individual creditor. The right of the trustee to bring a tort
action against the shareholder is then efficient as it saves the litigation costs of
a variety of suits for damages by individual creditors.
The trustee is not entitled, by contrast, to bring proceedings based on the
statement of liability issued pursuant to Section 2:403 as that statement does
not create rights for the bankrupt corporation or for the joint creditors as a
class but solely for the corporation's voluntary creditors. If the trustee, in the
right of the joint creditors, were entitled to bring proceedings based on the
cited statement of liability, both voluntary and involuntary creditors would
benefit from subsequent payments made by the shareholder concerned to the
trustee because according to Dutch bankruptcy law, such payments would
have to be distributed to a// creditors in proportion to their respective claims
(with due observance of creditors' differing preferential rights). That would
water down the protection which the statement of liability affords voluntary
creditors, and contrast with the tenor of Section 2:403 as it currently stands.
Likewise, only a creditor may bring an action based on misrepresentation
as described in the preceding section, given that such an action hinges on the
presumption that the creditor-plaintiff has contracted with the individual
shareholder, not with the corporation; as the action assumes that there has
been no involvement by the corporation in its own right, there is no role for
the trustee to play.
To date, like the concept of piercing-the-veil in U.S. jurisdictions, the
concept of personal liability of shareholders based on tort has resided in the
domain of (shareholders of) close corporations, covering both close
corporations whose shareholders are private individuals and close
corporations belonging to a corporate group. The same applies to shareholder
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liability on the basis of misrepresentation, whilst shareholder liability based
on the statement of liability given pursuant to Section 2:403, as noted, is
limited to a corporate group context.
fffa« may creditors, based on tort, claim compensatory damages from a
shareholder for unpaid debts of the corporation? In other words, when do
Dutch courts find that a shareholder committed a tort subjecting him to
personal liability for damages?
Generally, courts have broad discretion in adjudicating tort claims against
shareholders brought by creditors of a corporation, or by the trustee in the
event of bankruptcy, and in determining whether or not the defending
shareholder(s) acted tortiously. Like U.S. legislatures, the Dutch legislature
has left this domain to case law, and like the decisions of U.S. courts in
piercing-the-veil cases, the decisions of Dutch courts are highly dependent on
the facts of each case.
Categones of Torf/ous L/ab/7/fy
Judging from existing case law, instances of shareholder liability based on tort
may be grouped into the following three different categories.
First, a shareholder may have caused the corporation to incur an obligation
which it was unable to fulfill from the outset while at the time the obligation
was incurred the shareholder was aware, or should reasonably have been
aware, that the corporation was inadequately equipped or had insufficient
assets to properly perform that obligation, and lacked assets to pay damages
for its non-performance. Cases in which a shareholder used a deliberately
undercapitalized corporation to do business belong to this category, as do
certain instances of fraud. The courts have initially applied the aforesaid
standard of tortious liability to members of the management board, but it
equally applies to shareholders who control the management of the corporate
firm. In Sr/mw/a« v. AVara [NJ 1990, 286 (HR 1989)], for example, the
Supreme Court confirmed an appeal court decision quoting that standard
which imposed liability on a member of the management board who was at
the same time the corporation's single shareholder.
A shareholder is likely to become liable in tort, for instance, if he caused
the corporation to enter into a contract for the purchase of goods at a price
that he knew it was unable to pay. Decisive is what the shareholder actually
knew, or should reasonably have known, at the time the contract was entered
into. The existence at that time of a mere /HMs/A/V/fy that the corporation
might later become unable to perform the contract does not subject the
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shareholder to tortious liability, as is apparent from the judicial decisions in
/to/wm? v. Baxter [TWS 1994, 188 (HR 1994)] and &4SF A/e</er/a/u/ v.
Fan Ow/we« [NJ 1989, 92 (Hof Arnhem 1988)]. A shareholder may also
become subject to liability in tort along this line of case law if he caused the
corporation to engage in activities prone to generate corporate tortious
liability, although he was, or should have been, aware that the corporation's
assets were insufficient to indemnify prospective tort victims for the damage
inflicted upon them.
Secondly, liability in tort may be imposed upon a shareholder for having
deprived the corporation of the ability to duly perform an existing obligation,
/.e. a/?er the obligation was incurred, in particular, by depriving it of the
assets or funds necessary to fulfill the obligation concerned. For example, the
shareholder may have rendered the corporation unable to pay an outstanding
debt by occasioning it to assign corporate property or distribute corporate
funds to himself. Similarly, he may have caused the corporation to mortgage
or pledge assets to himself or for his private benefit; as a consequence,
creditors may have become unable, or less able, to collect on corporate
liabilities. Tortious liability may also arise if the shareholder willfully
precluded the corporation from fulfilling an obligation resting on it which it
COMW in fact have performed, as is apparent from the Supreme Court's
decision in Fa« Wcrm/ig v. Fan aer F//W [NJ 1992, 411 (HR 1992)].
The second category includes cases in which creditors of the corporation
were defrauded after they had extended credit, as well as cases of asset
stripping after a corporate liability had arisen in which the shareholder(s) did
not have a fraudulent intent. For instance, in Co/mwws/ort o///je furo/jeon
Co/M/nurt/lV v. 77jea/ er a/. [NJ 1985, 124 (Arr. A'dam 1981)], the district
court imposed liability in tort on, /nter a//a, a shareholder who had stripped
the corporation of its assets in an alleged restructuring operation after that
corporation had incurred a fine payable to the Commission of the European
Community based on European competition law. As a consequence of the
asset transfers, the corporation had become unable to pay the aforesaid fine.
The court found that the defending shareholder had acted tortiously by
wrongfully neglecting the Commission's interest in the payment of the fine
due to it by the corporate entity.
Another good example of a case belonging to the second category is Mmox
v. Fan aW; find [NJ 1992. 174 (HR 1991)]. In this case, the corporation's
single shareholder had decided that the corporation should distribute certain
reserves to himself. Such a distribution was in itself permitted by statutory
dividend restrictions. No physical distribution of funds took place but the
shareholder received a claim against the corporation equal to the amount of
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the reserves concerned. This claim was merged with another, pre-existing
claim of the shareholder. Subsequently, the shareholder sold his entire claim
to a creditor (in fact, another creditor) of the corporation in exchange for a
consideration in cash. Earlier that creditor had received security from the
same corporation in relation to other claims of his against the corporation,
which enabled him to also obtain payment of the shareholder's claim assigned
to him.
As a result of the distribution decision and the subsequent assignment by
the shareholder of his claim, the corporation became unable to pay creditors
other than the secured creditor to whom the shareholder's claim had been
sold. The court held the shareholder liable in tort based on the injury sustained
by the other creditors, a decision which is consistent with our view that
dividend restrictions (capital maintenance rules) may /nz/igafe, but not
e///n/'rtfl/e, the perverse incentives created by shareholders' limited liability:
the court's decision confirms that a shareholder's conduct may be tortious,
that is, may inflict externalities on the corporation's creditors, even though
statutory limitations on corporate distributions are duly observed [Maeijer
(1994), 895].
Thirdly, a shareholder may have given creditors the impression that the
corporation was financially sound or at least worthy of credit whereas in
reality it was not, for instance, by deliberately having failed to inform would-
be creditors that the corporation, although seemingly solvent, had virtually no
assets from which they could collect payment. Such acts or omissions may
give rise to tortious liability if the shareholder was involved in the
corporation's management and thus had sufficient insight into its affairs to
know better a«J to know that creditors erroneously relying on the
corporation's soundness in all likelihood would face injury whereas the
creditor-plaintiff himself was unaware, and could not reasonably have been
aware, of the real facts. Creditors may in this way be tempted to extend credit
which they would not otherwise have done had they known the corporation's
true financial situation, or at the very least they would have extended it on
different terms. This category includes cases in which creditors were
somehow presented with an inadequate picture of the corporation's capacity
to pay its debts and could not reasonably have known better, with the relevant
shareholder being aware, or having to foresee, that they would be likely to
incur loss if they relied on that picture and having neglected a positive duty to
correct them.
Cases belonging to the third category include /i/^adcr Je/gers/wa //oW/ng
v. /A7teA-coö/?eraf/eve Zw/ve/Zaor/e/t va« /tofw/pert [NJ 1988, 487 (HR 1988)]
and O^-Pamra« v. .Lay Fe/*oo/?/waattc/7a/?/?// [NJ 1982, 443 (HR 1981)].
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In the first case, the defending shareholder had acquired the shares in a nearly
insolvent corporation. Upon acquisition, the shareholder had publicly
announced that he would revitalize the corporation in question and enhance its
liquidity. Accordingly, trade creditors were given the impression that credit
extended to that corporation would be properly repaid. However, the
corporation was adjudicated bankrupt within a year of the acquisition, as a
result of which its debt to the trade creditor-plaintiff remained unsettled. The
court imposed tortious liability upon the shareholder for having suggested that
extending credit to the corporation was safe although he was aware of its
financial difficulties, and subsequently having failed to take measures to
protect creditors when the corporation proved to be irreparably insolvent.
In the second case, 0.s£y-.Paw7a/j v. Las Fer£oo/?ma<7tec/7tf/>/>//, the
defending shareholder (the parent company) had occasioned the subsidiary
corporation to assign virtually all of its assets to the parent. However, the
assets were physically left with the subsidiary. As a consequence, pr/ma j&c/e
the subsidiary appeared to afford new creditors a reasonable capital cushion
but in reality it had virtually no assets from which they could be paid. The
court held the parent company liable in tort, considering that the parent had
such insight into the subsidiary that it must have been aware, or should
reasonably have anticipated, that the aforesaid assignment of assets would
harm new creditors of the subsidiary as it practically deprived them of the
opportunity to enforce their claims, and that the parent had nonetheless
ignored the interests of such creditors.
The three categories described above do not constitute completely separate
realms. Claims and allegations falling within different categories may be
advanced in a single tort action and courts may base their decisions on
considerations from more than one category. In particular, there may be
overlaps in court decisions between the third category on the one hand and the
first or second category on the other. However, the basis for tortious liability
set out for each category, once established, may independently and on its own
merit result in the imposition of shareholder liability.
As a rule, Dutch courts do not apply an express "instrumentality" or "alter
ego" test similar to that applied in U.S. piercing-the-veil cases. However, in
all three categories described above, courts do require that the defending
shareholder effectively dominated the corporation to such a degree that the
non-payment of the corporation's debt to the relevant creditor-plaintiff is
attributable to the conduct of the shareholder. Some court decisions refer
explicitly to shareholder dominance or control, especially if the case falls
within the third category described above, whilst the same requirement is
rather implicit in decisions in other cases, especially in those belonging to the
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first or second categories. The economic rationales behind the dominance
requirement were described in our discussion of the instrumentality test in
U.S. piercing-the-veil law; we may refer back to that discussion.
Shareholder dominance may most obviously be present when the
shareholder is concurrently a member, or the sole member, of the
corporation's management board. However, membership of that board is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for deemed presence of
shareholder dominance and tortious liability of a shareholder. Moreover, if the
defending shareholder is found to have effectively dominated the corporation,
that does not in itself expose him to liability in tort. According to consistent
case law including tow/erc v. 5LG [NJ 1986, 792 (HR 1986)], £>emz
i v. G/orywave 5/i;/p;>>g [NJ 1992, 247 (HR 1991)] and Bato's £>/
v. //K? Afer/wr/a/K& [NJ 1996, 214 (HR 1995)], shareholder
dominance alone is insufficient for liability: it must be accompanied by
wrongful acts falling within one or more of the tort categories identified
above.
The U.S. "inequity" test does not have a direct equivalent in Dutch law
relating to shareholder liability. Whereas in the "inequity" test, the emphasis
is on the result if limited liability were to be upheld, the starting point in
Dutch tort (and misrepresentation) cases is the conduct of the defending
shareholder(s) /?er se. However, the instances of liability in tort in the three
categories described above reflect essentially the same notion of inequity: if
the shareholder were not liable to pay compensatory damages in the instances
described, "an inequitable result" (quoting j4«to/wo/r/z de/ Go//ö Je
Co///ör/7/a v. /tesM/'c£) would follow and creditors would sustain "an element
of injustice" (quoting Deff/Y/ 7>wc£ Broters, /we. v. W! /toy F/e/w/w/'/jg Frw/Y
Co.) by the very same standards as those set out in the U.S. inequity test. Like
the U.S. inequity test, the three Dutch categories of shareholder tortious
liability protect creditors against fraud, misrepresentation as applied in U.S.
piercing-the-veil law and against dealing with an undercapitalized
corporation; we have already discussed the rationales behind these factors in
relation to shareholder liability. The inequitable element present in all three
Dutch categories set forth above may be defined as wrongful neglect by a
shareholder of the interests of creditors.
The notion of inequity is also reflected in the Supreme Court's
consideration in A/äw/frtf/Mra 7ey.s/7e £Ww/ v. y4wwter£/am.sc/7e Ztowt [NJ 1957,
514 (HR 1957)] requiring creditors to look after their ovvn interests and take
protective measures so as to limit the risk of non-payment wherever
appropriate. Although the relief sought in this case was not shareholder
liability but liability of a bank towards a creditor of a borrowing corporation,
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the aforementioned requirement is also relevant to tort actions against
shareholders. Thus, creditors' prospects of having tortious liability imposed
on a shareholder are mitigated by the rule that they should endeavor to avoid
losses by looking after their own interests properly themselves. This
restriction serves to prevent extension of credit to de ^frcto insolvent
corporations and, thus, to reduce the social costs of corporate bankruptcy.
In the above-mentioned cases, Ös^y-Pa«««« v. Lay Fer£oo;?maatec/7a/jp7/
and i4/6ada JSe/gers/»a //o/d/»g v. /«/ercod/jerafteve Zu/ve(/äö/7e& van
i4«/wr/?en, the creditor-plaintiffs could not reasonably have protected
themselves from the losses they sustained because of lack of accurate
information, and liability in tort was imposed on the parent companies in
question as they had neglected creditors' interests. By contrast, in a somewhat
similar U.S. case, F/sser v. /«termtf/ona/ ßa«A: [282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. I960)]
involving a subsidiary corporation with minimum assets which was dominated
by its parent company, the parent had duly informed creditors of the
subsidiary company that the latter lacked substantial assets and was being
operated primarily for the purpose of furthering the interests of the parent
company. In that case, the U.S. court concluded that it would not be
inequitable to uphold the limited liability rule and so refused to lift the
corporate veil. Judging from the decisions in the Dutch cases quoted above,
the outcome would have been no different had the case been decided by a
Dutch court.
L/a/)///ry Based on M/smanagemenf
The final source of shareholder liability in Dutch law, which is in fact a
species of liability in tort (especially of the second category mentioned in the
previous section), is contained in Sections 2:138 and 2:248 of the Civil Code.
According to these sections, if a shareholder manages the corporation,
either as a member of the management board or by de ^ crc/o participating in
the management (;.e. by acting as a quasi-manager), in a manner so woefully
inadequate that the corporation is forced into bankruptcy, he will be liable for
the corporation's deficit in the bankruptcy. However, liability is imposed not
in his capacity as a shareholder but in his capacity as a member or quasi-
member of the corporation's management board.
Proceedings based on Section 2:138 or 2:248 of the Civil Code may only
be brought by the trustee appointed by the court in the corporation's
bankruptcy, who will distribute any subsequent payments from the
shareholder-manager among the corporation's various creditors. In such
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proceedings, the trustee must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that
the defending shareholder actively participated in the management of the
corporation, that the corporation was manifestly mismanaged, and that
moreover such mismanagement was an "important cause" of the corporation's
bankruptcy.
The trustee's right to hold shareholders personally liable as managers or
quasi-managers in bankruptcy cases prompted by mismanagement is the final
recourse under Dutch law for the protection of creditors against exploitation
by the shareholders. The rigid requisites for a successful action (viz. active
shareholder involvement in the firm's day-to-day management, bankruptcy,
manifest mismanagement and mismanagement having been an important
factor in causing the bankruptcy) preclude such actions from being more than
a means of last resort for the remedy of externalities arising from limited
liability.

Concluding Remarks
THE FIRM IS more than a production function, a series of inputs from which
output is obtained. The inputs that make up the firm cooperate as a torn to
jointly effect output, their individual efforts being combined into team
product. Within the team, the ordinary market mechanism does not operate to
allocate resources among alternative uses; intra-firm coordination takes its
place.
The corporate form organizes the team and substitutes centralized
management for the market to direct productive activity. The corporate form
so enables exploitation of the advantages associated with the organization of
productive activity in a firm: specialization of production factors,
specialization in the assessment of business risks, avoidance of the costs of
market exchange transactions, resolution of shirking problems in team
productive actions, and elimination of hold-up problems in production
processes involving relationship-specific assets. However, the corporate form
does not merely organize the team, it also promotes the supply of two
particular inputs to it: effective monitoring and risk capital. The
distinguishing features of the corporate concept of organization all advance
the supply of these inputs to the firm.
The desire to avoid market exchange transactions as an organizational
instrument, to ensure effective monitoring of input performance in team
productive activity, and to foster the influx of capital inputs into large-scale,
capital-intensive production processes, all induced the emergence of the
corporate form. As such, the corporation is a creature of market forces, not an
invention of state bureaucracies.
The relationships between the cooperative input owners in the firm are of a
voluntary associative nature and so is the adoption of corporate features to
organize the firm. Accordingly, the relationships between the cooperative
input owners, including the relationship between the residual claimants and
the other team members, involve private contractual and quasi-contractual
arrangements, which are reflected in the corporate concept. Incorporation
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under a public statute serves to avoid the transaction costs of establishing
corporate characteristics through private contracting. The cost reduction
attained is greatest if the statutory rules mimic the voluntary arrangements
upon which the private parties involved in the corporate firm would agree if
they were not impaired by transaction costs.
Promotion of effective monitoring and supply of risk capital to team
productive processes and avoidance of transaction costs in the organization of
such processes, particularly in the effectuation of corporate features, are the
upside effects of the corporate form as standardized in public corporation
statutes. However, there are downside effects, too.
The first downside effect of the corporate form arises as the corporation
institutionalizes the conflict of interests between utility maximizing managers
and wealth maximizing residual claimants. This conflict is responsible for the
existence of agency costs, which raise the operational costs of the corporate
firm, threaten the allocation of resources to their highest value in use, reduce
returns to shareholders, discourage investment and raise output prices.
Competition in product and factor markets, incentive contracts for managers,
the market for corporate control, and managerial labor markets all operate to
align managers' interests with those of the shareholders and so mitigate
agency costs. However, these mechanisms do not e/zm/nafe the divergence of
interests between managers and shareholders and consequent agency costs.
Product and factor market competition are incapable of disposing of
economy-wide agency costs, incentive contracts absorb at least a part of the
agency costs they purport to reduce and managers may pursue evasive
strategies offsetting their intended effects on incentives, the law of diminishing
marginal utility of wealth by definition limits the effectiveness of pecuniary
incentives such as those created by stock options, the market for corporate
control and managerial labor markets both involve substantial transaction
costs impairing their effective operation, labor market discipline also suffers
from adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and excessive retained
cash balances may pervert corporate control transactions.
The law may mitigate managerial departures from shareholders' wealth-
maximizing interests by strengthening market disciplinary forces, particularly
by facilitating the supply of information into the above-mentioned markets in
order to reduce transaction costs in these markets, and, to a limited extent, by
extending the instruments available to shareholders to monitor managerial
behavior. In addition, the law may enhance capital market discipline on
managers and purify the operation of the market for corporate control by
entitling the shareholders to challenge corporate policies concerning retention
of profits and to demand pay-out of cash reserves, either through direct
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distributions of cash or through corporate stock repurchase programs, so as to
prevent large retained cash balances insulating management from monitoring
by capital markets. Personal liability of managers for injury sustained by
shareholders as a result of managerial behavior is not generally a desirable
means to tackle the agency costs problem, for the cost of a rule subjecting
managers to potential personal liability (higher managerial salaries, over-
cautiousness, avoidance of profitable business, litigation costs) may well
outweigh its purported benefit of fewer aberrant activities by managers.
Consistent herewith, both in United States jurisdictions and in the
Netherlands, imposition of personal liability on managers is limited to
exceptional cases, in particular, to cases in which the rationales for
management by specialist managers (greater effectiveness in the monitoring of
input behavior at lower costs) are absent.
In June 1997, a private committee (the "Coiwmm/e Corporate
Goverrttfnce"), established under the auspices of Amsterdam Exchanges N.V.
(the corporation which organizes the Amsterdam stock exchange), published a
series of non-binding recommendations on the governance of publicly held
corporations in the Netherlands, primarily intended for corporations listed on
the Amsterdam exchange. These recommendations, mostly of a practical
nature, seek to improve the technical functioning of supervisory boards and
management boards as well as the intra-corporate relationships between
supervisory directors, managers and shareholders. They also promote greater
accountability of top management and supervisory directors to the
shareholders and independence of the supervisory board in the performance of
its supervising tasks, and they oppose possession of shares and stock options
by corporate insiders for the purpose of realizing short-term gains.
The committee proposes to enhance shareholders' ability to monitor
corporate management in several ways: first, by awarding shareholders who
own at least one percent of a corporation's outstanding shares or whose
shares represent a stock market value of at least NLG 500,000, the right to
nominate items for discussion at the company's general meeting of
shareholders; second, by introducing a system of "proxy solicitation"
(currently virtually non-existent in the Netherlands) in order to facilitate
greater influence of individual shareholders on the decision-making in the
general meeting of shareholders; and third, by inviting the management and
the shareholders of a particular corporation to re-evaluate the actual powers
of the shareholders and thus, the corporation's internal "balance of power". In
this context, the committee emphasizes that both the corporation's top
management and its supervisory directors should require the confidence of the
shareholders.
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The committee's recommendations do not contain or debate proposals for
•yrmc/ura/ reforms in the concept of the corporation, or in the Dutch corporate
law governing it (and therefore fall outside the scope of our study). That is
somewhat surprising in view of the fact that, as we have emphasized
throughout this book, conflicts of interests between those governing the
corporation and the shareholders subject to their governance are /«/?erertf in
the concept of the corporation, and greatly influence both investor-
management relations and the corporation's decision-making. It is remarkable
moreover, that the committee's report does not contain a single reference to
the extensive economic scholarship on matters of corporate organization,
including the relationships between the corporation's various constituents.
However, the "Co/w/wm/e Corporate Governance" certainly deserves credit
for having placed the delicate but important subject of conflicting interests
inside the corporation on the agenda for public debate.
A follow-up study published in December 1998, which examines whether
and to what extent the committee's recommendations have been implemented
by individual corporations listed on the Amsterdam exchange, has meanwhile
revealed that although corporations appeared generally supportive of the
recommendations, on the whole shareholders' powers vis-ä-vis corporate
management have not substantially increased in the year following their
publication. The follow-up study states (on page 370) that "(•••) severe
limitations on the influence of shareholders [on the management continue to]
exist and no fundamental changes of governance structures have been
announced in this regard. (...) Few companies decided to augment the
influence of shareholders." Accordingly, the study concludes (on page 371):
"The evidence suggests that companies felt no need to change substantially
the relations with their shareholders", /.e. to improve the latter's monitoring
opportunities.
Following these findings, in May 1999, the Dutch government announced
that it is to prepare new legislation intended to increase corporate managers'
accountability to the shareholders. Such legislation is to include, /«/er a//fl,
provisions aimed at facilitating proxy solicitation and a statutory right for
individual shareholders satisfying certain quantitative thresholds to add items
to the agenda of the corporation's general meeting of shareholders, like the
"Com/w/ss/e Cor/wra/e Governance" proposed earlier (save on a non-binding
basis). Such legislation could serve to limit managers' discretion to depart
from value maximization and to complement market disciplinary mechanisms,
without creating socially undesirable side-effects, and would therefore, in our
view, deserve Parliament's support.
The second downside effect of the corporate form ensues from statutory
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limited liability of shareholders. Limited liability does support the operation
of the corporate firm in various ways: it facilitates centralization of
management, enhances transferability of shares, thus promoting liquidity of
investments, enables risk reduction through diversification, and economizes
on transaction costs in the capital markets. However, limited liability also
creates perverse incentives to externalize business risk (/.e. the risk of failure)
to other members of society, viz. the corporation's voluntary and involuntary
creditors. As a result of limited liability, corporate decision-makers are
induced to ignore a part of the social costs of corporate activity, namely that
part which exceeds the value of the corporation's assets. This in turn may
lead them to have the corporation engage in over-risky ventures, underinvest
in care to reduce risks and take out inadequate third party liability insurance,
thus increasing the risk of loss to which parties external to the corporation are
exposed as well as their actual losses in the event of business failure.
Accordingly, limited liability permits shareholders to pursue private wealth
improvements potentially at the expense of other members of society.
In the case of publicly held corporations, the social costs of abolishing
statutory limited liability, that means, relinquishing its above-mentioned
advantages, presumably outweigh its detrimental effects to creditors. For this
class of corporations, establishment of a compensation fund to be sponsored
by the publicly held corporations may serve both to compensate limited
liability's costs to creditors and to correct the perverse incentives it creates. In
the case of closely held corporations, however, the advantages of limited
liability mentioned above are unlikely to be significant, and instead personal
liability for shareholders may be introduced to enhance social efficiency in
corporate decision-making. Consistent with our analysis, courts in the United
States and in the Netherlands invariably uphold limited liability for
shareholders of publicly held corporations, but they have imposed liability on
shareholders of closely held corporations in cases in which the limited liability
rule had resulted in the externalization of costs to creditors of the corporation
and the defending shareholders had not exploited the above-mentioned
advantages of statutory limited liability.
Given the socially undesirable effects summarized above attending the
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers and between
shareholders protected by limited liability and other members of society, the
question which almost inevitably faces policy makers is how to manage these
private conflicts of interests accompanying the corporate form of organization
in the interest of society at large. Generally, debate on the answers to this
question should, in our view, explore three potential routes (or combinations
thereof): (0 structural reform of the concept of the corporation, (ii)
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enhancement of market mechanisms operating to create incentives for socially
desirable behavior, and (iii) where such market mechanisms fail, regulation
devised to ban socially undesirable behavior, in particular, to mitigate agency
costs and to avoid externalization of business risk and in the event of failure,
costs.
As the conflicts of interests discussed in this book may be interpreted as
structural deficiencies of the corporate form, any agenda concerning the
resolution of these conflicts in the public interest should pay attention to the
structure of the corporation itself as embedded in, and governed by, the
applicable corporate law. Given the effects of market mechanisms upon
corporate behavior and the incentives they create for the individuals in the
firm, it is also impossible to ignore the significance of such mechanisms and
the prospects they offer to induce socially desirable behavior. And given both
the constraints on market forces in a world tainted by positive transaction
costs and the impact of the choices of the individuals inside the corporate firm
on other members of society and on the use of society's valuable resources,
the option of public regulation may not be ruled out either.
However, regulatory authorities should always recognize that the
corporate form is nothing but the exponent of the voluntary associative
activities of private individuals. Corporate law-makers should therefore strive
to mimic the arrangements upon which contracting individuals would
voluntarily agree, with which regulation should only interfere if required to
serve the public interest. This in turn requires that the social benefits of the
interference be carefully balanced against its social costs. With regard to the
nature of the corporate law, it follows that corporate law should be enabling
as a rule and mandatory as the exception in respect of rules devised to
preclude the externalization of costs to corporate insiders (shareholders) or
outsiders (creditors).
The strengthening of shareholder control over corporations' retained cash,
the enhancement of shareholders' monitoring abilities vis-ä-vis top
management and the abolishment of statutory limited liability for shareholders
of close corporations would all follow the route of structural reform. Yet, as
noted, a right for the shareholders to demand distribution of excessive cash in
whatever way would also enhance the disciplining of managers by the capital
markets and by the market for corporate control. Disclosure of specific
information relating to individual managers' remuneration packages would
feed information into managerial labor markets that discipline managerial
behavior. Regulation would serve to implement structural and market-oriented
reforms, and to establish the proposed compensation fund for creditors of
publicly held corporations.
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Pejovich [1981,257] has conceptualized law as a "public capital good",
costly to create but yielding a flow of benefits to society over a lengthy period
of time by enhancing the predictability of behavior. In effect, he maintains,
people are encouraged to "exploit beneficial exchange opportunities that have
long-run consequences" [1981, 258]. The same is true for the legal concept of
the corporation: it specifies the rules of the game for the relationships between
those involved in, or doing business with, a firm furnished with corporate
attributes and so it encourages private individuals to exploit long-term value-
creating opportunities of cooperative productive action in, or exchange
transactions with, the corporate firm. Any changes in the concept of the
corporation, or the law governing it, should preserve these benefits.
Finally, it is not our intention whatsoever that our book should explain
every economic aspect of the corporate form of organization or resolve the
manifold questions arising from it. Nor do we pretend that our proposed
remedies for the downside effects attending the corporate form provide full
answers to the complex problems observed; little would be less true. It is our
aspiration, however, that this study may contribute to the understanding of the
economic rationales and effects of the corporate form, help to appraise its
upside effects, and contribute to the debate concerning the appropriate legal
responses to its downside effects. Harold Demsetz [1987, 4] once wrote: "The
test of the quality of an idea is in the questions it raises". If our book, or a
single part of it, were to fulfill this test, we would be more than satisfied.

Summary in Dutch
"THE CORPORATE PARADOX" onderzoekt de relatie tussen de vennootschap
met rechtspersoonlijkheid als organisatievorm en de ondememing die met haar
is verbonden. Hierbij is vooral gekeken naar de vennootschap waarvan het
aandelenbezit over meerdere aandeelhoudcrs is gespreid en waarvan de
aandelen ter beurze zijn genoteerd of incourant worden verhandeld (aangeduid
als de "publicly held corporation"). Deze vennootschap is gedefinieerd aan de
hand van haar vier wezenskenmerken: rechtspersoonlijkheid, verdeling van
ondememingskapitaal in overdraagbare aandelen, beperkte aansprakelijkheid
van aandeelhouders, en het bestaan van een organisatorische scheiding tussen
(de functies van) bestuur van de ondememing en deelneming in het kapitaal
ervan.
"The Corporate Paradox" beoogt te inventariseren welke economische
factoren verantwoordelijk kunnen worden gehouden voor het ontstaan (en het
gebruik) van de vennootschap met haar hierboven vermelde kenmerken
(verder de "vennootschap") als methode van (bedrijfs)organisatie, en hoe deze
organisatievorm zieh verhoudt tot het functioneren van de ondememing en de
individuen die deze controleren (in het bijzonder managers en
aandeelhouders). Het is er, met andere woorden, om te doen de economische
grondslagen van de vennootschap en de repercussies van de
vennootschappelijke organisatiestructuur voor de daarmee verbonden
ondememing, nader in kaart te brengen.
De gevolgde onderzoeksmethode is die van de neo-klassieke economische
analyse, waarbij individueel en institutioneel gedrag wordt verklaard aan de
hand van maximalisatiepremissen en altematieve keuzemogehjkheden en door
identificatie van marktmechanismen waardoor keuzegedrag wordt beinvloed.
Hierbij is gebruik gemaakt van inzichten en concepten uit economische
theorieen met betrekking tot markten en ondememingen, waaronder in het
bijzonder de transactiekostennotie waarvan Coase [1937; 1960] als de
grondlegger geldt.
Het eerste deel van dit boek bespreekt de economische functies van (de
onderscheiden karakteristieken van) de vennootschap als organisatievorm. De
378 Summary
vennootschap is allereerst een middel om economische activiteit vorm te geven
in ondernemingsverband, dat wil zeggen in een organisatorisch leader
waarbinnen de werking van het (markt)prijsmechanisme is uitgeschakeld en
de aanwending van schaarse middelen niet wordt beheerst door
uitwisselingstransacties gedirigeerd door relatieve prijzen, maar door
beslissingen van de ondememingsleiding. Markt en ondememing
vertegenwoordigen alternatieve vormen van economische organisatie - zoals
Coase [1937] heeft uiteengezet -, waarbij de ondememing fungeert om de
transactiekosten die zijn verbunden aan de werking van het marktmechanisme
te vermijden indien (en zolang) de kosten van organisatie van economische
activiteit in een ondememing, geringer zijn dan de kosten van het gebruik van
de markt. De vennootschap draagt ertoe bij een dergelijke kostenbesparing
mogelijk te maken. Haar rol is hiertoe echter niet beperkt.
Alchian en Demsetz [1972] hebben de oorsprong van de
transactiekostenreductie bereikbaar door organisatie van economische
activiteit in ondernemingsverband, gezocht in het "team"-karakter van de
ondememing, waarbij de bijdrage van individuele deelnemers (de
"teamleden") aan het ondernemingsresultaat niet (althans niet eenvoudig)
onderscheidbaar is, met belonings- en lijntrekproblemen ("shirking") als
gevolg. In hun theorie kan deze problematiek op effectievere wijze worden
bestreden binnen het verband van een ondememing, door een
ondernemingsinterne "monitor" die de andere teamleden dirigeert en
disciplineert, dan door middel van marktprijzen en -transactics gestuurd door
vraag en aanbod. Vanuit dit perspectief kan de "rechtspersoonlijkheid"
waarmee de vennootschapsvorm de ondememing toerust, worden beschouwd
als de erkenning door het recht van de ondememing als "team", welke haar in
Staat steh als eenheid te voorzien in de behoefte aan een monitor.
De uitgifte van aandelen die de houder aanspraak geven op de door de
ondememing behaalde baten nädat de overige teamleden voor hun inbreng zijn
gecompenseerd (en die daarmee de "residual claim" op de inkomsten en activa
van de ondememing belichamen), strekken ertoe de monitor te motiveren om
het teamresultaat te optimaliseren teneinde zo zijn inkomsten als
aandeelhouder te vergroten. De overdraagbaarheid van aandelen dient als
uitweg uit besluitvormingsproblemen bij verschillen van inzicht waar de
funetie van monitor over meerdere aandeelhouders is verdeeld, als instrument
om opvolgingsproblemen te beperken met instandhouding van de
ondememing, en als middel om de adequate vervulling van de monitor-funetie
op längere termijn te waarborgen, respectievelijk te bevorderen. Deze laatste
funetie blijkt in het bijzonder waar verhandelbaarheid van aandelen een
actieve overnamemarkt (de markt voor "corporate control" c.q.
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vennootschappelijk bestuur) mogelijk maakt, die exteme, superieure, monitors
in staat stelt de monitor-functie te verwerven door aankoop van (een
meerderheid van) de aandelen.
De scheiding tussen aandeelhouderschap en bestuur, die delegatie van
monitor-bevoegdheden door aandeelhouders behelst, vormt vooreerst een
antwoord op hoge kosten van besluitvorming, complexiteit van
besluitvormingsprocessen en lijntrekproblemen tussen individuele
aandeelhouders die zouden resulteren als een veelheid van aandeelhouder-
monitors met de dagelijkse leiding van de ondememing zou zijn belast. Deze
scheiding stelt aandeelhouders bovendien in staat gebruik te maken van de
diensten van gespecialiseerde managers waar die een hogere opbrengst van de
"residual claim" kunnen genereren dan zijzelf, en bevordert aldus specialisatie
in bestuurstaken door personen die daarin een comparatief voordeel hebben,
ten gunste van de effectiviteit van het bestuur en daarmee de ondememing (het
team) als geheel.
De wettelijk beperkte aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders die
aandeelhouders, na volstorting van de aandelen, ontslaat van
aansprakelijkheid met betrekking tot de verplichtingen van de vennootschap,
limiteert hun risico indien zij zieh zouden onthouden van actieve bemoeienis
met de dagelijkse leiding van de ondememing. De regel van beperkte
aansprakelijkheid beperkt hierdoor de noodzaak voor individuele
aandeelhouders om te participeren in het bestuur van de ondememing, draagt
aldus bij aan de beteugeling van besluitvormings- en bestuurskosten en
moedigt aandeelhouders aan om gebruik te maken van de diensten van
gespecialiseerde, effectievere, managers.
De beperkte aansprakelijkheid-regel beperkt bovendien het nadeel van
lijntrekken door individuele aandeelhouder-monitors voor andere
aandeelhouders. Beperkte aansprakelijkheid bevordert voorts de
verhandelbaarheid van aandelen, de overdraagbaarheid daarvan aan
superieure monitors en - hiermee - de werking van de overnamemarkt als
middel ter bevordering van effectief ondememingsbestuur, doordat individuele
aandeelhouders onder deze regel, anders dan bij onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid,
geen eigen financieel belang hebben bij de vermogenspositie van andere
aandeelhouders (waarvan hun aansprakelijkheidsrisico bij onbeperkte
aansprakelijkheid mede afhankelijk zou zijn), en doordat hun belang bij de
vermogenspositie van de vennootschap zelf is beperkt tot de waarde van hun
investering. In beide opzichten reduceert beperkte aansprakelijkheid de
prikkels van individuele aandeelhouders tot verwerving van informatie, en
hierdoor tevens de transactiekosten (informatiekosten) verband houdende met
verwerving en bezit van aandelen, terwijl beperkte aansprakelijkheid
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bovendien de behoefte aan overdrachtsrestricties ter beperking van het risico
van de achterblijvende aandeelhouders wegneemt.
Niet alleen vanuit het perspectief van het beheer van de onderneming, maar
ook vanuit het gezichtspunt van haar behoefte aan kapitaal ter financiering
van kapitaalintensieve productieprocessen, verwezenlijking van
schaalvoordelen en venverving van ondernemingsspecifieke productie-
middelen, kunnen de onderscheiden kenmerken van de vennootschapsstructuur
worden verklaard. Uitgifte van aandelen stelt de ondememing in staat kapitaal
aan te trekken waar haar financieringsbehoefte de middelen van haar
oprichter(s) en door de onderneming zelf gegenereerde kasoverschotten
overstijgt, en waar haar mogelijkheden tot verkrijging van krediet beperkt of
de kosten daarvan prohibitief zijn. Overdraagbaarheid van aandelen stelt
aandeelhouders in staat hun investering eenvoudig te gelde te maken, zonder
dat de onderneming daartoe behoeft te worden geliquideerd, en biedt hen
bescherming tegen verlies van hogere rendementsvooruitzichten elders (zgn.
"opportunity losses").
Rechtspersoonlijkheid stelt de vennootschap in staat zelfstandig eigenaar te
zijn van de productiemiddelen waarin het bijeengebrachte kapitaal is
geinvesteerd en te dien aanzien rechtshandelingen te verrichten, en bespaart
hierdoor transactiekosten (in vergelijking met de situatie waarin de eigendom
van productiemiddelen zou hebben te berusten bij individuele investeerders).
Rechtspersoonlijkheid vereenvoudigt bovendien het bijeenhouden van
productiemiddelen als een onderneming, bevordert hierdoor de continuiteit van
de onderneming en het behoud van "going concem"-waarde, en draagt zo bij
aan haar attractiviteit voor investeerders en aldus aan haar vermögen om
kapitaal aan te trekken.
De scheiding tussen bestuur en aandeelhouderschap vervolgens bevordert
niet alleen het rendement op aandeelhouders' investering door te besparen op
besluitvormingskosten en door specialisatievoordelen te benutten, maar stelt
aandeelhouders bovendien in staat hun geinvesteerde vermögen over
verschillende ondememingen te spreiden (diversificatie) en daardoor hun
risico te beperken, waardoor (wederom) het aanbod van risicodragend
kapitaal wordt gestimuleerd.
Ook de beperkte aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders kan worden
verklaard vanuit het perspectief van de financiering van de onderneming. Dit
boek betoogt dat de betekenis van de beperkte aansprakelijkheid-regel in dit
verband, eerder dan als tegemoetkoming aan risicomijdende investeerders,
hoofdzakelijk moet worden gezocht in een reductie van transactiekosten in
kapitaalmarkten (daarbij inbegrepen kredietmarkten), het vvegnemen van de
behoefte aan beperkingen in de overdraagbaarheid van aandelen aan
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verkrijgers met minder vermögen dan de vervreemder en, hierdoor, het
vergroten van de hquiditeit van investeringen in aandelen, en tenslotte in het
faciliteren van diversificatie als methode voor beperking van
investeringsrisico's. In al deze opzichten versterkt de beperkte
aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders waarmee de vennootschap de
onderneming toerust, haar vermögen om kapitaal aan te trekken door
bevordering van het aanbod, en heeft een neerwaarts effect op de kosten van
kapitaalverwerving voor de onderneming.
Het tweede deel van "The Corporate Paradox" bespreekt het belangenconflict
tussen aandeelhouders en bestuurders dat gepaard gaat met de
organisatorische scheiding tussen aandeelhouderschap (risicodragend
kapitaal) en bestuur (management) die is belichaamd in de structuur van de
vennootschap. Dit conflict ontstaat waar het belang van aandeelhouders
primair is gelegen in maximalisatie van de waarde van hun "residual claim"
op de inkomsten en activa van de onderneming, en dat van bestuurders
(managers) in maximalisatie van hun persoonlijk nut (welbevinden). Deze
belangentegenstelling is verantwoordelijk voor het bestaan van "agency
costs": de kosten die zijn gemoeid met het beperken van afwijkingen van het
aandeelhoudersbelang, waaronder in het bijzonder de kosten voor
aandeelhouders van het observeren en corrigeren van gedragingen van
bestuurders, en de kosten van niet-verhinderde afwijkingen van het
aandeelhoudersbelang.
Er zijn verschallende economische mechanismen die opereren ter
beteugeling van het hierboven genoemde belangenconflict: mededinging in de
markten voor producten en productiemiddelen (inclusief kapitaalmarkten),
zgn. "incentive" contracten voor managers (waaronder de verlening door de
vennootschap van aandelenbonussen en optierechten op aandelen), de
overnamemarkt (de markt voor "corporate control") en de arbeidsmarkt voor
managers (zowel buiten als binnen de onderneming). Dit boek betoogt dat
geen van deze mechanismen evenwel bij machte is om de mogelijkheid dat
managers hun particuliere eigenbelang (nutsmaximalisatie) laten prevaleren
boven de belangen van de aandeelhouders (waardemaximalisatie), te
elimineren.
Mededinging in de markten voor producten en productiemiddelen laat deze
mogelijkheid als zodanig onverlet, "incentive" contracten voor managers
absorberen niet alleen een gedeelte van de inkomsten van de onderneming (ten
laste van de aandeelhouders) maar het effect ervan is bovendien beperkt door,
onder meer, de wet van het afhemend grensnut van geld, de werking van de
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markten voor "corporate control" en de arbeidsmarkt voor managers is
begrensd door de aanwezigheid van betekenisvolle transactiekosten, terwijl de
vorming van kasoverschotten matig renderende ondernemingen in staat kan
stellen om beter geleide ondernemingen over te nemen waardoor de werking
van de overnamemarkt wordt geperverteerd. De aanwezigheid van positieve
transactiekosten, gevoegd bij de spreiding van het door individuele
aandeelhouders gelnvesteerde vermögen over een veelheid van ondernemingen
en hiermee gepaard gaande "incentive"- en lijntrekproblemen aan hun zijde,
belemmeren bovendien een actief optreden van aandeelhouders tegen
managers die hun belangen verzaken, respectievelijk er niet in slagen de
waarde van hun "residual claim" te maximaliseren.
Het bovenstaande wijst op het feilen van private mechanismen (dat wil
zeggen, de markt) als middel om het belangenconflict tussen aandeelhouders
en bestuurders op te lossen, respectievelijk te overbruggen. Er zijn in beginsel
drie wegen waarlangs managers, hiervan uitgaande, kunnen worden
gestimuleerd tot een grotere getrouwheid aan het aandeelhoudersbelang: (i)
door versterking van marktmechanismen die van invloed (kunnen) zijn op hun
gedrag, in het bijzonder de arbeidsmarkt voor managers, de overnamemarkt
en de kapitaalmarkt, (ii) door vergroting van de mogelijkheden voor
aandeelhouders om het handelen van managers te sturen c.q. te corrigeren, en
(iii) door rechtsregels die managers persoonlijk aansprakelijk houden voor
veronachtzaming van de belangen van aandeelhouders.
Bij versterking van de markt kan worden gedacht aan een verplichting voor
vennootschappen om de honorering van individuele bestuurders openbaar te
maken in hun jaarrekening, welke informatie (en haar verhouding tot het
aandeelhoudersrendement van de betrokken onderneming) zowel betekenis zal
hebben voor de arbeidsmarkt voor managers als voor de overnamemarkt, aan
het wegnemen van obstakels voor het functioneren van de markt voor
"corporate control" (waartoe in Nederland in ieder geval behoort de wettelijk
voorgeschreven structuurregeling waar deze de zeggenschap over benoeming
en ontslag van de ondernemingsleiding wegneemt van de aandeelhouders), en
aan het toekennen aan de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders van een
bevoegdheid om uitbetaling van winsten en (vrije) reserves te vragen, zodat
het management voor de financiering van nieuwe projecten zal zijn
aangewezen op een positief oordeel van de kapitaalmarkt.
Bij vergroting van de mogelijkheden voor aandeelhouders tot beinvloeding
van het gedrag van bestuurders kan (voorts) worden gedacht aan een
agendarecht voor (in de Statuten van de vennootschap omschreven)
minderheidsaandeelhouders, een soortgelijk recht voor aandeelhouders om
zelfstandig kandidaten te nomineren voor vacatures in de raad van
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commissarissen, en een recht voor de aandeelhouders om de instelling van een
commissie uit de aandeelhoudersvergadering te verlangen waaraan het bestuur
verantwoording zal zijn verschuldigd voor bepaalde beslissingen (een en ander
nader te omschrijven in de Statuten).
Met betrekking tot de mogelijkheid van persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid van
bestuurders tenslotte betoogt dit boek dat aan deze mogelijkheid dusdanige
nadelen zijn verbonden (waaronder hogere salariseisen en een geringer aanbod
van gekwalificeerde bestuurders, alsmede overmatig risicomijdend gedrag),
die bovendien slechts tot op zekere hoogte door verzekering kunnen worden
ondervangen, dat zij dient te worden beperkt tot gevallen van fraude en
(andere) vormen van manifest wanbeleid, waarbij de rechter de gedragingen
van bestuurders slechts betrekkelijk marginaal zal dienen te toetsen. Inderdaad
blijft persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders naar Amerikaans en
Nederlands recht, die deze mogelijkheid beide kennen, in hoofdzaak beperkt
tot dergeüjke uitzonderingsgevallen.
Het Amerikaanse "common law" heeft hiertoe de "business judgment rule"
ontwikkeld, die bestuurders (inclusief "non-executive directors") vrijpleit van
aansprakelijkheid voor de gevolgen van beslissingen te goeder trouw genomen
en met argumenten onderbouwd, mits de betrokken bestuurder zieh vöör het
nemen van de betrokken beslissing behoorlijk had geinformeerd omtrent het
onderwerp ervan. De Nederlandse rechtspraak bereikt een soortgelijk resultaat
door het vereiste dat voor persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders
jegens de vennootschap wegens tekortschieten in hun taakvervulling, aan hen
in ieder geval een "ernstig verwijt" moet kunnen worden gemaakt. De
benadering in beide rechtsstelsels draagt ertoe bij dat persoonlijke
aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders beperkt blijft tot die gevallen, waarin het
nadeel voor aandeelhouders ten gevolge van het gedrag van bestuurders, de
beoogde bate van delegatie van bestuursbevoegdheden aan een gespecialiseerd
management (in het bijzonder een effectiever bestuur van de ondememing
tegen geringere kosten dan bij bestuur door de aandeelhouders zelf) overtreft.
Het derde deel van dit boek gaat in op de effecten van de wettelijk beperkte
aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders op het gedrag van de ondememing en
haar leiding. Als gevolg van de regel van beperkte aansprakelijkheid is
aandeelhouders' risico beperkt tot de omvang van hun investering.
Ondernemingsverliezen die dit bedrag overtreffen zijn voor hen daarom in
beginsel slechts van belang tot het bedrag van hun investering. Hetzelfde geldt
voor risico's verbonden aan activiteiten ontplooid door de ondememing, in het
bijzonder het risico dat zij niet aan haar (betalings)verplichtingen jegens
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derden zal kunnen voldoen: een dergelijk risico heeft voor aandeelhoudcrs
slechts betekenis tot het bedrag van hun investering, omdat hun potentiele
persoonlijke vermogensverlies tot dit bedrag is beperkt.
Gevolg hiervan is dat vanuit het gezichtspunt van het belang van de
aandeeihouders, de ondememing in haar besluitvorming de verwachte
maatschappelijke kosten van haar activiteiten, respectievelijk de risico's
daarvan voor derden, slechts zal hoeven te betrekken tot het maximale bedrag
dat aandeeihouders kunnen verspeien. Mogelijke verliezen (risico's) die de
marktwaarde van de activa in de ondememing overstijgen, zullen daarom in
beginsel irrelevant zijn voor haar besluitvorming. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat de
ondememing in verhouding tot de totale maatschappelijke kosten (risico's)
van haar activiteiten, bovenmatig investeert in projecten met een hoog
aansprakelijkheids- c.q. insolventierisico en benedenmatig in risicobeperkende
maatregelen (zoals veiligheidsvoorzieningen) en in de aankoop van
aansprakelijkheidsverzekering, gegeven dat de beperkte aansprakelijkheid-
regel als zodanig aandeeihouders reeds bevnjdt van aansprakelijkheden
rüstend op de ondememing (de vennootschap) en hiermee van het risico dat
deze laatste niet zal kunnen voldoen aan haar daaruit voortvloeiende
verplichtingen.
Het bovenstaande ware slechts anders indien de ondememing (en hiermee
onrechtstreeks haar aandeeihouders) zou dienen te betalen voor het risico dat,
via de beperkte aansprakelijkheid-regel, wordt afgewenteld op derden: indien
schuldeisers steevast een premie aan de ondememing zouden berekenen gelijk
aan het risico van onverhaalbaarheid van hun vordering ten gevolge van de
aansprakelijkheidsbeperking, zou zij, door het bedrag van zodanige premies,
worden gedwongen om het volledige risico van haar activiteiten voor derden
in ogenschouw te nemen bij haar besluitvorming, en niet slechts het risico
voor, respectievelijk het mogelijke verlies van, haar aandeeihouders. Er zijn
echter twee factoren die hieraan in de weg staan.
Op de eerste plaats kunnen derden onvrijwillig risico lopen ten gevolge van
de activiteiten van de ondememing en ten opzichte van haar niet in een
onderhandelingssituatie verkeren, zoals slachtoffers van aan de ondememing
(de vennootschap) toerekenbare onrechtmatige gedragingen en anderen jegens
wie zij schuldenaar is krachtens wettelijke verplichting, bijvoorbeeld de
Belastingdienst en de bedrijfsvereniging (zgn. onvrijwillige crediteuren) Op
de tweede plaats kunnen obstakels in de relevante markten, in het bijzonder
transactiekosten, informatieproblemen en ongelijke machtsposities, ook waar
wel onderhandehngen mogelijk (zouden) zijn eraan in de weg staan dat de
ondememing een risicoconforme premie zal dienen te betalen voor het risico
dat wordt afgewenteld op derden.
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Vervanging van de beperkte aansprakelijkheid-regel door een regime van
onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid zou (de leiding van) de onderneming er
ongetwijfeld toe kunnen aanzetten om de volledige maatschappelijke kosten
(risico's) van de activiteiten van de onderneming in overweging te nemen bij
haar besluitvorming, omdat aandeelhouders hiervoor nu met hun gehele
vermögen zouden hebben in te staan. Hierdoor zouden de reele
maatschappelijke kosten (risico's) verbonden aan ondernemingsactiviteit
worden weerspiegeld in aandelenprijzen, zodat maximalisering van de waarde
van de aandelen nu tevens vermijding van excessieve c.q. inefficiente risico's
zou vereisen.
De nadelen van onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders zouden
voor de vennootschap met een veelheid van aandeelhouders en een liquide
markt voor haar aandelen, echter hoogstwaarschijnlijk groter zijn dan de
beoogde bate van een grotere evenwichtigheid tussen de risico's en
maatschappelijke kosten van ondernemingsactiviteit enerzijds en het
verwachte gewin voor de aandeelhouders anderzijds. Onbeperkte
aansprakelijkheid zou de eerder besproken functies van de beperkte
aansprakelijkheid-regel doorkruisen en derhalve waarschijnlijk leiden tot
hogere besluitvormingskosten door grotere bemoeienis van aandeelhouders
met de leiding van de ondememing, aanleiding geven tot hogere
transactiekosten in aandelen- en kredietmarkten ten gevolge van extra
informatieverwerving door aandeelhouders respectievelijk crediteuren, een
behoefte creeren aan restrieties op aandelenoverdrachten aan verkrijgers met
minder vermögen dan de vervreemder - waardoor de liquiditeit van
investeringen in aandelen zou worden aangetast -, en tenslotte diversificatie
als Strategie ter beperking van investeringsrisico's nagenoeg onmogelijk
maken. Als gevolg van een en ander zou onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid van
aandeelhouders zowel de functies van de vennootschap met betrekking tot het
beheer van de onderneming, met inbegrip van haar bevordering van
specialisatie in de bestuursfunctie en de daarmee gepaard gaande besparing in
besluitvormingskosten, als de betekenis van de vennootschap voor de
financiering van ondernemingsactiviteit ondermijnen.
Een regime van />ro rato aansprakelijkheid, waarbij aandeelhouders
(slechts) voor een percentage gelijk aan het percentage van hun aandelen in
het totale geplaatste kapitaal van de vennootschap aansprakelijk zouden zijn,
bepleit door Hansmann en Kraakman [1991] ten aanzien van onrechtmatige
daden toerekenbaar aan de vennootschap, zou waarschijnlijk in grote lijnen
vergelijkbare effecten hebben. Bovendien is twijfelachtig - zoals Grundfest
[1992] heeft uiteengezet - of een dergelijke /vo ra/o regel in de praktijk effect
zou sorteren: denkbaar is dat internationale kapitaalmarkten wegen zouden
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ontwikkelen, door creatief gebruik van alternatieve financieringsmethoden en
derivaten, gespecialiseerde investeringsfondsen en jurisdicties waarin pro rata
aansprakelijkheid niet of bezwaarlijk lean worden geeffectueerd, waarlangs
onbeperlcte aansprakelijkheid zou worden omzeild en <afe f^crcfo beperkte
aansprakelijkheid zou worden gecreeerd. In dit geval zou /?ro rata
aansprakelijkheid hoofdzakelijk leiden tot een verhoging van transactiekosten
in kapitaalmarkten, ten detrimente van het functioneren van dergelijke
markten en het vermögen van de ondememing om kapitaal aan te trekken.
Een alternatief zou zijn om vennootschappen te verplichten tot betaling van
een risicoconforme premie aan een onafhankelijk fonds, waaruit onbetaalde
crediteuren in geval van faillissement van de vennootschap zouden kunnen
worden gecompenseerd. Dergelijke premies zouden de vennootschap, met
inbegrip van de aandeelhouders, dwingen om in haar besluitvorming het
volledige risico te betrekken dat door de activiteiten van de ondememing,
gegeven de beperkte aansprakelijkheid-regel, voor derden zou ontstaan.
Een en ander ligt anders ten aanzien van de besloten vorm van de
vennootschap, gekenmerkt door een beperkt aantal aandeelhouders, die
doorgaans tevens bestuurstaken vervullen, en het ontbreken van een liquide
markt voor haar aandelen. Voor deze vennootschapsvorm vervult de beperkte
aansprakelijkheid van aandeelhouders voornamelijk een functie als premie
voor verschaffers van risicodragend kapitaal (dikwijls gecombineerd met
management) aan ondernemingen, niet een organisatie-economische functie
vergelijkbaar met haar rol in de "publicly held corporation".
In overeenstemming met de hierboven samengevatte benadering zijn
gevallen waarin aandeelhouders, in weerwil van hun wettelijk beperkte
aansprakelijkheid aansprakelijk zijn gehouden voor schulden van de
vennootschap, zowel in de Amerikaanse als in de Nederlandse rechtsspraak
beperkt tot vennootschappen in de hiervoor bedoelde besloten vorm. Ofschoon
de gehanteerdc juridische doctrines in beide rechtsstelsels verschillen, wordt
aansprakelijkheid hoofdzakelijk opgelegd waar de regel van beperkte
aansprakelijkheid door de betrokken aandeelhouder verwijtbaar is gebruikt om
kosten af te vventelen op crediteuren. Materiele maatstaf hierbij is, in beide
rechtstelsels, zeggenschap en actieve bemoeienis van de aandeelhouder over,
respectievelijk met, het beleid van de ondememing, gecombineerd met
tekortschieten zijnerzijds in enige zorg- c.q. betamelijkheidsverplichting met
betrekking tot (de belangen van) de schuldeisers van de ondememing.
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of limited liability of shareholders, two features which are typical of the corporate
concept. Fina/iy, this book surveys, from a predominantly economic perspective,
legal remedies that United States and Dutch law have developed in response to
certain inefficiencies to which these features may give rise.
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